Interpretation of "Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit" in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

(Slip Opinion)

Interpretation of “Federal Means-Tested Public

Benefit” in the Personal Responsibility and Work

Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

This Office concluded in 1997 that the phrase “Federal means-tested public benefit,” as

used in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of

1996, could permissibly be read to include only benefits administered under manda-

tory (but not discretionary) federal spending programs. We therefore deferred to two

agencies’ interpretation under the Chevron framework. Having been asked to recon-

sider in view of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), we

now conclude that the best reading of “Federal means-tested public benefit” is its

plain meaning and withdraw our earlier opinion.

A “Federal means-tested public benefit” is any federal public benefit for which the eli-

gibility of an individual, household, or family eligibility unit for benefits, or the

amount of such benefits, or both, are determined on the basis of the income, re-

sources, or financial need of the individual, household, or unit—regardless of the

funding sources for that federal public benefit.

December 16, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

In 1996, Congress enacted bipartisan legislation to overhaul the na-

tional welfare system. See Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-

tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), Pub. L. No. 104-193,

110 Stat. 2105 (codified in relevant part as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1601

et seq. & 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.). Among other things, title IV of

PRWORA significantly reformed eligibility requirements for aliens

seeking access to welfare benefits by “deny[ing] illegal aliens benefits

for public services or welfare.” The President’s Radio Address, 1 Pub.

Papers of Pres. William J. Clinton 646, 647 (May 6, 1995),

https://perma.cc/9ETS-9CS6.

Just five months later, however, this Office told the Department of

Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and Department of Housing and

Urban Development (“HUD”) that it would be permissible to interpret

PRWORA’s phrase “Federal means-tested public benefit” as affecting

only benefits administered under mandatory (and not discretionary) fed-

eral spending programs. See Proposed Agency Interpretation of “Fed-

eral Means-Tested Public Benefit[s]” Under Personal Responsibility

and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 21 Op. O.L.C. 21, 21

(1997) (“1997 Opinion”) (alteration in original). We applied the

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49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

interpretive framework from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and opined that the statutory

text was ambiguous considering its legislative history, 21 Op. O.L.C. at

22. We therefore concluded that HHS and HUD could extend benefits to

aliens under discretionary benefit programs. See id. at 36–37.

As a result, many federal agencies since 1997 have not restricted wel-

fare benefits funded by discretionary spending from flowing to aliens.

Today, by some estimates, 59 percent of illegal-alien-headed households

receive government welfare. See The Impact of Illegal Immigration on

Social Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. Integrity,

Sec., & Enf’t of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. 25 (2024)

(testimony of Steven A. Camarota, Dir. of Rsch., Ctr. for Immigr. Stud.).

You have asked us to reconsider our 1997 Opinion. 1 The Supreme

Court recently overruled Chevron, see Loper Bright Enters. v. Rai-

mondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024), undercutting our 1997 Opinion’s

analytical framework and confirming that we must seek the “best” inter-

pretation of a statute, not merely a “permissible” one, id. at 2266. More-

over, the 1997 Opinion’s approach—divining statutory ambiguity from

legislative history—did not reflect best practices of statutory interpreta-

tion. See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011). In view of

intervening precedent and our reassessment of the statutory text, we now

withdraw our 1997 Opinion and confirm that PRWORA’s eligibility re-

quirements for “Federal means-tested public benefit[s]” apply to both

mandatory and discretionary spending programs.

I.

A.

Congress enacted title IV of PRWORA in 1996 to address abuse of

the welfare system by aliens in the United States. Because the then-ex-

isting “eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial

support agreements ha[d] proved wholly incapable of assuring that indi-

vidual aliens not burden the public benefits system,” Congress aimed to

“enact new rules to assure that aliens be self-reliant.” PRWORA

1 See Memorandum for Josh Craddock, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office

of Legal Counsel, from Emily Claire Mimnaugh, Deputy General Counsel, Department

of Health and Human Services (Sept. 15, 2025) (“Mimnaugh Memo”). We understand

that HUD concurs in this request.

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“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

§ 400(4)–(5), 110 Stat. at 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(4)–(5)).

Congress stressed that its intent was to further the “compelling govern-

mental interest [of] remov[ing] the incentive for illegal immigration pro-

vided by the availability of public benefits.” Id. § 400(6) (codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1601(6)). Together with the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat.

3009-546 (1996), which it enacted one month later, Congress made a

concerted effort to reform what it perceived to be a noxious relationship

between immigration and taxpayer-funded public benefits.

PRWORA thus contains many provisions designed to restrict aliens’

access to public benefits. It generally limits federal and state public ben-

efits to “qualified” aliens. See PRWORA § 401, 110 Stat. at 2261–62

(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611) (federal public benefits); id. § 411, 110

Stat. at 2268 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1621) (state and local

public benefits); see also id. § 431(b), 110 Stat. at 2274 (codified as

amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)) (defining “qualified alien”). Qualified

aliens are then subject to additional eligibility requirements before they

may receive benefits. For example, qualified aliens generally cannot ob-

tain “any Federal means-tested public benefit” until they have been in

the United States for five years with a qualified status. Id. § 403(a), 110

Stat. at 2265 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a)). And PRWORA takes an

expansive view of an alien’s financial means by including the “income

and resources” of an alien’s spouse or sponsor in its calculation of the

alien’s total assets. Id. § 421(a), 110 Stat. at 2270 (codified as amended

at 8 U.S.C. § 1631(a)).

