Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SHARI L.,1 Case No. 2:24-cv-09764-JC

12 Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

13 v.

14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner

of Social Security Administration,

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Defendant.

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19 I. SUMMARY

20 On November 13, 2024, Plaintiff Shari L. filed a Complaint seeking review

21 of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Plaintiff’s applications for

22 benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United

23 States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-briefs (respectively,

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“Plaintiff’s Brief,” “Defendant’s Brief,” and “Plaintiff’s Reply”) which the Court

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1Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted to protect Plaintiff’s privacy in compliance with

28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court

Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

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1 has taken under submission without oral argument. See November 13, 2024 Case

2 Management Order ¶ 4.

3 Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the

4 Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge

5 (“ALJ”) are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error.

6 II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE

DECISION

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On or after May 24, 2022, Plaintiff, an underwriter with a significant work

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history, filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental

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Security Income alleging disability beginning on August 1, 2021, due to chronic

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pain, multilevel degenerative disc disease, scoliosis, bulging discs, and sciatica.

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(Administrative Record (“AR”) 312-46, 351-53, 372, 398). In a letter dated

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April 27, 2024, Plaintiff also reported that her pain and related limitations had

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“affected [her] mental state in a negative way.” (AR 513-15).

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The Administration denied Plaintiff’s claims initially on September 16,

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2022, and on reconsideration on April 25, 2023. See AR 59-136 (finding Plaintiff

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would have at most mild mental limitations so her mental impairment(s) were non-

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severe, and that she could perform a range of light work with occasional postural

18 limitations apart from no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and hazard

19 restrictions).

20 An ALJ examined the medical record and, on December 7, 2023, heard

21 testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (AR 35-58). On February 22,

22 2024, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled since the alleged onset date.

23 (AR 17-27). The ALJ found in relevant part: (1) Plaintiff had not engaged in

24 substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date (AR 20 (classifying

25 earnings from the fourth quarter of 2021 through the first quarter of 2023, as from

26 an unsuccessful work attempt or not from work-related activities)); (2) Plaintiff

27 had severe lumbosacral radiculopathy, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and

lumbar spine spondylosis (AR 20-22 (finding non-severe Plaintiff’s mental

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1 impairments)); (3) Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 for a range

2 of light work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b)) with occasional postural

3 activities (i.e., climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling,

4 crouching, and crawling), no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and no

5 concentrated exposure to workplace hazards) (AR 21, 23-26 (adopting RFC

6 consistent with: (a) the state agency physician opinions, which the ALJ found

“persuasive”; and (b) the consultative examiner opinions, which the ALJ also

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found “persuasive,” who found Plaintiff would have no mental limitations and

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could perform a range of light work; declining to adopt opinions from

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Chiropractor Alan Rosenthal and Dr. Zahra Sherazi suggesting limitations which

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would preclude all work); and (4) with this RFC, Plaintiff would be able to

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perform her past relevant work as an underwriter as actually and generally

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performed (AR 26 (adopting vocational expert testimony at AR 53-57)).

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On September 18, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s application

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for review. (AR 1-3).

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III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

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A. Administrative Evaluation of Disability Claims

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To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that she is unable

18 “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

19 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

20 death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

21 less than 12 months.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012)

22 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded

23 by regulation on other grounds as stated in Sisk v. Saul, 820 Fed. App’x 604, 606

24 (9th Cir. 2020); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). To be considered disabled,

25 a claimant must have an impairment of such severity that she is incapable of

26 performing work the claimant previously performed (“past relevant work”) as well

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28 2A RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional

limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).

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| || as any other “work which exists in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180

2 || F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)).

3 To assess whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to use the five-

4 || step sequential evaluation process set forth in Social Security regulations. See

5 || Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006)

6 || (describing five-step sequential evaluation process) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

7 || 416.920). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four — i.e.,

8 determination of whether the claimant was engaging in substantial gainful activity

9 (step 1), has a sufficiently severe impairment (step 2), has an impairment or

10 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the conditions

1 listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”) (step 3), and

D retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work (step 4).

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The

Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five — 1.¢., establishing that the

14 claimant could perform other work in the national economy. Id.

