Moreno-Espinoza

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

ORLANDO MORENO-ESPINOZA, )

)

Petitioner, )

) No. 2:25-cv-03093-TLP-tmp

v. )

)

SCOTT LADWIG, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Orlando Moreno-Espinoza, an alien detained in the West Tennessee Detention

Facility in Mason, Tennessee, petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

(ECF No. 8.) On December 4, 2025, the Court entered an Order directing Respondent to show

cause why the Writ should not be granted and indicating that the Court would hold a hearing on

the Petition. (ECF No. 4.) Respondent responded to the Show Cause Order (ECF No. 6), and

Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 8.) The Parties consented, by email, to having the Court rule on the

briefing without a hearing.

For the reasons stated below, the Petition is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, has been living in the United States for an unknown period.

(ECF No. 6 at PageID 25.) He filed a Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)

application I-821D on March 29, 2021. (Id.) On his I-213 form narrative, Petitioner claims to

have attended school in the United States, suggesting his residence has been in the United States

for at least several years. (ECF No. 6-3 at PageID 51.) Petitioner was born in 2002 and is no

longer a minor. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 26.)

Federal law enforcement detained Petitioner during a traffic stop on November 19, 2025.

(Id. at PageID 25–26.) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took Petitioner into

custody, and he remains in ICE custody at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason,

Tennessee. (Id. at PageID 26; ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 13.) On November 19, 2025, ICE served

Petitioner with a Notice to Appear, charging him with being “an alien present in the United

States who has not been admitted or paroled.” (ECF No. 6-1 at PageID 46–47.) The Notice to

Appear set a hearing for Petitioner on December 12, 2025. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 26.)

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has not held a bond hearing for

Petitioner. (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 14.) Based on a new policy interpretation, DHS determined

that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (ECF No. 6 at PageID

26.) In July 2025, DHS, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and ICE issued the new policy on

the detention of noncitizens.1 The new policy subjects noncitizens who have resided in the

United States for a long time and who are apprehended in the interior of the country to

mandatory detention. In the past, immigration authorities would have afforded the noncitizens

bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Before this policy change, the immigration authorities

did not consider these noncitizens “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory detention

under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig et al., No. 2:25-cv-02962, 2025 WL 3047889,

1 American Immigration Lawyers Association, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding

Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA (July 8, 2025),

https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-

for-admission (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that

‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.”) (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).

at *1–2 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). They were instead detained under § 1226(a) and given a

bond hearing. Id.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) later upheld this new policy in the case of

Matter of Yajure Hurtado. 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). And so immigration judges are now

bound by precedent which denies noncitizens bond hearings under § 1225(b)(2)(A), even though

those same noncitizens would have been eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

Petitioner, who has presumably resided in the United States for several years, now faces

the prospect of extended detention in ICE custody. He asserts that the failure to provide him

with a bond hearing violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due

process, and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. (ECF No. 1 at

PageID 6.) He asks the Court to grant his Petition and to order a bond hearing, his immediate

release from custody if a bond hearing is not provided, and attorney’s fees and costs under the

Equal Access to Justice Act. (Id. at PageID 7; ECF No. 8 at PageID 68.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“Habeas relief is available when a person is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States.’” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 776

(E.D. Mich. 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).

Two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) primarily govern

the detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. The

Supreme Court has already distinguished these two provisions in Jenings v. Rodriguez. See 583

U.S. 281, 289 (2018). The Jennings Court determined that the government may “detain certain

aliens seeking admission into the country” under § 1225(b) while § 1226 “authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal

proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added). Relevant here, § 1225(b)(2)(A) governs mandatory

detention of applicants for admission after an immigration officer has determined that they will

not be entitled to admission.

(b) Inspection of applicants for admission

. . .

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In general

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien

who is an applicant for admission, if the examining

immigration officer determines that an alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under

section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). An “applicant for admission” is a noncitizen “present in the United

States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

“[A]dmission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States

after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

On the other hand, § 1226(a) provides for discretionary detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the

United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such

decision, the Attorney General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and

containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .

. . .