The enacted version of PRWORA does not define the term “Federal

means-tested public benefit,” though earlier versions of the bill did. The

closely related term “Federal public benefit” is broadly defined by the

statute as “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial

license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated

funds of the United States.” Id. § 401(c)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 2262 (codi-

fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)(A)). That term also includes “any retire-

ment, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecond-

ary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other

similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an in-

dividual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United

States or by appropriated funds of the United States.” Id. § 401(c)(1)(B)

(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)(B)). An earlier version of PRWORA

contained a similarly expansive definition of “Federal means-tested

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49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

public benefit.” See H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. § 2102(c) (as received by

Senate, July 18, 1996). Like the definition of “Federal public benefit,”

this proposed definition did not distinguish between federal benefits

funded from mandatory versus discretionary spending sources. But be-

cause the Senate Parliamentarian sustained a single senator’s procedural

point of order during reconciliation, the enacted version of the statute

did not contain a definition.

Senator J. James Exon’s point of order was a jurisdictional objection

commonly known as the “Byrd Rule.” Congress adopted the Byrd Rule

in 1985 and codified it in 1990 within the previously established budget

framework of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (“CBA”), Pub. L.

No. 93-344, titles I–IX, 88 Stat. 297, 299–332. See Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13214, 104 Stat.

1388, 1388–621 (codifying the Byrd Rule within the CBA at 2 U.S.C.

§ 644); Bill Heniff Jr., Cong. Research Serv., RL30862, The Budget Rec-

onciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd Rule” at 1–2 (updated Sept. 28,

2022), https://perma.cc/U39Q-CDG6 (“CRS, Byrd Rule”). This proce-

dural device allows any senator to remove provisions from reconciliation

bills when the provisions do not meet the statutory requirements for such

bills and are thus considered “extraneous matter.” CRS, Byrd Rule at 3.

Senator Exon’s omnibus point of order raised Byrd Rule objections to

several provisions in the Senate PRWORA bill, including the definition

of “Federal means-tested public benefit.” 142 Cong. Rec. 18,296–97

(1996). He offered no explanation on the floor at that time, but his list

of proposed edits stated that the definition fell outside the jurisdiction of

the Senate Committee on Finance. Id. at 18,297 (citing 2 U.S.C.

§ 644(b)(1)(C)). The Senate Parliamentarian upheld the point of order

on that ground, and also because the Byrd Rule “prohibits language in a

reconciliation bill or conference report if [a provision’s] deficit reduc-

tion is merely incidental to the [provision’s] larger policy changes.” See

id. at 20975 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(D)).

The conference report for PRWORA confirmed that the definition of

federal means-tested public benefit “was deleted due to the Byrd rule.”

H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 381–82 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). The very next

sentence of the report explained, however, that it was “the intent of con-

ferees that this definition be presumed to be in place for purposes of this

title.” Id. at 382. Congress did not enact any other definitional provision

in place of the deleted one. But in the next sentence of the conference

report, id., it added a new provision under the heading “Application of

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“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

[the] Term Federal Means-tested Public Benefit,” see PRWORA

§ 403(c), 110 Stat. at 2266. That provision—section 403(c)—included a

list of benefits exempted from the eligibility requirements otherwise ap-

plicable to federal means-tested public benefits. Id. Among these exclu-

sions were two discretionary spending programs—“Head Start” and ti-

tle I of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (known as “Job

Training”). Id. § 403(c)(2)(J)–(K).

B.

Immediately after PRWORA took effect, HHS and HUD took the po-

sition that the statutory phrase “Federal means-tested public benefit” was

“best construed to apply only to mandatory (and not discretionary)

spending programs.” 1997 Opinion, 21 Op. O.L.C. at 21. Our Office

balked at calling that the best interpretation. But, “guided by the Su-

preme Court’s landmark opinion” in Chevron, id. at 23, as well as the

statute’s legislative history, we blessed the agencies’ interpretation as “a

permissible and legally binding construction,” id. at 21 (emphasis

added).

Because PRWORA was “enacted as a budget reconciliation bill,” our

1997 Opinion reasoned that it must be “construed against the backdrop”

of the CBA. Id. Of course, the CBA itself does not mention federal

means-tested public benefits. That act simply created an expedited pro-

cess for legislation that implements congressional budget resolutions,

see 2 U.S.C. § 641, and created a procedural mechanism to strike bill

provisions that do not significantly affect the budget, id. § 644. So rather

than looking to the text of the CBA, our 1997 Opinion reviewed how

Senator Exon deployed his Byrd Rule objection during PRWORA’s rec-

onciliation process and the resulting deletion of the definition for “Fed-

eral means-tested public benefit” from the bill. See 21 Op. O.L.C. at 21–

22, 24–27. The 1997 Opinion noted that the Senate Parliamentarian sus-

tained Senator Exon’s objection because, “to the extent the definition

encompassed discretionary programs, its impact on the budget was

‘merely incidental.’” Id. at 26 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 641(b)(1)(D)). “In

light of this history,” our 1997 Opinion concluded that “the meaning of

the phrase ‘federal means-tested public benefit’ [was], at the very least,

ambiguous.” Id. at 22.

Having discovered ambiguity, the 1997 Opinion moved to the next

step of Chevron and found that HHS and HUD’s decision to include only

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49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

mandatory assistance programs in the definition was “a reasonable con-

struction of the statute.” Id. After inferring that “Congress intended for

the agencies to resolve the interpretive ambiguity,” id. at 32; see also id.

at 34, and that the agencies’ definition was “manifestly ‘permissible’” in

view of PRWORA’s “statutory purposes,” the 1997 Opinion concluded

that Chevron required deference to the agencies’ interpretation and that

their interpretation was a “legally binding construction,” see id.

at 36–37.

Relying on that opinion, HHS issued a notice that it would interpret

“Federal means-tested public benefit” under PRWORA to “include only

benefits provided by means-tested, mandatory spending programs.” In-

terpretation of “Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit”, 62 Fed. Reg.

45,256, 45,257 (Aug. 26, 1997) (emphasis added). Under that narrowed

interpretation, “only two HHS programs were affected by the

PRWORA’s new requirements.” Mimnaugh Memo at 3; see also 62 Fed.

Reg. at 45,257 (“[T]he HHS programs that constitute ‘Federal means-

tested public benefits’ under PRWORA are Medicaid and [Temporary

Assistance for Needy Families].”).

II.

Mindful of the “careful and respectful consideration” owed to prior

views of our Office, we have nevertheless determined it is appropriate

to reconsider and “depart from our precedent[]” here. See Reconsidering

Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C.

158, 159 (2018) (“Wire Act”). Our 1997 Opinion hinged on an analytical

framework that the Supreme Court has now rejected. See Loper Bright,

144 S. Ct. at 2248. Like the judiciary, we seek the “best meaning” of the

statutory text. Compare id. at 2266, with Permitting Part-Time Employ-

ees to Work Regularly Scheduled Weeks of 33 to 39 Hours, 39 Op.

O.L.C. 99, 111 (2015) (“[O]ur role is to identify the best reading of the

Act using standard tools of statutory construction.”). 2

2 To be clear, we do not cast doubt on our prior opinions that merely cited or applied

Chevron. An interpretation reached under an application of Chevron may still be the

best reading of a statute, and prior opinions of this Office remain “controlling, authori-

tative and binding within the Executive Branch,” Campaign for Accountability v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just., 155 F.4th 724, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted), unless overruled or withdrawn, see, e.g., Whether the Creation of Natcast

6

“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

By its own terms, the 1997 Opinion did not advance the best reading

of PRWORA, but merely what it considered a “permissible” one urged

by HHS and HUD. 21 Op. O.L.C. at 21. Our 1997 Opinion also relied

almost exclusively on legislative history to reach the conclusion that

PRWORA was ambiguous—an approach inconsistent with both Su-

preme Court instruction and our own precedent. See, e.g., Milner, 562

U.S. at 574; Legal Authority of the Department of the Treasury to Issue

Regulations Indexing Capital Gains for Inflation, 16 Op. O.L.C. 136,

150–51 (1992). Refocusing on PRWORA’s text, however, reveals that

the reading adopted in our 1997 Opinion was not even a permissible one.

We now retract that opinion and offer the best reading of the phrase

“Federal means-tested public benefit.”

A.

The key question is whether PRWORA’s limitation on aliens’ receipt

of certain benefits applies to all federal welfare programs, regardless of

their funding source, or just to welfare programs funded by mandatory

(but not discretionary) spending. “Statutory construction must begin

with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the

ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative

purpose.” Expenditure of Appropriated Funds for Informational Video

News Releases, 28 Op. O.L.C. 109, 119 (2004) (quoting Engine Mfrs.

Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)).

“[U]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in

accordance with their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S.

369, 376 (2013) (citation omitted); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). Here, PRWORA supplies half the an-

swer by defining the baseline phrase “Federal public benefit” in ex-

tremely capacious terms. PRWORA § 411(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 2262 (cod-

ified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)). As our 1997 Opinion acknowledged,

PRWORA defines that phrase “broadly, and in a manner that appears to

draw no distinction between mandatory and discretionary programs.”

21 Op. O.L.C. at 28.

Though PRWORA does not separately define “Federal means-tested

public benefit,” see PRWORA § 403, 110 Stat. at 2265–67 (emphasis

added), the term’s ordinary meaning is easily deciphered. It is a

Violates the Government Corporation Control Act, 49 Op. O.L.C. __, at *21 (Sept. 2,

2025).

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49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

“fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally

should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time Con-

gress enacted the statute.” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532,

539 (2019) (cleaned up). The statute tells us what federal public benefits

are, and the “phrase ‘means-tested’ . . . is defined in the dictionary.”

1997 Opinion, 21 Op. O.L.C. at 28. Dictionaries contemporaneous with

PRWORA define “means test” as “any examination of the financial state

of a person as a condition precedent to receiving social insurance, public

assistance benefits, or other payments from public funds.” Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 1399 (1986); see also The American

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1116 (3d ed. 1996) (defin-

ing “means test” as “[a]n investigation into the financial well-being of a

person to determine the person’s eligibility for financial assistance”);

Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1192 (2d ed. 1987)

(defining “means test” as “an investigation into the financial position of

a person applying for aid from public funds”).

A federal means-tested public benefit, then, is best understood as

any federal public benefit for which the eligibility of an individual,

household, or family eligibility unit for benefits, or the amount of such

benefits, or both, are determined on the basis of the income, resources,

or financial need of the individual, household, or unit—regardless of the

funding sources, whether mandatory or discretionary, for that federal

public benefit.3

Nothing in PRWORA indicates Congress deviated from that ordinary

meaning. Nor is there any textual basis for distinguishing between

3 Our 1997 Opinion suggested that PRWORA was unclear about the precise contours

of the statute’s means test. See 21 Op. O.L.C. at 28 n.14 (referencing the specific factors

reviewed in other statutory means tests). We did not consider then, however, that title

IV of PRWORA specifies how to “determin[e] the eligibility and the amount of bene-

fits” available to an alien “for any Federal means-tested public benefits program” by

calculating the alien’s “income and resources.” PRWORA § 421(a), 110 Stat. at 2270

(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1631(a)) (emphasis added). This indicates that PRWORA’s

means test considers both income and resources as factors—two variables that are ex-

pressly considered by other federal statutes containing means tests. See 1997 Opinion,

21 Op. O.L.C. at 28 n.14. If the use of those two variables in the other federal statutes

is sufficient to create clarity in those contexts, then it is also sufficient in PRWORA. In

any event, any imprecision in the statutory text about PRWORA’s means test would

create uncertainty only about the information relevant to determining an alien’s means.

It would not create ambiguity about whether discretionary benefits are federal means -

tested public benefits.

8

“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

means-tested benefits funded through mandatory spending programs as

opposed to discretionary ones. Congress could have easily added lan-

guage to clarify that PRWORA affected only federal means-tested public

benefits funded from mandatory spending programs if that was the case,

yet it did not do so. “[T]he plain, obvious and rational meaning of a stat-

ute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that

nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of

an acute and powerful intellect would discover.” Lynch v. Alworth-Ste-

phens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925) (citation omitted).

Indeed, the lack of distinction in PRWORA between mandatory and

discretionary funding sources harmonizes with the definitions of similar

phrases used elsewhere in the U.S. Code. For example, the similar phrase

“means-tested Federal benefit program” is used to refer to benefits

funded from mandatory and discretionary funding sources alike. See,

e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1067q(c)(5) (defining the term to include any “program

of the Federal Government . . . in which eligibility for the programs’

benefits or the amount of such benefits are determined on the basis of

income or resources of the individual or family seeking the benefit”); id.

§ 1087ss(b)(4)(H) (including both mandatory and discretionary funded

programs under the term’s umbrella). We are not aware of any other in-

stance in which the application of a similar statutory phrase has hinged

on whether the funding source is discretionary or mandatory.

The 1997 Opinion conceded that the statutory definition of “Federal

public benefit” and the plain meaning of “means-tested” arguably “com-

bine to produce a phrase that is sufficiently plain.” 21 Op O.L.C. at 28.

But it nevertheless “f[ou]nd this argument inconclusive” for two reasons.

Id. First, the 1997 Opinion observed that “combining plain terms” does

not “necessarily result[] in an equally plain phrase.” Id. That is true

enough as a general matter. But the only reason the 1997 Opinion iden-

tified for applying that principle here was “[a]n unrelated provision” in

a different title of the statute. Id. at 28 n.15 (citing PRWORA § 911(b),

110 Stat. at 2353 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608a(b))). That provision de-

fined the term “‘means-tested welfare or public assistance program for

which Federal funds are appropriated’ to include” the food stamp pro-

gram, federal housing assistance, and “‘any State program funded under

part . . . of the Social Security Act.’” Id. The 1997 Opinion supposed that

“the fact that Congress concluded that it was necessary to provide a def-

inition of some sort” meant that “Congress did not believe that the

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49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

meaning of the defined phrase was plain.” Id. By extension, the argu-

ment went, Congress would have likely found the term “Federal means-

tested public benefit” unclear too. Id.

That conclusion does not follow. Congress’s decision to define a very

different and more cumbrous phrase in a distinct statutory title does not

shed light on whether Congress thought “Federal means-tested public

benefit” was ambiguous. For example, Congress may have provided the

definition in section 911(b) to clarify that the section covered state pro-

grams receiving certain federal funding—an inclusion not facially obvi-

ous from the phrase itself. The term “Federal means-tested public bene-

fit,” by contrast, is closely related to the defined term “Federal public

benefit.” It would lack facial clarity only if the reader otherwise presup-

posed a latent ambiguity—namely, that Congress meant to distinguish

between mandatory and discretionary funding sources when determining

eligibility for means-tested benefits.

Second, and more importantly, the 1997 Opinion asserted that the

plain meaning of “Federal means-tested public benefit” was not “suffi-

ciently plain to . . . effectively overrule[] the prior Byrd rule deletions.”

21 Op. O.L.C. at 28 (emphasis added). Indeed, it claimed that “the criti-

cal question is not whether the phrase ‘federal means-tested public ben-

efit’ is plain,” but instead “whether the phrase reveals that Congress in-

tended to incorporate the definition that the Senate had deleted.” Id.

at 29.

This framing flipped the order of operations for statutory interpreta-

tion, which must “start, as always, with the text.” Bufkin v. Collins, 145

S. Ct. 728, 737 (2025); see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of

Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 109 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the alter-

native “a most suspicious order of proceeding”). Our 1997 Opinion nod-

ded to this axiom, see 21 Op. O.L.C. at 23, but failed to heed it. That was

wrong, because an interpreter should “not resort to legislative history to

cloud a statutory text that is clear.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S.

135, 147–48 (1994). It is improper to draw an inference from legislative

history and only then ask if the text is sufficiently clear to rebut that

inference. After all, “[l]egislative history, for those who take it into ac-

count, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.” Milner, 562 U.S. at

574. Yet that is precisely what our 1997 Opinion did when it reasoned

backward from legislative history to cast doubt on plain meaning,

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“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

thereby subordinating the enacted statutory text to the procedural minu-

tiae of legislative history.

B.

Statutory context and structure reinforce our conclusion that the plain

meaning of “Federal means-tested public benefit” in PRWORA does not

distinguish between discretionary and mandatory spending. Title IV in-

cluded findings about the “increasing rates” at which aliens were “ap-

plying for and receiving public benefits.” PRWORA § 400(3), 110 Stat.

at 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(3)). Congress expressly designed

title IV of PRWORA to ensure “that aliens be self-reliant” and “not bur-

den the public benefits system.” Id. § 400(4)–(5) (codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1601(4)–(5)). Reading “Federal means-tested public benefit” as in-

cluding both mandatory and discretionary spending programs would be

consistent with title IV’s animating policy that “aliens within the Na-

tion’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs.” Id.

§ 400(2)(A) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A)).

Of course, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,” and it

would be “simplistic[] to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s pri-

mary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S.

522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). But there are no

“limitations expressed in statutory terms” here, Stanley v. City of San-

ford, 145 S. Ct. 2058, 2067 (2025) (citation omitted), that would indicate

Congress designed the statutory provision governing “Federal means-

tested public benefit[s]” to circumscribe PRWORA’s pursuit of its

broader aims. Atextually narrowing the meaning of that term to apply

only to a very few spending programs would be inconsistent with the

statute’s enacted findings and purposes.

Section 403 of PRWORA further supports our interpretation. That

section—under the heading “Application of Term Federal Means-tested

Public Benefit”—includes a list of benefits that are excepted from the

usual five-year waiting period for qualified aliens to access federal

means-tested public benefits. PRWORA § 403(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 2266

(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(2)). Two of these enumer-

ated exceptions are discretionary grant programs—Head Start and Job

Training. Id. § 403(c)(2)(J)–(K) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1613(c)(2)(J)–(K)). Interpreting the phrase “Federal means-tested

public benefit” to exclude any benefits from discretionary funding

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49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

sources would render these exemptions superfluous. That result would

be in tension with the “cardinal principle” that an interpreter “must give

effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” Loughrin v.

United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (citation omitted). It would also

violate the rule that when “Congress explicitly enumerates certain ex-

ceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be im-

plied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent” ex-

pressed in the statute. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001)

(citation omitted). By reading “Federal means-tested public benefit” to

cover only mandatory spending programs, the 1997 Opinion transformed

the exceptions in section 403(c)(2) into the rule.

Our 1997 Opinion identified several counterarguments to the infer-

ence from section 403 that “Federal means-tested public benefit” gener-

ally includes all such benefits irrespective of funding source, but we do

not find them persuasive.

First, the 1997 Opinion thought it “likely that many, if not most, mem-

bers [of Congress] did not know precisely which programs fell into

which category” of spending. 21 Op. O.L.C. at 30. That rationale flips

our default presumptions that Congress means what it says and that

it legislates against the backdrop of existing law. See Oklahoma v. Cas-

tro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486, 2496 (2022); Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs.,

Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890 (2019). It also attributes to Con-

gress a startling ignorance of funding sources for federal benefits while

simultaneously inferring that Congress impliedly exempted a sweeping

category of federal benefits due to their funding source.

Second, the 1997 Opinion suggested that Congress’s inclusion of two

discretionary funding programs in section 403(c)(2) of PRWORA was a

drafting error because there is no “mechanism for re-drafting remaining

legislative provisions to conform them” following a Byrd Rule deletion.

21 Op. O.L.C. at 29–30. Despite the 1997 Opinion’s attention to legisla-

tive process, it failed to consider that the conferees could have chosen

not to adopt the House bill’s two exceptions for discretionary spending

programs. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 382; see also Elizabeth Ry-

bicki, Cong. Research Serv., 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences

in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the

Houses at 14–15 (updated May 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/79EU-

MD6A. Insofar as PRWORA’s legislative process was relevant to its

meaning—as our 1997 Opinion claimed—it is noteworthy that the con-

ferees added the Head Start and Job Training exceptions from the House

12

“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

bill immediately after acknowledging the Byrd Rule deletion of the

“Federal means-tested public benefit” definition. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-

725, at 381–82. The addition of those programs would make no sense if

Congress believed it had just excluded benefits funded from discretion-

ary spending programs from the meaning of “Federal means-tested pub-

lic benefit.” To the contrary, the report’s sequence underscores that Con-

gress believed that the procedural deletion of the definitional provision

did not change the statutory meaning.

Third, in a similar vein, the 1997 Opinion pointed to what it described

as “other drafting flaws” in PRWORA to conclude that the inclusion of

the two discretionary spending programs in section 403(c)(2) was an

oversight. 21 Op. O.L.C. at 29. Specifically, section 403 also excepts

certain “community level” services “necessary for the protection of life

or safety” that are not conditioned on a “recipient’s income or re-

sources.” PRWORA § 403(c)(2)(G), 110 Stat. at 2266 (codified at

8 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(2)(G)). That exception, the 1997 Opinion suggested,

would also be surplusage because it is not means-tested. See 21 Op.

O.L.C. at 29.

Neither view of the statute perfectly explains why Congress included

section 403(c)(2)(G). But our 1997 Opinion ignored a meaningful dif-

ference between subsection (c)(2)(G) and subsections (c)(2)(J) and

(K)—namely, that subsection (c)(2)(G) is repeated verbatim throughout

title IV of PRWORA. This repetition evidently reflected Congress’s

overriding concern that critical services “necessary for the protection of

life or safety” be clearly excepted from PRWORA’s otherwise broad re-

strictions on benefits for aliens. See, e.g., PRWORA § 401(b)(1)(D), 110

Stat. at 2261 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(D)); id. § 403(c)(2)(G),

110 Stat. at 2266 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(2)(G)); id. § 411(b)(4),

110 Stat. at 2268 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b)(4)); id. § 422(b)(7)(C),

110 Stat. at 2271 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(7)); id. § 423(d)(7),

110 Stat. at 2274 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a note). Other exceptions

that appear repeatedly throughout title IV likewise protect emergency

services.4

4 These include an exception for medical care “necessary for the treatment of an

emergency medical condition.” See, e.g., id. § 401(b)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 2261 (codified

at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A)); id. § 403(c)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 2266 (codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1613(c)(2)(A)); id. § 411(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 2268 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b)(1));

id. § 422(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 2271 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(1)); id. § 423(d)(1),

110 Stat. at 2273 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a note). PRWORA also repeatedly excepts

13

49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

While the inclusion of section 403(c)(2)(G) was not strictly necessary,

we understand that “Congress may on occasion repeat language in order

to emphasize it.” United States v. Johnson, 114 F.4th 148, 159 (3d Cir.

2024) (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th

Cir. 2011)); see also King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 502 (2015) (Scalia,

J., dissenting) (“Lawmakers sometimes repeat themselves . . . out of a

desire to add emphasis.”). The exceptions in sections 403(c)(2)(J) and

(K) for Head Start and Job Training, by contrast, are included in just one

parallel provision where the inclusion was sensible. See PRWORA

§ 423(d)(9), (11), 110 Stat. at 2274 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1183a note).5

We are “loathe to conclude that Congress made” a drafting error “if

there is another explanation of the relevant language.” Revocation of

Prior Monument Designations, 49 Op. O.L.C. __, at *48 (May 27, 2025)

(“Monument Designations”) (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.

303, 315 (2009)). Statutory language should only be considered a draft-

ing error when it is “apparent from the face of the law” or “decrees an

absurd result—a consequence ‘so monstrous, that all mankind would,

without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.’” King, 576 U.S. at

514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.

(4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.)). That stringent test is

not satisfied here. There are plausible explanations for why the inference

from section 403 is the correct one and not an unintended relic of recon-

ciliation. And even if there had been some drafting error, as the 1997

Opinion asserted, “[i]t is beyond our province to rescue Congress from

its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think is the preferred

short-term “emergency disaster relief.” See, e.g., id. § 401(b)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 2261

(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(B)); id. § 403(c)(2)(B), 110 Stat. at 2266 (codified at

8 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(2)(B)); id. § 411(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 2268 (codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1621(b)(2)); id. § 422(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 2271 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(2)); id.

§ 423(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 2273 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a note).

5 Section 423 of PRWORA imposes requirements for affidavits of sponsors seeking

an alien’s admission under the Immigration and Nationality Act and makes sponsors

liable to reimburse the government for “any public benefit under any means-tested pub-

lic benefits program” that a sponsored alien receives. 110 Stat. at 2271–72 (codified at

8 U.S.C. § 1183a). Section 423 lists excepted benefits from that rule that precisely par-

allel the exceptions given in section 403(c). That parity makes sense: an alien’s sponsor

cannot be liable to reimburse the government for a means-tested benefit that the alien

received if it was among the limited, excepted benefits under section 403(c) that a spon-

sored alien may be eligible to obtain.

14

“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

result.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (alteration and cita-

tion omitted).

C.

Legislative history cannot undermine a meaning evident from the

plain text and structure of a statute. See Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. at

2496–97. Although PRWORA itself is clear and unambiguous, we ad-

dress its legislative history because that history drove the analysis in our

1997 Opinion. A careful and holistic examination of PRWORA’s legis-

lative history shows that the history “is ambiguous at best.” Azar v. Al-

lina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1814 (2019).

1.

The load-bearing facts of our 1997 Opinion were Senator Exon’s par-

liamentary point of order against the proposed definition of “Federal

means-tested public benefit” and the definition’s subsequent deletion

from the bill. We emphasized that, “[a]lthough Senator Exon’s specific

objection to the definition, as itemized in his list, was jurisdictional

only,” the Senate Parliamentarian upheld the objection on both the juris-

dictional ground and the ground that, “to the extent the definition en-

compassed discretionary programs, its impact on the budget was ‘merely

incidental.’” 21 Op. O.L.C. at 26 & n.11. From these facts, we discov-

ered statutory ambiguity.

The 1997 Opinion justified its pivot from PRWORA’s text to this leg-

islative history by characterizing our approach as an application of the

doctrine that “a provision in one act of Congress should be read in con-

junction with other relevant statutory provisions.” Id. at 23. But rather

than compare the text of another statutory provision to PRWORA’s

phrase “Federal means-tested public benefit,” we focused on how the

Byrd Rule—as incorporated into the CBA—worked in practice during

the legislative process that enacted PRWORA.

That novel, process-based approach to statutory interpretation dis-

guised the 1997 Opinion’s reliance on legislative history and misapplied

the in pari materia canon. Nothing in the CBA’s statutory text informs

the meaning of PRWORA’s phrase “Federal means-tested public bene-

fit.” See 2 U.S.C. § 644(a), (b)(1). The CBA simply states a procedural

rule meant to safeguard the Senate’s deliberative process in

15

49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

reconciliation. It is not—as we suggested in our 1997 Opinion—an in-

terpretive rule for construing other laws akin to the Dictionary Act,

1 U.S.C. § 1. See 21 Op. O.L.C. at 24. Furthermore, none of the cases

we cited in the 1997 Opinion to bolster the validity of our approach used

Senate procedural rules to interpret statutory text, as we did. See id. at

23–24.6 To the contrary, at least one circuit court had already specifi-

cally rejected that approach to statutory interpretation. See Elizabeth

Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996). 7

The 1997 Opinion similarly purported to apply the canon that “Con-

gress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has

earlier discarded in favor of other language.” 21 Op. O.L.C. at 29 (quot-

ing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987)). Our appli-

cation of that venerable canon missed the mark, however. During

PRWORA’s reconciliation process, the Senate Parliamentarian struck a

6 See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738–39 (1989) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying the general -specific canon

to interpret a general statute by reference to a more specific statute on that topic); Gus-

tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569–70 (1995) (considering multiple provisions of

the same statute using the same term); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,

711–12 (1996) (applying in pari materia canon to interpret one statutory provision in

light of its neighboring provision); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)

(applying the presumption against implied repeal of a statute in interpreting another

statute); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 666 (1979) (applying a general

definition from the Dictionary Act in absence of “context indicat[ing] to the contrary”).

7 In Elizabeth Blackwell, abortionists argued that state-law eligibility requirements

for Medicaid coverage of abortion were at odds with Supreme Court precedent requiring

states to fund all abortions for which federal funds were available. 61 F.3d at 179. They

observed that federal law originally included eligibility requirements like those in the

state law, but that in later reenactments of the federal statute, Congress had rejected

versions with those requirements on procedural grounds. Id. From this legislative his-

tory, the abortionists inferred that Congress intended to prohibit such requirements. Id.

The Third Circuit was unconvinced, ruling that Congress’s rejection of a provision “on

procedural grounds provides no basis for any inference about Congress’s views about

the substantive provisions of the legislation.” Id. at 180 (emphasis added).

The 1997 Opinion attempted to distinguish Elizabeth Blackwell by suggesting in a

footnote that the “procedural objection made . . . did not in any way suggest that Con-

gress intended the specific interpretation offered in that case.” 21 Op. O.L.C. at 27 n.12.

That conclusion is doubtful. But more importantly, the Third Circuit’s decision did not,

contrary to our 1997 Opinion’s framing, turn on how strongly the procedural basis for a

legislative deletion “suggest[ed]” a particular interpretation of the enacted statute; in-

stead, it categorically rejected the validity of drawing interpretive inferences from pro-

cedural deletions altogether. See 61 F.3d at 180.

16

“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

proposed definition of the phrase “Federal means-tested public benefit”

based on a procedural objection from one senator. Congress did not “dis-

card[]” the definition “in favor of other language.” Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. at 442–43 (emphasis added). Rather, Congress simply did not

include any definitional provision.

There is no basis to infer that, because one senator objected to a defi-

nitional provision in a point of order, Congress intended to incorporate

a different and opposite definition. Such an inference is further under-

mined by the language Congress did enact—“Federal means-tested pub-

lic benefit.” That is a broad phrase that facially encompasses all benefit

programs, whatever their funding source. In short, the canon we used in

our 1997 Opinion should carry less weight—not “particular force,”

21 Op. O.L.C. at 29—when the deletion of a definitional provision was

due to a single senator’s procedural objection and the Senate Parliamen-

tarian’s agreement. “[F]loor statements by individual legislators rank

among the least illuminating forms of legislative history.” NLRB v.

SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 307 (2017). That maxim holds truer still

for explanations offered by an unelected Senate Parliamentarian—whose

decisions “reflect a judgment call,” Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting by

the Rules, 99 Tex. L. Rev. 1115, 1144 (2021), and are not binding on the

Senate, see Valerie Heitshusen, Cong. Research Serv., RS20544, The

Office of the Parliamentarian in the House and Senate at 1–2 (updated

Nov. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/7Z79-NSS5.

The 1997 Opinion thus piloted a novel approach to statutory interpre-

tation that required consideration of legislative history for an entire sub-

set of federal laws enacted through reconciliation. See 21 Op. O.L.C. at

25 (“The meaning of a particular provision of reconciliation legislation

. . . must be construed in light of congressional actions taken pursuant to

the CBA.”). 8 Nothing in “the purpose and language” of the CBA, id. at

27, requires that approach. Little wonder, then, that although this Office

has often been called upon to interpret legislation enacted through rec-

onciliation, we have never again interpreted such a law based on the con-

gressional procedures employed during its enactment.

8 This conclusion has potentially significant ramifications for other federal statutes.

From the time Congress adopted the Byrd Rule in 1985 through September 2022, the

Senate considered 23 reconciliation measures. See CRS, Byrd Rule at 6. Senators raised

specific Byrd Rule points of order in 19 of those bills, with the substantial majority (73

of 83) sustained in whole or in part. Id. at 8–10.

