LESKO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

ROBERT MICHAEL LESKO, )

) Civil Action No.:

) 2:24-CV-01660-CBB

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

) Christopher B. Brown

) United States Magistrate Judge

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

)

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

)

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ECF Nos. 4 and 6

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Michael Robert Lesko (“Lesko”) filed his claim for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§

401–434, on March 16, 2023. ECF No. 2-2 at 25. Lesko claimed he became disabled

beginning December 25, 2022 due to stage 1 blood cancer, chronic pain, gout,

fatigue/immune system deficiencies. ECF No. 2-3 at 3.

After Lesko’s claims were initially denied, he sought reconsideration and a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on July 18, 2024. ECF No. 5 at

1 All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge; therefore

the Court has the authority to decide dispositive motions, and to eventually enter final judgment.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.

1. On August 16, 2024, the ALJ denied Lesko’s requests for benefits and found that

Lesko was not disabled under the Act. Id. The Appeals Council declined to review

the ALJ’s decision and Lesko filed a timely appeal with this Court. ECF No. 7 at 3.

Presently pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment

by the parties. ECF Nos. 4 and 6. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for

consideration. ECF Nos. 5, 7, 9. For the reasons that follow, Lesko’s motion for

summary judgment is granted, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment

is denied, the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is vacated and the matter is

remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further review

consistent with this decision.2

II. Factual Background

The following summary is limited to information relevant to the current

appeal. Lesko was born on October 1, 1960 and was 62 years old at the onset of his

alleged disability on December 25, 2022. ECF No. 2-2 at 26; ECF No. 2-3 at 2. He

previously worked as a business manager, but testified he stopped working on

December 25, 2022 after he became ill and was diagnosed with myleofibrosis, a rare

type of incurable blood cancer in January 2023. ECF No. 2-10 at 26. For palliative

care, Lesko was prescribed Pacritinib (Vonjo), a medication used for treating

individuals with intermediate or high-risk myelofibrosis and azacytidine, a

chemotherapy medication to reduce the growth of cancer cells. Id. at 14; ECF No. 2-

2 Frank Bisignano is substituted as the Defendant in this matter, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect this change.

12 at 16, 20-21; ECF No. 5 at 9 n. 10; n. 11. Side effects of Pacritinib include, inter

alia, shortness of breath, numbness in a leg or arm and extreme fatigue. ECF No. 2-

12 at 2-5.. Side effects of azacitidine include, inter alia, unusual weakness or

tiredness. Id. at 21..

Lesko was treated by Dr. Salman Fazal, an oncologist, and his primary care

physician Dr. Brian Lamb. ECF No. 5 at 8-9. Throughout his treatment, Lesko

reported symptoms of, inter alia, brain fog, fatigue, and neuropathy in his feet to his

treating physicians. See ECF No. 5 at 9. In treatment notes for an April 2024

appointment, Dr. Fazal noted Lesko’s fatigue symptoms and characterized Lesko’s

inability to perform activities as remaining “quite significant.” ECF No. 2-25 at 12.

Among other medical testimony, there are several key medical opinions and

evaluations in the present record:

Dr. Fazal: Treating Oncologist

Dr. Fazal, Lesko’s treating oncologist, authored two medical opinions, one in

June 2023 and one in February 2024. ECF No. 2-17 at 32-33; 89-90. In his June

2023 opinion, Dr. Fazal opined Lesko could lift up to 5 lbs occasionally during the

workday; could use his hands for simple grasping repetitively, but not for pushing,

pulling or find manipulation; and he could not use his feet for repetitive movements.

Id. at 32; 89. Dr. Fazal expected Lesko’s disability to last twelve continuous months

and opined based on his clinical assessment of Lesko that he could not be employed.

Id. at 33. In his February 2024 opinion, Dr. Fazal again opined that Lesko could

stand/walk less than one hour and lift up to 5 lbs occasionally during the workday;

could use his hands for repetitive simple grasping; and could not push or pull. ECF

No. 2-24 at 65-66. Based on his clinical assessment, Dr. Fazal again opined that

Lesko could not be employed. Id. at 66.

