Samassa

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TAHIROU SAMASSA, No. 1:25-CV-02197

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

CRAIG LOWE, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DECEMBER 17, 2025

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Tahirou Samassa (“Samassa”), a Senegalese citizen seeking

asylum in the United States, brings this petition for writ of habeas corpus.1 Samassa

is currently detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility within the Middle

District of Pennsylvania.2 The petition names as Respondents: (1) Craig Lowe,

Warden of the Pike County Correctional Facility, (2) Kristi Noem, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, (3) the Department of Homeland Security, and

(4) Pamela Bondi, the Attorney General of the United States.3

On December 4, 2025, Samassa filed an emergency motion for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) asking the Court to enjoin the Government from detaining

1 Doc. 1.

2 Id. ¶ 1.

him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), to order his immediate release, and to grant the

writ of habeas corpus.4 For the reasons that follow, the emergency motion for a TRO

will be granted.5

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Respondents’ chief objection to the writ of habeas corpus, and subsequently

to the motion for a TRO, is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this challenge

to Samassa’s detention.6 They point to three sections of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”) — Sections 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) —

that they say strip district court of jurisdiction to hear such cases.7

Numerous courts, including several courts in the Middle District of

Pennsylvania, have had occasion to address the issue of whether these sections or

other sections of the INA strip district courts of jurisdiction over challenges to

administrative detention.8 Those courts have been nearly unanimous in their initial

determination that the INA does not strip district courts of jurisdiction to hear and

4 Doc. 4.

5 While the motion for a TRO is granted, the Court notes that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus has not been granted based upon the pending motion.

6 Doc. 8, at 18-26.

7 Id.

8 For a more extensive discussion on the jurisdiction of district courts over these matters see the

Report and Recommendation authored by Magistrate Judge Camoni and adopted by Judge

Wilson. See Santana-Rivas, v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:25-CV-01896,

2025 WL 3522932 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (the jurisdictional section of this report was

adopted in its entirety).

decide these habeas claims.9 Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit has stated unambiguously that Section 1252(g) “does not sweep

broadly.”10 Rather, Section 1252(g) “directs other courts not to hear challenges to

three of the Attorney General's ‘decision[s] or action[s]’: those that ‘commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”11 As it said, Section

1252(g) “reaches only these three specific actions, not everything that arises out of

them.”12

As Magistrate Judge Camoni succinctly put it: “Petitioner does not ask this

Court to review the decision or action to commence immigration proceedings

against her, nor to adjudicate her case, nor to impose or eventually execute a

removal order. Petitioner only seeks review of her ongoing detention, a heartland

9 See Patel v. O’Neill, 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“federal

district courts to consider this issue have almost universally held that they have jurisdiction to

consider habeas petitions like the one filed by Petitioner”); Quispe v. Rose, No. 3:25-cv-02276,

2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025); Cunin v. Brian, No. 3:25-cv-1887, 2025 WL

3542999 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025).

10 Tazu v. Att’y Gen. United States, 975 F.3d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 2020).

11 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).

12 Id. See also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).

Respondents’ arguments under Section 1252(b)(9) fare no better as their application of the

section would lead to the “staggering results” discussed by the United States Supreme Court

in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293 (2018). “Under such a regime of unreviewable,

indefinite executive detention, any person could be taken into custody and held for any amount

of time, without recourse.” Santana-Rivas, 2025 WL 3522932, at *5. Needless to say, such a

regime should surely be avoided, and can easily be avoided with a finding that district courts

have the jurisdiction to hear these cases. Further, “Section 1252(b)(9) also does not divest this

Court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition, because it ‘does not reach claims that are

independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process.’” Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *7

(quoting E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d. Cir.

2020)).

habeas corpus claim.”13 Respondents ignore the fact that this Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) to hear habeas corpus cases for persons alleging that

they are in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.14 Given that Samassa was detained within this Court’s jurisdiction and by a

custodian within this jurisdiction when he filed the Petition, this Court has

jurisdiction to hear the claims within the petition.15

B. Exhaustion

Respondents next argue that Samassa’s petition and TRO should be denied

because he has not exhausted all administrative remedies in this case. However,

this ignores the fact that “exhaustion exists only as a judicially created doctrine

applied at the Court's discretion.”16 Further, “[c]ourts have found that the

exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when available

remedies provide no opportunity for adequate relief, an administrative appeal

would be futile.”17 As Respondents have made clear in their briefing, the Board of

Immigration Appeals decision of In re Hurtado makes it impossible for Samassa to

obtain a bond hearing and be released from detention prior to a removal decision.18

13 Santana-Rivas, 2025 WL 3522932, at *4.

14 Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004).

