NEWSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

YOLANDA E. NEWSON, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-7134

:

SAMIHAH McNAIR MARQUISE :

MAYNOR, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

PEREZ, J. DECEMBER 19, 2025

Plaintiff Yolanda E. Newson brings this civil action against Samihah McNair Marquise

Maynor and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will

grant Newson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss her Complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

The allegations in Newson’s Complaint are sparse. She alleges she agreed to make a

dress for Maynor for $195.00, in advance of a trip Maynor had scheduled for the middle of

December 2025. (Compl. at 4.) Maynor paid $50.00 “as a down payment until the dress was

finished.” (Id.) Newson alleges that she completed the dress and gave Maynor “numerous

chances and made phone calls,” in an effort to collect the remaining balance, but that “[u]nder

color of law” Maynor failed to pay her. (Id.) As a result, she has suffered “a mental injury by

not being able to pay off the bills because of the lying and this issue is causing physical injury by

1 Newson used the form civil rights complaint available to unrepresented litigants to file her

Complaint (“Compl.”). (ECF No. 2.) The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are

taken from Complaint.

doing the work without getting paid.” (Id. at 5.) Accordingly, Newson claims a violation of her

due process rights and breach of contract. (Id. at 3.) She seeks $100,000 in damages. (Id. at 5.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Newson leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

she is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from an immune defendant.

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court must dismiss the action.”); see also Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango,

Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter

jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”).

A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015).

“Jurisdictional [issues] . . . may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them

sua sponte.” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted).

As Newson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8

F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Newson attempts to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

by using the Court’s form complaint for a plaintiff alleging a civil rights violation and asserting

due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, “wholly insubstantial” claims are

insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction, even if they purport to be predicated on a

federal statute. Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015) (“We have long distinguished

between failing to raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes . . . and failing

to state a claim for relief on the merits; only ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ claims implicate

the former.” (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)); see also Kehr Packages, Inc.

v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991) (dismissal of claims for lack of

jurisdiction is proper “when the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the

purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous” (cleaned up)). The

factual scenario described in the Complaint as the basis for Newson’s claims, i.e., a private

transaction with a private party who is not subject to liability under § 1983, does not raise a

substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes, see, e.g., Rose v. Husenaj, 708 F. App’x

57, 60 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (concluding that civil rights claims were insufficiently

substantial to invoke federal question jurisdiction because “Rose’s conclusory reference to ‘civil

rights’ does not convert his tort claims against non-state actors into constitutional claims”);

Yoder v. Morrow, 671 F. App’x 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for lack

of subject matter jursidction because “[a]lthough Yoder’s complaint purported to rely on 42

U.S.C. § 1983, her allegations do not actually implicate that federal statute”); see also Duffy v.

George, 669 F. App’x 73, 74 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“Defendants are private actors, not

state actors, who generally cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Accordingly, the

Court may not exercise jurisdiction under § 1331.

B. State Claims

Newson also raises a breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law, which is in any

event a better construction of her Complaint. See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d

244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant

has mentioned it by name.”). District courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases raising claims

exclusively under state law if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a). “Complete diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multiple

defendants, no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks

Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). For diversity purposes, an individual is a

citizen of the state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where she is physically present and

intends to remain. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). A

plaintiff’s good faith allegations governs whether the amount in controversy is satisfied unless it

is clear to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed. See, e.g., St.

Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (“The rule governing

dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives

a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good

faith.” (footnotes omitted)); Spectacor Mgmt. Grp. v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1997)

(“As a general rule, [the amount in controversy] is determined from the good faith allegations

appearing on the face of the complaint.”).

Newson provides Pennsylvania addresses for herself and Maynor, which suggests that

they are both Pennsylvania citizens. (Compl. at 2.) Further, it is apparent from the face of the

Complaint that the amount in controversy is not met here. The amount of money at issue is

$145, i.e., the amount Newson is still owed for her work on the dress. (See id. at 4.) That

amount is far below the jurisdictional threshold even taking into account any interest and

punitive damages if warranted. Cf. Goldfarb v. Kalodimos, 539 F. Supp. 3d 435, 450 (E.D. Pa.

2021) (“[T]he amount in controversy requirement is met when a punitive to compensatory

damages ratio of at least 1-to-1 exceeds the $75,000 threshold.” (citing Minissale v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 988 F.Supp.2d 472, 473-75, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2013))). Accordingly, it is clear to a

legal certainty that the amount in controversy is not met here. See Gibson v. Tip Towing &

Recovery LLC, No. 23-2919, 2024 WL 658977, at *1 n.3 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (per curiam)

(“Gibson alleged that the value of her roughly decade-old vehicle was $100,000, and she

demanded that the defendants pay her $10,000 per day for holding it. But the District Court

“ha[d] no trouble finding that such monetary demands are not made in good faith.”); see also

Kalick v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 372 F. App’x 317, 322 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming the

district court’s ruling that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because plaintiff's plausible damages

were well below $75,000).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. See Associated Builders & Contractors W. Pa. v. Cmty. Coll. of

Allegheny Cnty., 81 F.4th 279, 291 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[A] dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and thus should be ordered ‘without prejudice.’”

(quoting Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999))). The dismissal

does not preclude Newson from filing a complaint in the proper state court so she may proceed

on her claims in that venue, should she choose to do so.”

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

fii ZD

MIAR.PEREZ,J. sss—S

The Court expresses no opinion at this time on the merits of Newson’s state claims.