Dr. Lamb: Treating Primary Care Physician

Dr. Lamb, Lesko’s primary care physician, issued an opinion in the form of a

physical capacity evaluation in February 2024 in which he opined in an eight-hour

workday, Lesko could stand or walk less than one-hour and lift up to 5 lbs

occasionally; could use hands repetitively for simple grasping and no pushing,

pulling or fine manipulation; and could not use his feet for repetitive movements.

Id. at 68-69. Dr. Lamb stated Lesko was “still not able to work. He has MDS which

is preventing him from meaningful employment.” Id. at 69.

Independent Functional Capacity Evaluation

Lesko underwent a functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”) by David W.

Truschel, MS, OTR/L, CEAS, CMT. ECF No. 2-17 at 99-105. Truschel’s August 8,

2023 report noted a validity profile score of 100%, which means Lesko demonstrated

consistent effort throughout the evaluation. Id. at 99; 104-105. Truschel noted

Lesko could work part-time (five 4-hour days) at the sedentary level. Id. at 99-100;

105. Truschel noted “right hand prehensile strength was diminished. Weakness

was noted in the bilateral gluteus maximus and medius. Hamstring length was

diminished bilaterally. Crepitus was noted in the right knee and diminished

sensation in the bilateral fingertips bilaterally. Right shoulder external/internal

rotation was moderately limited.” Id. at 105. Truschel also noted that fatigue was

caused by several activities including hand carry, repetitive postural maneuvers,

overhead reaching, forward reaching, kneeling, stair climbing, and

standing/walking. Id. at 102-03.

Kathleen Lederman, PsyD.

In December 2023, Lesko underwent a mental status evaluation in

September 2023 with Kathleen Ledermann, PsyD. Id. at 106. Among other

diagnoses and assessments, Dr. Lederman diagnosed Lesko with fatigue,

exhaustion, and brain fog and assessed “mild limitations” to Lesko’s ability to

“understand and remember complex instructions,” “carry out complex instructions,”

and “make judgments on complex work-related decisions.” Id. at 109; 111.

State Agency Consultations

In April 2023, John Bertolino, M.D., a state agency medical consultant,

reviewed Lesko’s medical records and opined that Lesko could, in part, lift up to 20

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for about 6 hours

in a workday, and sit for about 6 hours in a workday. ECF No. 2-3 at 6.

In October 2023, state psychiatric consultant Karen Plowman, PsyD reviewed

Lesko’s medical records and cited a non-severe depressive, bipolar and related

disorder and anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder and assessed “mild”

limitations to Lesko’s ability to understand, remember or apply information,

interact with others, concentrate, persist or maintain pace, and adapt or manage

oneself. Id. at 14.

In December 2023, Michael Lombard, M.D., another state agency medical

consultant, reviewed Lesko’s medical records at the reconsideration level and

agreed with Dr. Bertolino’s assessment that Plaintiff could lift up to 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and sit for about 6 hours in a workday but

was limited to only 4 hours of standing or walking. Id. at 16. Dr. Lombard indicated

these exertional limits considered Lesko’s myeloid malignancies and “effects of

therapy on function.” Id. at 6.

III. The ALJ Decision

The following summary is limited to information relevant to the current

appeal.

At step one of the sequential analysis – whether the claimant is engaging in

substantial gainful activity – the ALJ found Lesko met the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2027 and had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his symptoms on December

25, 2022. ECF No. 2-2 at 28.

At step two of the sequential analysis – whether the claimant has medically

determinable impairments that are severe – the ALJ found Lesko had two severe

impairments: myelofibrosis and obesity. Id. at 29-30 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).

