V.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI

RONALDO VELASQUEZ BARTOLON, : Case No. 1:25-cv-747

Petitioner, Judge Matthew W. McFarland

PAM BONDI, et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1) and Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,

Preliminary Injunction, and Emergency Relief (Doc. 15). The Court held a telephonic

conference on December 1, 2025, as to the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. See

Ohio Civ. R. 65.1(a). Respondent Kevin Grathwohl, Butler County Jail Warden, had

previously filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 6), to which

Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 8). Federal Respondents filed a combined

Return of Writ and Response in Opposition to the Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order (Doc. 16), to which Petitioner filed a Reply in Support (Doc. 17) and Supplemental

Evidence (Doc. 18). This matter is therefore ripe for the Court's review.

For the reasons explained below, Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Respondent Kevin Grathwohl’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to State a Claim (Doc. 6) is DENIED AS MOOT, and Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order (Doc. 15) is DENIED AS MOOT.

FACTS AS ALLEGED

Petitioner Ronaldo Velasquez Bartolon is a 21-year-old Guatemalan citizen who

entered the United States in February 2022, when he was 17 years old. (Petition, Doc. 1,

{ 2.) At that time, Petitioner was apprehended by immigration officials and classified as

an Unaccompanied Alien Child (“UAC”). (Id.) He was then released to family members

in Ohio. (Id.) In September 2022, Petitioner applied for Special Immigration Juvenile

Status (“SIJ Status”) with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”),

and his application was approved in March 2023. (Id. at | 5-6.)

On June 19, 2025, the Municipal Court for Fairfield, Ohio sentenced Petitioner to

180 days in jail, with 90 days suspended, for the first-degree misdemeanor offense of

driving a motor vehicle without a license. (Petition, Doc. 1, § 8.) Petitioner’s sentence was

deemed completed early after he served 40 days in a Hamilton, Ohio jail. (Id. at J 8-10.)

However, because United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) had

placed a detainer on Petitioner, he was thereafter transferred to the Butler County Jail in

Ohio and placed in ICE custody. (Id. at § 10.) Petitioner remains in ICE custody, and no

removal proceedings were scheduled at the time Petitioner initiated this habeas

proceeding. (Id. at § 12.) Since then, on October 30, 2025, it appears that Petitioner was

served with a Notice to Appear in connection with his removal proceedings. (See Notice

to Appear, Doc. 16-1, Pg. ID 162-65.)

Petitioner filed a bond request prior to the Department of Homeland Security’s

commencement of removal proceedings. (Petition, Doc. 1, { 13.) The immigration judge

denied Petitioner’s request after concluding that the immigration court lacked authority

to determine bond. (Id. at § 14; see also Bond Order, Doc. 16-2, Pg. ID 166-67.) There is no

indication on the record here that Petitioner has appealed this decision to the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).

On December 9, 2025, Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge for a bond

redetermination hearing. (Reply, Doc. 17, Pg. ID 188-89; Supplemental Evidence, Doc.

18.) The immigration judge again denied Petitioner bond on jurisdictional grounds,

finding that Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), remains in effect and

therefore bars the immigration court from exercising jurisdiction to determine

Petitioner’s bond. (Second Bond Order, Doc. 18, Pg. ID 195-97.) The immigration judge

also determined that the orders concerning summary judgment and class certification by

the United States District Court for the Central District of California in Bautista v.

Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), did not alter this

conclusion. (Id.) It appears that Petitioner has reserved his right to appeal this decision

within the immigration court system. (Id. at Pg. ID 197.)

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On October 15, 2025, Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1). Specifically, Petitioner claims that his ongoing detention violates his right to due

process under the Fifth Amendment, and that his removal from the United States prior

to adjudication of his lawful permanent residency status violates his right to procedural

due process under the Constitution. (Id. at {| 66-78.) Petitioner further alleges that

Respondents violated the Administrative Procedure Act by revoking his release and

detaining him without a bond hearing. (Id. at 79-86.) Finally, Petitioner alleges that

his removal without an opportunity for judicial review violates the Suspension Clause.

