The opinion
12/22/2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs September 3, 2025
ASHLEY HESTER AYERS v. JOHN ROBERT AYERS
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County
No. 74CC5-2021-CV-300 Kathryn Wall Olita, Judge
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No. M2024-00813-COA-R3-CV
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This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in
assigning the entire amount dissipated to Husband. Husband further assigns error to the
trial court’s classification of an insurance settlement stemming from the theft of Husband’s
pre-marital vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
as modified by this Opinion.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed as
Modified
VALERIE L. SMITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.
Brenton H. Lankford and Elizabeth A. Garrett, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,
John Robert Ayers.
Lewis A. Williams, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ashley Hester Ayers.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are largely undisputed. The parties, Appellee Ashley Hester
Ayers (“Wife”) and Appellant John Robert Ayers (“Husband”) were married on May 6,
2017, and have two minor children together. On November 10, 2021, Wife filed a
complaint for divorce from Husband in the Robertson County Circuit Court. Wife alleged
irreconcilable differences, inappropriate marital conduct, and cruel and inhumane
treatment as grounds for divorce. Wife further alleged that the inappropriate marital
conduct perpetrated by Husband rendered further cohabitation unsafe and improper.
Husband filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce on December 13, 2021. Husband
admitted to verbally abusing Wife and further alleged that Wife was guilty of physical and
verbal abuse rendering cohabitation improper. The trial was conducted over five days—
November 28 and 29, 2023; January 23 and 24, 2024; and March 6, 2024.
As of the last date of trial, the parties had been married for almost seven years,
though the parties separated in November of 2021. The record indicates that the parties
enjoyed a high standard of living during the marriage. Over the course of the marriage, the
parties accumulated substantial assets including the marital residence and farmland, the
real property on which Husband’s business operates, multiple vehicles, bank accounts,
retirement assets, and farm equipment. Husband is a veterinarian whose practice, Root
Animal Clinic (the “Clinic”), is primarily dedicated to surgery. Husband’s gross monthly
income is $77,500.00. Wife is a Certified Public Accountant who earns $16,584.43 per
month.
Husband purchased the Clinic before the marriage for $680,000.00 in 2016. The
trial court found that shortly after the marriage, the parties paid off the remaining
$612,808.00 business loan using both Wife’s separate premarital funds as well as marital
earnings. Wife also used assets from the sale of her premarital condominium to eliminate
$205,000.00 of Husband’s student loan obligations. The Clinic increased in value during
the marriage and as of December 31, 2022, it was valued at $2,136,000.00 excluding
Husband’s personal goodwill. The trial court found that the appreciation of the business
constituted marital property, though the underlying enterprise remained Husband’s
separate asset.1 This is in part due to Wife’s contributions to Husband’s student loan
obligations and payment of portions of the loan on the Clinic.
Prior to the separation, Wife’s paycheck was routinely deposited into a joint banking
account, and Husband transferred funds into that account “frequently” and “as needed” to
cover recurring marital obligations. After the separation in November 2021, the court found
that Husband ceased making consistent deposits yet began withdrawing substantial sums
from the marital bank account. For example, after the parties separated, Husband wrote
checks to himself totaling $507,031 that were not deposited into any disclosed bank
account and for which no marital purpose was provided. The court contrasted this with the
parties’ pre-separation habits, finding that in similar situations such checks were typically
deposited into identifiable marital accounts. Though Husband testified that these amounts
represented tithing to local churches and cash charitable giving, subpoenas issued to the
churches he identified revealed no donations from him, and he claimed no charitable
deductions on the parties’ 2022 tax filings. The court further found that the parties had not
1
Specifically, the trial court noted that “[i]t would appear that Husband agrees that the increase in
the value of the practice during the marriage may properly be considered as marital if the Court determines
that Wife substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.” The trial court found that Wife
substantially contributed to the Clinic’s preservation and appreciation.
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historically engaged in significant cash tithing during the marriage. Ultimately, the trial
court found Husband’s testimony “that nearly half the unaccounted-for checks were cash
tithes” not credible.
