Summers

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

EPIPHANY SUMMERS,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:25-CV-2225-TWT

CITY OF ATLANTA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on the Defendant City

of Atlanta’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 12] and the Defendant Ronald Sluss’s

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 13]. For the following reasons, both motions are

GRANTED.

I. Background1

This action arose from Defendant Ronald Sluss’s November 2024

application for two search warrants for property belonging to Plaintiff

Epiphany Summers—a 2020 Blue Hyundai Kona and an iPhone. (Am. Compl.

¶ 11). Sluss’s warrant applications related to his suspicions that the Plaintiff

opposed the construction of a police training facility in Atlanta, known as Cop

City, and that she had participated in posting flyers in opposition to its

1 The Court accepts the facts as alleged in the [First Amended]

Complaint as true for purposes of the present Motion to Dismiss.

, 941 F.3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 2019).

construction. ( ). According to the Plaintiff, posting the flyers caused no

damage, but Sluss “falsely averred under oath in his warrant applications”

that the warrants were for the collection of evidence of the crime of

second-degree criminal damage to property, including property damage of $500

or more. ( ¶ 12). The Plaintiff alleges that the warrants were applied for in

accordance with the City of Atlanta’s “Cop City Policy,” under which

persons suspected to oppose [the] construction of [the] police

training facility are to be heavily surveilled—regardless of

whether such surveillance is legal or illegal, their property is to

be seized without regards of legality of such seizures (as

evidenced by the present case) and they are to be arrested for

pretextual offenses if the opportunity for such arrests presents

itself.

( ¶ 13).

The Plaintiff alleges that, in accordance with this policy, Sluss arrived

at her apartment complex on November 15, 2024, and had her car removed

from the premises. ( ¶ 16). On November 18, the Plaintiff returned from a

work trip to find her car was missing. ( ¶ 17). In response to the Plaintiff’s

phone call, Sluss arrived at the Plaintiff’s apartment complex, along with ten

City of Atlanta police officers. ( ). Sluss informed the Plaintiff that search

warrants were issued for her car and phone because her car had been spotted

in the vicinity of a location where Cop City opposition flyers were posted. (

¶¶ 17-18). Sluss gave the Plaintiff copies of the warrants but did not give her

the affidavits given in support of the warrants. ( ). Nonetheless, she “knows

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that there must have been false statements in the affidavits as she never

engaged in any criminal damage to property and there could not have been any

evidence of same—let alone sufficient evidence for probable cause.” ( ¶ 12).

The Plaintiff complied and turned over her phone to Sluss at that time. (

¶ 18). Sluss retained the Plaintiff’s car and phone for more than three months

before returning them, but no charges were ever filed against her. (

¶¶ 19-20).

The Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant Sluss in his

individual capacity, and the City of Atlanta (“the City”), asserting claims for:

(1) Fourth Amendment violation, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Sluss);

(2) First Amendment retaliation, under § 1983 (against Sluss); (3) municipal

liability as a final policy maker (against the City); (4) municipal liability for

failure to train (against the City); and (5) conspiracy to violate constitutional

rights under § 1983 (against both Defendants). ( ¶¶ 28-63). The Plaintiff

seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees. (

¶¶ 64-67). Both Defendants have moved to dismiss, and those Motions are

presently before the Court. [Docs. 12, 13].

II. Legal Standards

A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it

appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief.

, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may

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survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is

“improbable” that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the

possibility of recovery is extremely “remote and unlikely.”

, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court

must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

, 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir.

1983); , 40 F.3d

247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff

“receives the benefit of imagination”). Generally, notice pleading is all that is

required for a valid complaint. , 753

F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only

give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing ,

550 U.S. at 555).

III. Discussion

A. Sluss’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 13]

As an initial matter, the Court’s consideration of the Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss necessitates consideration of the warrants and warrant

affidavits at issue. The Defendants failed to attach the warrant affidavits to

their Motions to Dismiss, and instead attached only the warrants themselves.