15 B. Federal Court Review of Social Security Disability Decisions

16 A federal court may set aside a denial of benefits only when the

17 | Commissioner’s “final decision” was “based on legal error or not supported by

18 | substantial evidence in the record.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871

19 | F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The

20 || standard of review in disability cases is “highly deferential.” Rounds v. Comm’r

21 || of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation

22 || marks omitted). Thus, an ALJ’s decision must be upheld if the evidence could

23 || reasonably support either affirming or reversing the decision. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at

24 || 674-75 (citations omitted). Even when an ALJ’s decision contains error, it must

25 || be affirmed if the error was harmless. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

26 || Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ error harmless if

27 || inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination; or (2) ALJ’s path

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| || may reasonably be discerned despite the error) (citation and quotation marks

2 || omitted).

3 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

4 || accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674 (defining

5 || “substantial evidence” as “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

6 || preponderance”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When determining

7 || whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s finding, a court “must consider the

8 entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

9 evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion[.]” Garrison v.

10 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

1 Federal courts review only the reasoning the ALJ provided, and may not

D affirm the ALJ’s decision “on a ground upon which [the ALJ] did not rely.”

Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675 (citations omitted). Hence, while an ALJ’s decision need

13 not be drafted with “ideal clarity,” it must, at a minimum, set forth the ALJ’s

14 reasoning “in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,

15 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099).

16 A reviewing court may not conclude that an error was harmless based on

17 independent findings gleaned from the administrative record. Brown-Hunter, 806

18 | F.3d at 492 (citations omitted). When a reviewing court cannot confidently

19 | conclude that an error was harmless, a remand for additional investigation or

20 || explanation is generally appropriate. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173

21 || (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

23 Plaintiff raises two issues. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in

24 || evaluating Dr. Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s opinions suggesting greater

25 || limitations than the ALJ found to exist by failing to state specifically how

26 || persuasive the ALJ found these opinions. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s alleged

27 || errors “cause a concomitant defective analysis” of Plaintiffs statements regarding

9g || her limitations. (Plaintiff's Brief at 1, 5-15; Plaintiff's Reply at 2-3). Plaintiff also

1 contends that the ALJ failed adequately to explain why the RFC included no

2 mental limitations. (Plaintiff’s Brief at 16-19; Plaintiff’s Reply at 3-7). For the

3 reasons explained below, Plaintiff has not shown that reversal or remand is

4 warranted.

5 A. Any Error in Considering Dr. Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s

6 Opinions Is Harmless; Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s

RFC Assessment

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For claims filed after March 27, 2017 (such as Plaintiff’s claims), new

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regulations govern the evaluation of medical opinion evidence. Under these

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regulations, ALJs no longer “weigh” medical opinions; rather, ALJs “evaluate

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the[ir] persuasiveness” based on five “factors”: (1) supportability;

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(2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant (including the length of

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treatment, frequency of examinations, purpose of treatment, extent of treatment,

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and whether the medical source examined the claimant); (4) the medical source’s

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specialty; and (5) “other” factors that tend to support or contradict an opinion. See

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20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).

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The two most important factors in determining the persuasiveness of

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medical opinions are supportability and consistency with the evidence. See

18 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). ALJs must “explain” how they

19 considered the factors of supportability and consistency, but need not explain how

20 they considered any other factor. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b).

21 Supportability means the extent to which a medical source supports

22 the medical opinion by explaining the “relevant. . . objective medical

23 evidence.” Consistency means the extent to which a medical opinion

24 is “consistent. . . with the evidence from other medical sources and

25 nonmedical sources in the claim.”

26 Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R.