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Known as the Laken Riley Act, subsection (c) of § 1226, provides for

mandatory detention of noncitizens found inadmissible or deportable under certain provisions

and who have been “charged with,” “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit “having committed”

certain listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). “[N]oncitizens arrested and detained under § 1226

have a right to request a custody redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) before an Immigration

Judge.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). “The IJ evaluates whether there is a risk of nonappearance or danger to

the community.” Id. (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). The Court

now turns to the analysis of Petitioner’s claims.

ANALYSIS

The Court must determine whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s

detention. This is not an issue of first impression before this Court. And Respondent detaining

Petitioner under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is not an isolated event. Indeed, the Court

recently considered this same question and held that Ҥ 1226 governs the arrest and detention of

an alien without a criminal history who has been residing in the United States.” See, e.g.,

Monge-Nunez, No. 2:25-cv-03043-TLP-atc, 2025 WL 3565348, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12,

2025); Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, No. 2:25-cv-03045-TLP-cgc, 2025 WL 3638007 (W.D. Tenn.

Dec. 15, 2025). Because of the increasing frequency of these habeas petitions, other district

courts in this circuit have also been asked to consider which statutory provision governs. Most

of them have determined that § 1226(a) fits in this scenario. See, e.g., Godinez-Lopez, No. 2:25-

cv-02962-SHL-atc, 2025 WL 3047889 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,

797 F.Supp.3d 771 (E.D. Mich. 2025). Other district courts across the country have concluded

the same. As one court just observed:

By a recent count, the central issue in this case – the administration's new position

that all noncitizens who came into the United States illegally, but since have been

living in the United States, must be detained until their removal proceedings are

completed – has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts.

The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of

those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different

courts spread across the United States. Thus, the overwhelming, lopsided

majority have held that the law still means what it always has meant.

Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-cv-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)

(collecting cases). But the Sixth Circuit has yet to decide whether §§ 1225(b) or 1226(a) applies

under these circumstances.

With that in mind, the Courts analysis here comes in three parts.2 The Court first

considers whether it should require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before

hearing this claim. It then uses statutory interpretation to determine which section applies. And

finally, the Court addresses procedural due process. And for the reasons stated below, the Court

finds that § 1226(a) is the appropriate statute under which Petitioner should be considered

detained and that he is entitled to a bond hearing. The Petition therefore is GRANTED.

I. Administrative Exhaustion

Exhaustion is required when mandated by Congress. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503

U.S. 140, 144 (1992). The Parties agree that administrative exhaustion is not statutorily required

here but disagree on whether the Court should apply the doctrine of prudential exhaustion.

(Compare ECF No. 6 at PageID 27–28, with ECF No. 8 at PageID 57–59.) The Court agrees

that Congress has not explicitly mandated exhaustion in this context. When Congress has not

explicitly spoken, whether to require exhaustion of administrative remedies lies within “sound

judicial discretion.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144. In exercising that discretion, the Supreme

Court has stated that “federal courts must balance the interest of the individual in retaining

prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring

2 Because the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to the discretionary bond process under

§ 1226 as a matter of statutory interpretation and procedural due process, it need not consider

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim. (See ECF No. 6 at PageID 43–44; ECF No. 8 at PageID

67.)

exhaustion.” Id. at 146. Those institutional interests are “protecting administrative agency

authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 145.

The McCarthy Court also identified situations in which the interest of the individual

weighs heavily against the institutional interests. See id. at 146–49. Relevant here, “an

administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise

predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.

14 (1973); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's

submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to

petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney

General “would be to demand a futile act”); Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,

627 F.2d 1151, 1156–1157 (1979) (bias of Federal Trade Commission chairman), cert. denied,

447 U.S. 921 (1980); Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d 900, 912–913 (5th Cir.

1981) (en banc) (administrative procedures must “not be used to harass or otherwise discourage

those with legitimate claims”), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents of

Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)); See also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 822–23 (6th Cir.

2015) (“If administrative review would come to naught, if any efforts before the agency would

be pointless, the courts do not insist that litigants go through the motions of exhausting the claim

anyway.”) (internal quotations omitted).