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Later, in reply, the Defendants attached the warrants with the affidavits for

the first time. The Plaintiff objected to the Court’s consideration of these

documents in response to the Defendants’ attempts to seal the documents, for

the Plaintiff’s privacy. ( , Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Seal, Doc.

23). There, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendants had improperly sought to

provide the documents for the first time as an attachment to their reply brief,

which did not allow her an opportunity to respond, thus prejudicing her. (

at 3-5).

The Court rejects the Plaintiff’s concerns and will consider the warrants

and accompanying affidavits. The rule disallowing the introduction of

argument for the first time in a reply brief is a discretionary one, rather than

a mandatory one, and it is aimed at encouraging judicial efficiency. The

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint makes multiple references to the documents

and all of her claims, but particularly her Fourth Amendment claim, hinge on

the warrants and the warrant affidavits. ( , Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13,

17-18, 21-27). While the Defendants’ decision not to disclose the full warrants

and affidavits to the Plaintiff and the Court until their reply briefs was

ill-advised, it does not prevent the Court from considering them at this stage

where the documents are central to the Plaintiff’s claims and their authenticity

has not been disputed. , 107 F.4th 1292, 1300

(11th Cir. 2024) (“[A] court may properly consider a document not referred to

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or attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine if the

document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning

that its authenticity is not challenged.”). Nor would judicial efficiency be

promoted by considering the Motions without the warrant affidavits at issue.

The Plaintiff could have sought leave to file a surreply to address the warrant

affidavits further, and the Court would have granted that request. But she did

not do so, so the Court proceeds with its analysis on the briefs before it.

In her first, claim, the Plaintiff contends that her Fourth Amendment

rights were violated when her property was seized pursuant to warrants that

lacked probable cause. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29-35). Sluss asserts that the warrants

were properly supported and facially valid, and therefore, the Plaintiff’s rights

were not violated by the execution of the warrants. (Def. Sluss’s Mot. to

Dismiss, at 7-13). Sluss also asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

( at 17-20). Because the Court finds that Sluss is entitled to qualified

immunity on all of the Plaintiff’s claims against him, the Plaintiff’s claims fail.

However, because Sluss’s entitlement to qualified immunity hinges on whether

the warrants at issue were valid, the Court must first wade into the Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment arguments.

1. Fourth Amendment Claim (Count I)

“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing

discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their

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conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” , 884 F.3d 1290,

1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). “A defendant who asserts

qualified immunity has the initial burden of showing he was acting within the

scope of his discretionary authority when he took the allegedly

unconstitutional action.” at 1297. Once that is shown (and it is not

challenged here), “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified

immunity is not appropriate by showing that (1) the facts alleged make out a

violation of a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right at issue was

clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” The Court has

discretion to decide these issues in either order depending on the

circumstances, but the Plaintiff must demonstrate both prongs to survive a

qualified immunity defense. , 871 F.3d 1203, 1208

(11th Cir. 2017).

Where an officer seeks qualified immunity based on his application for

and execution of a warrant, the appropriate test is “whether a reasonably

well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known that his affidavit

failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the

warrant. If such was the case, the officer’s application for a warrant was not

objectively reasonable, because it created the unnecessary danger of an

unlawful arrest.” , 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986). With regard to

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allegations of false statements, the Supreme Court in

established the right to be free from officers making perjurious or recklessly

false statements in support of a warrant. 438 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1978). In so

holding, “[t]he Court made clear that statements made in support of a warrant

need not actually be true, but they needed “to be ‘truthful’ in the sense that the

information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as

true.” , 557 F. App’x 904, 907-08 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing ,

438 U.S. at 166). In applying this rule to qualified immunity cases, the

Eleventh Circuit has explained that

“[a]n officer loses qualified immunity if the plaintiff can prove

that the officer perjured himself—that is, put forth information

he did not believe or accept as true—in order to obtain a search

warrant. An officer does not lose qualified immunity, however, if

all the plaintiff can prove is that the officer made recklessly false

statements in order to obtain a search warrant.”

at 908 (citing , 21 F.3d 1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994)).2

Nonetheless, the Court’s inquiry must begin with “a presumption of validity

with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.” , 438 U.S.

at 171. “There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless

disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer

of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit

that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of

2 The Court notes that involved a decision at the summary

judgment stage. However, was decided on a motion to dismiss.