27 § 404.1520c(c)(1), (2)). “[U]nder the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an

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1 examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without

2 providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 792.3

3 1. Dr. Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s Opinions and Available

4 Treatment Records

5 Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. Sherazi each provided a “Physical Capacities

6 Evaluation” opining almost identical abilities and limitations for Plaintiff. See AR

1135-37 (Dr. Rosenthal’s November 2, 2023 form); AR 1141-43 (Dr. Sherazi’s

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November 8, 2023 form). Both doctors indicated that Plaintiff: (1) could lift up to

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five pounds; (2) could sit and stand/walk less than one hour each in an eight-hour

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workday; (3) would need to alternate between sitting and standing at will

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throughout the day; (4) could not use her hands “adequately” to grasp or for fine

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manipulation, and could not do repetitive motion tasks with one or both her hands;

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(5) could occasionally climb, balance, and reach above shoulder level, but could

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never stoop, kneel, or crouch; and (6) could not work at unprotected heights or

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around moving machinery or drive, and must avoid severe temperature changes/

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humidity and exposure to dust, fumes, and gases. (AR 1135-36, 1141-42). Dr.

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Rosenthal indicated that Plaintiff could use both feet for repetitive movements, but

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could never crawl. (AR 1135-36). Whereas, Dr. Sherazi indicated that Plaintiff

18 could use her left foot for repetitive movements, without indicating whether

19 Plaintiff could use her right foot, and did not indicate whether Plaintiff would have

20 a crawling limitation. (AR 1141-42).4

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3The new regulations also eliminated the term “treating source,” as well as the rule

23 previously known as the treating source rule or treating physician rule, which formerly required

special deference to the opinions of treating sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c;

24 Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (“The revised social security regulations are clearly irreconcilable with

25 our caselaw according special deference to the opinions of treating and examining physicians on

account of their relationship with the claimant.”); see also Cross v. O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211,

26 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2024) (discussing new regulations).

27 4Dr. Rosenthal provided a “Physical Ability Assessment” dated April 19, 2023, noting

28 slightly different limitations and abilities. He checked that, according to Plaintiff’s report and his

observation, Plaintiff: (1) could occasionally lift and carry 10 pounds, push and pull 10 pounds;

(continued...)

1 Both doctors also indicated that Plaintiff had fatigue and pain which would

2 prevent her from working at even a sedentary job. (AR 1136-37, 1142-43). Dr.

3 Rosenthal described the medical bases for Plaintiff’s pain as “bulging discs shown

4 on MRI scans, also degenerative joint disease, stenosis and scoliosis, also

5 Dupuytren’s contracture bilaterally.” (AR 1137). Dr. Sherazi described the

6 medical bases for Plaintiff’s pain as a “MRI scan showed bulging disc,

degenerative disease, foraminal stenosis L5-S1.” (AR 1143).

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The record contains some treatment notes from both of these doctors. Dr.

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Rosenthal provided treatment summaries and treatment notes for the period from

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May 2022 to November 2023, which indicated that Plaintiff had attended about 45

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chiropractic sessions for low back pain ranging from 3-4/10 to 9/10, with noted

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improvement from treatment in reducing the reported pain. (AR 788-96, 1171-73,

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1252-55). Plaintiff had one additional treatment, just after Dr. Rosenthal

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completed the Physical Capacities form, where her pain was 2-3/10. (AR 1254).

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Dr. Sherazi, who worked at Facey Medical Foundation, began seeing

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Plaintiff in September 2022, for hypertension, lumbar radiculopathy, back pain,

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and Plaintiff notedly then was on temporary disability pending a neurosurgery

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appointment for possible surgery. (AR 1058-61, 1112-14, 1204-07). Plaintiff’s

18 examination was within normal limits including normal musculoskeletal range of

19 motion. (AR 1206). Dr. Sherazi extended Plaintiff’s disability for two months.

20 (AR 1204).5

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4(...continued)

23 (2) could sit, stand, walk, reach below the waist, grasp with her hands, climb stairs or ladders,

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl zero hours a day; (3) could occasionally reach overhead

24 and at desk level, use her hands for fine manipulation and grasping, and use her lower extremities

25 for foot controls. (AR 830-31).

26 5Prior treatment notes from Facey Medical Foundation date back to February 2021, and

reflect ongoing pain management treatment for lumbar spondylosis, myofascial pain, chronic

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pain syndrome, lumbar radiculopathy, scoliosis, and sacroiliitis, which included medial branch

28 blocks, Gabapentin, epidural injections, lumbar radiofrequency ablation, Baclofen, Lyrica,

Tramadol, physical therapy, and decompressive treatments – without complete pain relief – and

(continued...)