The ALJ found that while documented in medical evidence, Lesko’s hypertension,

obstructive sleep apnea, gout, diarrhea, depressive disorder, adjustment disorder

and anxiety disorder were “non-severe” impairments and did not more than

minimally limit his ability to perform basic work activities. Id. at 30. (citing SSR 85-

28). As for Lesko’s mental impairments related to fatigue, “brain fog” and

concentration symptoms, the ALJ found testimony and records supporting a finding

that these symptoms were “no more than mild mental limitations[]” in Lesko’s

ability to do basic work activities and found these impairments were nonsevere. Id.

at 30-33 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1)). The ALJ stated the mild mental

limitations were “not a residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate

the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation

process. The mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5

of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment. The

following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation

the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” Id. at 32.

At step three of the sequential analysis – whether the claimant’s

impairments are so severe to meet or medically equal the criteria set forth in the

regulations – the ALJ found “the medical evidence does not document listing-level

severity” for Lesko’s myelofibrosis and obesity, and “no acceptable medical source as

mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment,

individually or in combination.” Id. at 33.

Prior to commencing step four, the ALJ determined Lesko’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”). The ALJ found Dr. Fazal and Dr. Lamb’s opinions not

persuasive, found Truschel’s opinion only partially persuasive, and found Drs.

Bertolino and Lombard’s opinions generally persuasive and adopted Dr. Lombard’s

opinion on Lesko’s RFC in full. Id. at 33-39. The ALJ did not explicitly discuss Dr.

Lederman or Dr. Plowman’s opinions on his mild mental limitations in formulating

the RFC. The ALJ found Lesko was capable of lifting and carrying 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sitting for six hours and standing and/or

walking for a total of four hours over the course of an eight-hour workday; push and

pull and much as he can lift and carry; frequently climb ramps and stairs;

frequently maintain balance over narrow, slippery, or erratically moving surfaces;

frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; occasionally climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolds; occasionally work at unprotected heights or in close proximity to

dangerous moving mechanical parts; and never work in conditions in which he is

exposed to the weather. Id. at 34.

At step four – whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from

performing his past relevant work – the ALJ found Lesko had the RFC to perform

less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). Id.

Relying on the RFC, the ALJ found Lesko could perform his past relevant work

because the work did not require the performance of work-related activities

precluded by Lesko’s RFC. Id. at 40 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565). Considering the

Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) testimony, the ALJ found Lesko could perform his past

work as a business manager, which the VE explained is a light exertional, skilled

job. Id. (citing Dictionary of Titles (“DOT”) 187.167-082). The ALJ then found Lesko

was not disabled. Id. at 40-41.

IV. Standard of Review

Judicial review of a social security case is based upon the pleadings and the

transcript of the record, and the scope of that review is limited to determining

whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the

record, as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's

findings of fact. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the Court finds substantial evidence

supports the final decision, it must uphold it. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d

546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court may not set aside a decision that is supported by

substantial evidence “even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”

Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing § 405(g)).

“Substantial evidence” is defined as “more than a mere scintilla.” Plummer v.

Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). It means “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.; Biestek v.

Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or

considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487

U.S. 552, 565 (1988). An ALJ's findings must “be accompanied by a clear and

satisfactory explication of the basis on which [they] rest[ ].” Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Decisions that are conclusory in their findings or

indicate the ALJ's failure to consider all the evidence are not supported by

substantial evidence. See id. at 705–06. Moreover, the Court must ensure the ALJ

did not “reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Id. at 706 (citing

King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980)).

A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or

reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing.

Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984). Remand is appropriate if

the record is incomplete or if the ALJ’s findings are incomplete and failed to

“explicitly weigh all relevant, probative and available evidence” of record. Adorno v.

Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (cleaned up).

To be eligible for Social Security benefits under the Act, a claimant must

demonstrate that they cannot engage in “substantial gainful activity” because of a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786

F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

When reviewing a claim, the ALJ must utilize a five-step sequential analysis

to evaluate whether a claimant has met the requirements for disability. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ must determine:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

(2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a combination of

impairments that is severe;

(3) whether the medical evidence of the claimant's impairment or

combination of impairments meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R.,

Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1;

(4) whether the claimant's impairments prevent them from performing their

past relevant work; and

(5) if the claimant is incapable of performing their past relevant work,

whether they can perform any other work which exists in the national

economy.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24–

25 (2003). The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical

evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment under steps 1

through 4. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). If the

claimant meets his burden and shows he is unable to resume previous employment,

the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step 5 to prove that, given claimant’s

mental or physical limitations, age, education, and work experience, he can perform

alternative substantial gainful activity. Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir.