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supporting reasons.”

The Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant to state with

particularity “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. But this requirement is applied with a “practical

margin of flexibility,” and “the property description need only be as specific as

the circumstances and nature of activity under investigation permit . . . [a]

warrant does not have to be elaborate.” , 84 F.4th 1317,

1327 (11th Cir. 2023). In the age of smartphones and digital media, the

Eleventh Circuit has identified two general types of limitations to particularize

a warrant:

The first is narrowing the search based on the subject matter of

the data. For example, a warrant may limit investigators’ search

of communications data to only communications with known or

suspected co-conspirators. The second is a temporal limitation.

Officers can narrow their search by requesting data only for the

time when an individual is suspected of planning or participating

in criminal activity.

(citation modified). The Eleventh Circuit further recognized that because

the same content can be stored in different formats, “a subject-based limitation

may sometimes be so broad as to be meaningless.” On that basis, it held

that a time-based limitation is the preferred method for limiting the scope of a

search of a cloud-based device. “By narrowing a search to the data created

or uploaded during a relevant time connected to the crime being investigated,

officers can particularize their searches to avoid general rummaging. Cloud or

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data-based warrants with a sufficiently tailored time-based limitation can

undermine any claim that they are the internet-era version of a general

warrant.” at 1328 (citation modified). In the context of qualified immunity,

“[g]iven that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the

Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly

did not comply with that requirement was valid.”

, 438 F. App’x 741, 744 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing , 540

U.S. 551, 563 (2004)).3

The Court turns first to the Plaintiff’s challenge to probable cause in the

underlying warrant affidavits. The Plaintiff alleges that Sluss must have lied

in his warrant application because “she never engaged in any criminal damage

to property and there could not have been any evidence of same,” since the

crime alleged was posting flyers to a building. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12 (“No

damage whatsoever was caused by the suspected posted of fliers.”). More

specifically, she alleges that “Defendant Sluss provided knowingly false

information to a judicial officer issuing a warrant (including but not limited to

misrepresenting that [the] crime of criminal damage to property had

3 The Court pauses to note both parties’ reliance on several Georgia

Supreme Court cases in support of their arguments. State court case law

interpreting United States Supreme Court precedent and the United States

Constitution is both inapplicable and unpersuasive here, where the claims

were brought in federal court, under a federal statute, and arising out of

alleged violations of the United States Constitution. Thus, the Court considers

only the parties’ citations to federal cases.

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occurred).” ( ¶ 31). She essentially alleges that absent Sluss’s false

statements, the warrants lacked probable cause. The Plaintiff has not alleged

that Sluss was acting outside the scope of his discretionary authority in

procuring the warrants. ( Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def. Sluss’s Mot. to

Dismiss, at 19-20). Thus, unless the Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing that

Sluss violated her Fourth Amendment rights, Sluss is entitled to qualified

immunity. , 884 F.3d at 1296-97. If Sluss did indeed knowingly

provide false information to procure the warrants, he is not entitled to qualified

immunity. , 557 F. App’x at 908.

Reviewing the warrant affidavits in question here, even construing the

facts in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Plaintiff has fallen short of establishing that

an objectively reasonable officer in Sluss’s shoes would not have applied for the

warrants. , 475 U.S. at 345. The warrants and accompanying

affidavits alleged that the Plaintiff was suspected of having committed the

crime of criminal damage to property in the second degree, in violation of

O.C.G.A. § 16-7-23. [Doc. 24 (“Warrants”) at 3, 6, 15, 18]. That statute makes

it a crime to “[i]ntentionally damage[] any property of another person without

his or her consent [where] the damage thereto exceeds $500.00.” O.C.G.A.