(Id. at | 87-88.) Respondent Kevin Grathwohl filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim (Doc. 6) on October 29, 2025, to which Petitioner filed a Response in

Opposition (Doc. 8) on November 10, 2025.

On November 25, 2025, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Emergency Relief requesting that this

Court order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody and enjoin Respondents from

transferring Petitioner outside the Southern District of Ohio pending these proceedings.

(Motion, Doc. 15, Pg. ID 122-23.) After correspondence with counsel for both Petitioner

and Respondents, the Court set this matter for a preliminary conference on December 1,

2025. (12/01/2025 Notice; see S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 65.1(a).) Counsel for both Petitioner and

Respondents were present by phone. (12/01/2025 Minute Entry.) On December 5, 2025,

Federal Respondents filed a combined Return of Writ and Response in Opposition to the

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 16), to which Petitioner filed a Reply in

Support (Doc. 17) on December 8, 2025. Petitioner also filed Supplemental Evidence (Doc.

18) on December 10, 2025, which indicated that Petitioner received a bond

redetermination hearing on December 9, 2025, but that the immigration judge denied

bond on jurisdictional grounds.

LAW & ANALYSIS

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The fundamental question of subject matter jurisdiction must precede any analysis

of the merits on this matter. As federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction” and

“possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,” they “have an

independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,

946 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

Petitioner asserts that this Court possesses jurisdiction to hear this matter because

it involves: (1) habeas review (28 U.S.C. § 2241), federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §

1331), and the Suspension Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2); (2) the All Writs Act (28

US.C, § 1651); (3) the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 701); and (4) injunctive

relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). (Petition, Doc. 1, { 24.)

Respondents, in turn, contend that several statutory provisions divest this Court of

jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. (See Return of Writ, Doc. 16, Pg. ID 129-35.)

To begin, in enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) through the REAL ID Act, Congress limited

the jurisdiction of federal courts as follows:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision

of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any

other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no

court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of

any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against

any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). “In the REAL ID Act, Congress decided that, as a matter of public

policy, [federal courts] do not have jurisdiction to decide claims that arise from the

decision of the Executive Branch to execute a removal order.” Rranxburgaj v. Wolf, 825 F.

App’x 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2020). This holds true “whether or not [federal courts] agree with

ICE’s decision to execute [a petitioner’s] removal order.” Id. Similarly, given § 1252(g)’s

language as to commencing proceedings and adjudicating cases, this jurisdictional bar

also extends to situations in which a petitioner is notified that he or she must “voluntarily

depart or face deportation.” Ene v. Phillips, 99 F. App’x 642, 643 (6th Cir. 2004).

The plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) therefore limits jurisdiction as it relates to

claims arising from the commencement of removal proceedings, adjudication of such

cases, or the execution of removal orders— even when jurisdiction would otherwise be

proper under federal question jurisdiction, mandamus jurisdiction, or “any other

provision of law.” See Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600 F.3d 597, 607 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Karki,

et al. v. Jones, et al., No. 25-CV-281, 2025 WL 1638070, at *7 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2025). By its

terms, this statutory limitation also applies to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which

would typically provide jurisdiction over cases where an alien is held in custody in

violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.

678, 687 (2001). That said, certain applications of § 1252(g) may potentially cause tension

with the Suspension Clause. As the Framers enshrined in the Constitution: “The Privilege

of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion

or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In order to

successfully contest the constitutionality of this statute on Suspension Clause grounds,

two things must be true: (1) the petitioner must be seeking “core” habeas relief; and (2)

there is no adequate substitute to effectively test petitioner’s detention. Hamama v.

Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 875-76 (6th Cir. 2018).