The trial court also found that Husband’s credit card spending “increased
exponentially” after the separation, including more than $12,000 in Nashville Predators
hockey tickets and approximately $15,000 in University of Tennessee football tickets.
Husband testified that the tickets represented a business investment to give as gifts to other
veterinarians who refer patients to the Clinic, which he previously did on a smaller scale.
Ultimately, the trial court found that Husband’s purchase of tickets used as gifts for
referrals, while ill-advised, was a business expense not entirely atypical of the marriage.
Husband’s increased spending post-separation also included $5,140.03 in dining
and entertainment expenses, some associated with individuals he dated after the parties
separated. Three of Husband’s four post-separation extra marital partners testified to
having been taken on dates and outings during May to September 2022 by Husband. The
court noted that these expenditures bore no marital purpose. After considering the
evidence, the trial court determined that Husband dissipated a total of $512,171.03 in
marital funds, comprised of the unreconciled checks and additional discretionary post-
separation spending. The court further found that Husband failed to meet “his burden of
producing evidence to show that all of his post-separation expenditures were appropriate.”
In distributing the marital estate, the trial court assigned the full dissipation amount
to Husband. To effectuate an equitable distribution of the marital estate, Wife received an
additional $512,171.03 credit—treated as an “above-the-line” adjustment—in the
allocation of equity in the marital residence. The court observed that even after accounting
for the dissipation, the overall division of property remained equitable and nearly equal.
Another asset in dispute on appeal is a roughly $40,000 insurance settlement
Husband had yet to receive at the time of trial after his 2015 Ford F-350 truck—his
premarital vehicle—was stolen during the course of the litigation. After Husband’s vehicle
was stolen, he used marital funds to purchase a replacement vehicle. However, Wife’s
statement of assets and liabilities filed with the trial court on November 20, 2023, proposed
that the $40,823.00 insurance settlement should be considered Husband’s separate
property. The trial court, however, classified the insurance settlement as marital property.
The settlement funds were therefore included in the marital estate and assigned to Husband
along with his replacement vehicle, a 2023 Ford F-350.
The trial court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Final Order on May 8, 2024,
granting Wife a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court
noted that its division of the marital estate was “equitable and nearly equal as a result of
weighing the relevant factors enumerated in [Tennessee] Code [Annotated] [section] 36-4-
121(c)[.]” Husband filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on June 4, 2024.
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II. ISSUES
Husband raises two issues on appeal, which we have slightly restated:
1. Whether the trial court erred by requiring Husband to reimburse Wife
$512,171.03 for the total amount of his dissipation.
2. Whether the trial court erred in classifying the insurance settlement as
marital property.
Wife raises two additional issues for review:
3. Whether Husband’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is proper as he
failed to raise his request for appellate attorney’s fees as a specific issue
for review.
4. Whether Wife is entitled to recover her attorney fees and expenses incurred
on appeal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the trial court’s findings of fact is de novo upon the record with a
presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P.
13(d); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tarrant, 363 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tenn. 2012). The evidence
preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact when it supports another finding
“with greater convincing effect.” Hardeman Cnty. v. McIntyre, 420 S.W.3d 742, 749
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citation omitted). Appellate review of a trial court’s
conclusions of law is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Rogers v. Louisville
Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Tenn. 2012). Questions related to the classification of
assets present questions of fact, which we also review de novo with a presumption of the
correctness, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Long v. Long, 642 S.W.3d 803,
818 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)).