The Court agrees with Petitioner that the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

which is binding on immigration judges, makes exhausting administrative remedies futile here.

(ECF No. 8 at PageID 57–59;) see 29 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (holding that aliens “who

surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they

are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer” because “[r]emaining in the

United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not

constitute an ‘admission”’). To exhaust his remedies here, Petitioner would appeal to the same

BIA. So the decision on whether to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing has been

predetermined.

What is more, the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. So Petitioner can only

have his due process claim reviewed in federal court. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279

(6th Cir. 2006). Requiring exhaustion here would not further the ends of judicial efficiency and

protecting administrative authority because it would simply delay the resolution of Petitioner’s

legal questions. Petitioner’s individual interest in having prompt access to this forum outweighs

any institutional interests at stake. Another practical reason supports this conclusion. “Bond

appeals before the BIA, on average, take six months to complete.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,

797 F.Supp.3d 771, 779 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239,

1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025)).

Requiring Petitioner to wait six months—or any length of time for that matter—so that

the BIA can address an issue it has already decided creates hardship for hardship’s sake. The

Court declines to impose such a result here.3

3 Respondent points the Court to a line of cases out of the Northern District of Ohio that require

immigration habeas petitioners to exhaust their bond-related administrative remedies before

considering their habeas claims. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 27 (citing Monroy Vaillalta v. Greene,

No. 25-1594, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2– 3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025); Hernandez Torrealba v.

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8–12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25,

2025); see also Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigration & Customs

Enforcement, No. 25-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025)). The Court

has reviewed those cases. And finds the reasoning unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above.

II. Statutory Interpretation

The Parties disagree over whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) should govern

Petitioner’s detention. And they take conflicting views on how to interpret these sections.

Pertitioner argues that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him and that § 1226(a) does for several

reasons. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 59–64.) He asserts that Respondent’s interpretation of §

1225(b)(2)(A) strips the words “seeking admission” of independent meaning by assuming that all

“applicants for admission” are necessarily seeking admission. (Id. at PageID 59–60, 61.) He

then argues that Respondent’s interpretation ignores the subject matter of § 1225, which deals

with immigrants actively crossing the border or arriving at a port of entry. (Id. at PageID 60.)

Petitioner notes that the Supreme Court in Jennings distinguished between § 1225 and § 1226 by

function and population, with § 1225 covering individuals arriving at the border and § 1226

functioning as the general detention authority for noncitizens inside the country. (Id. at PageID

61–62.) He also points out that the text of § 1226 allows the Attorney General to “arrest or

detain” any noncitizen “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed,” which

describes Petitioner’s current situation. (Id. at PageID 62.)

Petitioner argues that, given the overlap in the populations of noncitizens that both

§ 1225 and § 1226 cover—noncitizens present in the United States without being admitted—

§ 1226 should govern here because it is the specific provision authorizing detention of

noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the country. (Id. at PageID 63.) Petitioner further

argues that Respondent’s reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A) makes § 1226(c) superfluous because it

requires mandatory detention of individuals found inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A) who have

also committed another crime. (Id. at PageID 63–64.) If § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires the mandatory

detention of all noncitizens found inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A), then § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)

has no independent function. (Id.)

Petitioner continues by asserting that the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado was

wrongly decided. And the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright requires the Court to come

to its own independent interpretation of the statutory framework without deference to the BIA.

(Id. at PageID 64–65.) He points to his prior textual arguments as evidence that his

interpretation of the INA is the most persuasive. (Id.)

Petitioner makes a constitutional avoidance argument, asserting that his interpretation of

the INA eliminates any potential constitutional concerns with indefinite detention of noncitizens.

(Id. at PageID 65.) Finally, he cites the growing number of district courts, including this one,

that have decided this same legal question in favor of the petitioner. (Id. at PageID 65.)

Respondent argues that § 1225’s text is unambiguous, controls here, and that other

districts have adopted the Respondent’s position. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 29–37.) The thrust of

Respondent’s interpretation tracks the BIA’s recent opinion in Matter of Yajure Hurtado.