Petitioner, however, contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not strip this Court of

jurisdiction, as the statute reaches only “three discrete actions that the Attorney General

may take: her decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute

removal orders.” (Petition, Doc. 1, { 25, see also n.17 (quoting Reno v. Am-Arab Anti-

Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)) (cleaned up).) Further, Petitioner argues

that if § 1252(g) “did strip jurisdiction from this case, that statute would be

unconstitutional as applied,” pursuant to the Suspension Clause. (Id. at n. 18.)

In approaching this jurisdictional question, the Court splits Petitioner’s claims into

two categories: removal-based claims (Counts 2 and 4) and detention-based claims

(Counts 1 and 3). At bottom, Counts 2 and 4 seek to challenge the attempt to remove

Petitioner, arguing that such removal is erroneous given his SJJ Status, and that the

removal would violate the Suspension Clause. (Petition, Doc. 1, { 24, 73-78, 87-88.) His

detention-based claims, however, challenge his detention without a bond hearing in

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). The Court begins with Petitioner’s removal-based claims and then turns to

his detention-based claims.

a. Removal-Based Claims

To the extent Petitioner seeks this Court to enjoin removal proceedings or his

ultimate removal (Petition, Doc. 1, Pg. ID 27), the Court finds that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over these claims. In reaching this conclusion, the Court is guided by the

seminal precedent on this issue: Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018). In

Hamama, the Sixth Circuit found that “the Attorney General’s enforcement of long-

standing removal orders falls squarely under the Attorney General's decision to execute

removal orders and is not subject to judicial review.” 912 F.3d at 874. The Sixth Circuit

proceeded to explain why the district court’s “broad, novel, and incorrect application of

the Suspension Clause” was misguided for “at least two” independent reasons. Id. at 875.

First, the Sixth Circuit found that the petitioners in Hamama were not seeking a

“core remedy” of habeas relief through their removal-based claims; thus, such relief was

not protected by the Suspension Clause. Hamama, 912 F.3d at 875-76. “The traditional

remedy provided by habeas is removing the injury of unjust and illegal confinement.” Id.

at 875 (quotation omitted). As the petitioners neither sought — nor were granted release

from custody, the Sixth Circuit concluded that habeas relief was not implicated. Id.

Specifically, “the nature of the relief sought by the habeas petitioners suggest[ed] that

habeas is not appropriate in these cases’ because ‘the last thing petitioners want is simple

release’ but instead a ‘court order requiring the United States to shelter them.’” Id.

(quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693-94 (2008)).

Second, the Sixth Circuit explained that “[e]ven if the relief Petitioners seek was

available under the common-law writ, Petitioners’ Suspension Clause claim would fail

for the independent reason that Congress has provided an adequate alternative as

applied to them.” Hamama, 912 F.3d at 876. This is significant because “Congress does not

suspend the writ when it strips the courts of habeas jurisdiction so long as it provides a

substitute that is adequate and effective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Id.

(citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977)). The Sixth Circuit found that the

alternative method of review —filing a motion to reopen with the ability to appeal the

decision to the federal appellate court— proved adequate. Id. at 876-77. Though the

petitioners argued that this alternative would be inadequate as applied to them, the Court

disagreed since they had years to file their motions to reopen and the ability to pursue

stays of removal while seeking relief. Id.

Courts throughout the Sixth Circuit have faithfully applied Hamama as a bar to

judicial review of the execution of removal orders. For instance, the District Court for the

Eastern District of Michigan has frequently denied similar requests to stay removal

orders in light of Hamama’s controlling precedent. See, e.g., Al Shimary v. Rayborn, No.

2:24-CV-11646, 2024 WL 3625169, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2024); Kazan v. Sessions, No.