1 Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Sherazi in January 2023, requesting Tramadol

2 for her pain and to extend her disability for three more months, which Dr. Sherazi

3 approved. (AR 1054-57, 1104-07, 1196-1200). Examination findings again were

4 with normal limits including normal musculoskeletal range of motion. (AR 1198-

5 99). When Plaintiff returned for a shingles vaccine in February 2023, she reported

6 no other concerns but was given Lidocaine patches. (AR 1051-54, 1095-98, 1192-

95). Examination findings again were within normal limits including normal

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musculoskeletal range of motion. (AR 1194).

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10 5(...continued)

referrals to an orthopedic surgeon and a neurosurgeon. (AR 543-57, 563-98, 621-709, 727, 756,

11 1207-19, 1228-49).

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A December 2021 lumbar spine MRI showed mild to moderate multilevel disc disease,

13 moderate to severe multilevel foraminal stenosis, mild central canal and lateral recess stenosis

from L2-L3 through L4-L5, and moderate dextro convexity. (AR 1236-37; see also AR 708-09

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(October, 2019 lumbar spine MRI)). In January 2022, an orthopedic surgeon recommended

15 surgery. (AR 525-29). Her examination at the time showed she had some difficulty heel walking

on the right side, decreased lumbar spine range of motion, strength of 5/5 in all extremities

16 except the Tibialis Anterior which was 4+/5, no tenderness or spasm, and negative straight leg

17 raising. (AR 527-28).

18 In April 2022, Plaintiff had a neurology consultation where she complained of right side

sciatic pain at up to 9/10, and reportedly had been scheduled for orthopedic surgery for the

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following week but Plaintiff was fearful and canceled the surgery. (AR 1213-14). She was

20 referred for a nerve conduction study and to neurosurgery for a second opinion. (AR 1214). Her

examination findings were within normal limits, including 5/5 strength in her extremities. (AR

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1216). Later in April, she went to her internal medicine doctor for a disability letter for work for

22 severe bilateral lumbar radiculopathy with pain and weakness in the lower extremities and

difficulty sitting or standing more than 15 minutes, difficulty driving and ambulating, and several

23 unsuccessful attempts at pain management. (AR 1210). She was referred to neurosurgery,

notedly was unable to sit or stand for more than 20 minutes without significant pain, declined a

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trial of Cymbalta, and her disability was continued until she “is able to have surgery and

25 rehabilitate.” (AR 1210).

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Plaintiff had her neurosurgical consultation in June 2022, and surgery was an option.

27 (AR 719-22). Her examination at the time showed she had normal gait, 5/5 strength, lumbar

scoliosis, severe tenderness to palpation of the right SI joint, right hip bursa, and positive straight

28 leg raising on the right, but normal range of motion in all joints. (AR 721).

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1 Plaintiff returned in April 2023, complaining of back pain and discomfort,

2 weakness, and stiffness in her hands/palms, and requesting completion of

3 disability forms for her history of chronic back pain from lumbar radiculopathy for

4 which she was not interested in surgery. (AR 1046-50, 1080-84, 1188-91).

5 Examination findings again were unchanged except for nodules and tenderness to

6 palpation on both hands. (AR 1190-91). Dr. Sherazi filled out Plaintiff’s

disability form, continued her Tramadol and spinal cord compression therapy, and

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referred Plaintiff to a hand surgeon for Dupuytren’s disease. (AR 1188).

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Dr. Sherazi’s last note is from a physical examination in November 2023 –

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the day she completed the Physical Capacities Evaluation form. (AR 1183-87).

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Plaintiff’s “active problems” included a “disability examination,” anxiety, lumbar

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radiculopathy, lumbar spondylosis, lumbar disc degeneration, and chronic

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continuous use of opioids (Tramadol). (AR 1185). Plaintiff notedly complained

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of back pain but was not depressed, nervous or anxious, and on examination had

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findings within normal limits including normal musculoskeletal range of motion,

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(AR 1185-86).