§ 16-7-23(a)(1). In support of that belief, Sluss averred that a specific building

had been postered with Stop Cop City flyers, that videos of the incident had

been posted on social media, and that surveillance video showed the Plaintiff’s

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vehicle, identified by its tag number, arrive at the postering location.

(Warrants at 8-9). Sluss averred that the video showed individuals getting out

of the vehicle with posters, buckets, paint rollers, and other items and walk

towards the building in question. ( ). Sluss also included a still surveillance

image of a figure, suspected to be the Plaintiff, recording the postering on a cell

phone. ( at 12). Sluss averred that a total of sixty-six posters were glued to

the building and that the building tenant was contacted, who informed him

that the posters were placed without consent. ( at 11-12). In the Court’s

view, these allegations support an objectively reasonable officer’s application

for search warrants based on probable cause to believe the Plaintiff’s phone

and car had been used in the commission of the alleged crime and would reveal

evidence that the crime of criminal damage to property in the second degree

had been committed. , 84 F.4th at 1324 (“Probable cause requires a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place.” (citation modified); , 767 F.3d 1264,

1276 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have explained that an affidavit should establish a

connection between the defendant and the property to be searched and a link

between the property and any criminal activity.” (citation modified),

, 577 U.S. 347 (2016)).

The Plaintiff’s allegation that no crime was committed necessarily

implies that the cost to remove and repair the area where the posters were

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affixed would not exceed $500, taking her suspected actions out of the purview

of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-23(a)(1). But whether or not the building was actually

damaged to that extent is not the inquiry before the Court—instead, Sluss is

entitled to qualified immunity so long as he believed or accepted as true that

the damage exceeded that amount when he applied for the warrants.

, 557 F. App’x at 907-908. The Plaintiff has not alleged that Sluss

knowingly or intentionally lied about the extent of the damage done in order

to swear out the search warrants at issue, nor has she even alleged that he did

not believe the damage exceeded $500. To the contrary, the Plaintiff

essentially alleges that Sluss must have lied about the damage because

believes no damage was done. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12 (“No damage whatsoever

was caused by the suspected posted of fliers.”). This unsupported conclusion

does not suffice to overcome the Plaintiff’s burden with respect to qualified

immunity. Thus, because she has failed to establish that the warrants lacked

probable cause, she has failed to establish a Fourth Amendment violation on

that basis. For that reason, Sluss is entitled to qualified immunity as to the

probable cause portion of the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment challenge.

, 884 F.3d at 1296 (noting the burden on the plaintiff to establish that

qualified immunity is not appropriate by showing that the facts alleged make

out a violation of a constitutional right); , 871 F.3d at 1208.

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The Plaintiff’s other Fourth Amendment challenge is that the warrants

were unconstitutionally broad in violation of the particularity requirement.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-34); (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def. Sluss’s Mot. to Dismiss, at

7-10). She contends that the warrants “do[] not limit the search in any way.

The entirety of the phone is fair game . . . it actually goes to great lengths to

make [the search’s] scope as broad as [] is conceivably possible.” (Pl.’s Resp. in

Opp’n to Def. Sluss’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 7-8). As Sluss points out in his reply

brief, the warrants at issue here include limitations on the timeframe for the

data that is sought and search categories to narrow the search to items

reasonably connected to the crime of criminal damage to property in the second

degree. (Warrants at 3-4, 15-16). The warrant relating to the Plaintiff’s phone

is limited to a roughly three-month timespan from August 2024 to November

2024. ( at 4). That warrant further states that an executing officer is

specifically to look for “visual media matching specific criteria: Protests, signs,

black block clothing, DTAF (Defend the Atlanta Forest) and Stop Cop City.”