18-CV-11750, 2023 WL 2347069, at *2-3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2023); Portillo v. Wolf, No. 2:20-

CV-12730, 2020 WL 6130880, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2020); E! Moustrah v. Barr, No. 19-

CV-13549, 2020 WL 1473305, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2020). More recently, this Court

has found the same. See, e.g., Karki, et al. v. Jones, et al., No. 1:25-CV-281, 2025 WL 1638070,

at *7 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2025); Abdugoniev v. Bondi, et al., No. 1:25-CV-133, 2025 WL 2772934

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2025). Not to mention, the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed its reliance on

Hamama. See, e.g., Karki v. Jones, No. 25-3440, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 20660, *6-10 (6th Cir.

Aug. 13, 2025); Rranxburgaj v. Wolf, 825 F. App’x 278, 282 (6th Cir. 2020).

Applying Hamama here, the Court finds that Petitioner’s removal-based claims

arise squarely under the Attorney General’s power to “commence proceedings,

adjudicate cases, [and] execute removal orders” and are thus not subject to judicial review

by this Court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Like in Hamama, Counts 2 and 4 do not seek simple

release from unlawful detention but instead ask the Court to enjoin Petitioner’s removal

and to essentially “shelter” him—requests which fall outside the scope of core habeas

relief. 912 F.3d at 875; see also Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-CV-1097, 2025 WL

3012033, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025) (finding that the Suspension Clause does not

apply and that § 1252(g) precludes jurisdiction over removal-based claims). The Court

would note that Petitioner’s Reply does not provide argument as to how his removal-

based claims fall beyond the ambit of § 1252(g). (See Reply, Doc. 17, Pg. ID 182.) And,

even assuming these claims were available under the common-law writ, Petitioner’s

Suspension Clause argument fails because Petitioner has an adequate alternative method

of review for these removal-based claims. Namely, Petitioner can appeal any removal

order he receives to the BIA. See Karki, 2025 WL 1638070, at *7-8 (discussing potential

avenues of relief). Thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Counts 2 and 4

of the Petition; for this reason, these counts must be dismissed.

b. Detention-Based Claims

Turning to Counts 1 and 3, the Court finds that these claims sound in core habeas

relief and do not fall within the scope of § 1252(g). In Hamama, the Sixth Circuit confirmed.

that the “district court’s jurisdiction over the detention-based claims [was] independent

of its jurisdiction over the removal-based claims.” Hamama, 912 F.3d at 877; see also Moussa

v. Jenifer, 389 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2004); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Indeed,

over 100 years, habeas corpus has been recognized as the vehicle through which

10

noncitizens may challenge the fact of their detention.” Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp.3d

643, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing Chin Yow v. U.S., 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908)). Here, Petitioner

argues that his detention without a bond hearing is unlawful; in other words, he

challenges the fact of his detention, independent from his removal. Accordingly, § 1252(¢)

does not inhibit this Court from reviewing such detention-based claims. See, e.g., Zhen v.

Doe, No. 3:25-CV-1507, 2025 WL 2258586, at *2-4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2025); Resendiz v.

Noem, No. 4:25-CV-159, 2025 WL 3527284, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2025).

Respondents cite a few other statutory provisions to make the argument that the

Court lacks jurisdiction over the detention-based claims. (Return of Writ, Doc. 16, Pg. ID

129-30, 132-35.) The Court takes each remaining argument in turn. First, 8 U.S.C. §

1252(e)(3) entitled as “Challenges on Validity of the System” — provides:

Judicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its

implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations of —

(i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement

such section, is constitutional; or

(ii) | whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive,

written policy guideline, or written procedure issued by or under the

authority of the Attorney General to implement such section, is not

consistent with applicable provisions of this subchapter or is

otherwise in violation of law.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A). Rather than “challenging the validity of the statutory scheme

itself” or a written policy, Petitioner is challenging “the lawfulness of his detention

without a bond hearing” because —as Petitioner sees it— the mandatory detention statute

simply does not apply to him. Rivero v. Noem, et al., No. 1:25-CV-1294, 2025 WL 3438303,

11

at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 2025). Thus, § 1252(e)(3) does not preclude jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

id.; Ardon-Quiroz v. Assistant Field Director, No. 25-CV-25290, 2025 WL 3451645, at *3 (S.D.