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2. The Other Opinion Evidence

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Consultative examiner Dr. Jerry Chuang provided a “Complete Orthopedic

18 Consultation” dated April 6, 2023. (AR 1034-38). Dr. Chuang reviewed medical

19 records including the December 2021 lumbar spine MRI. (AR 1034). Plaintiff

20 complained of low back pain going to both legs since 2006, with numbness and

21 tingling, relieved by lying flat. (AR 1034). On examination, Plaintiff had a

22 normal gait but difficulty with toe and heel walk, tenderness and weakness in her

23 lumbar spine due to pain with limited range of motion and positive straight leg

24 raising, and mild weakness of 4+/5 in the lower extremities. (AR 1035-37). Dr.

25 Chuang assessed lumbosacral radiculopathy causing moderate weakness in the

26 lower back and mild weakness in the bilateral lower extremities. (AR 1037). Dr.

27 Chuang opined that Plaintiff would be capable of light work with occasional

pushing, pulling, overhead reaching, bending, crouching, stooping, crawling,

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1 walking on uneven terrain, climbing ladders, and working at unprotected heights.

2 (AR 1037-38).

3 Consultative examiner Dr. Minas Harutunian provided a “Mental

4 Evaluation by Psychologist” dated April 14, 2023. (AR 1145-48). Dr. Harutunian

5 reviewed no medical records. (AR 1145). Plaintiff complained that chronic pain

6 had “made [her] emotionally broken physically,” and reported symptoms related to

being born with back issues that had gotten worse with age. (AR 1145). Although

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Plaintiff had received psychiatric counseling and/or treatment, she was not

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currently in treatment. (AR 1146). Plaintiff lived alone, managed her own money,

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could drive, use a bus or an Uber, and go places by herself, but reportedly could

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barely dress or bathe herself. (AR 1146). Mental status examination noted

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findings within normal limits except Plaintiff reportedly was having whole body

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pain, stood throughout the evaluation due to pain, appeared to be in pain and was

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grimacing, was anxious, described her mood as, “I’ve been worse,” was able to

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register two out of three items at five minutes. (AR 1147). Dr. Harutunian

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diagnosed anxiety disorder due to medical problems and opined that Plaintiff

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would have no mental limitations or difficulties in performing work tasks. (AR

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1147-48).

18 State agency physicians reviewed the record in September 2022 and April

19 2023, and opined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would cause at most mild

20 limitations and were not-severe, and agreed with Dr. Chuang that Plaintiff would

21 be limited to a range of light work with occasional postural activities, no climbing

22 of ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and no concentrated exposure to hazards. (AR 65-

23 136).

24 3. The ALJ’s Decision

25 In determining that Plaintiff had a RFC for a range of light work which

26 would permit Plaintiff to perform her past relevant work as an underwriter, the

27 ALJ considered and found persuasive the opinions from Dr. Chuang, Dr.

Harutunian, and the state agency physicians. (AR 21-22, 24-26). The ALJ also

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1 considered Dr. Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s functional assessments suggesting

2 Plaintiff had limitations which would preclude Plaintiff from working, which the

3 ALJ characterized as not providing an opinion on what Plaintiff could still do

4 despite her impairments (where they actually did state what Plaintiff could still do,

5 albeit what Plaintiff could do was greatly restricted). (AR 25). The ALJ did not

6 state whether she found Dr. Rosenthal’s or Dr. Sherazi’s opinions persuasive, but

did discuss their supportability and consistency as follows:

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They primarily summarized in the treatment notes the claimant’s

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subjective complaints, diagnoses, and treatment, but he [sic] did not

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provide medically acceptable clinical or diagnostic findings to

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support the functional assessment. These opinions are also

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inconsistent with the claimant’s admitted activities of daily living,

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which have already been described above in this section.[6] The

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Chiropractor [Dr.] Rosenthal conservatively treated the claimant with

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chiropractic care of spinal decompression, mechanical intersegmental

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traction, laser, ice and Thera gun treatments.

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(AR 25-26). The ALJ did not adopt the limits Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. Sherazi had

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found. (AR 22-23). The ALJ also rejected their assertions that Plaintiff was

18 disabled as an issue that is reserved for the Commissioner. (AR 25 (citing

19 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e)).