Respondent asserts that an “applicant for admission” is any unadmitted noncitizen in the United

States. And since Petitioner is an applicant for admission, he is necessarily seeking admission.4

As a result, says Respondent, Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) pending

further removal proceedings under § 1229a. (Id.) And this reading of § 1225 aligns with the

policy goal of avoiding rewarding noncitizens that evade examination upon entry into the

country. (See id. at PageID 34–36.)

4 According to Respondent, the INA recognizes only two classes of unadmitted noncitizens that

are not seeking admission: (1) “someone who withdraws his application for admission and

‘depart[s] immediately from the United States’” and (2) “someone who agrees to voluntarily

depart ‘in lieu of being subject to proceedings under § 1229a . . . or prior to the completion of

such proceedings.’.” (Id. at PageID 30–31.)

Respondent also argues that § 1225 does not contradict or render superfluous § 1226.

(Id. at PageID 37–38.) He argues that 1226(a) applies to any alien who is not an “applicant for

admission.” (Id. at PageID 37.) He asserts that, although the two provisions overlap, § 1226(c)

independently requires mandatory detention for any admitted noncitizen found deportable under

certain provisions of § 1227(a)(2), inadmissible noncitizens who were admitted in error, and

noncitizens who are crewmen or stowaways. (Id. at PageID 38–40.) He continues that § 1226(c)

limits the circumstances in which noncitizens who commit certain offenses can be paroled as

compared to those detained under Section 1225(b)(2). (Id. at PageID 38–39.)

Courts should construe statutes “so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part

will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303,

314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)). In doing so, courts must give each

word within the statute “‘its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while keeping in mind

that ‘statutory language has meaning only in context.’” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603

(6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.

Ct. 1002, 1010, (2017); Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States ex rel.

Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 415 (2005); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 356

(2013)). And courts “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in

a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).

And “[b]arring unusual cases, ‘[s]tatutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words.’”

Maldonado Bautista et al. v. Santacruz Jr. et al., No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL

3289861, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (quoting Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336

U.S. 198, 201 (1949)).

For the reasons below, these principles resolve the dispute in Petitioner’s favor.

Although certain legal principles overlap, the Court first addresses the plain language before

considering the statutory framework. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016).

a. Interpretation of the Plain Text

As noted above, the Parties disagree over whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) should

govern Petitioner’s detention. Detention under 1225(b)(2)(A) applies “in the case of an alien

who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien

seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A). This means the alien must be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking

admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”

For starters, as the Maldonado Bautista court reasoned, the plain text of the statutory

definition of “applicants for admission” does not support its application to Petitioner. 2025 WL

3289861 at *8–9. An “applicant for admission” is defined in § 1225(a)(1) as “[a]n alien present

in the United States who has not been admitted . . . ,” and “admitted” is defined in

§ 1101(a)(13)(A) as noncitizens who have not “lawful[ly entered] into the United States after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). So the definition of “applicants for admission” can be read

as noncitizens who have not “lawful[ly entered] into the United States after inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer.” This definition requires applicants for admission to

have undergone inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. It does not fit

Respondent’s definition of “applicants for admission,” which includes noncitizens who have

been residing in the interior of the country for a long time without inspection or authorization by

an immigration officer.

Respondent also ignores several words and phrases within § 1225(b)(2)(A) in its

interpretation of the provision. See Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig et al. No. 2:25- CV-02962, 2025

WL 3047889, at *4–5 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). “If possible, every word and every provision

is to be given effect.” Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 174 (2012). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) states, “[I]n the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained

for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

As Petitioner points out, he was not seeking admission at the time of his apprehension. (See ECF

No. 8 at PageID 60.) An examining immigration officer did not decide whether he was “not

clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” (See id.) The language of § 1225(b)(2)(A)

points to a noncitizen arriving at the border or port of entry and a candidate for expedited

removal. It does not coherently apply to a noncitizen detained far from the border years after

entry.

