Anderson and Abbett

664 December 17, 2025 No. 1082

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Marriage of

Bonita Lynn ANDERSON,

Petitioner-Respondent,

and

David Allen ABBETT,

Respondent-Appellant.

Washington County Circuit Court

23DR14541; A184558

Maalik M. Summer, Judge.

Submitted October 15, 2025.

R. Brady Williams filed the brief for appellant.

Daniel S. Margolin and Margolin Family Law filed the

brief for respondent.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and

Hellman, Judge.

HELLMAN, J.

Affirmed.

Cite as 345 Or App 664 (2025) 665

HELLMAN, J.

In this domestic relations case, husband appeals

from a general judgment of dissolution of marriage, raising

three assignments of error. In his first assignment, hus-

band challenges the trial court’s decision to enforce a mar-

ital settlement agreement executed by the parties in 2019,

arguing that the trial court evaluated the agreement under

the incorrect legal standard. In his second assignment,

husband argues that the trial court failed to consider an

oral reconciliation agreement from 2020, which in his view

superseded the 2019 agreement. Finally, in his third assign-

ment, husband argues that the trial court erred in enforc-

ing the marital settlement agreement without conducting a

trial on the merits. We reject husband’s second assignment

of error as unpreserved, and we further conclude that the

trial court did not err by granting wife’s motion to enforce

the agreement and declining to set a trial on the merits.1 We

therefore affirm.

We review the trial court’s decision to enforce a mar-

ital settlement agreement for an abuse of discretion. Brown

and Brown, 259 Or App 618, 624-25, 315 P3d 422 (2013),

rev den, 355 Or 142 (2014). A trial court’s exercise of discre-

tion must comport with the applicable legal framework and

lie within the range of legally permissible outcomes. Olson

and Olson, 218 Or App 1, 16, 178 P3d 272 (2008). In con-

ducting our review, we are bound by the trial court’s express

and implicit factual findings, if they are supported by any

evidence in the record. Haggerty and Haggerty, 261 Or App

159, 161, 322 P3d 1101 (2014). With that standard of review

in mind, we briefly state the relevant facts.

The parties married in 2013. In 2019, husband

filed a petition for dissolution. That same year, the parties

1

Specifically, on the second assignment of error, wife testified that, in 2020,

after husband filed a petition for dissolution, the parties again reconciled and

“came up with a workable different plan” to sell their respective houses and pur-

chase a house together in central Oregon, although the parties did not “execute

a new marital settlement agreement” at that time. Husband argues, for the first

time on appeal, that that “plan” was a binding reconciliation agreement that effec-

tively rescinded the 2019 marital settlement agreement. Because husband failed

to preserve that argument for our review, we reject his second assignment without

further discussion. See ORAP 5.45(1) (“No matter claimed as error will be consid-

ered on appeal unless the claim of error was preserved in the lower court[.]”).

666 Anderson and Abbett

negotiated and executed a marital settlement agreement.

They then reconciled, and husband dismissed the petition.

At the time of dismissal, the marital settlement agreement

was not incorporated into a judgment or otherwise placed

on the record. In 2023, wife petitioned for dissolution, placed

the 2019 marital settlement agreement into the record, and

moved to enforce it. As relevant, that agreement provided

that, in the event of “any future dissolution,” wife would

receive $150,000 from husband’s 401(k) retirement account

and husband would pay wife $850 per month in mainte-

nance spousal support for a period of three years. After a

contested hearing, the trial court granted wife’s motion and

incorporated that agreement into a dissolution judgment,

which is the subject of the present appeal.

In his first assignment of error, defendant relies

on our decision in Brown to argue that the trial court erred

in granting wife’s motion because it evaluated whether the

agreement was enforceable under ORS 107.104, when it was

instead required to evaluate whether the agreement was

equitable.

Under ORS 107.104, a trial court must enforce

“a judgment incorporating a marital settlement agreement”

unless doing so “would violate the law or would clearly con-

travene public policy.” A trial court may, in its discretion,

decline to enforce a settlement agreement that has not been

incorporated into a judgment; however, given “the strong

policy favoring settlements,” such agreements are presump-

tively enforceable. Haggerty, 261 Or App at 166-67 (inter-

nal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “where there is

a validly executed settlement agreement between the par-

ties, the court must evaluate the terms of that agreement

and should enforce [it] if [it is] within the range of what is

just and equitable under the circumstances.” Id. at 167; see

also ORS 107.105(1)(d), (f) (providing that a trial court may

award spousal support “as may be just and equitable” and

divide property “as may be just and proper in all the circum-

stances”). In its evaluation, “a court should not substitute its

own judgment of what is ‘just and proper’ for the parties’ val-

idly executed arm’s-length settlement agreement.” Brown,

259 Or App at 627. Applying those principles, in Brown, we

Cite as 345 Or App 664 (2025) 667

concluded that a trial court incorrectly evaluated whether a

settlement agreement that had not been incorporated into a

judgment was contrary to public policy under ORS 107.104,

and because the record did not otherwise reflect that the

trial court independently evaluated whether the agreement

was just and equitable, we vacated and remanded the trial

court’s judgment. Id. at 628-29.

