Barbour

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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PATRICIA A. BARBOUR,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM

AND ORDER

v. 22-CV-06409-SJB-ARL

NORTHWELL HEALTH & NORTHWELL HEALTH

CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS,

Defendants.

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BULSARA, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Patricia A. Barbour (“Barbour”) filed this pro se action against her

former employer Defendant Northwell Health1 (“Northwell”) alleging that her

termination for failure to comply with Northwell’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement

constituted religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(“Title VII”). (Compl. filed Sep. 30, 2022, Dkt. No. 2 at 3, 5). Northwell has moved to

dismiss all claims with prejudice. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss dated May 23, 2025, Dkt. No.

16 at 1). For the reasons explained, the Court grants Northwell’s motion.

1 The Complaint names “Northwell Health” and “Northwell Health Corporate

Headquarters,” as the defendant. In its Motion to Dismiss, Northwell asserts that the

proper entity is “Northwell Health, Inc.” (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1 n.1). If a

defendant believes it has been misidentified, the proper course is to make a motion

(perhaps to substitute, or to dismiss, on the grounds that no claim can be asserted

against a non-existent entity, and providing legal and factual evidence for the relief),

but a party cannot simply unilaterally announce it believes the suit has named the

wrong party and have the Court direct the caption be changed. (Indeed, such power

could be abused by a defendant seeking to shift liability (or financial exposure) to an

entity less amenable to suit or one that is judgment-proof). Because there is only one

entity ultimately being sued, the Court uses the term defendant throughout.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For the purpose of this motion, the Court is “required to treat” Barbour’s “factual

allegations as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of [her] to the extent that

the inferences are plausibly supported by allegations of fact.” In re Hain Celestial Grp.,

Inc. Secs. Litig., 20 F.4th 131, 133 (2d Cir. 2021). The Court “therefore recite[s] the

substance of the allegations as if they represented true facts, with the understanding

that these are not findings of the court, as we have no way of knowing at this stage

what are the true facts.” Id. In addition to the Complaint, the Court considers

documents that are incorporated by reference, documents which are integral to the

pleading, and documents of which the Court takes judicial notice, including those filed

in another court proceeding. DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.

2010); Glob. Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006).

Barbour was employed as a Front Desk Receptionist at the Department of

Ophthalmology in Great Neck, New York from August 2005 until her termination on

September 28, 2021. (Compl. at 3, 8). 2

In August 2021, the New York State Department of Health issued an emergency

rule directing healthcare entities to “continuously require” certain employees to be fully

vaccinated against COVID-19 beginning on September 27, 2021. N.Y. Comp. Codes R.

& Regs. tit. 10, § 2.61 (2021) (repealed Oct. 4, 2023) (“10 N.Y.C.R.R.” and “Section 2.61”);

see also We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 274 (2d Cir. 2021) (“We The

2 Barbour’s Complaint lists two dates for her termination: September 27, 2021,

(Compl. at 6), and September 28, 2021, (id. at 8).

Patriots I”), opinion clarified, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021) (“We The Patriots II”). Section 2.61

applied to employees covered by the Rule’s definition of “personnel,” namely, those

employees, staff members, and volunteers “who engage in activities such that if they

were infected with COVID-19, they could potentially expose other covered personnel,

patients or residents to the disease.” 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.61(a)(2); see also We The Patriots I,

17 F.4th at 274. The Rule provided medical exemptions to the vaccination requirement,

Section 2.61(d)(1), but it did not contain any “’exemption’ for personnel who oppose

vaccination on religious or any other grounds not covered by the medical exemption.”3

We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 275. Northwell implemented a mandatory vaccination

policy requiring its employees be vaccinated by September 27, 2021. (Compl. at 6).

Barbour submitted a letter to Northwell’s Human Resources department on

August 16, 2021, requesting an exemption from the COVID-19 vaccine because of “[her]

religious beliefs.” (Id.). Barbour, who identifies as a “female of Christian faith,” (id. at

8), wrote that she “believe[s] that [her] body belongs to God . . . which prohibits [her]

from putting anything in [her] body that would harm [her].” (Pl.’s Religious Exemption

3 On August 18, 2021, the New York State Commissioner of Health issued an

“Order for Summary Action” requiring certain healthcare facilities to ensure full

vaccination against COVID-19 and allowing for both medical and religious exemptions.

See We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 275. Northwell instituted a vaccination policy and

permitted employees to file a “Religious Exemption Request Form.” See Braccia v.

Northwell Health Sys., No. 24-2665, 2025 WL 2610704, at *1 (2d Cir. Sep. 10, 2025). On

August 26, 2021, the New York State Department of Health adopted Section 2.61,

superseding the Order for Summary Action and eliminating the ability to request a

religious exemption; Northwell, accordingly, refused to accept religious

accommodation forms. Id.

Req., attached to Pl.’s Opp’n as Ex. A, (“Pl.’s Req.”), Dkt. No. 17 at 9).4 She stated that

she understood the COVID vaccines to have been “manufactured contain[ing] aborted

fetal cells” which “[her] faith in God prohibit[ed] [her] from being a part of.” (Id.). She

claimed to feel “led by the Holy Spirit of God not to accept the COVID shot.” (Id.).

Northwell denied her exemption request on September 3, 2021. (Compl. at 6).

Barbour subsequently renewed her request on September 22, 2021 (with an

amendment), which Northwell again denied two days later because “there is no

alternative arrangement that can be made that would allow [Barbour] to perform [her]

duties” and because she “would be a threat to patients, co-workers and visitors.” (Id.).

Barbour alleges that she had worked for two years during the COVID-19 pandemic,

“masked and set apart,” and was “never absent or sick during the time.” (Id.). She also

asserts that during that time she “was in full compliance” with an order requiring

Northwell healthcare workers to be tested on a weekly basis. (Id.). Barbour was fired

on September 27, 2021, “because [she] did not take the vaccine.” (Id.).

Barbour filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) on October 22, 2021, and received a Notice of Right to Sue on

July 7, 2022. (Compl. at 7–9). She commenced this action on September 30, 2022, in the

United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, seeking lost wages,

4 The Court also considers the factual allegations made by Barbour in her

opposition papers as doing so does not change the outcome of the case. See Moss v. Bd.

of Educ. of Brentwood Sch. Dist., No. 23-CV-6571, 2025 WL 1548945, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May

30, 2025) (“[B]ecause of the liberal construction afforded to pro se papers, ‘[a] district

court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se

party in [her] papers opposing the motion.” (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122

n.1 (2d Cir. 2013)).

lost medical benefits, and punitive damages. (Id. at 1, 10). Barbour was granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis. (Order dated Oct. 4, 2022, Dkt. No. 4). On October 13,

2022, the Court issued an order, sua sponte, transferring the case to the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York based on Barbour’s allegations.

(Order dated Oct. 13, 2022, Dkt. No. 5). 5

Northwell filed a letter requesting a premotion conference in anticipation of

filing a motion to dismiss the entirety of Barbour’s Complaint, (Def.’s PMC Req. dated

Mar. 10, 2025, Dkt. No. 10), and Barbour responded in opposition, (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n

to Def.’s PMC Req. filed Apr. 18, 2025, Dkt. No. 14). This Court determined that a

premotion conference was unnecessary and ordered full briefing on the motion to

dismiss. (Order dated Apr. 22, 2025).

DISCUSSION

“To survive a motion to dismiss [pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation

omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  Id. A complaint must contain more than “naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”  Id. (quotations omitted). In other

words, a plausible claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.; Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

5 The case was transferred to the undersigned on January 14, 2025.

speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true

(even if doubtful in fact)[.]”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

omitted). The determination of whether a party has alleged a plausible claim is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

This pleading requirement “does not impose a probability standard at the

motion-to-dismiss stage.” Mosaic Health, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 156 F.4th 68, 77

(2d Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (noting that plausibility does not equate to probability). And “on

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it is not the province of the court to dismiss the complaint on the

basis of the court’s choice among plausible alternatives. Assuming that [plaintiff] can

adduce sufficient evidence to support its factual allegations, the choice between or

among plausible interpretations of the evidence will be a task for the factfinder.” Id.

(quotations omitted). Because Barbour is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her

Complaint “to raise the strongest claims [it] suggest[s].” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys.

MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024). However, her pro se status does not permit

the Court to read into her “submissions claims that are not consistent with [her]

allegations, or arguments that the submissions themselves do not suggest.” Triestman v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).

Northwell argues that Barbour’s Complaint should be dismissed as it fails to

state a plausible claim for religious discrimination or a failure to accommodate. (Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss at 1–2). The Court addresses each theory of liability in turn.

I. Religious Discrimination

Under Title VII, it is “unlawful for employers ‘to discharge . . . or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual’ in his or her employment ‘because of such

individual’s . . . religion.’” We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 291 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a)(1)). Generally, there are two elements to a Title VII religious-discrimination claim:

first, that “an employer discriminates against a plaintiff by taking an adverse

employment action against [her],” and second that the plaintiff’s religion “was a

substantial or motivating factor contributing to the employer’s decision to take the

action.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation

omitted).

At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not plead specific facts to support

a prima facie case “as contemplated by the McDonnell Douglas” summary judgment

framework. Id. at 84. Instead, absent direct evidence of religious discrimination, a

plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) that she “is a member of a protected class,” (2) that

she “was qualified” for her position, (3) that she “suffered an adverse employment

action,” and (4) facts that provide “at least minimal support for the proposition that the

employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 79 (2d

Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).

Northwell contends that Barbour has not plausibly pled that after refusing the

COVID-19 vaccination she was still qualified for her position as a Front Desk

Receptionist. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6–7). An employee is qualified under Title VII

when they satisfy “the criteria the employer has specified for the position.” Scé v. City of

New York, No. 20-3954, 2022 WL 598974, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2022) (quoting Williams v.

R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by,

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024)); see also Moore v. City of New York, No.

16-CV-7358, 2018 WL 1281809, at *4 (“To be ‘qualified’ for a position, however, an

employee must not only be capable of performing the work; she must also satisfy the

employer’s conditions of employment.”), aff’d, 745 F. App’x 407 (2d Cir. 2018).

Under Section 2.61 being vaccinated against COVID-19 was a requirement for

Barbour’s employment as a receptionist at a healthcare facility. It required all

“[c]overed entities,” like hospitals, to “continuously require personnel to be fully

vaccinated against COVID-19.” 6 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.61(c). The law’s definition of

“personnel” was expansive, including “all persons employed . . . who engage in

activities such that if they were infected with COVID-19, they could potentially expose

other covered personnel, patients or residents to the disease.”7 Id. §§ 2.61(a)(2), (c).

Interpreting these provisions, the Second Circuit held that “[v]accination is a condition

of employment in the healthcare field.” We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 294; see also id. at

293 (“Both this Court and the Supreme Court have consistently recognized that the

6 Northwell asserts, and Barbour does not contest, that it was required to comply

with Section 2.61 as a healthcare entity. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2–3).

7 Barbour does not contest that the receptionist position fell within the definition

of “personnel” under Section 2.61, nor could she. See, e.g., Moore v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.,

No. 22-CV-10242, 2023 WL 7280476, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023) (finding that a

receptionist “clearly met the DOH Mandate’s definition of ‘personnel’ because she

could ‘expose other personnel, patients, or residents to the disease’”); Corrales v.

Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 22-CV-3219, 2023 WL 2711415, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023)

(finding that a receptionist qualified as “personnel” under the statute because “she

worked for a covered entity in an office with other staff members”).

Constitution embodies no fundamental right that in and of itself would render vaccine

requirements imposed in the public interest, in the face of a public health emergency,

unconstitutional.”).8

By refusing vaccination, Barbour was no longer qualified for her position; and

that disables her Title VII religious discrimination claim. See, e.g., Brown v. S. Shore

Univ. Hosp., 762 F. Supp. 3d 191, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (dismissing religious

discrimination claim where plaintiff refused to take vaccine on religious grounds as

employee of South Shore University Hospital and Northwell Health ); Bandalos v. Stony

Brook Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 23-CV-0135, 2024 WL 4276175, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2024)

(noting Section 2.61 changed job requirements for health care workers and “[b]ecause

the Plaintiff’s job required vaccination, she cannot be qualified for her position because

she did not receive the vaccine or an exemption”). This claim is, therefore, dismissed.9

8 The Second Circuit addressed whether Section 2.61 presumptively burdens

religion because it permits “comparable secular conduct” in allowing for a medical

exemption but not a religious one. See We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 284–88. In We The

Patriots I, it concluded the record did not support a conclusion that “the medical

exemptions provided in Section 2.61 and the religious exemption sought are likely

comparable.” Id. at 288; see also id. at 285 (noting that the two exemptions “differ in an

important respect: applying the Rule to those who oppose vaccination on religious

grounds furthers the State’s asserted interests, whereas applying the Rule to those

subject to medical contraindications . . . would undermine the government’s asserted

interest in protecting the health of covered personnel”). This analysis was in the context

of a constitutional free exercise claim, which Barbour did not bring.

9 Having found that Barbour was not qualified for the position, the Court need

not address the other bases for dismissal, such as failure to allege discriminatory intent,

(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9).

II. Failure to Accommodate

Title VII requires an employer “to accommodate the religious practice of their

employees unless doing so would impose an ‘undue hardship on the conduct of the

employer’s business.’” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 453–54 (2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(j)). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff “must plausibly allege that (1) [she] held a

bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) [she]

informed [her] employers of this belief; and (3) [she was] disciplined for failure to

comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” D’Cunha v. Northwell Health

Sys., No. 23-476, 2023 WL 7986441, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2023) (quoting Knight v. Conn.

Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the “employer must offer him or

her a reasonable accommodation, unless doing so would cause the employer to suffer

an undue hardship.” Hale v. Vidal, No. 22-2973, 2023 WL 7211909, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 2,

2023) (quotation omitted); see also We The Patriots II, 17 F.4th at 370 (“Title VII does not

obligate an employer to grant an accommodation that would cause ‘undue hardship on

the conduct of the employer’s business.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j))). Such hardship

exists “when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.”

D'Cunha, 2023 WL 7986441, at *2 (quoting Groff, 600 U.S. at 468). An employer may

raise the defense of an undue hardship in a motion to dismiss “if the defense appears on

the face of the complaint.” Id. (quoting Iowa Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. MF Glob., Ltd., 620

F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2010)).

Barbour alleges that Northwell discriminated against her by failing to provide

her with a reasonable accommodation in light of her religious beliefs. Northwell has

demonstrated that granting Barbour her requested accommodation, an exemption from

the vaccination requirement, would have imposed an “undue hardship” on its

operations.10 At the time Northwell rejected Barbour’s request for an exemption, state

law required all “[c]overed entities” to “continuously require personnel to be fully

vaccinated against COVID-19.” 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.61(c). The law did not permit

religious exemptions. See id. § 2.61(d). Failing to comply with the state law subjected

Northwell to civil fines and penalties and subjected it to loss of licensure. See N.Y. Pub.

Health L. § 2806(1)(a) (2010); id. § 12(1); Does 1–2 v. Hochul, No. 22-2858, 2024 WL

5182675, at *4 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2024), petition for cert. filed, No. 24-1015 (U.S. Mar. 24,

2025).

In sum, to grant Barbour’s requested accommodation, a vaccination exemption,

Northwell would have had to violate state law, subjecting it to financial penalties or a

suspension or revocation of its operating licenses. See Does 1–2, 2024 WL 5182675, at *4.

“[A]n accommodation that would require an employer to violate the law imposes an

undue hardship.” Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129 F.4th 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2025)

(per curiam). Courts in this circuit have repeatedly found that violating New York’s

vaccine requirement created an undue hardship on hospital employers. E.g., Haczynska

v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc., No. 23-CV-3091, 2025 WL 1384133, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. May

10 Northwell also argues that Barbour fails to state a prima facie failure-to-

accommodate claim, but the Court does not reach this issue.

13, 2025) (“District courts in the Second Circuit have routinely dismissed Title VII

claims against employers with COVID-19 vaccination mandates on the basis that

granting employees’ requests for religious exemptions would have created an undue

hardship by forcing employers to violate Section 2.61.”) (collecting cases); Bartholomew

v. Mount Sinai W., No. 23-CV-3854, 2025 WL 2772911, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2025)

(same); Algarin v. NYC Health + Hosps. Corp., 678 F. Supp. 3d 497, 509–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

(same), aff’d, No. 23-1063, 2024 WL 1107481 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2024).

Barbour contends that Northwell has failed to satisfy Groff’s “undue burden”

standard by failing to offer an “individualized analysis—only blanket statements about

legal risk.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss dated June 10, 2025 (“Pl.’s

Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 17 at 2). In Groff, the Supreme Court clarified that undue hardship

must be more than de minimis—it must be “substantial in the overall context of an

employer’s business.” 600 U.S. at 468. And the Second Circuit has addressed the

heightened standard in just this context, more than once, and found that “[e]ven under

the heightened standard for undue hardship recently set forth in Groff, the risk of these

potential penalties [from violating state law] more than suffices to demonstrate that

[defendants] were subject to such hardships.” Does 1-2, 2024 WL 5182675, at *4. For

example, in D’Cunha, where the plaintiff was also employed by Northwell and subject

to its vaccination requirement, the Second Circuit found that Northwell “could not have

granted [plaintiff’s] religious-exemption request without violating [Section 2.61],

exposing itself to potential penalties, and thereby suffering an undue hardship.” 2023

WL 7986441, at *1, *3. It held that its conclusion was consistent with Groff “because the

burden placed on an employer from violating a state law, like [Section 2.61] in this case,

is both ‘excessive’ and ‘unjustifiable.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Groff, 600 U.S. at 469). Such

legal risk is, therefore, sufficient to show an undue burden, and no further

“individualized analysis” is required.

Barbour also argues that Northwell failed to consider alternative

accommodations—namely reassignment, remote work, unpaid leave, or enhanced PPE

(personal protective equipment)—that would not have imposed an undue hardship.

(Pl’s Opp’n at 2). In We The Patriots II, the Second Circuit clarified that “Section 2.61, on

its face, d[id] not bar an employer from providing an employee with a reasonable

accommodation that remove[d] the individual from the scope of the Rule,” such as by altering

her job duties to “remove [her] from the Rule’s definition of ‘personnel.’” 17 F.4th at

370. But Barbour did not request an alteration of her job duties that would have put her

outside of the “personnel” that required vaccination. Nor did she appear to request any

accommodation she now raises, like remote work, beyond an exemption to doing her

job unvaccinated. (See Compl. at 6; Pl.’s Req.; Pl.’s Opp’n at 1).

Even if the Court were to consider these alternative accommodations, they

would still fail to prevent dismissal. 11 “Title VII does not require covered entities to

provide the accommodation that Plaintiffs prefer.” We The Patriots II, 17 F.4th at 370.

With respect to any request from Barbour asking to work from home, remotely, or in a

11 The Court assumes, for purposes of this motion, that Barbour requested all of

the accommodations she raises in her papers. (E.g., Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s PMC

Req. filed Apr. 18, 2025, Dkt. No. 14 at 2 (asserting that she had asked her supervisor “to

work from home”)).

non-public facing capacity, the accommodation would not have been reasonable, since

it would have forced Northwell to hire another employee to perform the front desk

duties, which is an undue hardship. See, e.g., Brown, 762 F. Supp. 3d at 213–14 (“[S]uch

an accommodation [remote work] would result in an undue hardship on hospital

defendants . . . because such employers would have to hire another employee to

perform an employee’s in-person duties.”) (collecting cases); Devita v. Mount Sinai Hosp.,

No. 22-CV-9826, 2024 WL 3046121, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2024) (dismissing Title VII

failure to accommodate claim where plaintiff “d[id] not elaborate how she could have

performed any of the essential functions of her job” by working remotely, or how

defendant “could have accommodated her without assigning others to perform her

duties”). To the extent Barbour requested other accommodations such as testing, social

distancing, or masking in place of vaccination, Section 2.61 did not permit covered

entities to do so. Had Northwell provided these accommodations and permitted

Barbour to remain unvaccinated, it would have violated Section 2.61. See Braccia v.

Northwell Health Sys., No. 24-2665, 2025 WL 2610704, at *2 (2d Cir. Sep. 10, 2025) (“[I]f

Northwell had accommodated plaintiffs in the way they sought [masking, weekly

testing, and social distancing], it would have been violating the law.”); Algarin, 678 F.

Supp. 3d at 511 (“[T]racking compliance with testing, permitting Plaintiff to potentially

expose other workers at [the hospital] to the COVID-19 virus, and facing legal

consequences if someone should be infected with COVID-19 due to exposure from

Plaintiff, are all significant hardships that create an undue burden on Defendant with

the requested accommodation.”).

Because Northwell could not have granted Barbour her requested

accommodation without violating Section 2.61,12 the undue burden from its legal

obligation defeats her failure to accommodate claim.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants Northwell’s motion and dismisses Barbour’s

Complaint in its entirety. In the alternative, Barbour requests leave to amend her

Complaint. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3). But leave to amend is not warranted when the “problem

with [the plaintiff’s] causes of action is substantive” and “better pleading will not cure

it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Since the problems with

Barbour’s Title VII claims are substantive, as detailed above, leave to amend would “be

futile,” and is denied. See id. The dismissal is with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara

SANKET J. BULSARA

United States District Judge

Date: December 16, 2025

Central Islip, New York

12 Barbour also argues that there would have been no violation of New York state

law, because Title VII as federal law preempts conflicting state law. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2).

The Second Circuit has considered and rejected this argument. See We The Patriots I, 17

F.4th at 293 (“[T]he district court erred by finding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on

their claim that Section 2.61 is preempted by Title VII and therefore violative of the

Supremacy Clause.”).