Respondent asserts that almost all noncitizens who entered the country unlawfully were

“seeking admission,” no matter how or when ICE arrested them or how long they lived in the

United States. (See ECF No. 6 at PageID 31.) He ignores the language of § 1225(b)(2)(A)

which suggests active conduct by the noncitizen. That statute is written using the progressive

verb tense. So under § 1225(b)(2)(A), to be mandatorily detained, the noncitizen must be

“seeking admission,” not simply residing in the country after entering it unlawfully. The Court

finds that this language suggests action and that to fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the noncitizen

must be actively seeking admission. The Court’s reading differs from Respondent’s by

recognizing the class of noncitizens that did not lawfully enter the United States—subject to

removal proceedings as a result—but who are nonetheless not seeking admission. That the INA

provides two examples of noncitizens who are not seeking admission does not preclude the

existence of more classes of noncitizens that do not fall under § 1225. (See id. at PageID 30–31.)

The plain meaning of § 1226 better captures Petitioner’s situation. It applies to the

“apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by the Attorney

General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be

removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner was apprehended in the

interior of the country after residing here for presumably, several years. Thus the Attorney

General has the discretion under this section to “continue to detain [him]” or she “may release

[him] on bond.” (Id.) She may not, though, deny him the bond hearing to which he is entitled.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).

b. Interpretation of the Statutory Framework

The titles of the provisions here suggest that Petitioner’s interpretation of the statutory

framework is correct. See Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig et al., No. 2:25-cv-02962, 2025 WL

3047889, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). “[T]he title of a statute in the heading of a section

are tools available for the resolution of a doubt” about the statute’s meaning. Dubin v. United

States, 599 U.S. 110, 121 (2023). The title of § 1225 is “Inspection by immigration officers;

expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing,” and the title of § 1226 is

“Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225–26. Section 1225’s title envisions

arriving aliens placed in expedited removal, but Petitioner was detained far from the border

presumably several years after he had crossed it. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 25; ECF No. 6-3 at

PageID 61.) The title of § 1225 therefore seems inapplicable to noncitizens in Petitioner’s shoes,

but the title of § 1226 seems spot on. Petitioner is a noncitizen who was apprehended in the

interior of country and then detained.

A look at the subject matter of § 1225 further undercuts Respondent’s interpretation of

the statutory framework. Section 1225 describes the process of inspecting and removing

immigrants who are actively crossing the border or entering at a port of entry. See Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (“That process of decision [described in § 1225] generally

begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether

an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). It explicitly

applies to “an alien who . . . has not affirmatively shown . . . that the alien has been physically

present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of

the determination of inadmissibility . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). It makes little sense

to apply § 1225 to Petitioner who has resided in the United States a long time and is not actively

entering the country.

The existence of § 1226(c) also undercuts the Respondent’s position here because

Respondent’s interpretation of the INA makes § 1226(c) largely superfluous. See Godinez-Lopez

v. Ladwig et al., No. 2:25- cv-02962, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). “In Section 1226(c), the

INA describes people who would otherwise be eligible for bond under Section 1226(a), but are

rendered ineligible for bond because of their criminal histories.” Monge-Nunez v. Ladwig,

No. 2:25-cv-03043-TLP-atc, 2025 WL 3565348, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2025) (internal

quotations omitted). Subsections 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) provide for mandatory detention of

certain noncitizens. But they apply only to those noncitizens who both entered the country

without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (C), and (7) and are also “charged with, . . .

arrested for, . . . convicted of . . .” certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And so, to

read § 1225(b)(2)(A) to make, essentially, every noncitizen that did not lawfully enter the

country subject to mandatory detention (as Respondent argues) would strip 1226(c) of meaning.

Further, Congress only recently added subsection 1226(c)(1)(E) to § 1226 with the Laken Riley

Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Respondent’s interpretation also asks this Court to

presume Congress pointlessly amended the statute with a largely redundant provision when it

most recently considered it. See Lopez-Campos Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 783–

84 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (quoting Maldonado v. Olsen, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 237441, *12 (D.

Minn. Aug. 15, 2025)). The Court declines to do so.