20 4. Analysis

21 The ALJ followed the new regulations in considering and finding

22 persuasive the medical opinions from the consultative examiners and state agency

23 physicians. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c). The opinions of Dr. Chuang, Dr.

24 Harutunian, and the state agency physicians, which the ALJ found persuasive and

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26 6Plaintiff had reported that she lived alone, could grocery shop and could lift and/or carry

a purse and a bag of groceries 50-100 feet, vacuum, dust, wipe down counters, drive a car, take a

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bus or Uber, and go places by herself. See AR 23-24 (discussing same; citing AR 387-89,

28 1146)).

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1 had found limitations arguably consistent with those the ALJ assessed, furnish

2 substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC assessment. See 20 C.F.R.

3 §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3) (in determining a claimant’s RFC, the

4 Administration will consider medical source statements about what a claimant can

5 still do, whether or not based on formal medical examinations).

6 The ALJ may not have thought she needed to follow the new regulations for

Dr. Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s opinions because the ALJ incorrectly

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characterized each as not providing an opinion on what Plaintiff could still do

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despite her impairments. (AR 25; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3),

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416.945(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2), 416.913(a)(2) (defining a “medical

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opinion” as a statement about what a claimant can still do despite impairments)).

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As noted above, the new regulations require ALJs to explain how they considered

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supportability and consistency as factors in determining the persuasiveness of

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medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), (c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(b), (c)(1)-

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(5). While the ALJ did not use the word “persuasive” in discussing Dr.

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Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s opinions, the ALJ did explain how she considered

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the supportability and consistency of these opinions in declining to adopt their

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limitations, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings.

18 As the ALJ noted, Dr. Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s opinions arguably were

19 not supported by clinical or diagnostic findings. As detailed above and as the ALJ

20 discussed, while the record showed lumbar spine related diagnoses and MRIs, and

21 several modes of pain treatment which did not alleviate Plaintiff’s pain, Plaintiff’s

22 physical examinations were generally within normal limits. See AR 24-25 (citing

23 AR 529, 805, 814, 1047 (noting diagnoses); AR 517-18 (December 2021 lumbar

24 spine MRI); AR 716, 719, 805, 814, 1047, 1259 (reports of various pain

25 treatments and options); AR 527-28, 721, 807, 815-16, 839, 1049, 1186

26 (examination findings). The ALJ also noted their opinions were inconsistent with

27 Plaintiff’s admitted activities including being able to shop for groceries, carry a

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1 | grocery bag and her purse, drive, ride a bus, take an Uber, and do some household

2 || chores. (AR 23-25 (citing AR 387-89, 1146)).

3 It is reasonable to infer from the ALJ’s reasoning that she found Dr.

4 || Rosenthal’s and Dr. Sherazi’s opinions unpersuasive, despite her not using the

5 || word “persuasive.” See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989)

6 || (ALJ was not required to recite “magic words” to reject medical opinion; “As a

7 || reviewing court, we are not deprived of our faculties for drawing specific and

8 legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.”). It thus appears that any error

9 from the ALJ’s failure to use the word “persuasive” is harmless. See, e.g., Bryan

10 T. v. Dudek, 2025 WL 2588924, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (finding harmless

1 ALJ’s failure to use the word “persuasive” in considering some of the medical

D opinions, where ALJ explained why she found those opinions were supported and

consistent as required by the regulations); Fierro v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL

3 6725135, at *2-3, 5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2023) (finding ALJ adequately explained

14 how persuasive he found doctor’s opinion even if the ALJ did not use the term

15 “persuasive”; it was clear from the ALJ’s decision that the ALJ rejected the

16 opinion as not persuasive, and the reasons for rejecting the opinion were clear);

17 | Barbara K. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 6633855, at *12 (D. N.J. Oct. 11, 2023) (same);

18 compare Jessica R. v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 4449448, at *5

19 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2024) (finding reversible error where ALJ did not find

20 || medical opinion persuasive or unpersuasive; ALJ simply stated that there was

21 || partial support in the record for opinion without any references to facts or citations

22 || to the record — ALJ did not articulate what the opinion was or how it was

23 || supported by the record); Daylene S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 166890, at

24 || *3 & n.2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2023) (instructing ALJ to use complete sentences

25 || and some form of the word “persuasive” in evaluating opinions on remand; the

26 || ALJ did not find opinions persuasive or unpersuasive, and while the context of the

27 || decision suggested the ALJ found the opinions at least somewhat persuasive, the

|| sentence where such a finding would be made was incomplete).