Fla. Dec. 1, 2025) (collecting cases for proposition that § 1252(e)(3) does not deprive

federal courts of jurisdiction in such situations).

Respondents’ invocation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) is also unavailing as applied to

Petitioner’s detention-based claims. Under this provision, “[j]udicial review of all

questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and

statutory provisions, arising from any action taken... to remove an alien from the United

States” is exclusively funneled to the Courts of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), (a)(5). In

Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court rejected an “expansive interpretation of §

1252(b)(9)” and determined that “questions of law” as to whether “certain statutory

provisions require detention without a bond hearing” do not “arise from” the decision to

remove an alien. 583 U.S. 281, 292-94 (2018). Here, since Petitioner’s detention-based

claims squarely contest his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and whether he is entitled to

a bond hearing, § 1252(b)(9) is no bar to this Court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Lewis,

et al., No. 4:25-CV-143, 2025 WL 3553676, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2025) (citing DHS v.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020)); Guerra v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-1341, 2025

WL 32042839, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2025); Alonso v. Tindall, No. 3:25-CV-652, 2025 WL

3083920, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2025).

Thus, for all these reasons, Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments concerning

Petitioner’s detention-based claims do not persuade. See Coronado v. Sec’y, Dep't of

Homeland Sec., et al., No. 1:25-CV-831, 2025 WL 3628229, at *3-6 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025)

12

(similarly walking through why §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and 1252(e)(3) do not divest

jurisdiction as to analogous claims).

Still, one final excursion is in order before the Court can entertain the merits of

Petitioner’s detention-based claims. The dictates of Article II] provide that—even if

justiciability exists at the time the case commences □ federal courts may only adjudicate

“actual, ongoing controversies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). Consequently, a

case becomes moot if “the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome.” Los Angeles Cnty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1978)

(quotation omitted). “The test for mootness is whether the relief sought would, if granted,

make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” Hanrahan v. Mohr, 905 F.3d 947, 960

(6th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

Respondents argue that this matter is moot because Petitioner received a bond

redetermination hearing on December 9, 2025. (Return of Writ, Doc. 16, Pg. ID 129.)

Petitioner specifically requests an order for “the immigration judge to enter a decision

regarding [his] custodial redetermination request on the merits of the case and not on

jurisdictional grounds.” (Petition, Doc. 1, Pg. ID 27 (emphasis added); see also Reply, Doc.

17, Pg. ID 188.) The immigration judge determined, again, that the court did not have

jurisdiction over the bond proceedings pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado. (Second

Bond Order, Doc. 18, Pg. ID 195-97.) Although the immigration judge stated, “if it were

to be [alternatively] found that this Court has jurisdiction to redetermine bond, the Court

would grant bond in the amount of $35,000,” this alternative ruling was not given effect

due to the primary holding that the court lacked jurisdiction. (Id.)

1S

Accordingly, Counts 1 and 3 shall proceed, and the Court will now address the

substance of these detention-based claims.

II. Merits of Counts 1 and 3

28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires a court to issue a writ or order the respondent to show

cause as to why a writ should not issue “unless it appears from the application that the

applicant or person detained is not entitled” to a writ of habeas corpus. The statute also

“requires an initial screening of a petition” in which “a court accepts as true the

allegations in the petition and construes them in favor of the petitioner.” Espinoza v. Dir.

of Detroit Field Off, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, No. 4:25-CV-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at

*2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025) (citing Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x

544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011)). “If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,” then the court must dismiss

the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (applicable to petitions arising

under § 2241).