17

49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

The methodology in our 1997 Opinion is also difficult to square with

principles of textualism and the Constitution’s vesting of legislative

power in Congress. “[I]f the conventions of legislative history or the leg-

islative process reveal that Congress used language in something other

than its natural sense, a textualist [interpreter] should not necessarily de-

fer to that meaning.” Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and

Outsiders, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2193, 2194 (2017). What matters “is how

the ordinary English speaker—one unacquainted with the peculiarities

of the legislative process—would understand the words of a statute.” Id.

The Constitution sets the lawmaking process, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 7,

and the public is entitled to rely on the words produced by that process.

Congressional customs and practices of lawmaking do not give license

to imbue enacted texts with hidden meanings.

2.

The 1997 Opinion also cited floor colloquies from a few senators—

including Senator Exon—for their understanding that, “[u]nder the Byrd

rule, the budget reconciliation process cannot be used to change discre-

tionary spending programs.” 21 Op. O.L.C. at 31 n.20 (quoting 142

Cong. Rec. at 20,975 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy)). Upon review,

we disagree that these exchanges constituted “strong evidence” of the

meaning of “Federal means-tested public benefit.” Id. at 26. It bears re-

peating that such “floor statements by individual legislators rank among

the least illuminating forms of legislative history.” NLRB, 580 U.S.

at 307.

Even if our analysis could properly turn on this legislative history,

other aspects of the legislative record contradict it. As our 1997 Opinion

acknowledged, the conference report noted the deletion of the defini-

tional provision but explained in the very next sentence that it “is the

intent of conferees that this definition be presumed to be in place for

purposes of this title.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 382. One of those con-

ferees was Senator Exon. Id. at 504. The 1997 Opinion rejected this leg-

islative statement of intent, reiterating the principle that Congress does

not silently enact language it previously “discarded in favor of other lan-

guage,” 21 Op. O.L.C. at 30 (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at

442–43)—a rule that, as we have explained, does not apply here.

If PRWORA’s legislative record clearly establishes anything, it is that

divining statutory meaning from legislative history is fraught with

18

“Federal Means-Tested Public Benefit” in PRWORA

danger. See Monument Designations at *48.9 We accordingly part ways

with the 1997 Opinion and decline to hang the meaning of “Federal

means-tested public benefit” on that parlous hook.

III.

“Our Office embraces a ‘long tradition of general adherence to Exec-

utive Branch legal precedent.’” Reconsidering the Application of the

Hyde Amendment to the Provision of Transportation for Women Seeking

Abortions, 49 Op. O.L.C. __, at *17 (July 11, 2025) (quoting Wire Act,

42 Op. O.L.C. at 177). Yet “as with any system of precedent,” reconsid-

ering our prior opinions is appropriate where intervening precedent un-

dermines our conclusion or when we have identified other “errors in

the supporting legal reasoning.” Id. (quoting Wire Act, 42 Op. O.L.C. at

177–78); see also Statutory Rollback of Salary to Permit Appointment of

Member of Congress to Executive Office, 33 Op. O.L.C. 201, 201–02

(2009). Here, the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright and the er-

rors in statutory interpretation that we have identified are sufficient to

warrant withdrawing our 1997 Opinion.

Whatever reliance might have developed on our prior interpretation

cannot overcome adherence to the plain statutory text. See Wire Act,

42 Op. O.L.C. at 180; Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of

Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1930 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). While some aliens may have come to rely on means-

tested public benefits funded through discretionary spending programs,

the existence of such reliance on federal welfare contradicts the textually

expressed congressional policy that aliens must not rely on taxpayer sup-

port or burden the public benefits system. See PRWORA § 400(4)–(5),

110 Stat. at 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(4)–(5)); see also id.

§ 400(1) (“Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States

immigration law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes.”).

Congress gave clear notice about the “restrictions on the use of those

funds” when it enacted PRWORA. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.

9 One Supreme Court Justice has observed that, “[i]n a world without initial determi-

nations of ambiguity” where an interpreter must “decide on the best reading of the stat-

ute”—that is, in a post-Chevron world—legislative history (to the extent it is considered

at all) is “largely limited to helping answer the question of whether the literal reading

of the statute produces an absurdity.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpreta-

tion, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2016) (book review).

19

49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Dec. 16, 2025)

Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012). It is Congress, not this Office, that

weighed the relevant interests and then made the policy decision about

eligibility. Our interpretation today “impose[s] no new, affirmative ob-

ligations” on recipients of public benefits. See Illinois v. Sullivan, 919

F.2d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 1990). It merely applies to them the text of the

statute Congress enacted.

American taxpayers have interests, too, in ensuring that their tax con-

tributions do not encourage illegal entry into the United States.

See PRWORA § 400(6), 110 Stat. at 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1601(6)). Americans are entitled to rely on duly enacted legislation

crafted by their elected representatives and designed to protect the public

fisc from abuse. While reliance interests may be relevant “in evaluating

past expenditures” and may preclude attempts to divest aliens of benefits

received under our prior interpretation, see Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ.,

470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985), there can be no prospective reliance on a con-

tinued misinterpretation of federal law.

For these reasons, we conclude that the best reading of “Federal

means-tested public benefit” in PRWORA includes benefits under both

mandatory and discretionary spending programs, and we withdraw our

contrary 1997 Opinion.

T. ELLIOT GAISER

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

20