1986).

V. Discussion

Lesko argues the ALJ erred in assessing his residual functional capacity

because he failed to account for the “total limiting effects” of his impairments –

specifically, his chronic fatigue, “brain fog” and neuropathy. ECF No. 5 at 3. Within

that overarching argument, Lesko makes the specific arguments that the ALJ erred

in formulating the RFC when (1) he failed to consider the medical opinions from his

treating oncologist and PCP with respect to his aforementioned impairments; (2)

used highly selective references to the record to support his decision and ignored

other objective medical records supporting Lesko’s impairments; (3) engaged in lay

interpretation of medical evidence; (4) failed to provide the VE with any

hypothetical incorporating the limitations ascribed by Lesko’s treating physicians;

and (5) failed to consider Lesko’s self-described chronic fatigue, brain fog and

neuropathy symptoms. ECF No. 5 at 13-18.

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. ECF No. 7 at 8-13.

In his reply brief, Lesko reemphasizes his argument that the RFC was not

supported by substantial evidence because while the ALJ found Lesko had mild

mental limitations, the ALJ provided “no analysis of how [these symptoms]

impact[ed] his RFC – except for the conclusory statement . . . that ‘the persistence

and intensity of symptoms [] including fatigue, are reflected in the limitations found

in this RFC.’” ECF No. 9 at 3 (quoting ECF No. 2-3 at 19). Because Lesko is correct

that the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence related to his mild mental

limitations, only that argument is addressed.

a. The RFC was not Supported by Substantial Evidence Related

to Lesko’s Mental Limitations

Lesko argues the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence because the

ALJ adopted the state agency administrative findings which acknowledged Lesko’s

brain fog and fatigue as consistently demonstrated symptoms but provided no

analysis about how these mild mental limitations impacted the RFC, and relatedly

that the ALJ failed to include these limitations in the hypothetical question to the

vocational experts whom the ALJ relied in determining that he could return to his

past prior work. ECF No. 5 at 4; 15-16; ECF No. 9 at 3. The Commissioner does not

explicitly respond to this argument but responds the ALJ considered Lesko’s

symptoms and resulting limitations when he considered the medical record as a

whole and found Lesko’s subjective complaints were not consistent with his

treatment record, reasonably determined he was less limited than he alleged and

was not precluded from performing a range of light work. ECF No. 7 at 13.

At step 2, when the claimant alleges mental impairments, the ALJ must

determine whether the mental impairment is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a,

416.920a. If the ALJ determines the medical record supports a medically

determinable mental impairment, but finds those mental impairments are not

“severe” and instead rates the degree of the claimant’s limitations as “mild,” 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a; 416.920a; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1); 416.920a(d)(1), an ALJ

is still required to consider all impairments – both severe and non-severe – when

formulating the RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).

In determining the RFC, the ALJ must determine “the most [a claimant] can

still do despite [his] limitations based on all the relevant evidence in [the] case

record.” Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

The RFC determination “requires a more detailed assessment [of the areas of

functional limitation] by itemizing various functions contained in the broad

[functional limitation] categories” and “must be expressed in terms of work-related

functions” like “describing the claimant’s abilities to: understand, carry out, and

remember instructions; use judgment in making work-related decisions; respond

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; and deal with

changes in a routine work setting.” Id. (cleaned up). While no special “incantations

are required at step four and five simply because a particular finding has been

made at steps two and three[,]” the ALJ’s statement of limitation must

reflect the claimant’s particular impairments, including those

embodied in the functional limitation findings. “In assessing RFC, the

adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of

an individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’ ” [SSR

96-8P] at *5; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c) (explaining

that a mental RFC assessment must begin with an examination of “the

nature and extent of [the claimant’s] mental limitations and

restrictions”). And, again, although steps two and three differ from

steps four and five, the functional limitation findings are plainly

relevant to an ALJ’s statement of the claimant’s limitation at the later

steps because they involve the claimant’s actual impairments. Cf. SSR

96-8P, at *4 (“The mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the

sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment [of

the areas of functional limitation] by itemizing various functions

contained in the broad [functional limitation] categories[.]”).