a. Exhaustion

The Court turns to the preliminary question of exhaustion. The well-established

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies instructs that “no one is entitled to

judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative

remedy has been exhausted.” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (quotation

omitted). Exhaustion serves several commendable goals: promoting judicial efficiency,

allowing agencies to weigh in on the question as designed through the statutory or

regulatory regime, providing an opportunity for self-correction, and producing a useful

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record. Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013); Wheeler v. Williams, No. 20-

4037, 2021 WL 6071501, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2021). Specifically, exhaustion often takes

one of three forms: statutory exhaustion, regulation-based exhaustion, or—as in “most

contexts” — prudential exhaustion. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746-47 (6th

Cir. 2019); Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 1994). While statutory exhaustion may

be understood as a mandate because the need to exhaust is explicitly spelled out by

statute, “sound judicial discretion” otherwise governs when courts decide whether to

apply prudential exhaustion. Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593 (quotation omitted); McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). “[C]Jongressional intent and any applicable statutory

scheme” inform judicial discretion on this point. Id. at 593-94 (quotation omitted).

No relevant statute commands administrative exhaustion within this context, so

the Court’s inquiry focuses upon prudential exhaustion. See Hernandez Capote v. Sec’y of

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-CV-13128, 2025 WL 3089756, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 5,

2025). As sister district courts have widely recognized while recently wrestling with cases

like this one, “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not decided whether courts should impose

administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful

mandatory detention.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3

(E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (collecting cases). And, while the Sixth Circuit “has not formally

adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies” in such

situations, the Ninth Circuit has promulgated a relevant test. Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,

No. 2:25-CV-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Under this test,

exhaustion may be required when “(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration

15

necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the

requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and

(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to

preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007).

If prudential exhaustion is appropriate under this test and a petitioner does not exhaust

all administrative remedies, a district court should generally either dismiss the petition

without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner exhausts all remedies.

Espinosa, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2 (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir.

2011)).

The Sixth Circuit has cited to the Ninth Circuit’s approach in the context of

challenging bond determinations by immigration courts, albeit in a brief, unpublished

order. See Rabi v. Sessions, No. 18-3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1 (6th Cir. July 16,

2018) (citing Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160). Additionally, several other district courts

throughout the Sixth Circuit have addressed this issue by applying the Ninth Circuit's

test. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-CV-2183, 2025 WL 3157796, at *9 (N.D. Ohio

Nov. 12, 2025); Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-CV-1621, 2025

WL 2444114, at *8-9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025); Monroy Villalta v. Greene, 794 F. Supp. 3d

528, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2; Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL

2496379, at *4; Orellana v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 3006763, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct.

27, 2025).

Finding this framework persuasive under the circumstances, the Court will apply

the Ninth Circuit's test for prudential exhaustion. As the Court adjudicates these cases

16

and controversies, it is mindful of the separation of powers doctrine at play. See City of

New York v. Slater, 145 F.3d 568, 570 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (“In general, a party is

required to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an

agency decision, ‘in part because of concerns for separation of powers (i.e., the need to

limit judicial interference in the agency process) and the need to conserve judicial

resources.”” (quoting Pavano v. Shalala, 95 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1996))). Respondents walk

through each factor within their briefing, while Petitioner does not offer any argument in

opposition to the application of the specific factors. (See Return of Writ, Doc. 16, Pg. ID

135-37; Reply, Doc. 17, Pg. ID 183-84.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds

that the three Puga factors weigh in favor of requiring Petitioner to exhaust his

administrative remedies.

Beginning with the first Puga factor, the Court finds that the BIA’s expertise makes

agency consideration beneficial to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision.

While an agency’s interpretation of a statute “cannot bind a court,” agency expertise “has

always been one of the factors which may give an Executive Branch interpretation

particular power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 402 (2024) (quotation omitted) (citing Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &

Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

US. 134, 140 (1944)). As discussed above, Petitioner challenges his detention and removal

before this Court, and the record is devoid of any appeal filed through the immigration

system. “[A]ny determination regarding detention here turns on interpretation and

application of the governing removal regime.” Villalta, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 531. “In the first

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instance, such review should proceed before the Board of Immigration Appeals to apply

its experience and expertise without judicial interference.” Id. (quotation omitted). A

“petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims

in a habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal.” Rojas-Garcia

v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2003).