( ). And the warrant relating to the Plaintiff’s car is limited to the data

contained on the car’s Infotainment system for a roughly six-week timeframe

and physical items from the car including “[p]osters, adhesive, brushes,

buckets, black clothing, masks, and electronic devices.” ( at 15). These

limitations sufficiently particularize the warrants at issue in the way the

Eleventh Circuit instructed in There, the Eleventh Circuit explained

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that “in the mine run of cases . . . a time-based limitation will be both practical

and protective of privacy interests.” , 84 F.4th at 1328. The Eleventh

Circuit said so after acknowledging that “a subject-based limitation may

sometimes be so broad as to be meaningless.” at 1327. Here, both

subject-based and time-based limitations sufficiently particularize the

warrants to the extent practical at the early stages of Sluss’s investigation.

But even if the subject-based limitations here are overbroad, as the Plaintiff

contends, the time-based limitation sufficiently tailors the scope of the

searches to the extent required by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Plaintiff’s

particularity arguments do not carry her burden of establishing that Sluss is

not entitled to qualified immunity here. , 438 F.

App’x at 744; , 884 F.3d at 1296.

For all of these reasons, Sluss is entitled to qualified immunity as to the

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant Sluss’s

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 13] as to this claim.

2. First Amendment Claim (Count II)

In this claim, the Plaintiff contends that Sluss obtained the warrants at

issue to harass her and retaliate against her for exercising her First

Amendment rights with regard to protesting against Cop City. (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 36-38). Sluss argues that this claim is due to be dismissed because the

existence of probable cause underlying the warrants defeats the Plaintiff’s

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contention that her actions were constitutionally protected. (Def. Sluss’s Mot.

to Dismiss, at 13-14). Sluss also contends that he is entitled to qualified

immunity as to this claim. ( 17-20). The Court agrees on both points.

The Eleventh Circuit has described the general standard for stating a

retaliation claim as follows: “[T]he commonly accepted formulation requires

that a plaintiff must establish first, that his speech or act was constitutionally

protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected

the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the

retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” , 423

F.3d 1247, 1250 (2005) (citations omitted),

, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). But the Supreme Court has held

that a plaintiff “pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the

absence of probable cause for the arrest.” , 587 U.S. 391,

400-03 (2019).

The Court finds that the reasoning underlying the decision

extends to a retaliatory search claim, as both contexts implicate the same

Fourth Amendment concerns. at 403-04; , 2025

WL 3455398, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (extending to retaliatory

search claims); , 942 F.3d 1277, 1304

(11th Cir. 2019) (extending to a retaliatory civil action claim). The

decision dooms the Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim because, as the

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Court has already discussed, the search warrants at issue in this matter were

supported by probable cause and, therefore, the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights were not violated. In other words, regardless of any subjective

motivation Sluss may have had in investigating the Plaintiff’s actions and

pursing the search warrants, his actions were not objectively unreasonable.

This negates the third element of the retaliation claim standard.

, 423 F.3d at 1250; , 587 U.S. at 402.

The Plaintiff argues that carved out an exception to the

no-probable cause requirement where “a plaintiff presents objective evidence

that he was [subjected to a search] when otherwise similarly situated

individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”

, 587 U.S. at 407. The problem for the Plaintiff is that she presents no

such evidence in response to Sluss’s Motion, or even allegations in her

Amended Complaint, that such similarly situated individuals were not

subjected to similar search warrants. The closest she comes is alleging that

Atlanta Police Department officers have “[n]ever before . . . executed a search

warrant for [a] personal cell phone and personal vehicle belonging to any

individual . . . when that individual was suspected of nothing more than

posting fliers . . . unless the subject matter of the fliers was related to the Cop

City controversy.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 38). This sole, conclusory allegation does not

satisfy the “objective evidence” requirement, nor does it attempt to

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identify similarly situated individuals who were not subjected to a similar

search warrant. , 587 U.S. at 407. Instead, the Plaintiff’s allegation

is that she was targeted solely because of the City’s and Sluss’s views on Cop

City. But the Court explained that the similarly situated individuals

exception is an objective inquiry, so “the statements and motivations of the

particular arresting officer are irrelevant at this stage.” (citation modified).