Hess, 931 F.3d at 209. The ALJ is not required to recite the functional limitation

findings verbatim in the statement of limitation but must “adequately convey[]”

those findings because they are “relevant to that statement of limitation, which

must be sufficient to reflect all of a claimant’s impairments.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 210.

Here, at step 2, the ALJ found that Lesko had medically determinable mental

impairments related to, inter alia, fatigue, memory and concentration, and brain

fog, that caused no more than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas. ECF

No. 2-2 at 30-32. The ALJ stated “[t]he mental residual functional capacity

assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a

more detailed assessment. The following residual capacity assessment reflects the

degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the “paragraph B” mental

function analysis.” Id. at 32. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ recounted the record

evidence including treatment notes indicating that Lesko had fatigue,

memory/concentration and brain fog symptoms but provided no analysis how these

mild limitations impacted the RFC. The ALJ concluded the limitations in the RFC

related to reduced standing and walking and postural limitations “accounted for”

Lesko’s “variable symptoms (fatigue, shortness of breath, etc.)[.]” Tr. at 38. But,

there was no further discussion or analysis of Lesko’s mental limitations except to

note that state agency medical consultant’s proposed limitations that were adopted

by the ALJ “accounted for” these limitations. Id. at 39. These boilerplate

statements and incorporation by reference of Lesko’s mental limitations into the

RFC are not “valid explanations” or “detailed assessments” of how Lesko’s mental

limitations were considered in deciding his RFC as required by the applicable

regulations and jurisprudence. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213–14; Ramirez v. Barnhart,

372 F.3d 546, 555 (3d Cir. 2004); SSR96-8P.

Courts in this circuit have “consistently held that even mild limitations in the

relevant domains of mental functioning must be included in an RFC assessment

and hypothetical question posed to the VE that the ALJ relies upon.” Meersand v.

Kijakazi, No. CV 20-1084, 2021 WL 5003331, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2021) (citing

Benedetto v. Saul, No. CV 19-4021, 2020 WL 5763551, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28,

2020); Hefferan v. Berryhill, No. 17-2720 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2018); Kennedy v.

Berryhill, Civil No. 16-5478 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2018); Metelli v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-

6094, 2017 WL 2570913, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2017), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CV 16-6094, 2017 WL 2547288 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017); Savage v.

Berryhill, No. 17-2548 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2018); Green v. Colvin, 179 F. Supp. 3d

481, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Curran v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 11-5894, 2012 WL 5494616,

at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2012); Harmon v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 10-6781, 2012 WL

94617, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2012); Washington v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 08-2938,

2009 WL 855893, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009)). See also: Gunn v. Kijakazi, 705

F. Supp. 3d 315, 332 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (remand appropriate when ALJ did not explain

why claimant’s mild mental impairments were not considered in determining

claimant’s RFC); Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 357 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (remand

appropriate where ALJ did not explain why mental health related limitations were

omitted in the RFC); Siry v. Bisignano, No. CV 24-1910, 2025 WL 2447786, at *5

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2025) (remand appropriate when ALJ did not explain why

claimant’s mild mental impairments were not considered in determining claimant’s

RFC and ALJ used boilerplate language at step 4 to analyze the impact of

claimant’s minimal mental limitation); Maria A. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No.

CV 23-2484 (MAS), 2024 WL 943466, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2024) (remand

appropriate when ALJ included only a “passing reference” to mild mental

limitations which was insufficient to determine a claimant’s RFC); Balla v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., No. CV 18-00386 (RBK), 2019 WL 2482661, at *3 (D.N.J. June 14,

2019) (remand appropriate because “the ALJ's reference to [the] [p]laintiff's mild

mental limitations fails to clearly explain the ‘impact of [the] [p]laintiff's mental

impairments on her ability to’ complete the relevant work”); Curry v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., No. 1:15-CV-07515-NLH, 2017 WL 825196, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2017)

(same).