We conclude that this case is distinguishable. Unlike

Brown, the arguments and evidence presented at the hearing

on wife’s motion focused on whether the marital settlement

agreement was just and equitable. Specifically, at the hear-

ing, wife argued that the agreement was “just and proper”

and that “[e]quitable does not mean * * * it has to be a 50/50

division.” Husband argued that, because the agreement had

not been incorporated into a judgment under ORS 107.104,

the trial court was required to deny wife’s motion and pro-

ceed to a trial so that it could then determine whether the

agreement was “just and proper.” The trial court correctly

rejected husband’s argument, explaining that marital settle-

ment agreements are intended to “short-circuit” the litiga-

tion process and that ORS 107.104 did not “prohibit[ ] this

[c]ourt from” enforcing the agreement. See Patterson and

Kanaga, 242 Or App 452, 469, 255 P3d 634, rev den, 351

Or 216 (2011) (“Oregon law encourages [marital settlement]

agreements, both to decrease litigation and to remove disso-

lution proceedings from the adversarial process.”). The trial

court then asked whether the parties were prepared “to pres-

ent evidence for me to make a determination about whether

* * * [the agreement] is so outrageous that it’s not enforce-

able” and further noted that “it doesn’t have to be equal.”

The parties proceeded to present evidence. Husband

and wife both testified and generally described their work

histories, wife’s domestic contributions, as well as the cou-

ple’s financial arrangements during the marriage and their

respective incomes, monthly expenses, and retirement sav-

ings. Wife also introduced annual account statements for

husband’s 401(k), and husband introduced a demonstrative

exhibit totaling contributions and investment gains to his

401(k) on a yearly basis during the marriage. In ruling to

enforce the marital settlement agreement, the trial court

668 Anderson and Abbett

explained that whether the division of assets and support

award were equitable was “relevant,” that “wife’s resources

are a bit more limited” than husband’s, and that “[a]n agree-

ment need not be exactly what would be ordered by this

[c]ourt in the event of a dissolution.” Although the trial court

also explained that the marital settlement agreement did

not contravene public policy, in context, that reference can

be fairly understood as referencing the state policy favoring

the enforcement of marital settlement agreements that fall

within the range of what is just and equitable. On that record,

we conclude that the trial court permissibly exercised its dis-

cretion to enforce the marital settlement agreement and that

its ruling comported with the governing legal framework as

articulated in Brown.

Turning briefly to husband’s third assignment of

error, we conclude that it does not provide a basis for rever-

sal. Husband argues that the trial court erred by denying

his request to set a trial on the merits. Husband asserts

that the parties had not exchanged full discovery at the

time that the trial court ruled on the enforceability of the

marital settlement agreement and that a trial was needed

to develop the relevant facts.2

Under ORS 107.105(1)(f)(F), a trial court must

require the parties to fully disclose their assets to assist the

court in making a just property division. In the context of a

prejudgment motion to enforce a settlement agreement, “the

parties are entitled to discovery under ORS 107.105(1)(f)(F)

that is relevant to the issue of whether the division of mari-

tal assets effected by the agreement is within a range that is

just and proper in all the circumstances.” Pollock and Pollock,

357 Or 575, 591-92, 355 P3d 117 (2015). Consequently, where

2

Husband also argues that the trial court could not properly rule on wife’s pre-

judgment motion to enforce the marital settlement agreement because the parties

had not yet filed and served on each other a statement listing all marital assets

and a Uniform Support Declaration as required by UTCR 8.010(3) and (4). Before

the trial court, husband did not raise or develop any argument as to whether the

Uniform Trial Court Rules limit a court’s authority to rule on a prejudgment motion

to enforce a settlement agreement. Accordingly, husband failed to preserve his argu-

ment for appellate review. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000)

(“[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection

that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with

enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correc-

tion is warranted.”).

Cite as 345 Or App 664 (2025) 669

a marital settlement agreement does not indicate whether

the parties have fully disclosed their assets, a trial court

is obligated to resolve any pending discovery requests or

motions to compel before deciding whether to enforce that

settlement agreement. Id. at 592-94. Here, there were no

pending motions to compel production, and the parties rep-

resented to the trial court that neither party had requested

discovery that was not submitted. Moreover, the marital set-

tlement agreement itself expressly provided that the parties

had fully disclosed their assets. The trial court therefore did

not err by declining to set a trial.

Affirmed.