For the same reason, Sluss is entitled to qualified immunity as to this

claim. Since the Plaintiff has not challenged Sluss’s assertion that he was

acting within the scope of his discretionary warrant when he pursued the

search warrants, the burden shifted to the Plaintiff to establish, as relevant,

that her First Amendment rights had been violated. , 884 F.3d at

1296. But as just explained, the Plaintiff has not made and cannot make that

showing here. , 423 F.3d at 1250; , 587 U.S. at 402.

Accordingly, Sluss’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 13] will be granted as to the

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

3. Conspiracy Claim (Count IV)

In this claim, the Plaintiff alleges that Sluss acted at the City’s direction

and in accordance with its “Cop City Policy,” which she alleges directed officers

to “arrest[] protesters under the pretext of violating pedestrian in the roadway

laws.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 48). She acknowledges that, although she was not

arrested, the policy “is evidence of the City’s treatment of individuals holding

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First Amendment protected beliefs that are not in alignment with the City’s

approved views. ( ¶ 42). The Plaintiff alleges that Sluss’s actions in her case

were approved of by the City’s final policy makers, and that he and the City

“jointly and in concert engaged in numerous past instances of property seizures

without probable cause.” ( ¶¶ 58-62). Sluss argues that the Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim fails because she was not deprived of any constitutional

rights. (Def. Sluss’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 14-16). He also contends he is entitled

to qualified immunity as to this claim. ( at 17-20).

The elements of a claim for conspiracy to deprive an individual of her

constitutional rights or privileges are: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the

equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the

laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is

either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of

a citizen of the United States.” , 247 F.3d 1172, 1190

(11th Cir. 2001) (citation modified). Thus, where a plaintiff’s substantive claim

fails on the merits, the conspiracy claim necessarily fails as well, since the

plaintiff “would not have been deprived of any rights or privilege by the

[d]efendants’ allegedly wrongful acts.”

Again, the Court agrees with Sluss. The Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is

premised on her Fourth Amendment claim—that her property was seized and

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searched without a valid warrant. That is the core constitutional right that the

Plaintiff alleges Sluss (and the City) conspired to violate. ( Am. Compl.

¶¶ 49-51). But because the Court found that claim failed on the merits, the

Plaintiff necessarily cannot state a claim for conspiracy to violate her Fourth

Amendment rights. , 247 F.3d at 1190. Sluss is entitled to qualified

immunity on this claim for the same reason—the Plaintiff has not challenged

Sluss’s assertion that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary

authority when he applied for the warrants, and she has not stated a viable

claim for a constitutional violation arising out of the procurement and

execution of those warrants. , 884 F.3d at 1297. Accordingly, the

Court will grant Sluss’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 13] as to the conspiracy claim,

too.

B. City of Atlanta’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 12]

In Count III, the Plaintiff asserts a claim for municipal liability against

the City, alleging that “there was a decision by a final policymaker to seize and

search Plaintiff’s property or to conduct searches and seizures in cases such as

Plaintiff’s—namely in cases related to the Cop City controversy.” (Am. Compl.

¶ 40). As previously discussed, the Plaintiff alleges that the City routinely

arrests protesters for violating the pedestrian in the roadway statute as a

means of tamping down Stop Cop City protests. ( ¶¶ 42-46). She further

alleges that “the City—if not deliberately promoting this policy—is at the very

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least deliberately indifferent to it.” ( ¶ 42). And, she alleges that Sluss acted

at the direction of a final policy maker of the City, who “encouraged and

approved [his] actions.” ( ¶ 47). In Count IV, the Plaintiff alleges that the

City is liable for failing to train its officers to respect citizens’ First Amendment

rights, and that failure to train results in the routine arrest of Cop City

protestors. ( ¶¶ 49-59).