Simply put, while a finding that a claimant has a mild mental limitation does

not automatically result in “a corresponding mental limitation in the RFC[,]” an

ALJ must consider these findings in formulating the RFC. Gunn, 705 F. Supp. 3d at

333. In Gunn, the court was asked to assess similar language to that used by the

ALJ here to assess a claimant’s mild mental limitations. Id. After considering the

universe of authority, the court found

a boilerplate statement at step two that the ensuing RFC assessment

“reflects” the limitations determined at step two, with no further

discussion of those limitations (except to the extent they match the

limitations noted in the required discussion of the State agency

psychological consultants’ administrative findings) is not the “valid

explanation” required by Third Circuit case law or the “detailed

assessment” required by SSR 96-8p. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213-14;

Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 555; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. It is

inconsistent with regulations requiring the ALJ when formulating the

RFC to “consider” all impairments, even non-severe ones, and at odds

with the only circuit-level decision addressing the viability of such a

statement. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); Wells [v.

Colvin], 727 F.3d [1061] at 1068-71.

Id. See also Siry, 2025 WL 2447786, at *5 (rejecting similar “boilerplate language”

that “neglected to articulate how [claimant’s] minimal mental limitation impacted

her RFC.”).

“[I]t is insufficient for the ALJ to state that he considered all symptoms and

make passing reference to the medical evidence regarding mental health if the ALJ

did not specifically consider or address the impact of a plaintiff’s mental

impairments on her ability to work[.]” Maria A., 2024 WL 943466, at *6 (cleaned

up). Having a mild mental limitation does not automatically signify that a claimant

can perform his “past relevant work at the calculated RFC.” Balla, 2019 WL

2482661, at *3.

The ALJ here did not account for any impact of Lesko’s mental limitations in

formulating his RFC and used boilerplate language at step 4 that has been rejected

by other courts explained supra. The ALJ found Lesko had mild mental limitations

at step 2 and did not explain the impact those limitations had, if any, on Lesko’s

RFC. The ALJ’s assessment simply stated: “The following residual functional

capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in

the “paragraph B” mental function analysis.” ECF No. 2-2 at 32. At step 4, the ALJ

adopted the state medical consultant’s opinion because it included physical

limitations for standing and sitting that “better accounted for the claimant’s

variable symptoms (fatigue, shortness of breath, etc.)” but neglected to articulate

the impact of his mental limitations on the RFC. Accordingly, the case will be

remanded for the ALJ to consider Lesko’s mild mental limitations in formulating

the RFC.

b. Lesko’s Additional Arguments

Because the court cannot independently weigh the evidence or substitute its

conclusions for those of the ALJ, the Court cannot determine whether the ALJ’s

decision was otherwise supported by substantial evidence. Curry, 2017 WL 825196,

at *6 (“The Court cannot weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those

of the ALJ, or independently determine the impact of Plaintiff's mental

impairments in combination with her physical impairments on her RFC. Without

the ALJ performing that analysis, the Court also cannot determine whether the

ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.”). Because it is possible on

remand that the ALJ may reach different conclusions after considering Lesko’s

mental limitations in formulating the RFC, which may render any further

arguments levied by Lesko moot, the Court declines to address Lesko’s additional

arguments, without prejudice for him to reassert if appropriate. See William R. v.

Bisignano, No. 24-CV-4765, 2025 WL 1738663, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2025);

Steininger v. Barnhart, No. CIV.A. 04-5383, 2005 WL 2077375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug.

24, 2005).

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is granted in favor

of Lesko, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is denied, the

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is vacated and this matter is remanded

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration of Lesko’s

mental impairments in the formulation of the RFC. An appropriate Order follows.

DATED this 18th day of December, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge