GARCIA-ZAMORA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMILCAR JOSUE GARCIA-ZAMORA : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

J.L. JAMISON, et al. : NO. 25-6656

MEMORANDUM

Bartle, J. December 16, 2025

On November 24, 2025, Amilcar Josue Garcia-Zamora

filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 and the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. He also filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order. He challenges the lawfulness of

his detention at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center by

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The Respondents

are: J.L. Jamison, the Warden of the Philadelphia Federal

Detention Center; Brian McShane, the acting Director of the

Philadelphia Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal

Operations; Todd Lyons, the acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem,

the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Pamela

Bondi, the Attorney General of the United States; and the

Department of Homeland Security. All individuals are sued in

their official capacities.

Petitioner asks this court to issue a writ of habeas

corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner on his own

recognizance or on parole, bond or reasonable conditions of

supervision. In the alternative, he requests a bond hearing

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). He also asks the court to set

aside Respondents’ detention policy under the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), as contrary to law, arbitrary

and capricious, and contrary to constitutional rights.

Additionally, Petitioner requests a declaration that his

mandatory detention is unlawful.

In his motion for a temporary restraining order, he

seeks this court to enjoin Respondents from moving him outside

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; enjoin Respondents from

detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); and order

Petitioner’s immediate release from Respondents’ custody. This

court has ordered him not to be removed from this District

pending further order of this court.

I

The Constitution guarantees the availability of the

writ of habeas corpus “to every individual detained within the

United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

(citing U.S. Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas

corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of

that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is

to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Historically, “the writ of habeas

corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of

Executive detention.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301

(2001). It is a core remedy for unlawful executive detention

that is regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens. Munaf v.

Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305. When

reviewing the legality of executive detention, its protections

have been the strongest. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.

Accordingly, a district court's habeas jurisdiction includes

challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

II

Petitioner is a native of Venezuela. According to his

petition, he and his family were active political protesters in

Venezuela who demonstrated against the regime of Nicolas Maduro.

In retribution, the regime arrested and persecuted him on

multiple occasions.

Petitioner initially entered the country on September

12, 2022 in El Paso, Texas. Officials from Customs and Border

Patrol detained him upon entry. The Department of Homeland

Security placed him in detention briefly and subsequently

released him on parole into the United States presumably under 8

U.S.C. § 1226. Under § 1226(a), “an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be

removed from the United States . . . . [P]ending such a

decision, the [alien] . . . may [be] release[d] . . . on bond .

. . or . . . [on] conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2).

Petitioner was charged with being an inadmissible alien under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). That provision states that an alien

present in the United States without being previously admitted

or paroled is ineligible to be admitted to the United States.

Id. He was also charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i),

which provides that “any immigrant [who] at the time of

application for admission . . . is not in possession of a valid

unexpired immigrant visa,” or other similar documents, and “a

valid, unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document[s]”

is inadmissible. Id.

Petitioner has resided in the United States since

September 2022. Up until his recent detention, he lived in

Allentown, Pennsylvania where there is a large community of

Venezuelans. He maintains that he has worked lawfully paying

taxes in order to support his family.

During his residency, Petitioner attended check-ins as

required at the ICE office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in

October 2022, November 2023, and November 2024. Petitioner

filed a timely application for asylum, on or about October 17,

2024. His application is based on his fear of persecution in

his home country.

On November 19, 2025, he attended his fourth required

check-in when he was arrested by ICE officers. He was

transferred to the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia

where he is currently detained. Once in custody, his detention

was continued without an opportunity to post bond or be released

on other conditions.

ICE took the action it did based on a new policy

position that non-citizens residing in the interior of the

United States are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)

proceedings and not to § 1226(a). Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

provides: “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that

an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a

[removal] proceeding.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Those detained

pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not entitled to a bond hearing

before an immigration judge during their removal proceedings.

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018). Respondents

take the position they do as a result of a series of

precedential decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals that

finally culminated in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216

(BIA 2025).

Petitioner argues that Matter of Yajure Hurtado is

contrary to law and that the government has unlawfully

determined that he was subject to mandatory detention. He

argues that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like

himself who are already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.

III

In recent months, numerous district courts have

addressed the issues raised by Petitioner in this case. There

have been close to 300 decisions overall. See Patel v. McShane,

No. 25-5975, 2025 WL 3241212, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2025)

(Brody, J.). Included are decisions by at least seven judges in

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See, e.g., id.; Ibarra v.

Warden of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 25-6312, 2025 WL

3294726, at *1-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.); Ndiaye v.

Jamison, No. 25-6007, 2025 WL 3229307, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov.

19, 2025) (Sanchez, J.); Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No.

25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025)

(Diamond, J.); Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill, No. 25-6338, 2025 WL

3171639, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Kenney, J.); Kashranov

v. Jamison, No. 25-5555, 2025 WL 3188399, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov.

14, 2025) (Wolson, J.). In one of these cases, Anirudh v.

McShane, No. 25-6458, 2025 WL 3527528 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2025),

the undersigned granted a similar habeas petition on December 9,

2025. Id. at *6. The court incorporates its Memorandum by

reference.

The government invokes the same procedural arguments

here as it did in Anirudh. It argues that this court lacks

jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), and that the court cannot review the petition

because Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies.

As in Anirudh, the jurisdiction-stripping provisions

in § 1252 do not apply. Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at *2-4.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not bar review of Garcia-Zamora’s claims

because he is not challenging the government's commencement of

removal proceedings but rather the legality of his detention.

Id. at *3. Similarly, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not oust the

court of jurisdiction because the provision does not bar the

court from reviewing collateral issues to the removal process,

such as whether a bond hearing is required. Id. Finally,

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not strip the court of the power to

adjudicate this matter because Petitioner is not challenging a

discretionary decision to deny him bond but rather the

government's legal position that no bond hearing is required.

Id.

Petitioner is not required to exhaust his

administrative remedies because the issue presented involves

statutory construction and exhaustion would be futile in light

of the Board of Immigration Appeals' recent decisions in Matter

of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). See Anirudh, 2025 WL

3527528, at *4.

Accordingly, for the reasons more fully stated in

Anirudh, the court has jurisdiction and Petitioner is not

required to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at *2-4.

IV

Finally, the government argues that the petition fails

on the merits. As in Anirudh, it asserts that under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), Garcia-Zamora qualifies as an alien who is

“applicant for admission” and thus subject to mandatory

detention in advance of removal proceedings. See Anirudh, 2025

WL 3527528, at *4-5.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) proceedings require mandatory

detention while a noncitizen's removal proceedings are pending

and the person may be released only “for urgent humanitarian

reasons or significant public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). To trigger

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining immigration officer must determine

that the individual is: (1) an “applicant for admission”; (2)

“seeking admission”; and (3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The court

agrees with previous decisions in this district that these are

separate requirements, all of which must be met for

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply. See Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528,

at *5.

As in Anirudh, this court rejects the government’s

interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) that conflates “applicant for

admission” and “seeking admission” under Matter of Yajure

Hurtado. 29 I&N Dec. at 222-24; Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at

*5. This interpretation disregards the plain meaning of

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and violates the rule against surplusage

of statutory language. Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at *5.

Instead, the court finds that § 1225(b)(2)(A) statutory

requirement of “seeking admission” limits the provision’s

application to noncitizens who are just arriving or have

recently arrived in the country. Id.

At the time of his arrest in November 2025, Petitioner

had been present in this country for over three years and was

not at that point “seeking admission,” that is seeking “lawful

entry,” into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A);

Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at *5.

In contrast, Section 1226 authorizes the government to

detain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89.

Section 1226(a), as noted above and in contrast to Section 1225,

establishes a discretionary detention framework for noncitizens

arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney

General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also Anirudh, 2025 WL

3527528, at *5. It allows noncitizens subject to removal

proceedings to be released on their own recognizance, a form of

conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B); see also Gomes v.

Hyde, No. 25-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *2 (D. Mass. July 7,

2025). It also entitles noncitizens to a bond hearing at the

outset of any detention. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.l(d).

Petitioner entered the country in September 2022. He

was shortly thereafter charged with being an inadmissible alien,

subjected to removal proceedings, and released on conditional

parole. Since 2022, he has resided in the country. The

detention of noncitizens like Petitioner who have been long-

present in the United States is governed by the discretionary

framework of § 1226(a). Therefore, Petitioner’s detention

without the opportunity for a bond hearing violates the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

Since his mandatory detention violates federal law,

the court need not address his claims that either the bond

regulations, due process, or the Administrative Procedure Act,

5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et. seq., has been violated.

V

The court will issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring

that Respondents release Petitioner because his mandatory

detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. The

court also declares his current detention unlawful.

Because the court has granted the writ of habeas

corpus, the court will deny Petitioner’s motion for a temporary

restraining order as moot.