The second Puga factor also weighs in favor of requiring exhaustion because the

Court “has concerns that relaxing the exhaustion requirement would encourage the

deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme in favor of what may be perceived as a

potentially more favorable and/or timely reviewing body, i.e., federal court.” Mendoza,

2025 WL 3157796, at *10. Petitioner’s apparent attempt to sidestep the BIA appeals

process in favor of habeas review highlights the need for an exhaustion requirement here

to protect agency authority, limit interference with agency affairs, and promote judicial

efficiency. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2003), as amended (July 24, 2003).

Finally, the Court finds that the third Puga factor weighs in favor of requiring

exhaustion, as administrative review of the bond denials here would allow the agency to

correct its own alleged mistakes and alleviate the need for judicial review. Petitioner does

not contest that the BIA could provide the same relief it seeks before this Court.

“Requiring exhaustion under these circumstances therefore promotes the main purposes

of exhaustion, i.e., it protects the BIA’s authority by allowing it the opportunity to correct

its own mistakes and, further, promotes judicial efficiency by resolving potential issues

and potentially obviating the need for judicial review.” Mendoza, 2025 WL 3157796, at *10.

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Although the Puga factors weigh in favor of requiring exhaustion, a court may

nevertheless waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if “administrative remedies

are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile

gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.”

Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). In his Reply, Petitioner argues that

even if he appealed to the BIA and won, it would be a largely pyrrhic victory as the

process can take over a year and he would remain detained until then. (Reply, Doc. 17,

Pg. ID 183-84.) But, the Court finds this argument unpersuasive. At this point, it is

“speculative to make any assumptions regarding when the BIA will resolve” a potential

bond appeal by Petitioner, as “[t]here is insufficient information before the Court at this

time to demonstrate that exhaustion of Petitioner[’s] administrative remedies will be

unduly prolonged.” Mendoza, 2025 WL 3157796, at *13. Further, even if the BIA appeals

process were to create additional delay, the Court has insufficient evidence before it to

conclude that “the risk of irreparable harm to Petitioner[] outweighs the importance of

requiring exhaustion under the circumstances presented.” Id.

Petitioner’s apparent failure to timely file a notice of appeal with the BIA regarding

his first bond denial is also insufficient to deem exhaustion futile, as “exhaustion may not

be achieved through a litigant’s procedural default of his or her available remedies.”

Laing, 370 F.3d at 998. Moreover, waiver is inappropriate here because, if the exhaustion

requirement were waived in every case where a party failed to timely file for an

administrative appeal, then “any party could obtain judicial review of initial agency

actions simply by waiting for the administrative appeal period to run and then filing an

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action in district court.” Stock W. Corp. v. Lujan, 982 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).

Importantly, though, Petitioner has now received a second bond determination. (See

Second Bond Order, Doc. 18, Pg. ID 195-97.) And, notably, Petitioner reserved his right

to appeal that determination. (Id. at Pg. ID 197.) Thus, requiring Petitioner to exhaust his

administrative remedies by appealing his second bond determination is not futile, as he

is well within the time to lodge that appeal in the BIA.

Petitioner further argues that exhaustion would be futile given the BIA’s decision

in Matter of Hurtado. (Motion, Doc. 15, Pg. ID 116 n.6; Reply, Doc. 17, Pg. ID 183-84.) Such

futility must be “clear and positive,” as a petitioner “must show that it is certain that his

claim will be denied on appeal, not merely that he doubts that an appeal will result in a

different decision.” Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 1998)

(quotation omitted). The Court would note that a flurry of litigation has ensued since

Matter of Hurtado, including—as the immigration judge observed in the bond

redetermination hearing —a class action ruling in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-1873,

2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). (Second Bond Order, Doc. 18, Pg. ID 195-97.)