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1 The Court will uphold the ALJ’s RFC assessment, and the ALJ’s related

2 findings regarding the medical opinion evidence, including Dr. Rosenthal’s and

3 Dr. Sherazi’s opinions, as supported by substantial evidence and free from

4 material legal error. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th at 792. To the extent the record

5 evidence is conflicting, the ALJ properly resolved the conflicts. See Treichler v.

6 Comm’r, 775 F.3d at 1098 (court “leaves it to the ALJ” to resolve conflicts and

ambiguities in the record). The Court must uphold the administrative decision

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when the evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.”

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Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court will

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uphold the ALJ’s rational interpretation of the conflicting evidence in this case.

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B. The ALJ Adequately Explained Why the RFC Assessment Did

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Not Include Any Mental Limitations

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Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s failed adequately to explain why the

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RFC included no mental limitations. Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ’s discussion

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of the relevant medical opinions which was at step two of the analysis was not

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sufficiently detailed as a basis on which to find Plaintiff would have no mental

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limitations. (Plaintiff’s Brief at 16-19; Plaintiff’s Reply at 3-7).

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Significantly, no medical source opined that Plaintiff would have any

18 specific work restrictions from her mental impairments. As detailed above, Dr.

19 Harutunian opined that Plaintiff would have no mental limitations or difficulties

20 performing work tasks. (AR 1148). The state agency physicians found her

21 impairments non-severe and would cause only none-to-mild limitations. (AR 66-

22 67, 81-82, 103-04, 125-26).

23 The ALJ detailed Dr. Harutunian’s opinion and the state agency physicians’

24 opinions about Plaintiff’s mental impairments at step two when the ALJ found

25 Plaintiff’s mental impairments non-severe because they would cause no more than

26 a minimal limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to do basic work activities. (AR 21-22).

27 The ALJ found these opinions were persuasive. (AR 21). The ALJ stated that the

RFC she assessed at step four reflected the degree of limitation she found for the

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1 || “paragraph B” criteria (i.c., none to mild limitations). (AR 20-22). At step four,

2 || the ALJ also noted that she had considered all of Plaintiff's symptoms and medical

3 || opinions in determining Plaintiff's RFC. (AR 23).

4 The ALJ’s decision properly considered the medical opinions about

5 || Plaintiff's mental impairments under the applicable regulations. The Court

6 || discerns no error. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 2001) (while an

7 || ALJ is required to discuss and evaluate evidence that supports his or her

g conclusions, the ALJ is not required to do so under any specific heading); see also

9 Ozolins v. Saul, 849 Fed. App’x 682, 683 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Although the ALJ’s

10 explanation might have been more robust, her lengthy evaluation of the evidence

1 elsewhere ‘is an adequate statement of the foundations on which the ultimate

D factual conclusions are based.’”’) (citation omitted); compare Kaufmann v.

3 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022) (district court “clearly erred” when it

failed to consider “all the pages of the ALJ’s decision’). In formulating a RFC,

14 and in the consequent hypothetical questioning of a vocational expert based on

15 such capacity, an ALJ need not include all conceivable limitations that favorable

16 interpretation of the record might suggest to exist — only those limitations the ALJ

17 finds to exist. See, e.g., Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir.

18 2005); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Magallanes v.

19 Bowen, 881 F.2d at 756-57. In the present case, the ALJ was not required to

20 | include in Plaintiff's RFC alleged mental limitations the ALJ found not to exist

21 || that medical providers also did not find. See id.

22 | ///

23 | ///

24 ///

25 | ///

26 | ///

97 || ///

2 ///

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1 V. CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social

3 Security is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff is not entitled to a remand based on the ALJ’s

4 consideration of the medical record and the resultant RFC determination.

5 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

6 DATED: December 18, 2025

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_____________/s/____________________

Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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