15 Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (per curiam) (noting jurisdiction for “core habeas

petitions” lies in the district of confinement).

16 Kashranov v. Jamison, No. 2:25-CV-05555-JDW, 2025 WL 3188399, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14,

2025) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).

17 Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666-67 (D.N.J. 2003).

18 See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025).

Therefore, it would be futile for him to pursue administrative remedies and this is a

worthy case to excuse any judicially-created exhaustion requirement.

C. Temporary Restraining Order

A party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish four factors:

“(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the probability of irreparable harm if

the relief is not granted, (3) that granting injunctive relief will not result in even

greater harm to the other party, and (4) that granting relief will be in the public

interest.”19 Courts use a balancing test to determine whether injunctive relief is

warranted.20 The movant bears the burden of establishing all four elements.21

Taking each element in turn, the first is easily satisfied here. Nearly every

court who has had occasion to address it have rejected the Respondents contention

that all aliens present without parole in the United States must be detained because

they are “applicants for admission” who are actively “seeking admission” under

Section 1225(b)(2).22 If more were needed, every court within the Third Circuit

that has considered the issue has rejected this contention.23 While the Court will

not opine on the ultimate success of Samassa’s habeas petition, the overwhelming

19 Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Frank's GMC Truck Center,

Inc. v. G.M.C., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3rd Cir.1988)).

20 Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975).

21 Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 486 (3d Cir. 2000).

22 See Santana-Rivas, 2025 WL 3522932, at *8 (including a collection of many of those

decisions).

23 See Santana-Rivas, 2025 WL 3522932, at *9.

quantity of cases—and their quality—demonstrates an extreme likelihood for

success on the merits.

The three remaining elements can be quickly disposed of in Samassa’s

favor. Looking to the probability of irreparable harm, the harm threatened here is

the deprivation of liberty due to an unlawful detention. That is a sufficient injury

for the purposes of a motion for a TRO.24 Given the current backlog of “mandatory

detainees” that the Executive Office of Immigration Review has on its hands, if a

TRO were denied, Samassa would face an indefinite, prolonged detention.25 That is

sufficient here to make out the element of probability irreparable harm.

Finally, a balance of the equities and the public interest both favor granting a

TRO in this case. “[I]f a plaintiff demonstrates both a likelihood of success on the

merits and irreparable injury, it almost always will be the case that the public

interest will favor the plaintiff.”26 Further, “public interest favors the protection of

constitutional rights, and any comparison of harm to the Government turns mostly

on matters of public interest, as those considerations merge when the Government

24 See Arias Gudino v. Lowe, 785 F. Supp. 3d 27, 46 (M.D. Pa. 2025) (“In the immigration

context, unlawful detention is a sufficient irreparable injury.”); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872

F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding “Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of

irreparable harm by virtue of the fact that they are likely to be unconstitutionally detained for

an indeterminate period of time.”).

25 See Doc. 4, Ex. 1, at 4.

26 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 n.8 (3d Cir.

1994).

is an opposing party.”27 Here, the government would suffer no—or very limited—

hardship(s) if a TRO was granted and Samassa was released from detention for the

pendency of his asylum application.28 There are assuredly present interests of

national security and ensuring the administration of our nation’s immigration laws,

but the government has not set forth any arguments that these goals would be

frustrated by Samassa’s release pending his removal decision. Given that “there is

a strong public interest in preventing the unnecessary and unlawful detention of

persons who otherwise should be set free,” both a balance of the equities and the

public interest counsel toward granting a TRO here.29

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Samassa’s emergency motion for a TRO will be

granted.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

27 See Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 332 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Nken v.

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

28 See Cunin v. McShane, No. 3:25-CV-1887, 2025 WL 3542999, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025).

29 Id.