The division of marital property in an “equitable” manner does not require that the
trial court divide it equally. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 109-10 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2014) (citing Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 341 (Tenn. 2002)). Furthermore, an
equitable division “is not achieved by a mechanical application of the statutory factors, but
rather by considering and weighing the most relevant factors in light of the unique facts of
the case.” Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). A trial court is
given “wide latitude” in its equitable division of a marital estate, and this Court defers to
such division unless it is inconsistent with the relevant factors in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). While the trial courts have
broad discretion in dividing marital property, that discretion is not unfettered. There must
be an explanation rooted in statutory analysis to support the division of assets and
allocation of debts. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). The
fairness of the trial court’s division should be “inevitably reflected in its results.” Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
1. Dissipation
Husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred by requiring him to reimburse
Wife for the total value of his dissipation from the parties’ marital estate. Husband does
not dispute the trial court’s finding that he dissipated $512,171.03 from the marital estate;
however, Husband assigns error to the trial court’s allocation of the dissipation. Husband
asserts that the trial court made a clear error in assigning him the entirety of the dissipation
because both parties maintained an interest in the estate. Wife argues that the overall
division of the marital estate is equitable and should not be disturbed.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121 governs a court’s: (1) classification of
property as either marital or separate; and (2) equitable division of the marital
estate. Tennessee law requires that marital property be divided equitably, not necessarily
equally, upon divorce. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 168
(“Trial courts have wide latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property.
Their decisions must be guided by the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c).”) (internal
citations omitted). Equity in the dissolution context considers the unique circumstances of
each party and aims to produce a fair result. We defer to the decision of the trial courts in
reviewing equitable divisions of marital assets unless their decisions are inconsistent with
the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) or are not supported by the
preponderance of the evidence. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 449-50 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991). These factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) include:
(1) The duration of the marriage;
(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability,
earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each
of the parties;
(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the education,
training or increased earning power of the other party;
(4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets
and income;
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(5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate
property, including the contribution of a party to the marriage as
homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as
homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party
has fulfilled its role;
(B) For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means
wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property available for
equitable distributions and which are made for a purpose contrary to the
marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal separation
has been filed;
(6) The value of the separate property of each party;
(7) The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;
(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of
property is to become effective;
(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably
foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses
associated with the asset;
(10) In determining the value of an interest in a closely held business or
similar asset, all relevant evidence, including valuation methods
typically used with regard to such assets without regard to whether the
sale of the asset is reasonably foreseeable. Depending on the
characteristics of the asset, such considerations could include, but would
not be limited to, a lack of marketability discount, a discount for lack of
control, and a control premium, if any should be relevant and supported
by the evidence;
(11) The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and
(12) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the
parties.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-4-121(c)(1)-(13) (July 1, 2017 to Mar. 30, 2022). The equitable
division of property requires findings regarding each party’s financial condition,
contributions, and future prospects. See Kerley v. Kerley, No. E2022-01206-COA-R3-CV,
2024 WL 3443463, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2024) (vacating a final decree and
remanding for further findings because the trial court “failed to delineate its analysis of the
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required statutory factors” as to the distribution of marital assets and the award of alimony).
A party’s dissipation of marital or separate property is one of many factors a trial
court may take into consideration in making an equitable division of a marital estate. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A). While there is no statutory definition of dissipation, the
term typically refers to the use of marital property for a purpose unrelated to the marriage,
often to “hide, deplete, or divert” marital property after a marriage is irretrievably
broken. Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “The concept of
dissipation is based on waste.” Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005). “Dissipation of marital property occurs when one spouse uses marital property,
frivolously and without justification, for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and at a time
when the marriage is breaking down.” Id. at 681-82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). As this Court
has explained:
[T]he allegedly improper or wasteful expenditure or transaction must be
considered in the context of the marriage as a whole, and it must be weighed
along with all the other relevant factors in the case. The factors that courts
most frequently consider when determining whether a particular expenditure
or transaction amounts to dissipation include: (1) whether the expenditure
benefitted the marriage or was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the
marriage; (2) whether the expenditure or transaction occurred when the
parties were experiencing marital difficulties or were contemplating divorce;
(3) whether the expenditure was excessive or de minimis; and (4) whether
the dissipating party intended to hide, deplete, or divert a marital asset.