The City argues that the Plaintiff’s policymaker claim is due to be

dismissed because the Plaintiff fails to identify who the alleged policymaker is

in Count III and because Sluss did not possess final authority to establish

municipal liability. (Def. City’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 7-14). Additionally, the City

contends that the Plaintiff’s claims fail under both the policymaker theory and

the failure to train theory because Sluss’s actions in procuring the search

warrants were lawful. ( at 9-12, 14-15). And as to the failure to train claim

in Count IV, the City asserts that the cases identified by the Plaintiff in

support of a purported policy of violating the rights of individuals opposing Cop

City are not factually analogous because those cases involved arrests for

violations of the pedestrian in the roadway statute and therefore fail to

establish a policy applicable to her case. ( at 15-18).

Under , a local government body is liable under § 1983 when the

execution of its policy or custom constitutes the “moving force” that inflicts

injury upon an individual in violation of her constitutional rights.

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436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a claim for § 1983

liability against a municipality or other local government entity, a plaintiff

must allege plausible facts showing (1) that her constitutional rights were

violated, (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted

deliberate indifference to her constitutional rights, and (3) that the custom or

policy caused his constitutional violation. , 392 F.3d 1283,

1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

The Supreme Court has also held that, in “limited circumstances,” a

§ 1983 claim can arise from a municipality’s failure to train or supervise its

police officers. , 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). These

limited circumstances occur:

[O]nly where the failure to train amounts to deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come

into contact. . . . Only where a municipality’s failure to train its

employees in a relevant respect evidences a “deliberate

indifference” to the rights of its inhabitants can such a

shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom”

that is actionable under § 1983.

at 388-89 (citations omitted). The “deliberate indifference” standard sets a

high bar to § 1983 liability. It requires a plaintiff to present evidence that the

municipality knew of a need to train or supervise in a particular area but made

a deliberate choice not to take corrective action. , 151

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). The need for training is obvious when there

is a pattern of constitutional violations by municipal employees or when the

failure to train is likely to result in a constitutional violation. at

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1351-52; , 30 F.3d 1390, 1397-98 (11th Cir. 1994).

Under either theory, the Plaintiff’s claims against the City fail

for the same reason her claims against Sluss failed—she has failed to state a

viable claim for her underlying Fourth Amendment violation. The City could

not have been deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights if

those rights were not violated in the first place. at 1289 (noting the

first prong of a claim is a showing that the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights were violated); , 489 U.S. at 385 (“It is only when

the execution of the government’s policy or custom . . . that

the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” (emphasis added) (citation

modified)). And as to the failure to train claim, even if the Plaintiff had

established a constitutional violation, her cited cases involving arrests of

protestors do not exemplify a pattern of constitutional violations with regard

to search and seizure practices in cases involving protestors. , 151 F.3d at

1350 (explaining that the plaintiff must present evidence that the municipality

knew of a need to train “in a particular area”); ,

662 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2023) (“That both the prior incident and

this case involve citizens exercising their First Amendment rights is not

sufficient to transfer the need for training in one specific area (a citizen’s right

to film police) to the need for training in a distinct area (a citizen’s right to

peacefully protest).”).

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Finally, the Plaintiff asserts the same conspiracy claim in Count V

against the City as she asserted against Sluss. But without a surviving

substantive claim for a constitutional violation, that claim necessarily fails

against the City, too. Denny, 247 F.3d at 1190. For all of these reasons, the

Court will grant the City’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 12].

C. Damages

Because the Court is dismissing the entirety of the Plaintiffs claims, her

claims for damages and attorney’s fees necessarily fail as well. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988(b); see Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant City of Atlanta’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. 12] and the Defendant Ronald Sluss’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc.

13] are GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the

Defendants and to close the case.

SO ORDERED, this __ 18th day of December, 2025.

A torres, DO Tiplron □

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.

United States District Judge

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