And, “even where there is a high probability of denial of a petitioner’s appeal of an

Immigration Judge’s bond decision, such a probability does not weigh in favor of waiving

exhaustion.” Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173, at *3 (quotation omitted); see also Beharry, 329

F.3d at 62 (explaining that merely because an “argument would likely have failed is not

tantamount to stating that it would have been futile to raise it”).

Moreover, Petitioner expresses concern as to the delay that would result from

requiring administrative exhaustion. (Motion, Doc. 15, Pg. ID 116 n.6; Reply, Doc. 17, Pg.

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ID 183-84.) Courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement and rule on a

matter when the “legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala

v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). While some

courts in this circuit have chosen to waive exhaustion because of the delay caused by a

potentially lengthy appeal process, such a decision remains in the Court's discretion. See

Alvarez-Lopez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 25-CV-13098, 2025 WL 3525956, at *2

(E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025) (surveying intra-circuit split on the issue). And, the Court notes

that, in many of those cases, the district courts supported their decision to waive

exhaustion with both a finding of futility and undue hardship, not just the latter. By

comparison, the Court finds here that Petitioner has not made a showing of futility.

Absent binding precedent to the contrary, this Court therefore declines to find that the

risk of delay alone warrants a waiver of exhaustion.

b. Applicability of Bautista v. Santacruz

One final matter remains. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a bond hearing

because he is purportedly a member of the class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-

CV-1873, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). (Reply, Doc. 17, Pg. ID 184-85 n.16.)

Specifically, the United States District Court for the Central District of California entered

declaratory relief to the following class: “All noncitizens in the United States without

lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2)

were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject

to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department

of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.” Bautista, 2025 WL

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3288403, at *9. Petitioner, however, does not provide argument as to why Bautista applies

here.

As an initial matter, no final judgment has been issued in the Bautista litigation at

this juncture. Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal.

Nov. 20, 2025) (granting partial motion for summary judgment but denying request to

enter final judgment); see also Avalos v. Hardin, No. 2:25-CV-1008, 2025 WL 3537566, at *2

n.2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2025) (emphasizing non-final nature of the Bautista order). Several

district courts have also expressed that “it is unclear what specific relief the [Bautista]

court has afforded to the petitioner or to the class members.” Shi v. Lyons, et al., No. 1:25-

CV-274, 2025 WL 3637288, at n.5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2025); see also Cahuec v. Soto, et al., No.

29-CV-17389, 2025 WL 3524463, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2025) (characterizing “the current

status of the Bautista action [as] unclear”); Melgar v. Bondi, et al., No, 8:25-CV-555, 2025

WL 3496721, at *15 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2025) (“There is as yet no order in Bautista granting

any injunctive relief to class members.”).

And, perhaps even more fundamentally, “[i]f another federal district court in

another district has ordered a party (e.g., ICE) to do something, and the party is failing to

follow that order, the relief for that failure primarily lies before the court that entered the

order in the first instance.” Coronado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., et al., No. 1:25-CV-

831, 2025 WL 3628229, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025) (concluding that the petitioner

“cannot simply ask this Court to enforce that court’s order”); see also Ramirez v. Lewis, et

al., No. 4:25-CV-143, 2025 WL 3553676, at *4 n.6 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2025) (finding that

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Bautista “does not dictate the Court's opinion”). Accordingly, Bautista does not alter the

Court’s preceding analysis.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s removal-

based claims and, after consideration, declines to review Petitioner’s detention-based

claims due to failure to exhaust. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the following:

1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE;

2) Respondent Kevin Grathwohl’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

(Doc. 6) is DENIED AS MOOT;

3) Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 15) is DENIED AS

MOOT; and

4) This matter is TERMINATED from the Court's docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

By: : a

JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND

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