Id. at 682 (internal citations and footnote omitted). In determining whether dissipation has
occurred, the court “must distinguish between dissipation and discretionary
spending.” Larsen-Ball, 301 S.W.3d at 235. While discretionary spending may be ill-
advised, it “is typical of the parties’ expenditures throughout the course of the
marriage.” Id. Expenditures that constitute dissipation, on the other hand, are so far
removed from normal expenditures that they can be characterized as wasteful or self-
serving. See Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)
Here, the trial court awarded approximately 55% of the over $4.6 million estate to
Wife and 45% to Husband, which resulted in roughly a $420,000.00 disparity. Husband
argues that the size of the disparity renders the trial court’s distribution inequitable.
However, the trial court’s assignment of the dissipation to Husband is not a “mathematical
error” as Husband argues. Husband invokes this Court’s precedent in Holdsworth v.
Holdsworth, No. W2013-01948-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 3488929 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3,
2015), to assert that the amount Husband dissipated should be divided equally between the
parties. In Holdsworth, the trial court determined that checks the husband wrote to an extra
marital partner constituted dissipation. Id. at *9. The trial court subsequently ordered the
husband to reimburse wife for the full amount dissipated. Id. We noted that “[t]he trial
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court’s award ignore[d] the fact that [h]usband also had an interest in the money.” Id.
(citing Odom v. Odom, No. E2007–02250–COA–R3–CV, 2008 WL 4415429, at *8, (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2008)). We further noted that “because the trial court divided the parties’
marital assets equally . . . [h]usband is entitled to one-half of the assets he dissipated.” In
contrast, the trial court here did not divide the estate equally. Rather, the trial court awarded
Wife “$512,171.03 in the form of an above the line adjustment to her share of the equity
in the marital residence as a result of Husband’s dissipation of that amount of money from
the marital estate.” This is a clear indication that the trial court intended to distribute the
estate equitably rather than equally.
Further, this Court recently concluded that divisions of marital estates were
equitable even though one party received a more significant portion of the estate than the
other spouse. See Perkins v. Sloane, No. M2024-00756-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 1100057,
at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2025) (affirming an equitable division where the husband
received 80% of the marital estate and the wife received 20%); Harris v. Harris, No.
E2023-00061-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 8716469, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18,
2023) (adjusting the division of the marital estate to award the husband 75% and the wife
25%).
The trial court expressly credited Wife’s testimony over Husband’s concerning
the dissipation of marital assets post-separation, and our reading of the trial transcript
supports this credibility finding. The issue of dissipation is “a question that often hinges on
the trial court’s assessment of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses at trial[.]” Ellis v.
Ellis, No. E2020-00869-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 3724768, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29,
2022). Moreover, we will not disturb a trial court’s credibility finding absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. See Kelly, 445 S.W.3d at 692.
A division of marital property is not rendered inequitable simply because it is
not precisely equal. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 341; Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823,
832 (Tenn. 1996). One of the many factors for a trial court to consider when distributing
marital property is the “contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) (July 1, 2017 to Mar. 30, 2022). Thus, we will
ordinarily defer to the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital estate unless it is
inconsistent with the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) or is not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 168; Mahaffey v.
Mahaffey, 775 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Hardin v. Hardin, 689 S.W.2d
152, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
As previously stated, the division of the marital estate is not a “mechanical
process,” and a court has broad discretion when considering the weight it will place on
any given factor. See Flannary, 121 S.W.3d at 650. The trial court’s division of the
marital assets, including the assignment of the dissipation, is consistent with the factors
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in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) and is supported by the
preponderance of the evidence. The judgment of the trial court on this issue is,
therefore, affirmed.
2. Classification of Marital Property
Husband argues that the trial court committed error by misclassifying an insurance
settlement—that resulted from an asset of Husband’s pre-marital, separate property—as
marital property. Husband contends that as the insurance settlement stems from his separate
property that was stolen, the insurance settlement remains his separate property. Wife
contends that the trial court correctly classified the asset as marital property, but even if the
trial court misclassified the insurance settlement payment as marital property, any
misclassification would not render the distribution inequitable.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121 classifies as “marital property” “all
real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses
during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by
either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce[.]” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) (July 1, 2017 to Mar. 30, 2022). Marital property also includes
“income from, and any increase in the value during the marriage of, property determined
to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (b)(2) if each party substantially
contributed to its preservation and appreciation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i)
(July 1, 2017 to Mar. 30, 2022). “Separate property” is defined as:
(A) All real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage,
including, but not limited to, assets held in individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) as that term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26
U.S.C.), as amended;
(B) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage;
(C) Income from and appreciation of property owned by a spouse before
marriage except when characterized as marital property under
subdivision (b)(1);
(D) Property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or
descent;
(E) Pain and suffering awards, victim of crime compensation awards, future
medical expenses, and future lost wages; and
(F) Property acquired by a spouse after an order of legal separation where
the court has made a final disposition of property.
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2) (July 1, 2017 to Mar. 30, 2022).
Assets acquired during a marriage are presumed to be marital property and a party
who disputes this classification has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the asset is separate property. See Owens, 241 S.W.3d at 486. A party may
rebut this presumption with evidence of circumstances or communications clearly
indicating an intent that the property remain separate. See Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d
849, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Income from and the appreciation in value of a spouse’s
separate property can become marital property where both spouses have substantially
contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i)
(July 1, 2017 to Mar. 30, 2022). Those contributions may be direct or indirect. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(D) (July 1, 2017 to Mar. 30, 2022).
It is undisputed that Husband purchased and financed the 2015 Ford F-350 truck
prior to the parties’ marriage. Testimony from the multiple hearings in this case
demonstrated that Husband paid the auto insurance using marital funds and continued to
do so until the trial court entered final judgment. Our review of the record did not uncover
testimony regarding whether the stolen truck was titled to, or even used by, both parties
during the marriage. Wife’s statement of assets and liabilities filed with the trial court on
November 20, 2023, proposed that the insurance settlement be considered Husband’s
separate property. While the trial court’s order includes a thorough and meticulous analysis
concerning whether the animal clinic should be considered transmuted marital property,
the order does not perform the same analysis as it pertains to the insurance settlement.
There is no discussion concerning whether Wife contributed to the truck’s preservation and
appreciation before it was stolen.
We agree with Husband that the insurance settlement should not have been
classified as marital property. The judgment of the trial court is modified to reflect that
the $40,000 insurance settlement is Husband’s separate property. This reclassification
does not render the overall distribution of the marital estate—valued at over $4.6
million—inequitable as our modification represents less than one percent of overall
value of the estate. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s distribution of the
marital estate in light of the reclassification. We affirm the judgment of the trial court
as modified by this Opinion.
3. Attorney’s Fees
Each party requested attorney’s fees on appeal. “The determination of whether to
award attorney’s fees on appeal is within the sole discretion of the appellate court.”
Trezevant v. Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Moses v.
Moses, No. E2008-00257-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 838105, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.
31, 2009)). The Tennessee appellate courts set forth factors that should be applied when
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considering a request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. “These factors include the
ability of the requesting party to pay fees, the requesting party’s success in the appeal,
whether the requesting party sought the appeal in good faith, and any other equitable factor
that need be considered.” See Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 413 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2017) (internal citations omitted).
We respectfully decline to award either party attorney’s fees on appeal. Each party
possesses the ability to pay their respective attorney’s fees based on the assets awarded in
the divorce. There is no indication that Husband pursued this appeal in bad faith. The
marital estate was valued at approximately $4.6 million with each party receiving
substantial assets to pay the attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. Accordingly, we determine
that this is not an appropriate case for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. See Parris v.
Parris, No. M2006-02068-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2713723 at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
18, 2007) (“[I]t is in the sole discretion of this court whether to award attorney’s fees on
appeal.”).
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this Opinion. Costs of the
appeal are taxed to Appellant, John Robert Ayers, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
s/ Valerie L. Smith
VALERIE L. SMITH, JUDGE
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