Respondent’s arguments that his interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not render

§ 1226(c) superfluous are unavailing. Respondent interprets 1226(c) to require mandatory

detention of only certain classes of noncitizens that fall outside of those mandatorily detained

under § 1225(b)(2)(A). (ECF No. 6 at PageID 37–38.) In effect, Respondent asks the Court to

read the language of § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E)(i), which covers noncitizens deportable or inadmissible

under several statutory provisions, to only apply to (1) noncitizens already admitted and now

deportable, (2) noncitizens admitted in error; and (3) stowaways and crewmembers. (Id.) This

reading contradicts the plain language of § 1226(c), which applies to all inadmissible noncitizens

on its face and does not reference stowaways or crewmembers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

Respondent therefore asks the Court to read § 1226(c) narrowly as well as ignore the language of

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), which limits its reach to applicants for admission who have been encountered at

the border. Instead, this Court chooses to give the language of each provision the effect its plain

meaning requires—by limiting § 1225(b)(2)(A) in its application to border encounters and by

applying § 1226(c) broadly to criminal noncitizens.

Given the plain text and structure of the INA and its recent amendment with the Laken

Riley Act, the Court finds § 1226 governs the arrest and detention of a noncitizen without an

apparent criminal history who has been residing in the United States for several years. Petitioner

is therefore subject to the discretionary bond process under § 1226 and entitled to a bond

hearing.

III. Due Process

Because the Court has found that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, he is owed

the process given to him under the statute. See, e.g. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,

591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[A]n alien in [Petitioner’s] position has only the rights . . . that

Congress has provided by statute.”). Petitioner alleges that Respondent violates his due process

rights by continuing to detain him without a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.)

Respondent counters that because Petitioner complains that he is detained under the wrong

statute, even if his detention is unlawful, it is not unconstitutional. Respondent notes that

Petitioner “has been given notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend

hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, and has the right to appeal the

denial of any request for bond.” (ECF No. 6 at PageID 42–43 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1362).) Put

simply, Respondent asserts that § 1225(b)(2)(A) has already afforded Petitioner the due process

that Congress chose to provide him. (Id. at 40–43.)

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being

“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The

Due Process Clause extends to all ‘persons’ regardless of status, including non-citizens (whether

here lawfully, unlawfully, temporarily, or permanently).” Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771,

784 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). “In the context of

civil immigration detention, the Sixth Circuit applies the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldrige,

424 U.S. 319 (1976), to evaluate the level of process owed a noncitizen.” Godinez-Lopez v.

Ladwig et al., No. 2:25-cv-02962, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025) (citing United States v.

Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)). Under the Matthews test, this Court

considers (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action.” (2) “the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail.” Mattews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. He has a strong liberty interest in being free

from physical detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation is high here considering that

Respondent and the BIA’s current position is to afford him no bond hearing whatsoever. And

bond hearings are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s interest in

immigration enforcement against individual liberties. So the Court finds that the Government’s

interest in detaining Petitioner without that procedural safeguard does not outweigh Petitioner’s

liberty interest or the risk of erroneous deprivation. This is all the more true because Petitioner

has no meaningful opportunity for an immigration judge to consider whether he is a danger to

society or a flight risk. And the fact that Petitioner has been living in the United States for the

past several years with no apparent criminal history further tips the scales in his favor.

Consequently, Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing violated his liberty interest.

Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. The Court therefore

GRANTS the Petition.

IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 17.) Section 2412(b) allows a court to award “reasonable

fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to

subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States .

. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 requires that claims for attorney’s

fees and related expenses be made by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). Petitioner must

therefore move under Local Rule 54.1(b) to seek attorney’s fees and costs. See Loc. R. 54.1(b).

CONCLUSION

Immigration policies have long been subject to the changing tides of government. But

those changing tides cannot usurp statutory authorization. For the reasons above, the Petition is

GRANTED. Respondent is ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1) within seven days of the entry of this Order

and to release Petitioner pending the bond hearing. Respondent is further ENJOINED from

pursuing Petitioner’s detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

SO ORDERED, this 19th day of December, 2025.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE