Walsh

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LORI CHAVEZ-DEREMER, :

Secretary of Labor, : No. 1:22-cv-01355

United States Department of Labor, :

Plaintiff : (Judge Kane)

:

v. :

:

MENNONITE MESSIANIC MISSION :

OF THE EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA :

MENNONITE CHURCH, :

d/b/a Liberty Ridge Farm, and NELSON :

MARTIN, :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This case arises from the alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29

U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by Defendant Mennonite Messianic Mission of the Eastern Pennsylvania

Mennonite Church (“Defendant Mennonite Mission”) and Defendant Nelson Martin (“Defendant

Martin”) (collectively “Defendants”) in connection with their “rehabilitation” of young men at

Liberty Ridge Farm. Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment filed by

Defendants (Doc. No. 43) and Plaintiff Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Secretary of Labor at the United

States Department of Labor (“Plaintiff”) (Doc. No. 42). For the following reasons, the Court

will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and deny Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties’ Statements of Facts in Support of their Summary Judgment

Motions

The relevant facts of record set forth infra are taken from Plaintiff’s Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. No. 44-2) (“PSUMF”) and Defendants’ response thereto (Doc.

No. 52-1) (“DRSMF”), as well as Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of

Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 48-1) (“DSUMF”) and Plaintiff’s Counter

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. No. 53-1) (“PCSMF”).

Local Rule 56.1 provides that:

A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, shall be

accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in

numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine

issue to be tried. The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall

include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to

the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required in the foregoing

paragraph, as to which it is contested that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.

See L.R. 56.1. The rule further provides that “[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in

opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the

statements” and “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the

moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be

served by the opposing party.” See id. (emphasis added).

The Court notes that the DRSMF largely fails to cite to the record in the paragraphs in

which Defendants purport to deny or dispute the facts asserted in the PSUMF, as required by

Local Rule 56.1. Only 18 out of 144 responsive paragraphs offer record citations in support of

the response. See (Doc. No. 52-1 at ¶¶ 11, 16, 23, 27–30, 35, 47, 62–64, 69–70, 92–94, 108). In

accordance with Local Rule 56.1, the Court will deem the facts in all other paragraphs of the

PSUMF admitted. See Allen v. Foxway Transportation, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305 (M.D. Pa.

2023) (citing Local Rule 56.1 and stating that “[i]f a party has not supported its stated fact or its

denial of that fact with a record citation, then the Court will either assume that the fact is

disputed or admitted accordingly”).

In addition, the Court notes that the PSUMF, DRSMF, DSUMF, and PCSMF contain

numerous legal conclusions or arguments. Such legal conclusions or arguments are

inappropriate in a statement of material facts in support of or in opposition to a motion for

summary judgment and will be disregarded by the Court. See Perez v. Great Wolf Lodge of the

Poconos LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 471, 474 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (highlighting that statements of

undisputed material facts should not contain “legal arguments or conclusions”).

Finally, “[c]oncurrent resolution of cross-motions for summary judgment can present a

formidable task.” See Interbusiness Bank, N.A. v. First Nat’l Bank of Mifflintown, 318 F. Supp.

2d 230, 235 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (Conner, J.) (citing 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that the court

view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. However, in the

circumstances of cross-motions for summary judgment, where both parties are moving and non-

moving parties, “[i]nferences to which a party is entitled with respect to the opponent’s motion

may not be granted with respect to its own” and accordingly, “[i]n such circumstances, Rule 56

requires two statements of the ‘facts’ of the same case, a proposition that may counsel separate

opinions on the respective motions.” See Interbusiness Bank, N.A., 318 F. Supp. 2d at 235–36

(first citing United States v. Hall, 730 F. Supp. 646, 648 (M.D. Pa. 1990) and then citing Rains v.

Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)). In the instant case, the basic facts are

substantially undisputed and therefore whether the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff or Defendants, the same conclusions generally prevail. The few existing evidentiary

discrepancies are noted infra.

B. Factual Background

Defendant Mennonite Mission is a 501(c)(3) organization,1 consisting of a “group of

members of the Eastern Pennsylvania Mennonite Church Ministries” who together conduct the

mission activities of the church. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶ 1; 48-1 ¶ 2.) In approximately 2011,

Defendant Mennonite Mission established the Family Support Committee (“FSC”), which was

tasked with finding land which would later become the Liberty Ridge Farm (“Liberty Ridge”).

(Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 2.) Defendant Mennonite Mission formed the Liberty Ridge Farm Committee

(“LRFC”) to operate Liberty Ridge, the activities of which are the subject of this action. See

(Doc. No. 48-1 ¶ 5). The LRFC is responsible for the day-to-day operations at Liberty Ridge.

(Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 6.) The LRFC consists of a Chairman, Assistant Chairman, Secretary, Assistant

Secretary, Treasurer, and Assistant Treasurer. (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶ 6.) Defendant Martin served as

the LRFC’s Treasurer. (Id. ¶ 7.) In that capacity, he registered the “fictitious name of ‘Liberty

Ridge Farm’” with the Pennsylvania Department of State. (Doc. Nos.44-2 ¶ 4.)

1 501(c)(3)’s are:

[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and

operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,

literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports

competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic

facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no

part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or

individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,

or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in

subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the

publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in

opposition to) any candidate for public office.

See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

Defendant Mennonite Mission established Liberty Ridge to assist in the rehabilitation of

young men who were struggling in life. (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶¶ 8–9.)2 Parents and guardians in the

Mennonite community send their “troubled” children to Liberty Ridge. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 8.)

Liberty Ridge personnel informed the families that their children (hereafter the “Minors”), would

be provided both food and shelter during their time at Liberty Ridge. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶ 9; 52-1 ¶

9.) Parents submit applications for Minors to participate in the Liberty Ridge program, which

includes “tending the garden, planting, harvesting, to some extent processing the procedure and

the product of the garden . . . tending of other animals at the farm and building pallets.” (Doc.

No. 48-1 ¶ 10.)3 The parties dispute the role parental/guardian donations played at Liberty

Ridge. Defendants maintain that parents and/or guardians would offer Liberty Ridge daily

donations at the amount of fifty-six dollars and sixty-seven cents ($56.67) per day, “to offset the

costs of the program,” (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶ 11 (citing Doc. No. 48-9 at 7)), while Plaintiff asserts

that Defendants rely on inadmissible hearsay to support their factual assertion, and further

maintain that the cited evidence does not support the idea that the daily payments made by

parents/guardians were “donations” or offered to “offset the cost of operating the program” (Doc.

No. 53-1 ¶ 11 (citing Doc. No. 44-9 at 4)). The parties agree that Minors’ parents completed

power of attorney forms prior to Minors’ arrival at Liberty Ridge (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶ 14), but

2 Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants’ witness so testified as to the purpose of Liberty Ridge

but asserts her position that “Liberty Ridge Farm was a money-making commercial enterprise,

and the work performed on Liberty Ridge Farm primarily benefited Defendants.” (Doc. No. 53-

1 ¶¶ 8–9.)

3 Plaintiff admits only that Defendants’ witness so testified but disputes that the Minors only

engaged in these activities, stating that “[a]s the factual record shows, the Minors spent

considerable time working in furtherance of the Defendants’ commercial activities.” (Doc. No.

53-1 § 10.)

Plaintiff contends that any reference in the power of attorney form that contracts away the

Minors’ employment rights is invalid (Doc. No. 53-1 ¶ 14).

Upon arrival at Liberty Ridge and during their initial period of residence, Minors were

not permitted to contact their families. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 10.) Defendants’ philosophy was “if

you don’t work, you don’t eat,” a philosophy Defendants concede was prevalent at Liberty

Ridge, with the added context that such a philosophy has biblical origination. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶

11; 52-1 ¶ 11.)4 The Liberty Ridge Handbook of Standard Operating Policy discusses the

“therapeutic nature” of the Minors’ activities, which include tending to chickens and building

pallets. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 12.) That policy also highlights that the activities “help to offset the

cost of the program.” (Id.)5 Liberty Ridge’s programming was regimented and subject to

Defendants’ control. (Id. ¶ 13.)

As part of Liberty Ridge’s regimented programming, during a typical day at Liberty

Ridge, Minors spent between four (4) and seven (7) hours building pallets,6 tending to chickens,

and chopping wood with a maul. (Id. ¶ 14.) Those activities of the Minors generated products

that Defendants sold commercially. (Id.) Wengerd Pallets bought the pallets built by the Minors,

while Clark’s Feed paid Defendants to have the Minors tend to their chickens. (Id. ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff maintains that Minors worked during school hours. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants claim that

Plaintiff mischaracterizes that fact because the work of building pallets was done as part of a

4 Specifically, Defendants cite 2 Thessalonians 3:10, which reads, in relevant part, “[i]f a man

will not work, he shall not eat.” See 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

5 In response, Defendants state that “[a]s Plaintiff is aware, the handbook referenced is outside

the relevant scope of this litigation.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 12.) Defendants do not include additional

explanation or a citation to the record in support of this assertion. See (id.).

6 Pallets are generally made of wood, “rectangular in shape” and used to load and transport other

products. See Tatko Bros. Slate Co. v. Capitol Slate Co., 221 F. Supp. 212, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1963).

vocational skills program. (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 16.) Minors worked both in the morning and

afternoon (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 17) and worked on Saturdays (id. ¶¶ 18–19).

Liberty Ridge had rules for Minors governing their time on the farm including how

Minors should act while furthering Liberty Ridge’s commercial activities. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 20–

21.) Minors were not allowed to send text messages while at Liberty Ridge. (Id. ¶ 31.) If a

Minor damaged a tool, they were forced to reimburse Liberty Ridge. (Id. ¶ 22.) If a Minor

failed to comply with Liberty Ridge’s rules, they were subjected to punishment, such as being

forced to drag chains or being placed on involuntary restrictive dieting. (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendants

dispute this statement, asserting that “Plaintiff[] [is] attempting to conflate the issues, as there

were no consequences or punishments if a resident refused any of the vocational training,

including building pallets.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 23.) Because Minors worked four (4) to seven (7)

hours a day during the week (Monday through Friday) and also worked on Saturday, these rules

necessarily applied during the time the Minors worked. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 24.)7 Plaintiff asserts

that some Minors were punished for being “slow” to perform tasks. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.)8

Defendant Martin personally participated in the punishment of Minors, including the

dragging of chains. (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.)9 Liberty Ridge and the LRFC were aware that Minors were

being punished, and further considered other potential punishments for disciplinary violations

such as having Minors build stone walls, having Minors press down on scales with outstretched

7 Defendants purport to dispute the fact; however, Defendants fail to cite to record evidence in

support of their denial. (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 24.)

8 Defendants again purport to dispute this fact, explaining that punishments were implemented

for Minors who “used poor manners . . . and talked back”; however, Defendants fail to cite to

record evidence in support of their denial. (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶¶ 25–26.)

9 Defendants assert that the testimony reflects that Martin was “unaware if those punishments

coincided with the time period of this litigation.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 27.)

arms, or forcing Minors to eat hot peppers. (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendants respond by stating that

“Plaintiff[] [is] attempting to conflate the issues, as there were no consequences or punishment if

a resident refused any of the vocational skills training, including building pallets.” (Doc. No. 52-

1 ¶ 29.) There were Minors who did not like the restrictions placed on them, and some who even

attempted to escape Liberty Ridge. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 33–34.) Plaintiff asserts that when

Liberty Ridge implemented punishments, “it is reasonably inferred that they did so to send a

message to the other Minors and keep them ‘workable,’” while Defendants reiterate that “there

were no consequences or punishments if a [Minor] refused any of the vocational skills training,

including building pallets.” (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶ 30; 52-1 ¶ 30.)

Liberty Ridge also “employed” Mentors to work with the Minors in a supervisory

capacity. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 35.) Defendants state that Mentors served to “walk beside the

residents in order to show them honesty and integrity in the Anabaptist beliefs.” (Doc. No. 52-1

¶ 35.) Liberty Ridge informed Mentors, before they arrived at the farm, that they would be

provided food and shelter upon arrival and subsequently paid them two hundred and fifty dollar

($250) monthly stipends for each month worked. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 42–43, 45.) Defendants

maintain that Mentors were volunteers, not employees, and further note that “Mentors were

advised that they would receive tokens of appreciation for their volunteerism.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶

45.)

Liberty Ridge required Mentors to spend almost their entire day with the Minors. (Doc.

No. 44-2 ¶ 36.) Another requirement of the Mentors was to supervise the Minors during the

Liberty Ridge Farm program. (Id. ¶ 37.) The Liberty Ridge Handbook of Standard Operating

Policy states that Mentors supervise Minors for twenty-four (24) hours per day. (Id. ¶ 38 (citing

Doc. No. 42-9 at 3).)10 Mentors typically “worked” from six (6) in the morning until nine (9) in

the evening, from Monday through Friday, “with few breaks.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Mentors “worked” up

to six (6) days per week. (Id. ¶ 40.) Mentors, like Minors, built pallets, tended to chickens, and

chopped firewood, while Defendants “sold all of these products commercially.” (Id. ¶ 41.)

Mentors were also governed by Liberty Ridge’s rules, which included limits on texting. (Id. ¶

51.)

It is undisputed that Mentors did not receive federal minimum wage or overtime

payments for their work at Liberty Ridge. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶ 46; 52-1 ¶ 46.) Mentors typically

“worked” at Liberty Ridge for six (6) months to a year and could take off six (6) days of work

per month. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 47–48.) Defendants dispute the Mentors’ length of “employment”

at Liberty Ridge, stating that “Mentors at Liberty Ridge Farm were able to decide how long they

felt they could volunteer their service without restriction.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 47.) Mentors

received W-2 forms reflecting pay earned from Liberty Ridge. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 49.) Liberty

Ridge documented the payments made to Mentors. (Id. ¶ 50.)

The LRFC tried to involve Minors in vocational training, which included tasks such as

rebuilding tractor engines or assembling pallets. (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶¶ 15–16.) Plaintiff disputes

this factual assertion, insofar as she alleges that Liberty Ridge focused on general life skills, not

vocational skills, while also alleging that Defendants overstate the nature of their vocational

training, because “there is no evidence to support the claim [that] Defendants had a mechanics

program or woodworking program at Liberty Ridge Farm.” (Doc. No. 53-1 ¶¶ 15–16.)

Defendants maintain that their vocational skills program included building pallets and further

10 Defendants again respond by stating that “[a]s Plaintiff is aware, the handbook referenced is

outside the relevant scope of this litigation” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 38); however, Defendants offer no

additional explanation or citation to the record in support of their assertion (id.).

assert that the goal of building pallets was to teach Minors “accuracy and structure.” (Doc. No.

48-1 ¶¶ 17–18.) Defendant Martin testified to a “verbal agreement” between Liberty Ridge and

Wengerd Pallets providing that Liberty Ridge would provide pallets to Wengerd Pallets. (Id. ¶

19; Doc. No. 53-1 ¶ 19.) In addition to the “verbal agreement” with Wengerd Pallets, Liberty

Ridge also maintained a verbal agreement with Clark’s Feed Mill to raise chickens. (Doc. No.

44-2 ¶ 60.) Other businesses that sold chickens made offers to Liberty Ridge to raise their

chickens, but Liberty Ridge rejected those other offers. (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 62.)

As mentioned supra, the LRFC runs the day-to-day operations of Liberty Ridge. (Doc.

No. 44-2 ¶ 52.) In furtherance of that oversight, the LRFC holds regular meetings and produces

meeting minutes to document the topics of conversation discussed at said meetings. (Id. ¶ 53.)

At these meetings, the LRFC discusses their commercial activities and the income derived

therefrom. (Id. ¶ 54.) Liberty Ridge thus documented that it “generated considerable revenue”

due to the “work” of the Mentors and Minors. (Id. ¶ 55.)11 In 2019, Liberty Ridge generated

11 In response, Defendants state that:

[t]he training received at Liberty Ridge, including building pallets and rebuilding

engines, is identical to what would be provided at a similar farming-focused

vocational school, and is incredibly beneficial to the Residents. The Residents did

not displace regular employees, as Liberty Ridge Farm is not operating as a pallet

company, nor does it have any contracts with a pallet company. Rather, Wengerd

Pallet endorsed the same [Mennonite] Beliefs as the Farm and had an interest in

helping the young men, and ultimately purchased the pallets that were building

during the skills training portion of the program. In fact the vocational training

portion of Liberty Ridge Farm is only a fraction of the activities taking place at the

Farm, as the day-to-day activities also included schooling, bible study, recreation,

tending to the garden, raising other animals at the farm, and sourcing firewood.

Likewise, though the pallets were ultimately purchased, this was not an integral

part of any ‘alleged business,’ as the Parents and/or Legal Guardians of residents

would offer donations to Liberty Ridge to offset the costs of the program, at a

suggested amount of $56.67 per day.

nine-hundred and thirty-seven thousand, one dollar and fifty-eight cents ($937,001.58) in

revenue. (Id. ¶ 56.) In 2020, Liberty Ridge generated eight hundred and eighty-one thousand,

two hundred and thirty-one dollars and eighty-five cents ($881,231.85) in revenue. (Id. ¶ 57.) In

2021, Liberty Ridge generated one million, two hundred and twelve thousand, four hundred and

fifty dollars and eighty-three cents ($1,212,450.83) in revenue. (Id. ¶ 58.) Pallets created by

Liberty Ridge, through the labor of Mentors and Minors, made their way across state lines to

Baltimore, Maryland. (Id. ¶ 59.)

Plaintiff asserts that the LRFC “would also make employment related decisions for

Liberty Ridge.” (Id. ¶ 75.) Defendants, however, take issue with the characterization of Mentors

and Minors as “employees,” arguing that “[t]here were no employment decisions to be made,

because Mentors and [Minors] were not employees.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 75.) As described by

Plaintiff, Liberty Ridge interviewed people for positions at Liberty Ridge. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 63-

65.) Liberty Ridge interviewed prospective Minors and prospective Mentors. (Id. ¶¶ 63–64.)

This, according to Plaintiff, means that Liberty Ridge chose the Mentors and Minors tasked with

working at Liberty Ridge. (Id. ¶¶ 69–70.) Additionally, Plaintiff states that Liberty Ridge

determined the compensation for Mentors (id. ¶ 71), rewarded Minors “when they completed

jobs efficiently” (id. ¶ 73), and provided food and shelter to both Mentors and Minors (id. ¶ 72).

Liberty Ridge similarly interviewed prospective fellows, who would serve as house parents,

work coordinators, or department heads. (Id. ¶¶ 65–66.) Department heads would also assist the

Mentors and Minors in building pallets. (Id. ¶ 68.) Liberty Ridge made salary determinations

for and paid the fellows a salary. (Id. ¶¶ 67, 74.)

(Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 55.) Defendants do not provide any citation to the record in support of their

lengthy response. See (id.).

Although Defendants dispute whether references to “contacts” describe a

supervisor/supervisee relationship between LRFC members and Minors, it is undisputed that

some LRFC members were assigned Minors as “contacts.” (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 76–77; 52-1 ¶¶

76–77.) LRFC members acted as supervisors for many of the fellows, including those who

served as house parents. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 78.) The Liberty Ridge house parents and work

coordinators maintained “direct control” over Mentors and Minors. (Id. ¶ 79.) The house

parents and work coordinators created task lists for each workday, while work coordinators were

responsible for scheduling the Mentors and Minors to build pallets and tend to chickens. (Id. ¶¶

80–81.)

At committee meetings, the LRFC discussed Minors’ progress. (Id. ¶ 82.) Liberty Ridge

discussed and evaluated Minors’ work abilities outlined in the Minors’ progress reports. (Id. ¶

83.) Liberty Ridge also provided a regimented schedule for Minors, while also exerting control

over Mentors’ personal time. (Id. ¶¶ 84–85.) Liberty Ridge controlled Mentors and Minors’

schedule from “morning to night.” (Id. ¶ 86). Mentors needed to speak to LRFC committee

members to request a day off from “work.” (Id. ¶ 87.) Liberty Ridge assigned Mentors to

Minors. (Id. ¶ 88.) Liberty Ridge would also determine whether a Minor was ready to leave (id.

¶ 89), with Defendants offering the caveat that “if a parent wished to remove their child from the

program, they could do so” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 89).

Liberty Ridge drafted the Handbook of Standard Operating Policy, which provided rules

for Minors while “working” at Liberty Ridge. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 90–91.)12 The LRFC also

12 In responding to this assertion, Defendants state that “[a]s Plaintiff is aware, the handbook

referenced, however, was not in place during the relevant time period of this litigation.” (Doc.

No. 53-1 ¶ 90.) Defendants do not include additional explanation or a citation to the record in

support of this assertion. See (id.).

discussed rules violations and the range of punishments for Minors. (Id. ¶ 92 (citing Doc. Nos.

44-17, 44-30).) By way of clarification, Defendants assert that, in citing the LRFC’s ability to

implement punishments, “Plaintiff[] [is] attempting to conflate the issues, as there were no

consequences or punishments if a [Minor] refused any of the vocational skills training, including

building pallets.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 92 (citing Doc. No. 44-7 at 129–30).) The parties similarly

dispute whether Minors were punished cruelly—Plaintiff maintains that Minors could be “forced

to drag chains” or be placed on restrictive diets, while Defendants assert that Plaintiff again

conflates the issues, because such punishments were not tied to a Minor’s failure to participate in

vocational skills training. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶ 93 (citing Doc. Nos. 44-12, 44-17); 52-1 ¶ 93

(citing Doc. No. 44-7 at 129–30).) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants forced Mentors to drag

chains alongside Minors, and that Minors were punished for being slow workers, while

Defendants respond that neither Minors nor Mentors were punished for the failure to participate

in vocational skills training, and further clarify that Minors were punished for an array of

reasons, but not solely because they worked slowly. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 94–95 (citing Doc. Nos.

44-12, 44-31); 52-1 ¶¶ 94–95 (citing Doc. No. 44-7 at 129–30).) The parties dispute the

prevalence of discipline; Defendants cite the deposition testimony of Kenton Kreider for the

proposition that Minors did not face consequences or punishments if they refused any vocational

skills training, while Plaintiff maintains that Defendants’ own internal documents state that

“Minors were punished, in part, for working too slowly.” (Doc. Nos. 48-1 ¶ 21; 53-1 ¶ 21.)

Liberty Ridge’s rules also prohibit the taking of photographs (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 97), although

Defendants offer the clarification that photography was not universally prohibited, but rather

“[t]he Mentors required permission to take photographs of the minor residents.” (Doc. No. 52-1

¶ 97.) Mentors received training on the prevention of child sexual abuse, as well as how to

“handle” Minors. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 98.) Liberty Ridge also trained Minors on how to build

pallets. (Id. ¶ 99.)

As noted supra, Defendant Martin served as LRFC Treasurer and accordingly was a

member of the LRFC. (Id. ¶¶ 100–01.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Martin participated in

the “employment decisions made on behalf of Liberty Ridge,” while Defendants respond that

“neither the [Minors] nor the Mentors are employees” and thus Defendant Martin could not have

participated in employment decisions. (Id. ¶ 102; Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 102.) Defendant Martin had a

role in determining whether a Mentor could take a day off and entered business arrangements on

Liberty Ridge’s behalf. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 103–04.) Defendant Martin also reviewed the

Handbook of Standard Operating Policy, interviewed prospective work coordinators before they

were hired, supervised the work coordinators in the performance of their duties, and participated

in the punishing and reprimanding of Minors. (Id. ¶¶ 105–08.)13 Defendant Martin was

involved in the selection process determining which Minors would “work” at Liberty Ridge, as

well as the interview process for prospective Minors. (Id. ¶ 109–10.) Additionally, Defendant

Martin participated in training the Minors at Liberty Ridge and signed checks for Mentors and

fellows. (Id. ¶¶ 111–12.)

It is undisputed that Minors did not receive payment for hours “worked” at Liberty

Ridge, and Mentors did not receive minimum wage or overtime premiums for hours “worked” in

excess of forty (40) hours in a week. (Id. ¶¶ 113–15; Doc. No. 52-1 ¶¶ 113–15.)14 Defendants

13 Defendants dispute Martin’s involvement in punishment by stating that “[t]he testimony

reflects that Nelson Martin was unaware if those punishments coincided with the time period of

this litigation. Further, Plaintiff[] [is] attempting to conflate the issues, as there were no

consequences or punishments if a resident refused any of the vocational skills training, including

building pallets.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 108.)

14 Defendants posit that Minors and Mentors were not “employees” under the FLSA and thus

they are not entitled to payment for hours worked. (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶¶ 113–15.) The Court

did not track the hours “worked” by Mentors and Minors, nor did they keep any pay records for

Minors. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 116–17.) Defendants have records showing “substandard monthly

payments” to Mentors, insofar as the records reflect that Mentors did not receive proper

minimum and overtime wages. (Id. ¶ 118.)

The Minors at Liberty Ridge ranged in age from twelve (12) to twenty (20). (Id. ¶ 119.)

Minors often used mauls to chop firewood. (Id. ¶ 120.) Some Minors under the age of fourteen

(14) “worked” during school hours, while other Minors “worked” more than eighteen (18) hours

per week during months when school was in session and for more than three (3) hours in a day.

(Id. ¶¶ 121–22.) Although Defendants do not dispute this, they assert that Minors were not

“working” but “were learning.” (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 122.) One example given by Plaintiff is the

Minor C.T, who was a twelve (12) year old at Liberty Ridge during the relevant period. (Doc.

No. 44-2 ¶ 123.) On October 5, 2019, C.T. arrived at Liberty Ridge, and while on the farm, he

built pallets for Liberty Ridge’s business. (Id. ¶¶ 124–25.)

Because Defendants did not keep track of hours “worked” by Mentors and Minors,

Plaintiff utilized the information obtained through discovery to determine how much Mentors

and Minors would be owed, should they be covered by the FLSA. (Id. ¶¶ 126–27.) Plaintiff

asserts that the relevant time period is at least July 1, 2019 to May 15, 2022, and utilized the

following in reconstructing the back wages owed to Mentors and Minors: (1) the deposition

testimony of Kenton Kreider15; (2) the deposition testimony of Defendant Martin; and (3)

observes that this is a legal conclusion, which will be evaluated infra in the discussion section of

this memorandum. See Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating that

determining whether a worker is an employee under the FLSA is “a mixed question of fact and

law”).

15 Kreider was, at all relevant times, the Chairman of the LRFC. (Doc. No. 44-1¶ 142.)

documents such as business expense ledgers, LRFC meeting minutes, and interviews with

Mentors. (Id. ¶¶ 128–29.) Plaintiff maintains that a review of the evidence shows that Minors

“worked” an average of thirty (30) hours per week, while Mentors “worked” an average of sixty-

five and a half (65.5) hours per week, and the evidence shows how long each Minor and Mentor

worked at Liberty Ridge. (Id. ¶¶ 130–32.) Plaintiff determined that the Mentors are owed four

hundred and ninety-nine thousand, eighty-seven dollars and eighty-three cents ($499,087.83) in

back wages. (Id. ¶ 133.) Plaintiff further determined that Minors are owed one hundred and

seventy thousand, five hundred and twenty dollars ($170,520.00) in back wages. (Id. ¶ 134.)16

Defendants failed to take steps to learn the requirements of the FLSA either before or

after the formation of Liberty Ridge. (Id. ¶ 135.) Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants do not

properly dispute, that “Defendants did not speak to anyone to determine whether running a de

facto child labor camp or paying the Mentors well below $7.25/hour violated the FLSA.” (Id. ¶

136.) Defendant Martin did not speak to anyone or take steps to learn about the FLSA’s

requirements either during the period where Liberty Ridge was formed or after it was

established. (Id. ¶¶ 137–38.) Defendant Martin “did not take any steps to learn what goes into a

501(c)(3) or how the FLSA applies to a 501(c)(3) organization.” (Id. ¶ 139.) Some employees at

Liberty Ridge, namely department heads, were paid for their work. (Id. ¶ 140.) And more

broadly, Defendant Martin and Kenton Kreider are both aware that minimum wage laws exist in

the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 141–42.) Defendants acknowledge that, in December of 2021,

Plaintiff informed them that they needed to pay workers “fair wages.” (Id. ¶ 143.) Despite this,

16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owe a total of six hundred and sixty-nine thousand, six

hundred and seven dollars and eighty-three cents ($669,607.83) in back wages. See (Doc. No.

44-2 (proposed order outlining the back wages owed)).

Defendants continued to pay Mentors two-hundred and fifty ($250) dollar monthly stipends, not

the FLSA minimum wage. (Id. ¶ 144.)

C. Procedural Background

On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff initiated the instant action against Defendants, alleging that

Defendants violated the following FLSA provisions: Section Six (6), the minimum wage

provision; Section Seven (7), the overtime provision; Section Eleven (11)(c), the recordkeeping

provision; and Sections Twelve (12)(a) and (12)(c), as well as Section Fifteen (15)(a)(4), the

oppressive child labor provisions. (Doc. No. 1.) On October 31, 2022, Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. No. 9.) On January 4, 2023, the Court denied

Defendants’ motion and scheduled a case management conference for February 15, 2023. (Doc.

Nos. 15, 16.) On January 16, 2023, Defendants filed an answer. (Doc. No. 19.) Following the

case management conference, the Court set a close of fact discovery date of August 31, 2023.

(Doc. Nos. 20, 22.) The Court then received and granted numerous motions to extend discovery

and postpone a post discovery status conference. (Doc. Nos. 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36.)

Following a post discovery status conference, on April 2, 2024, the Court set a dispositive

motion deadline of May 7, 2024. (Doc. No. 39.) On May 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed an unopposed

motion to exceed the page limits for summary judgment filings as delineated in the Local Rules

of this Court, while also requesting that the dispositive motion deadline be extended to May 17,

2024. (Doc. No. 40.) That same day, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. No. 41.)

On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 42.) That

same day, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 43.) On May 21,

2024, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of her motion (Doc. No. 44), the PSUMF (Doc. No. 44-2),

as well as dozens of exhibits (Doc. Nos. 44-3 through 44-42). On May 31, 2024, Defendants

filed a brief in support of their motion (Doc. No. 48), along with the DSUMF (Doc. No. 48-1), as

well as several exhibits (Doc. Nos. 48-2 through 48-23). On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed an

unopposed motion to exceed the page limitations for responsive briefing (Doc. No. 50), which

the Court granted later that day (Doc. No. 51). On June 17, 2024, Defendants filed a brief

opposing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 52), as well as the DRSMF (Doc.

No. 52-1). On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a brief opposing Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (Doc. No. 53), as well as the PCSMF (Doc. No. 53-1). That same day, Plaintiff filed a

reply brief supporting her own motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 54.) On July 15, 2024,

Defendants filed a reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 56.)

After the record closed, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs

addressing the import of Johnson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 108 F.4th 163 (3d

Cir. 2024), a precedential opinion issued by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals just days before

the parties completed briefing on the motions for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 57.) Plaintiff

subsequently filed her supplemental brief (Doc. No. 58), and Defendants filed their supplemental

brief (Doc. No. 59), which attached numerous exhibits (Doc. No. 59-1 through 59-12).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants’ supplemental brief (Doc. No. 60), with a

brief in support (Doc. No. 61), arguing that Defendants’ supplemental brief should be stricken

from the docket as violative of the Court’s Order permitting supplemental briefing (Doc. No. 57),

as well as Local Rules 56.1 and 7.8(b), in that the brief contains “new factual allegations and

new exhibits” (Doc. No. 61 at 1). Defendants filed a brief in response to Plaintiff’s motion to

strike. (Doc. No. 62.) Plaintiff’s motion to strike will be addressed by separate Order. The

parties’ summary judgment motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is

warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute

is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law, and it is genuine

only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a

verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49

(1986). At summary judgment, the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law. See id. at 251-52. In making this determination, the Court must

“consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See A.W.

v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).

The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364

F.3d 135, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of

evidence to support the non-moving party’s claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion

with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal

memoranda, or oral argument.” See Berckeley Inv. Grp. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d

Cir. 2006); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party

“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is

warranted. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence that the

non-moving party must provide, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the

non-movant’s evidence is merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative. See Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249–50. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and

more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See id. at 252; see also Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Further, a party may not

defeat a motion for summary judgment with evidence that would not be admissible at trial. See

Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 387 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court first examines the applicable legal standards and relevant FLSA provisions

before addressing the motions for summary judgment.

A. The FLSA’s Coverage and Relevant Provisions

The FLSA was enacted in 1938 “to protect covered workers from substandard wages and

oppressive working hours.” See Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir.

1992). Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C), employees “who, in any workweek, are engaged in

commerce or the production of goods for commerce[] or are employed in an enterprise engaged

in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” must be paid at least seven dollars and

twenty-five cents ($7.25) in hourly wages. See Rui Tong v. Henderson Kitchen Inc., No. 17-cv-

01073, 2018 WL 4961622, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2018) (cleaned up) (citing 29 U.S.C. §

206(a)(1)(C)). “The FLSA’s minimum wage provisions apply to those that fall under the

statutory definition of ‘employees’ and ‘employers.’” Burrell v. Staff, 60 F.4th 25, 43 (3d Cir.

2023). “When determining whether someone is an employee under the FLSA, ‘economic reality

rather than technical concepts is to be the test of employment.’” In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage &

Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Because the FLSA

was “part of the large body of humanitarian and remedial legislation enacted during the Great

Depression,” see Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1987), courts generally

recognize the liberal definitions of employer and employee contained therein. See Burrell, 60

F.4th at 43.

To that end, the FLSA defines an employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in

the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not

include any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the

capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization,” see 29 U.S.C.§ 203(d), and defines an

employee as “any individual employed by an employer.” See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). “Because

of the breadth of the FLSA, the employer need not necessarily have ultimate control for an

employer-employee relationship to exist; even indirect control may be sufficient. In other words,

the alleged employer must exercise significant control.” Solis v. A-1 Mortg. Corp., 934 F. Supp.

2d 778, 788 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). Additionally, in order to determine whether a joint

employment relationship exists under the FLSA, insofar as multiple entities can simultaneously

be classified as someone’s “employer,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

(“Third Circuit”) has set forth a four-part test in which courts should consider the alleged

employer’s “(1) ‘authority to hire and fire’ the relevant employees; (2) ‘authority to promulgate

work rules and assignments’ and to set the employees’ conditions of employment; (3)

‘involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline;’ and (4)

‘actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.’” See Sec’y United

States Dep’t of Lab. v. Mosluoglu, Inc., No. 22-2749, 2023 WL 5972044, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 14,

2023) (unpublished) (citing In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d at

469–70); see also Thompson v. Real Est. Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014)

(noting that “[a]side from the corporate entity itself, a company’s owners, officers, or supervisory

personnel may also constitute ‘joint employers’ for purposes of liability under the FLSA”).

The FLSA minimum wage provision applies to employers and employees who are

“engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, or . . . employed in an

enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” See 29 U.S.C. §

206(a). Additionally, the FLSA defines an “enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production

of goods for commerce” as one who:

(A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for

commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods

or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person; and

(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is

not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are

separately stated);

(B) is engaged in the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily engaged in the

care of the sick, the aged, or the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises

of such institution, a school for mentally or physically handicapped or gifted

children, a preschool, elementary or secondary school, or an institution of higher

education (regardless of whether or not such hospital, institution, or school is public

or private or operated for profit or not for profit); or

(C) is an activity of a public agency.

See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).

Furthermore, as it pertains to overtime wages, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) provides that:

no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged

in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an

enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a

workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for

his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one

and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.

See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Accordingly, the triggering language in the FLSA overtime provision

is identical to that contained in the minimum wage provision: employers and employees engaged

in commerce are subject to the FLSA’s overtime provision. See id.

The principal requirement of FLSA coverage, upon finding that an entity is a covered

employer, is that claimants are “employees.” To that end, the Court observes that the FLSA

“covers trainees, beginners, apprentices, or learners if they are employed to work for an

employer for compensation.” See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151 (1947)

(hereinafter “Walling”). “But the FLSA does not transform every training relationship into an

employer-employee relationship. As broad as the terms ‘employee’ and ‘employ’ are, ‘they

cannot be interpreted . . . to make a person whose work serves only his own interest an employee

of another person who gives him aid and instruction.’” Jochim v. Jean Madeline Education

Center of Cosmetology, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 750, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). In other

words, “an individual may work for a covered enterprise under the FLSA and not be an

employee within the ambit of the statute.” See id. (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y

of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 299–300 (1985) (hereinafter “Alamo Foundation”)). Ultimately, “[t]he

test of employment under the [FLSA] is one of ‘economic reality.’” See Alamo Foundation, 471

U.S. at 301.

“An economic realities test is used as the basis for determining an individual’s

employment status: ‘Employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent

upon the business to which they render service.’” Todaro v. Township of Union, 27 F. Supp. 2d

517, 534 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1985)). When

considering the economic realities test, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances

instead of “technical concepts of the employment relationship.” See Johnson v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Assoc., 108 F.4th 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult

Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 418 (3d Cir. 2012)). To aid in that determination, courts have

devised multifactor tests for evaluating different employment relationships. See, e.g., Donovan

v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985) (adopting a test to determine

whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor); In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage

& Hour Emp’t Prac. Litig., 683 F.3d at 469 (adopting a test to determine whether alleged

employers are joint employers); Johnson, 108 F. 4th at 180 (crafting a four-factor test to

determine whether college athletes are employees under the FLSA).

In Walling and Alamo Foundation, the Supreme Court fashioned a test to determine

whether workers are either FLSA-exempt trainees or volunteers, respectively. See Walling, 330

U.S. at 149; Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 291–92. The Supreme Court instructed that courts

should first determine whether the commercial activities of an entity fall within FLSA’s

definition of enterprise, and then courts should determine whether the workers alleged to be

trainees or volunteers worked in expectation of compensation. See Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S.

at 299–301; Walling, 330 U.S. at 152.

When determining whether a worker is an apprentice, trainee, or learner and not an

employee, the Supreme Court provided in Walling that a worker who works without any express

or implied compensation agreement and “whose work serves only his own interest” will not be

deemed an employee “of another who gives him aid and instruction.” See Walling, 330 U.S. at

152. In addition, where an employer receives no immediate advantage from any work done by

trainees, the trainees are not employees within the Act’s meaning. See id. at 153.

When determining whether a worker is a volunteer, the Supreme Court has similarly

directed courts to look at the economic realities and expectation of compensation which can take

the form of workers’ dependency upon the employer for long periods of time (e.g., several years)

and expectation of in-kind benefits in exchange for services provided. See Alamo Foundation,

471 U.S. at 301. Moreover, Alamo Foundation and Walling instruct that a worker who is exempt

from FLSA coverage as a volunteer or trainee must work for their own “personal purpose or

pleasure.” See id. at 295; Walling, 330 U.S. at 152; see also Acosta v. Paragon Contractors

Corp., 884 F.3d 1225, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that children who are coerced to

perform work are not working for their own personal pleasure, purpose, or profit as required by

the Alamo Foundation and Walling standard).

Before addressing the parties’ motions for summary judgment and the central issue of

whether the Minors or Mentors can be considered employees under the FLSA, the Court first

addresses the question as to which “economic reality” test to apply to determine this issue. In

Plaintiff’s initial brief in support of her motion for summary judgment, she relies on Alamo

Foundation in arguing that the Minors and Mentors should be considered employees, not

volunteers. (Doc. No. 44 at 21–24.) In their brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, as well as

in their brief in support of their own summary judgment motion, Defendants rely on Alamo

Foundation in arguing that the Mentors are volunteers and not employees and on Walling to

argue that the Minors are trainees and not employees. See (Doc. No. 52 at 4–9; Doc. No. 48 at

8–12, 14–18). As to the Minors, Defendants cite a six-factor test articulated by the Tenth Circuit

in Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993), which relies on Walling and

the “Wage and Hour Manual” as promulgated by the Wage and Hour Division of the United

States Department of Labor. (Doc. No. 48 at 10.)17

17 The Reich test assesses the following factors:

(1) Whether the training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the

employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school;

(2) Whether the training is for the benefit of the trainee;

(3) Whether the trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close

observation;

After the parties completed briefing on their summary judgment motions, the Third

Circuit issued its opinion in Johnson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 108 F.4th 163

(3d Cir. 2024), which considered whether student athletes are employees under the FLSA. See

Johnson, 108 F.4th at 167. The Third Circuit held that student athletes could be employees for

FLSA purposes and announced a four-factor test to determine employment status of those

athletes. See Johnson, 108 F.4th at 167, 180. Due to the date of its publication, the parties did

not have the opportunity to opine on the potential applicability of Johnson to this case in their

briefs; accordingly, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the

impact of the Third Circuit’s precedential opinion in Johnson on the pending motions for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 57), and the parties subsequently filed those supplemental briefs

(Doc. Nos. 58, 59). In her supplemental brief, Plaintiff maintains that, although the Third Circuit

created a new four-factor test for the “sui generis” fact pattern addressed in Johnson, it

reaffirmed the tests used to evaluate the employee status of trainees and volunteers; accordingly,

Plaintiff contends that “[t]hose precedents, rather than [Johnson], should guide the Court in

determining whether the Minors and Mentors are employees.” (Doc. No. 58 at 1–2.) However,

Plaintiff argues that, even if the Court applies the Johnson test to the facts of the instant case,

“the Minors and Mentors were undisputedly employees.” (Id. at 2.) In their supplemental brief,

Defendants simply utilize the Johnson framework in arguing that they are entitled to summary

(4) Whether the employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage

from the activities of the trainees and on occasion his operations may actually be

impeded;

(5) Whether the trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the

training period; and

(6) The employer and the trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages

for the time spent in training.

See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026.

judgment without offering any analysis regarding whether Johnson provides the appropriate test

to apply in the instant case. See (Doc. No. 59).

The Court has carefully reviewed Johnson and the supplemental briefing of the parties,

and notes that, as Plaintiff represents, Johnson reaffirms the tests devised by the United States

Supreme Court to evaluate whether trainees or volunteers may be considered employees under

the FLSA. The Third Circuit stated as follows in this regard:

Under this framework, the employer-employee “relationship does not depend on .

. . isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.”

McComb, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. 1473; see also Haybarger . Lawrence Cnty.

Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 418 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that “whether a

person functions as an employer depends on the totality of the circumstances rather

than on ‘technical concepts of the employment relationship’”) (citation omitted).

Limitations articulated by the Supreme Court include that independent contractors

are not employees under the FLSA, see McComb, 331 U.S. at 729, 67 S. Ct. 1473,

and “[a]n individual who, ‘without promise or expectation of compensation, but

solely for his personal purpose or pleasure worked in activities carried on by other

persons either for their pleasure or profit,’ is outside the sweep of the Act,” Tony &

Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 295, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (quoting Walling v. Portland

Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152, 67 S. Ct. 639, 91 L. Ed. 809 (1947)).

Importantly, in determining that the Alamo “volunteers” were actually employees

because they expected “in-kind” compensation for services performed, Tony &

Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301, 105 S. Ct. 1953, the Court distinguished

their situation from that of a group of trainees in Walling. Id. at 299–301, 105 S.

Ct. 1953. In Walling, the trainees participated in a week-long course, during which

they performed some work under close supervision without receiving or expecting

remuneration beyond the possibility of future employment. 330 U.S. at 149–150,

67 S. Ct. 639. But the Court held that the trainees did not qualify as “employees”

under the FLSA, as their work did not confer an “immediate advantage” to the

purported employer. Id. at 153, 67 S. Ct. 639. Instead, as the Court in Alamo

explained, the trainees in Walling were akin to “students in a school,” whose

activities are driven by the educational benefits. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471

U.S. at 300, 105 S. Ct. 1953. By contrast, the Alamo “volunteers” engaged in work

over extended periods, sometimes years, and received “in-kind benefits” like food,

clothing, shelter, and other benefits as compensation. Id. at 292, 105 S. Ct. 1953.

These benefits were “wages in another form.” Id. at 301, 105 S. Ct. 1953. Even

though the Alamo “volunteers” claimed they expected no compensation, the Court

explained that a compensation agreement can be either “express” or “implied,” and

“[i]f an exception to the Act were carved out for employees willing to testify that

they performed work “voluntarily,” employers might be able to use superior

bargaining power to coerce employees to make such assertions, or to waive their

protections under the Act.” Id. at 301–02, 105 S. Ct. 1953.

Since McComb, we and other courts of appeal have adopted multifactor tests to

analyze, based on the circumstances of the whole relationship between the parties,

whether individuals are employees or independent contractors, whether entities are

joint employers, and whether individuals are employees or interns. See, e.g.,

Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985) (adopting

a six-factor test developed to determine whether an individual is an employee or an

independent contractor); In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 688 F.3d at 469 (adopting a

four-factor test to determine whether entities are joint employers); Glatt, 811 F.3d

at 536–37 (adopting a non-exhaustive set of seven factors to determine whether an

individual is a student intern or an employee). Here, we confront circumstances

unlike those previously addressed, but core principles that traditionally define an

employee-employer relationship are no less applicable.

See Johnson, 108 F.4th at 176–77. Upon consideration of the sui generis nature of the Third

Circuit’s analysis in Johnson, as well as Johnson’s reaffirmation of the utility of the Walling and

Alamo Foundation tests to assess the employment status of trainees and volunteers, and given

Defendants’ characterization of the Minors and Mentors as trainees and volunteers, the Court

will utilize the tests from Walling and Alamo Foundation to evaluate the employment status of

the Minors and Mentors, respectively, when assessing the parties’ motions for summary

judgment.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment18

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the following issues: (1) Defendant Mennonite

Mission is a covered enterprise engaged in commerce pursuant to the FLSA; (2) Defendant

Martin is jointly liable as an employer pursuant to the FLSA; (3) Defendants’ employees are

entitled to minimum wages pursuant to the FLSA; (4) Defendants’ employees are entitled to

overtime wages pursuant to the FLSA; (5) Defendants engaged in oppressive child labor; (6)

18 The Court notes that, in opposing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Defendants rely

not only on the arguments made in their opposing brief but also their briefing in support of their

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 52 at 3.) Accordingly, the Court considers arguments

made in both sets of briefing in assessing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Defendants violated the FLSA’s recordkeeping provision; (7) Defendants’ FLSA violations were

willful; (8) Defendants are jointly and severally liable for six hundred and sixty-nine thousand,

six hundred and seven dollars and eighty-three cents ($669,607.83) in back wages; (9)

Defendants are jointly and severally liable for six hundred and sixty-nine thousand, six hundred

and seven dollars and eighty-three cents ($669,607.83) in liquidated damages; and (10)

Defendants should be permanently enjoined from violating the FLSA. (Doc. No. 42-4.) The

Court addresses each issue in turn.

1. Defendant Mennonite Mission’s Mentors and Minors Coverage Under

the FLSA

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Mennonite Mission, which does business as Liberty

Ridge, is an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce pursuant to the FLSA. (Doc. No. 44 at

16.) Plaintiff maintains that Liberty Ridge’s annual volume sales are greater than five-hundred

thousand dollars ($500,000), and further notes that the pallets built by Minors and Mentors

crossed state lines into Baltimore, Maryland. (Id.) It follows, according to Plaintiff, that Liberty

Ridge is a covered enterprise under the FLSA. (Id.)

In further support of her position that Defendant Mennonite Mission is a covered

enterprise, and that the Mentors and Minors are employees under the FLSA, Plaintiff discusses

the details of Liberty Ridge’s operations. Plaintiff relies on the facts of record indicating that the

LRFC interviews prospective Mentors and Minors, supervises them, determines their payrates,

sets their schedules, and evaluates their work progress. (Id. at 18–19.) Plaintiff also points to the

undisputed facts of record that the LRFC offered incentives to Minors to work efficiently and

provided training to both Mentors and Minors. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff maintains that the Mentors

and Minors are not volunteers. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff argues that the facts of this case are

analogous to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Alamo Foundation, in which the

Supreme Court held that church volunteers were actually employees under the FLSA because

compensation agreements can be express or implied, and, as in that case, the Mentors and Minors

had the expectation of some sort of compensation for their work, thus rendering them employees

pursuant to the FLSA. (Id. at 21 (citing Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 290, 293, 301).)

Plaintiff further maintains that the Court should, in accordance with the relevant

authority, consider the coercive elements of Defendants’ working arrangement, which she claims

points towards a finding that Mentors and Minors are employees. (Doc. No. 44 at 21.) Plaintiff

asserts that Minors had an expectation of compensation, in the form of housing and food, and

this fact, combined with the philosophy of “if you don’t work, you don’t eat,” renders them

employees under the FLSA. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff notes that: (1) Minors were placed at Liberty

Ridge by their parents; (2) Minors were punished if they did not work quickly enough or comply

with the Liberty Ridge rules; and (3) Minors could not leave Liberty Ridge unless their parents

and Liberty Ridge approved. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff maintains that these facts all suggest that the

Minors’ work was not voluntary. (Id.) Plaintiff additionally asserts that Mentors are employees

and not volunteers, noting that Mentors “expected compensation” in the form of monetary

payments as well as room and board. (Id. at 24.) It follows, according to Plaintiff, that Alamo

Foundation dictates a finding that Mentors were employees under the FLSA. See (id.).

In response, Defendants offer several arguments opposing Plaintiff’s motion on this

question. Defendants first observe that their status as an “enterprise engaged in commerce” is

not relevant to Plaintiff’s motion, and instead the operative inquiry is whether the Mentors and

Minors are employees under the FLSA. (Doc. No. 52 at 3.) To that end, Defendants assert that

the Minors are not employees but rather are “student-trainees in a Faith-based schooling and

vocational skills program.” (Id. at 4.) Defendants maintain that the Minors receive training,

“identical to what would be provided at a similar farming-focused vocational school.” (Id. at 6.)

Defendants argue that Minors “did not displace regular employees,” and further note that

“Liberty Ridge Farm is not operating as a pallet company, nor does it have contracts with a pallet

company.” (Id. at 6–7.) Defendants maintain that Minors partake in a wide range of activities at

Liberty Ridge and further note that even though the pallets made by Mentors and Minors were

ultimately purchased, “this was not an integral part of any alleged business.” (Id. at 7.)

Defendants assert that the Minors and their parents knew and acknowledged that Minors were

not employees and thus not entitled to be paid. (Id.)

Defendants cite Walling’s holding that “prospective railroad brakemen who received on-

the-job training, but were not paid during the training period, were not entitled to wages under

the FLSA,” in arguing that here, as in Walling, the Court should find that the Minors were

student trainees who are not entitled to wages. (Doc. No. 48 at 10 (citing Walling, 330 U.S. at

153).) As noted supra, Defendants rely on Walling and Reich, a Tenth Circuit case, in arguing

that the Minors were trainees, not employees. Defendants argue that: (1) Minors built pallets and

rebuilt engines, similar to activities done by farming focused vocational school students; (2)

Minors did not displace Liberty Ridge’s other employees; (3) the vocational training was only a

small portion of the activities taking place at Liberty Ridge; and (4) Minors’ parents would

donate to Liberty Ridge, and the farm did not rely on income derived from external sources

purchasing the pallets to fund its programming. (Doc. No. 48 at 11.)

Defendants argue that the Mentors who worked at Liberty Ridge are volunteers and thus

not employees under the FLSA. (Id. at 16.) Defendants maintain that Mentors determined the

length of time for which they would serve, indicated that they did not expect payment, and were

merely volunteers “for a nonprofit organization with a religious or humanitarian objective,” and

pursuant to Department of Labor guidance, should appropriately be classified as volunteers. (Id.)

Defendants further cite United States Department of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Fact Sheet

#14A, particularly noting language which reads that:

the FLSA recognizes the generosity and public benefits of volunteering and allows

individuals to freely volunteer in many circumstances for charitable and public

purposes. A volunteer generally will not be considered an employee for FLSA

purposes if the individual volunteers freely for public service, religious or

humanitarian objectives, and without contemplation or receipt of compensation.

(Id. at 15.) It follows, according to Defendants, that Mentors are more appropriately classified as

volunteers, given the religious objective of their organization. See (id. at 15–16).

Plaintiff asserts in response that Defendants do not cite any evidence of record reflecting

that Minors received an education similar to what they would receive in other schools and further

note that Liberty Ridge was not an accredited school during the relevant period. (Doc. No. 53 at

13.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants provide no evidence that the “education Minors received

is similar to that in other schools,” and further maintains that Defendants provide no “curriculum,

certifications, [or] any documents from Mennonite/Anabaptist run schools, or any evidence to

support their argument that the students could have received a similar education at a different

school.” (Id.)

Plaintiff also responds that there is no evidence that Liberty Ridge’s programming

benefitted Minors, especially considering the harsh punishments Minors were forced to endure.

(Id. at 14.) Plaintiff maintains that the only evidence supporting the proposition that Minors

benefitted from Liberty Ridge’s training is a self-serving statement from one of Defendants’

witnesses, which is insufficient to support their motion for summary judgment. (Id.) Defendants

cite the deposition testimony of Mr. Mark Torkelson (“Mr. Torkelson”), a member of Defendant

Mennonite Mission’s board, in which he discusses how Liberty Ridge tries to provide Minors

with vocational skills “that they could use in their life further beyond Liberty Ridge.” (Doc. No.

48-6 at 88.)

Plaintiff also argues that the evidence of record supports the conclusion that the pallet

building program displaced regular Liberty Ridge employees, insofar as Defendants discussed

needing to recruit additional workers to aid department heads in building pallets after the

Department of Labor initiated its investigation, because “they (supposedly) no longer had

children to do the work.” (Doc. No. 53 at 15.) Plaintiff notes that Defendants benefitted from

Minors’ labor, deriving “significant revenue from selling pallets, tending to chickens, and

engaging in other commercial activities.” (Id.) Plaintiff also maintains that Minors expected

compensation, namely in the form of housing and food, such that this factor too points in favor

of a finding that Minors were employees. (Id. at 16.)

a. Enterprise Coverage

Upon consideration of the foregoing, the Court first determines that it is generally

undisputed that Defendant Mennonite Mission, in operating Liberty Ridge, “is an enterprise

whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,00.00.” See 29

U.S.C. § 203(s)(1); see also (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 56–58 (discussing Liberty Ridge’s revenue for

the years 2019 through 2021); 42-23 through 42-24 (containing the income statements for

Liberty Ridge)). Accordingly, the Court determines that, viewing the record as a whole, and

construing all facts in the light most favorable to Defendants, Defendants fail to raise a genuine

dispute of material fact sufficient to permit a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Defendant

Mennonite Mission is not a covered enterprise under the FLSA. See (Doc. No. 53 at 3

(highlighting Defendants’ failure to contest this issue)).

b. The Minors

As it pertains to the Minors’ status as employees, the Court is principally guided by the

economic realities test and the expectation of compensation as explained by the Supreme Court

in Walling and Alamo Foundation. First, the Court considers whether the Minors’ work is

performed in expectation of express or implied compensation and for their “personal purpose or

pleasure” before turning to whether Defendants received an “immediate advantage” from the

Minors’ work. See Walling, 330 U.S. at 152–53.

The Court determines that the Minors’ work was done with the expectation of implied

compensation. In Walling, the Supreme Court concluded that the trainees were not employees

under FLSA because they worked “without promise or expectation of compensation” because the

yard brakemen did not expect express or implied compensation for learning the work of a

brakeman over the course of seven to eight days on average. See id. at 149, 152. In Alamo

Foundation, the Supreme Court concluded that, unlike in Walling, the economic realities

revealed that the workers were entirely dependent on the Foundation for long periods of time.

See Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 301. Further, the Supreme Court held that the food, clothing,

and other benefits that the workers received for those long periods of time constituted in-kind

benefits that the workers expected in exchange for their services. See id.

Comparing Walling and Alamo Foundation to the instant case, Defendants, a religious

nonprofit, operated a behavioral rehabilitation farm where the Minors, as residents, worked.

Similar to the Alamo Foundation volunteers, the Minors worked tending animals (i.e., chickens),

chopping wood, and building pallets for approximately four to seven hours per day. See Alamo

Foundation, 471 U.S. at 292 (detailing that the volunteers worked at service stations, hog farms,

and roofing and electrical construction companies). Further, the Minors worked for months to

years at Liberty Ridge—as the volunteers in Alamo Foundation did— whereas the trainees in

Walling worked for seven to eight days on average. See Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 301

(“[I]n this case the associates were ‘entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long periods, in

some cases several years.’” (internal citations omitted)); Walling, 330 U.S. at 149 (stating that

the preliminary training was seven to eight days on average). Most importantly, Defendants

promised, and the Minors received, food and shelter for the entirety of the Minors’ stay at

Liberty Ridge as promised to the Minors’ parents. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 9.) The provision of food

and shelter distinguishes this case from Walling because it demonstrates that the Minors expected

“wages in another form.” See Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 301 n.23 (noting that the FLSA

defines food and lodging as wages). Therefore, the undisputed evidence of record demonstrates

that the Minors expected implied compensation, in the form of food and shelter, for the months

to years long stay at Liberty Ridge.

The Court also determines that undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that the

Minors did not work for their own personal purpose or pleasure. Defendants assert that the

Minors built pallets, repaired tractors, built gates, tended to animals, and gardened in furtherance

of improving their interpersonal and vocational skills. (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶¶ 10, 15–17, 30.)

Despite Defendants’ arguments, even if the vocational training is seen as legitimate—which is

not borne out in the record—the undisputed facts indicate that the Minors did not voluntarily join

or participate in Liberty Ridge Farm. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 8 (stating that parents send their

“troubled” children to Liberty Ridge).)

The Minors’ circumstances are similar to the circumstances of the children in Acosta v.

Paragon Contractors Corp., 884 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2018). In Acosta, children of community

members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints gathered fallen

pecans on the Southern Utah Pecan Ranch. See id. at 1230–31. The children were ordered to

attend the pecan harvest, and the church facilitated the harvesting by closing schools when it was

time for harvesting. See id. at 1231. At trial, the parents and children testified that they felt

required to attend the harvest or face consequences, such as excommunication, from the church.

See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (“Tenth Circuit”) concluded

that pursuant to Alamo Foundation and Walling the children did not work for their own personal

pleasure but rather were coerced by the church into working. See id. at 1231–32. Here, the

Minors were residents in a religious disciplinary rehabilitation program. (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶¶ 8–9.)

The parents of the Minors placed them in the care of Defendants with the expectation that the

Minors would receive religious disciplinary rehabilitation, food, and shelter. See (id.; Doc. No.

44-2 ¶ 9.) At Liberty Ridge, the Minors could not leave the farm, worked for nearly a full eight-

hour workday building pallets and tending chickens, stayed for months to years until they

graduated from the program, and faced punishments, such as dragging chains or being placed on

a restrictive diet of rice and beans for disobedience, which included slow work. Therefore, just

like the children in Acosta, the Court determines that the Minors cannot be said to have worked

for their own pleasure.

Lastly, the Court considers whether Defendants received an “immediate advantage” from

the work of the Minors. Defendants argue that they received no immediate advantage because:

(1) the Minors’ work only represented “a fraction of the activities” taking place at Liberty Ridge;

and (2) the donations of the parents and/or legal guardians of the Minors offset the cost of the

program as opposed to the pallet purchases. (Doc. No. 52 at 7.) The Court is unpersuaded.

First, the undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that the donations of parents and legal

guardians of the Minors totaled $77,720.82 in 2019, $118,663.46 in 2020, and $91,657.77 in

2021. (Doc. No. 48-9 at 125, 127, 129.) Second, the undisputed evidence of record shows that

Liberty Ridge generated nearly a million dollars in revenue in 2019 ($937,001.58), hundreds of

thousands of dollars in 2020 ($881,231.85), and over a million dollars in 2021 ($1,212,450.83)

largely from the Minors tending chickens, splitting firewood with a maul, and building pallets.

See (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 55–58; 44-18 (noting the monies paid to Liberty Ridge by a range of

companies)). In fact, the results of the Minors’ products and services made up $818,445.03 out

of $937,001.58 in revenue in 2019, $717,354.77 out of $881,231.85 in revenue in 2020, and

$1,079,431.04 out of $1,212,450.83 in revenue in 2021. See (Doc. No. 48-9 at 125–30). Thus,

the record reflects that the Minors contributed 87% of Defendants’ revenue in 2019, 81% in

2020, and 89% in 2021, whereas the Minors’ parents and legal guardians contributed

approximately 8.2% in 2019, 13.4% in 2020, and 7.5% in 2021. See (id.). Because the

undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that the Minors’ work generated the bulk of

Defendants’ revenue, the Court determines that the Minors’ unpaid work provided an “immediate

advantage” to Defendants.

Thus, viewing the undisputed evidence of record as a whole, and construing all facts in

the light most favorable to Defendants, the Court determines that Defendants fail to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact as to the Minors’ status as employees under the FLSA.19

19 The Court notes that the Reich test, cited by Defendants in their briefing in support of their

argument that the Minors are not employees, does not constitute governing authority. However,

even assessing the undisputed facts of record under the Reich test, the Court comes to the same

conclusion that the Minors should be classified as employees, not trainees, for purposes of the

FLSA. First, as to whether the training provided at Liberty Ridge is akin to vocational school

training, Defendants cite only Mr. Torkelson’s deposition testimony, which merely discusses

Liberty Ridge’s program and provides no comparison or insight as to how the training received

by Minor is “similar to that which would be given in a vocational school.” See Reich, 992 F.2d

at 1026. Second, as to whether the Minors benefit from the training, Defendants again offer only

the self-serving testimony of Mr. Torkelson, who testified that the vocational training Minors

received, in the form of building pallets and rebuilding engines, was “incredibly beneficial” to

Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this question. The

Court next addresses whether the Mentors can be classified as employees pursuant to the FLSA.

c. The Mentors

As it pertains to the Mentors’ status as employees, the Court considers whether the

Mentors’ work is performed in expectation of express or implied benefits, for their personal

purpose or pleasure, and for an “immediate advantage” to Defendants. See Walling, 330 U.S. at

152–53. The undisputed evidence of record, construed in the light most favorable to Defendants,

suggests that the Mentors’ work was done with the expectation that they would receive the

them. (Doc. No. 48 at 11.) As Plaintiff notes, Defendants “could have submitted declarations to

that effect from the Minors themselves about the skills they supposedly learned and how those

skills benefited them in future jobs. They did not. They could have submitted declarations to

that effect from the Minors’ parents. They did not.” (Doc. No. 53 at 14.) Ultimately,

Defendants fail to support their position on this point with any record evidence beyond Mr.

Torkelson’s self-serving deposition testimony. The general rule that “conclusory self-serving

affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment . . . has been extended to

self-serving deposition testimony.” See Martin J. Walsh v. Fusion Japanese Steakhouse, 548 F.

Supp. 3d 512, 530 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (citations omitted) (citing Irving v. Chester Water Auth., 439

F. App’x 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished)) As to whether Minors displaced regular

employees, Defendants assert that they did not displace regular employees, but Plaintiff cites

LRFC meeting minutes discussing how “they needed to recruit additional help to satisfy their

pallet obligations” because they “no longer had children to do the work.” (Doc. No. 53 at 15

(citing Doc. No. 44-24 (containing LRFC meeting minutes stating “[s]ome youth helped in the

pallet shop on Saturdays in the month of May because of our reduced work force”).) The Court

concludes that, without additional context, it is unclear whether Minors displaced regular

employees and therefore this factor is neutral. As to whether the employer derives an immediate

advantage from the activities of the trainees, the undisputed evidence of record reflects that

Defendants derived an immediate advantage from the Minors’ labor in the form of significant

revenue from selling pallets and tending to chickens. See (Doc. No. 44-23 (containing Liberty

Ridge income ledger)). With regard to whether the trainees are entitled to a job at the conclusion

of training, the record is devoid of any evidence that the Minors are engaged in a training period

that may lead to a paid position. Finally, as to whether the Minors expected compensation for

their work, the Court agrees with Plaintiff’s position that the Minors expected compensation in

the form of food and housing, which are “wages in another form,” see Alamo Foundation, 471

U.S. at 301. Accordingly, assessing the evidence of record under the Reich test cited by

Defendants, the Court concludes that five of the six Reich factors weigh in favor of a finding that

the Minors were employees, not trainees.

express benefit in the form of a monthly two hundred and fifty dollar ($250) stipend, and the

implied benefits-in-kind of food and shelter while at Liberty Ridge. (Doc. Nos. 44-26 at 3

(containing Defendants’ admission that they provided food and shelter to the Minors and

Mentors); 52 at 9 n.4 (admitting that the Mentors received a two hundred and fifty dollar

stipend).)

The Mentors’ position at Liberty Ridge Farm mirrors the position of the Alamo

Foundation volunteers. The Supreme Court noted that the volunteers in Alamo Foundation were

employees because: (1) the Foundation relied on the volunteers for long periods up to “several

years”; (2) the volunteers received food, shelter, clothing, and other benefits; and (3) the

volunteers worked for ten to fifteen hours a day, six to seven days per week. See Alamo

Foundation, 471 U.S. at 293, 301, 301 n.22. In this case, the Mentors spent at least three months

to a year working for and dependent on Defendants. (Doc. Nos. 44-6 at 127 (“Q. how long is a

normal stay for a mentor at the Liberty Ridge Farm? [The Witness]: six months to a year.”); 48-1

¶ 24 (stating that Mentors spent from at least three months to a year at Liberty Ridge Farm).)

They were promised, and received, food and lodging from Defendants for the entirety of their

stay at Liberty Ridge. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 42.) The Mentors additionally worked six days a week

from 6:00 AM to 9:00 PM “with few breaks”. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 39.) One of the principal differences

between Alamo Foundation and this case is the Mentors’ two-hundred-and-fifty-dollar ($250)

monthly stipend, which Defendants promised them in advance of their stay. The existence of the

stipend supports the determination that the Mentors were employees who worked in expectation

of compensation because it is an express compensation agreement. Therefore, the undisputed

facts demonstrate both an express and implied compensation agreement. Although Defendants,

and the Mentors themselves, argue that the Mentors are volunteers, see (Doc. Nos. 52 at 10; 42-

42 at 1, 4), “the purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who would decline its

protections.” See Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 302.

As to the issue of immediate economic advantage, the Mentors also built pallets and

tended chickens with the Minors. (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 41.) Therefore, their work contributed to the

$818,445.03 in revenue in 2019, $717,354.77 in revenue in 2020, and $1,079,431.04 in revenue

in 2021. Because those products and services made up approximately 87% of Defendants’

revenue in 2019, 81% in 2020, and 89% in 2021, the Court determines that Defendants reaped

immediate economic advantage from the work of the Mentors. Accordingly, the Court

determines that, although the Mentors volunteered for their own “personal purpose or pleasure,”

they nevertheless worked in expectation of both express and implied compensation such that

they are not exempt from the FLSA’s protections.

The economic realities of the Mentors, when all circumstances are considered, reflect

that of an employer-employee relationship. Therefore, the Court, viewing the undisputed

evidence of record as a whole, and construing all facts in the light most favorable to Defendants,

determines that Defendants fail to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to the Mentors’

status as employees under the FLSA. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment on this question as well. The Court next examines whether Defendant

Martin should be jointly liable as an employer for any FLSA violations.

2. Defendant Martin’s Coverage Under the FLSA

Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Martin is a joint employer under the FLSA and should

thus be liable for any FLSA violations of Defendant Mennonite Mission and Liberty Ridge.

(Doc. No. 44 at 19.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Martin had “operational control,” and was

“directly involved in running Liberty Ridge.” (Id.) Plaintiff further maintains that Defendant

Martin participated in decisions by the LRFC and had primary responsibility for supervising the

work coordinators tasked with scheduling the Minors and Mentors for their duties. (Id. at 19–

20.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Martin: (1) admitted to training Minors; (2)

signed the checks for Mentor stipends; and (3) directly participated in the reprimanding of

Minors by forcing them to drag chains. (Id. at 20.) Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s

arguments on this issue.

As discussed supra, the Third Circuit has articulated a four-part test for courts to utilize

when examining “a potential joint employment relationship under the FLSA.” See In re Enter.

Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d at 469. This Court accordingly

considers:

(1) the alleged employers authority to hire and fire the relevant employees; (2) the

alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work rules and assignments and to set

the employees’ conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work

schedules, including the rate and method of payment; (3) the alleged employer’s

involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline;

and 4) the alleged employer’s actual control of employee records, such as payroll,

insurance, or taxes.

See id. (hereinafter the “Enterprise” factors).

As to the first factor, Defendant Martin indisputably served as the Treasurer (a board

position) of the LRFC which, as reflected by the facts of record, interviewed prospective

Mentors and Minors before ultimately deciding whether to welcome them to Liberty Ridge. See

(Doc. Nos. 44-6 at 61 (deposition testimony of Defendant Martin wherein he identifies himself

as the treasurer of the LRFC); 48-1 ¶ 6 (describing the members of the LRFC as a Chairman,

Assistant Chairman, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer, and Assistant Treasurer); 44-16 at

1 (LRFC meeting minutes discussing an interview undertaken with a prospective Minor)).

However, in his deposition, Defendant Martin stated that he had interviewed maybe “one or two”

potential Minors. (Doc. No. 44-6 at 55.) The Court observes that there is very little discussion

of this element in the parties’ briefing or the evidence of record, and accordingly, this factor does

not point towards or against a finding of a joint employment relationship. Without more

evidence indicating that Defendant Martin was personally involved in the admittance decisions

for Mentors and Minors, the Court cannot conclude that this factor weighs in favor of a finding

of joint employment. However, given Defendant Martin’s role on the LRFC and the LRFC’s

documented role in vetting prospective Mentors and Minors, the Court determines that this factor

is neutral.

As to the second Enterprise factor—the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work

rules and assignments and to set the employees’ conditions of employment, including

compensation, benefits, and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment, see In re

Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d at 469—the Court determines that

this factor weighs in favor of finding Defendant Martin to be a joint employer with Defendant

Mennonite Mission. It is undisputed that Defendant Martin was “primarily responsible just for

the work coordinator,” who would set Mentor and Minor schedules. (Doc. No. 44-6 at 95

(deposition testimony of Defendant Martin identifying himself as responsible for the work

coordinator).) Additionally, Defendant Martin testified that, in his role on the LRFC, he helped

set the stipend amount for Mentors. (Id. at 107–08.) Defendant Martin further testified that, in

his role on the LRFC, he was part of the decision-making process for determining whether to

grant a Mentor’s request for a day off from Liberty Ridge. (Id. at 102–03.) Finally, it was

Defendant Martin who signed the stipend checks sent to Mentors. See (Doc. No. 44-19

(containing Defendant Martin’s signature on stipend checks)). To that end, the overwhelming

weight of the evidence points in favor of a finding of a joint employer relationship as to this

factor.

Pertaining to the third Enterprise factor, it is undisputed that Minors were sometimes

forced to drag chains as punishment while at Liberty Ridge, and Defendant Martin, at least once,

personally approved a Minor’s chain dragging punishment and helped him to drag said chains.

(Doc. No. 44-6 at 172–73.) As discussed supra, Defendant Martin also identified himself as

being “primarily responsible . . . for the work coordinator” who would set Mentor and Minor

schedules, (Doc. No. 44-6 at 95), while also noting that he would have participated in the

interviews for the work coordinator positions (id. at 99–100). The Court determines that the

undisputed evidence of record as to the third Enterprise factor weighs in favor of finding the

existence of a joint employment relationship between Defendant Mennonite Mission and

Defendant Martin.

The final Enterprise factor requires examining the “alleged employer’s actual control of

employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.” See In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage &

Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d at 469. Upon review of the undisputed evidence of record, the

Court determines that, as the Treasurer of the LRFC, Defendant Martin entered into business

agreements on behalf of Liberty Ridge, while also managing payroll. See (Doc. Nos. 44-6 at 37,

149 (deposition testimony of Defendant Martin discussing using Liberty Ridge funds to pay real

estate taxes and how he maintained personal control over Liberty Ridge’s back account

information); 44-7 (deposition testimony of Mr. Kreider explaining that Defendant Martin made

business arrangements on behalf of Liberty Ridge); 44-19 (containing Defendant Martin’s

signature on stipend checks to Mentors)). Accordingly, the Court determines that this fourth and

final factor suggests a joint employment relationship between Defendant Mennonite Mission and

Liberty Ridge and Defendant Martin.

The Third Circuit has stated that the four Enterprise factors are “not exhaustive” and

“cannot be ‘blindly applied’ as the sole considerations necessary to determine joint

employment.” See In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d at 469

(citation omitted). To that end, the Court examines whether “other indicia of ‘significant control’

are present to suggest that a given employer was a joint employer of an employee,” because “that

determination may be persuasive, when incorporated with the individual factors” outlined supra.

See id. at 470. On this question, the “other indicia,” see id. at 469, also weigh in favor of finding

the existence of a joint employment relationship between Defendant Mennonite Mission and

Defendant Martin. In particular, the Court observes that Defendant Martin registered Liberty

Ridge’s paperwork with the Pennsylvania Department of State. (Doc. No. 44-6 at 30.) In

considering the foregoing, the Court observes that three out of the four Enterprise factors, as well

as additional “indicia” of control, favor a finding of joint employment. Accordingly, because

Defendants fail to provide evidence raising a genuine dispute of material fact on this issue, the

Court, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to Defendants, will grant Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment on the question of whether Defendant Martin is liable for FLSA

violations as a joint employer with Defendant Mennonite Mission.

3. Whether Defendants Violated the FLSA’s Minimum Wage Provision

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the question of whether Defendants violated

the FLSA’s minimum wage provision, set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 206. Plaintiff asserts and

Defendants do not contest that Defendants did not pay Mentors the federal minimum wage and

did not pay Minors any wages at all. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 46, 117; 52-1 ¶¶ 46, 117.) Accordingly,

viewing the record as a whole, and construing all facts in the light most favorable to Defendants,

the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this issue. Defendants do not

offer any argument on this point and appear to rest on the assertion that Mentors and Minors are

volunteers and thus not employees under the FLSA. (Doc. No. 52 at 4–10.) However, the Court

has determined supra that Defendant Mennonite Mission, doing business as Liberty Ridge, and

Defendant Martin, are jointly liable as employers for FLSA violations, and that Minors and

Mentors are employees pursuant to the FLSA. Because there is no factual dispute that Mentors

did not receive a minimum wage salary, and Minors also did not receive a minimum wage salary

(because they did not receive any salary at all), the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment as to Defendants’ violation of the FLSA minimum wage provision. The

Court next reviews whether Defendants violated the FLSA’s overtime provision.

4. Whether Defendants Violated the FLSA’s Overtime Provision

It is undisputed that Defendants failed to pay Mentors overtime wages, as required by the

FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); see also (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 46, 118; 52-1 ¶ 46). Accordingly,

viewing the record as a whole, and construing all facts in the light most favorable to Defendants,

the Court determines that summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s overtime claim is proper.

Defendants again rest on the position that Mentors are volunteers and thus not employees under

the FLSA. (Doc. No. 52 at 7–10.) However, for the reasons outlined supra, the Court

determines that Mentors are employees under the FLSA. Because there is no factual dispute,

insofar as Defendants concede that Mentors did not receive overtime premiums (Doc. No. 52-1 ¶

46), the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the question of whether

Defendants violated the FLSA’s overtime provision.

5. Whether Defendants Engaged in Oppressive Child Labor

“Oppressive child labor in any industry is a reversion to an outmoded and degenerate

code of economic and social behavior.” W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 510 (1945)

(Murphy, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the FLSA provides that “[n]o employer shall employ any

oppressive child labor in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce or in any

enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” See 29 U.S.C. §

212(c). “Subject to certain exceptions . . . employment of any child under the age of sixteen

constitutes oppressive child labor.” Acosta v. Cent. Laundry, Inc., No. 18-cv-00190, 2019 WL

3413514, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2019) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(l)). Under the FLSA,

oppressive child labor refers to, in relevant part:

a condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of sixteen

years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person standing in place

of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody under the age of

sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation

found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment

of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their

health or well-being) in any occupation.

See 29 U.S.C. § 203(l).

Plaintiff maintains that Minors were forced to engage in several activities which the

Secretary of Labor has defined as being too dangerous for children to undertake. (Doc. No. 44 at

25.) Plaintiff asserts that the Secretary has disallowed children from chopping firewood pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. § 570.34. (Id.) Plaintiff further maintains that some of the Minors were under the

age of fourteen (14), and worked during school hours at Defendants’ direction, in direct violation

of 29 C.F.R. § 570.35. (Id. at 25–26.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are in violation of the

FLSA’s prohibition against oppressive child labor because they forced some Minors to work

longer than eighteen (18) hours in a week and more than three (3) hours during a day when

school was in session, all in violation of a validly promulgated regulation. (Id. at 26.) Finally,

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief and asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from “continuing to

violate the FLSA’s prohibition against oppressive child labor.” (Id.) In response, Defendants

merely assert that because “Minor residents were not employees,” the oppressive child labor

section of the FLSA does not apply to them. (Doc. No. 52 at 4.)

The Court determines that, upon careful review of the evidence of record, Defendants fail

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to the question of their engagement in oppressive

child labor as defined by the Secretary of Labor because the record clearly supports a finding that

children under the age of fourteen (14) worked in the Liberty Ridge pallet shop. 29 C.F.R. §

570.34 is titled “Occupations that may be performed by minors 14 and 15 years of age,” and the

regulation discusses the permissibility of fourteen and fifteen-year-olds working “inside and

outside of places of business where machinery is used to process wood products.” See 29 C.F.R.

§ 570.34 (m)(1). The regulation defines “places of business” as “sawmills, lath mills, shingle

mills, cooperage stock mills, furniture and cabinet making shops, gazebo and shed making shops,

toy manufacturing shops, and pallet shops.” See 29 C.F.R. § 570.34(m)(3) (emphasis added).

The regulation does not permit activities for minors under the age of fourteen (14). See 29

C.F.R. § 570.2(a) (noting that the FLSA “sets a general 16-year age minimum” and provides the

Secretary with the authority to “provide by regulation or by order that the employment of

employees between the ages of 14 and 16 years in occupations other than manufacturing and

mining shall not be deemed to constitute oppressive child labor”).

Upon consideration of the foregoing, and construing all facts in the light most favorable

to Defendants, the Court concludes that the undisputed evidence of record indicates that Liberty

Ridge operated de facto as a pallet shop, insofar as it had agreements with several local

businesses to purchase the pallets made by Minors and Mentors. (Doc. No. 44-26 at 8

(containing Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s requests for admission)); see also (Doc. No. 44-

28 (LRFC minutes referring to the Liberty Ridge “pallet shop”)). The undisputed evidence of

record further reveals that Liberty Ridge houses Minors “within the ages 12-20.” (Doc. Nos. 44-

8 at 2 (containing the Liberty Ridge Handbook of Standard Operating Procedure); 44-32

(delineating the age of a Minor as twelve (12) in his progress report); see also (Doc. No. 44-28

(LRFC minutes identifying a Minor as celebrating his thirteenth birthday and complimenting his

previous work “in the pallet shop”).) The Court determines that, drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of Defendants and looking at the evidence of record in the light most

favorable to them, Defendants have not presented evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable

finder of fact to conclude that they did not engage in oppressive child labor as defined by the

Secretary of Labor. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence of record confirms that Minors

under the age of fourteen (14) were permitted to work in the “pallet shop” at Liberty Ridge,

which is a clear violation of 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a). Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment on the issue of Defendants’ engagement in oppressive child labor.

6. Whether Defendants Violated the FLSA’s Recordkeeping Provision

In evaluating Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to Defendants’ alleged

violation of the FLSA’s recordkeeping provision, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c), the Court views the record

as a whole and construes all facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant Defendants. To

that end, Defendants concede that they did not keep records for the hours worked by Mentors

and Minors. (Doc. Nos. 44-2 ¶¶ 117–18; 52-1 ¶¶ 117–18.) Defendants merely assert that

“[b]ecause the Mentors and [Minor]s were not employees, Defendants were under no obligation

to maintain records.” (Doc. No. 52 at 3.) However, for the reasons outlined supra, the Court

determines that Mentors and Minors are employees under the FLSA, and it follows that the Court

will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this question because Defendants fail to

raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to their noncompliance with the FLSA’s recordkeeping

provision. The Court next turns to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment before addressing

the issue of Plaintiff’s remedies for Defendants’ FLSA violations.

C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment for two reasons: (1) the

Minors and Mentors are not covered as employees under the FLSA; and (2) the Department of

Labor lacks the authority to pursue this investigation. (Doc. No. 48 at 6–7.)20 As to Defendants’

second argument, the Court notes that Defendants raise the novel argument that Acting Secretary

of Labor Julie A. Su “has no standing or actual authority to bring enforcement actions, especially

if those enforcement actions are predicated upon a policy decision by Ms. Su.” (Doc. No. 48 at

21.) However, on March 11, 2025, Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer was sworn in as the

Secretary of Labor after being confirmed by the United States Senate. See Press Release, Office

of the Secretary, Lori Chavez-DeRemer Sworn in as 30th U.S. Sec’y of Labor (March 11, 2025),

https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osec/osec20250311. Accordingly, Defendants’

argument in this regard is moot, and the Court addresses only Defendants’ argument as to the

Mentors and Minors infra.

1. Minors

As to the Minors, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on two

principal bases: (1) the totality of the circumstances indicates that Minors are student trainees

and not employees; and (2) to designate the Minors as employees violates the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the first issue, the Court has determined supra in

connection with its analysis of Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion that the undisputed facts of

20 Defendants also address willfulness and the appropriate look back period for damages

calculations (Doc. No. 48 at 18–21), which the Court examines infra in the remedies section of

this memorandum.

record support the conclusion that the Minors were employees, not student trainees, for purposes

of the FLSA.21 Accordingly, the Court addresses only Defendants’ due process argument infra.

As an alternative argument, Defendants assert that designating Minors as employees

under the FLSA violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 (Doc. No. 48

at 12.) Defendants maintain that Minors’ parents decided to send Minors to Liberty Ridge to

“learn the necessary skills and structure contemplated by the program as a whole,” which

included vocational and religious training. (Id. at 13.) Defendants rely on several Supreme

Court cases dealing with compulsory education laws in arguing that parents have a due process

right to educate their children “in accordance with their beliefs.” (Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205, 232–34 (1972) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments are violated

when a state compels parents to send their children to formal high school) and Pierce v. Soc’y of

the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (finding that a

compulsory education law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to

direct the upbringing of children”).) It follows, according to Defendants, that “failing to allow

21 The Court notes that the analysis differs slightly insofar as in evaluating Defendants’ motion,

the Court views the facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff and in evaluating Plaintiff’s motion, the Court views the facts and draws all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to Defendants. However, given the largely undisputed

nature of the factual record, the Court concludes that whether it views the facts in the light most

favorable to Defendants or to Plaintiff, the same conclusion prevails. Therefore, the Court finds

it unnecessary to repeat the analysis here.

22 The Court also notes that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to

actions of the federal government, while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

applies to state actors.” See Seldomridge v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 24 F. Supp. 3d 425,

432 (M.D. Pa. 2014). The “Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, like the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects ‘liberty’ interests,” see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.

693, 723 n.10 (1976), and the analysis does not change whether the Court assesses Defendants’

arguments under either amendment.

the parents to control the rearing and education of their children in this manner would be an

absolute violation of the Due Process Clause.” (Doc. No. 48 at 14.)

In response, Plaintiff first argues that Defendants’ constitutional argument, insofar as they

assert that the due process rights of the Minors’ parents are infringed upon by classifying the

Minors as employees, is waived because such an argument is an affirmative defense that was not

pleaded. (Doc. No. 53 at 6.) As to the substance of Defendants’ due process argument, Plaintiff

contends that Defendants lack standing to raise such an argument. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff maintains

that “Defendants assert not that paying the Minors wages would violate Defendants’ due process

right, but rather that of the Minors’ parents – but the Minors’ parents are not parties to this matter

and the Defendants have not” sufficiently argued that they have third party standing on behalf of

the Minors’ parents. (Id.) Plaintiff next argues that, even assuming Defendants have standing to

assert the due process defense on behalf of Minors’ parents, Defendants still fail to articulate how

exactly Minors’ parents’ rights would be infringed by requiring Defendants to pay the Minors

minimum wages for their work. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff maintains that “Defendants cite no cases

recognizing a due process right to have ones’ children engage in free labor for a third party.

Defendants are asking this Court to create one and it should not.” (Id. at 19.)

First, the Court observes that “[a]n affirmative defense is an assertion raising new facts

and arguments that, if proven, defeat[s] the plaintiff’s claim even if the allegations in her

complaint are true.” See Sterten v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 479, 482 (E.D. Pa.

2007). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ due process argument is an affirmative

defense because Defendants in effect argue that, even if the Court concludes that the Minors

should be considered employees for purposes of the FLSA, the application of the Due Process

Clause would not permit a finding that Minors were employees. The Court notes that

“[a]ffirmative defenses must be raised as early as practicable, not only to avoid prejudice, but

also to promote judicial economy. If a party has a successful affirmative defense, raising that

defense as early as possible, and permitting a court to rule on it, may terminate the proceedings

at that point without wasting precious legal and judicial resources.” See Robinson v. Johnson,

313 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 218

(3d Cir. 2017) (finding that “[a]n affirmative defense which is neither pleaded as required by

Rule 8(c) nor made the subject of an appropriate motion under Rule 12(b) is waived”) (cleaned

up); Fed R. Civ. P. 8(c) (noting that affirmative defenses must be raised “responding to a

pleading”). However, “affirmative defenses can be raised by motion, at any time (even after

trial), if [the adverse party] suffer[s] no prejudice.” See Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d

494, 506 (3d Cir. 2006).

The Court concludes that Defendants’ failure to plead a due process affirmative defense

renders that affirmative defense waived. On October 31, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

(Doc. No. 9.) In the brief supporting said motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that classifying

them as employers under the FLSA violates their First Amendment rights under the Free

Exercise Clause. (Doc. No. 10 at 7–9.) A due process affirmative defense is not mentioned

anywhere in Defendants’ brief in support of their motion to dismiss, their reply brief (Doc. No.

14) in further support of that motion, nor is it mentioned in Defendants’ answer (Doc. No. 19)

filed after the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendants

argue that their first responsive pleading discussed how “Plaintiff’s lawsuit and request for

injunction infringes on Defendants’ constitutional rights.” (Doc. No. 56 at 2.) This statement

mischaracterizes the nature of Defendants’ responsive pleadings. As discussed supra, Defendants

raised a First Amendment defense in their answer, and first raised their due process argument in

their brief supporting their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is prejudiced by Defendants’

failure to raise this affirmative defense “as early as possible” see Robinson, F.3d at 147, insofar

as Plaintiff did not have “notice and the opportunity to demonstrate why the affirmative defense

should not succeed” see In re Sterten, 546 F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court

concludes that Defendants have waived any due process defense. See Fed R. Civ. P. 8(c) (noting

that affirmative defenses must be raised “responding to a pleading”).

However, even assuming arguendo that Defendants did not waive their due process

affirmative defense, the Court concludes that Defendants lack standing to raise such a defense.

As a general matter, “a litigant ‘must assert his own legal rights and interests, [sic] and cannot

rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” See U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v.

Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for

Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)). “When, however, enforcement of

a restriction against the litigant prevents a third party from entering into a relationship with the

litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship the third party has a legal

entitlement (typically a constitutional entitlement), third-party standing has been held to exist.”

Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720. More generally, “third-party standing requires the satisfaction of three

preconditions: (1) the plaintiff must suffer injury; (2) the plaintiff and the third party must have a

‘close relationship’; and (3) the third party must face some obstacles that prevent it from

pursuing its own claims.” See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc.,

280 F.3d 278, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 n.12 (1975)

(discussing the prudential considerations when “the litigant asserts the rights of third parties

defensively, as a bar to judgment against” them).

In this case, Defendants assert that, if the Court permits Minors to be classified as

employees under the FLSA, thus requiring them to be paid appropriate wages, such a ruling

would impede the due process rights of the Minors’ parents to direct the upbringing of their

children. (Doc. No. 48 at 14.) Defendants do not explain how classifying Minors as employees

would prevent parents from sending their children to Liberty Ridge, or what, if any,

constitutional deprivation the Minors’ parents would suffer. Instead, Defendants assert that it is

their constitutional rights, not the rights of the Minors’ parents, which “would be violated by

Plaintiff’s requested relief.” (Doc. No. 56 at 19.) While Defendants emphasize components of

Anabaptist faith, and cite “congregants, community members, participants, parents, mentors, and

committee members” as being impacted by Plaintiff’s enforcement of the FLSA (id. at 18–19),

the Court finds that Defendants’ assertion of their own constitutional injury is devoid of

evidentiary or factual support.

Furthermore, Defendants offer only a footnote discussing third-party standing and

maintain that they are able to raise a due process defense “where the rights of the parents,

mentors, and those congregants otherwise participating in the mission of Liberty Ridge are at

issue.” (Id. at 19 n.7.) Even assuming Defendants can satisfy the first two preconditions of

third-party standing, the Court finds that Defendants fail to explain what, if any, obstacles the

third-party, in this case the Minors’ parents, face that would impede them from pursuing their

own constitutional claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants do not have third-party

standing to raise this affirmative defense on behalf of Minors’ parents.

However, even if Defendants had not waived their due process affirmative defense and

had standing to raise such a defense in the first place, the Court is unpersuaded by the merits of

Defendants’ position. As an initial matter, “[t]o prevail on a substantive due process claim

challenging a state actor’s conduct, ‘a plaintiff must establish as a threshold matter that he [or

she] has a protected property interest to which the . . . due process protection applies.’” See

Musila v. Lock Haven Univ., 970 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Nicholas v.

Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2000)). Defendants have failed to

provide, on behalf of themselves or the Minors’ parents, any “protected property interest” to

which the Due Process Clause applies. See Musila, 970 F. Supp. at 391. Plaintiff correctly notes

that “Defendants cite no cases recognizing a due process right to have ones’ children engage in

free labor for a third party” (Doc. No. 53 at 19), and the Court has found none. The Third Circuit

has recognized that “[p]arents have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to

raise their children without undue state interference.” See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 150

(3d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases discussing the rights of parents). However, that right is not

unlimited, and to implicate due process, it must be clear that the Government has implemented

some “constraint or compulsion” such that the parents’ rights are impeded. See Anspach ex rel.

Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2007). In this

case, Defendants do not articulate any “constraint or compulsion” see id., which interferes with

the Minors’ parents’ rights to raise their children. As noted supra, Defendants also fail to explain

how the enforcement of the FLSA against them would infringe their own constitutional rights.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated the

applicability of a due process defense on behalf of the Minors as a matter of law, and

accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue. The

Court next evaluates Defendants’ motion as it pertains to the Mentors’ status as employees or

volunteers.

2. Mentors

As an initial matter, for the reasons discussed supra pertaining to Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment on the same issue, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence of record

supports a determination that the Mentors are employees and not volunteers. However, in their

motion for summary judgment, Defendants raise an argument not discussed in their opposition to

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment—whether classifying Mentors as employees violates

the Mentors’ free exercise rights. Accordingly, the Court addresses that defense.

Defendants maintain that Mentors “chose to practice servitude to their Church as part of

their sincerely held religious beliefs,” and it follows that classifying them as employees would

impede their ability to pursue their service driven mission “without government intrusion.”

(Doc. No. 48 at 18.)

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have waived their free exercise defense, but

that even if they have not, they also lack standing to raise this defense. (Doc. No. 53 at 22.)

Plaintiff asserts that, if Mentors were both members of a religious organization and employees,

then perhaps Defendants would have standing to raise a First Amendment defense on their

behalf, but because Defendants argue that the Mentors “are not their employees,” it follows that

Defendants do not have a sufficiently close relationship to Mentors to raise this third-party

defense. (Id.) Plaintiff next maintains that, even if Defendants can raise Mentors’ free exercise

defense, the Supreme Court in Alamo Foundation explained that paying workers FLSA mandated

wages does not violate the free exercise rights of employees. (Id. at 23.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts

that Defendants fail to provide any evidence indicating that a sincere religious belief precluded

the acceptance of wages for work performed by Mentors at Liberty Ridge. (Id.)

As discussed supra, “[a]ffirmative defenses must be raised as early as practicable, not

only to avoid prejudice, but also to promote judicial economy. If a party has a successful

affirmative defense, raising that defense as early as possible, and permitting a court to rule on it,

may terminate the proceedings at that point without wasting precious legal and judicial

resources.” See Robinson, 313 F.3d at 137; see also Moody, 870 F.3d at 218 (finding that “[a]n

affirmative defense which is neither pleaded as required by Rule 8(c) nor made the subject of an

appropriate motion under Rule 12(b) is waived”); Fed R. Civ. P. 8(c) (noting that affirmative

defenses must be raised “responding to a pleading”). “[A]ffirmative defenses can be raised by

motion, at any time (even after trial), if [the adverse party] suffer[s] no prejudice.” Cetel, 460

F.3d at 506. Additionally, “an affirmative defense generally ‘need not be articulated with any

rigorous degree of specificity, and is sufficiently raised for purposes of [Federal] Rule [of Civil

Procedure] 8 by its bare assertion.’” See Moody, 870 F.3d at 218 (citing Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch.

Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Here, in the brief in support of their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No.

10), Defendants raised a free exercise defense (id. at 7–10). However, in that brief, Defendants

asserted a free exercise affirmative defense on their own behalf, not on behalf of the Mentors.

See (id. (stating “[t]hese views adopted by Plaintiff are starkly in violation of Defendants’ First

Amendment right to the free exercise of religion”)). Defendants assert that enforcing the FLSA

“on Defendants would be a clear infringement on their free exercise of religion.” (Id. at 8.) For

the first time in the brief supporting their motion for summary judgment, Defendants allege that

Plaintiff’s enforcement of the FLSA is an attempt to burden “the Mentors’ freedom to exercise

their religious rights.” (Doc. No. 48 at 18.) While this is similar to the argument raised in their

initial motion to dismiss, the Court observes that this is a distinct affirmative defense. Plaintiff is

prejudiced by Defendants’ failure to raise this affirmative defense “as early as possible” see

Robinson, F.3d at 147, insofar as Plaintiff was “specifically deprived . . . of an opportunity to

rebut that defense or to alter her litigation strategy accordingly,” see In re Sterten, 546 F.3d at

285, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), Defendants have waived their third-

party free exercise affirmative defense on behalf of Mentors.

However, even assuming arguendo that Defendants did not waive this defense, the Court

concludes that Defendants lack standing to raise this free exercise defense on the Mentors’

behalf. In the brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that

“any attempts to burden the Mentors’ freedom to exercise their religious rights is an egregious

violation of the First Amendment.” (Doc. No. 48 at 18.) The Court reiterates that, as a general

matter, “a litigant ‘must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to

relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720. “When,

however, enforcement of a restriction against the litigant prevents a third party from entering into

a relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship the

third party has a legal entitlement (typically a constitutional entitlement), third-party standing has

been held to exist.” Id. More generally, “third-party standing requires the satisfaction of three

preconditions: (1) the plaintiff must suffer injury; (2) the plaintiff and the third party must have a

‘close relationship’; and (3) the third party must face some obstacles that prevent it from

pursuing its own claims.” See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc., 280 F.3d at 288–89.

In arguing that they have third-party standing to raise this free exercise defense,

Defendants essentially reiterate the arguments discussed supra related to their contention that

they have third-party standing to raise a due process defense on behalf of the Minors’ parents.

The Court again finds that Defendants fail to explain how requiring them to pay Mentors the

appropriate wages under the FLSA would prevent Mentors (the third party) from entering into a

contractual relationship with Defendants. See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720. More broadly, the Court

finds that Defendants do not explain how the third party, in this instance the Mentors, “face some

obstacles that prevent it from pursuing its own claims.” See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc., 280

F.3d at 288–89. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants do not have standing to raise a free

exercise defense on behalf of the Mentors.

However, even if Defendants had not waived this defense and had standing to raise such

a defense in the first place, the Court is unpersuaded by the merits of Defendants’ position. As

the Supreme Court stated in Alamo Foundation, requiring a religious employer to pay laborers

does not “interfere” with the laborers “right to freely exercise their religious beliefs,” because

“there is nothing in the [FLSA] to prevent the associates from returning the amounts to the

[employer], provided that they do so voluntarily.” See Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 304–05.

Defendants also fail to explain how their free exercise rights would be impeded if they are

required to pay workers appropriate wages under the FLSA.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated the

applicability of a fair exercise defense on behalf of the Mentors as a matter of law and will

therefore deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue. Having concluded that

Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on its FLSA claims against Defendants and that

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be denied, the Court turns to the issue of the

appropriate remedies in this case.

D. Remedies

Because the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the questions

of whether: (1) Defendant Mennonite Mission is a covered enterprise engaged in commerce

pursuant to the FLSA; (2) Defendant Martin is jointly liable as an employer pursuant to the

FLSA; (3) Mentors and Minors are employees pursuant to the FLSA; (4) Defendants’ employees

are entitled to minimum wages pursuant to the FLSA; (5) Defendants’ employees are entitled to

overtime wages pursuant to the FLSA; (6) Defendants engaged in oppressive child labor; and (7)

Defendants violated the FLSA’s recordkeeping provision, and will deny Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, the Court must assess the appropriate remedies for Defendants’ violations.

The Court first determines the appropriate statute of limitations for the calculation of damages,

and evaluates Plaintiff’s damage calculation formula, before assessing Plaintiff’s entitlement to

liquidated damages and injunctive relief.

1. Willfulness

As a general matter, the statute of limitations for the initiation of claims for “unpaid

minimum wages” and “unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages” is two (2) years.

See 29 U.S.C. § 255. However, the statute expressly provides that, when a cause of action arises

from a “willful violation” of the FLSA, the statute of limitations increases to three (3) years. See

id. An employer willfully violates the FLSA when they “either knew or showed reckless

disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” See McLaughlin

v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). Further, a claimant need not show that the

employer acted egregiously to establish the employer’s willfulness. See Stone v. Troy Constr.,

LLC, 935 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing how “Supreme Court case law and our own

precedent counsel against a standard for willfulness that requires a showing of egregiousness”).

However, “[a]cting only ‘unreasonably’ is insufficient—some degree of actual awareness is

necessary.” See Souryavong v. Lackawanna County, 872 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation

omitted). Although willfulness is generally a question of fact, it can be treated as a question of

law where “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the

non-moving party.” See Fusion, 548 F. Supp. 3d at 527 (quoting id.).

In the instant case, Plaintiff pursues three (3) years of liquidated damages, for the years

2019 through May of 2022, thus requiring her to demonstrate that Defendants willfully violated

the FLSA. (Doc. No. 1); see also Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. at 135 (discussing that “to obtain

the benefit of the 3–year exception, the Secretary must prove that the employer’s conduct was

willful” in discussing the FLSA look back period). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have

conceded that they took no steps to learn whether Minors and Mentors were entitled to

appropriate wages under the FLSA, and further maintains that “[g]enerating revenue from forced

child labor and simply assuming the law did not apply to them is, at best, [a] reckless disregard

of the FLSA.” (Doc. No. 44 at 27–28.) Finally, Plaintiff maintains that Liberty Ridge’s decision

to pay some, but not all, employees a salary for their work is indicative of their willful disregard

of the FLSA. (Id. at 28.)

In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to show that they acted in a voluntary,

deliberate, or intentional way, so as to establish their willfulness. (Doc. No. 52 at 11.)

Defendants maintain that the only reason Plaintiff pursues liquidated damages is because

Defendants “did not choose to pay the initial amount sought” by Plaintiff when she initiated this

action. (Id.)

Upon consideration of the foregoing and viewing the record evidence in the light most

favorable to Defendants as the non-moving party, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment as to Defendants’ willfulness. To reiterate, an employer willfully violates the

FLSA when they “either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct

was prohibited by the statute.” See Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. at 133. In this case, the

undisputed evidence indicates that Defendants did not consult with “any individuals or third

parties, including accountants, attorneys, and representatives of other business” pertaining to

their FLSA obligations. (Doc. No. 44-9 at 4.) Additionally, in December of 2021, Defendants

were informed by the Department of Labor that they needed to pay workers “fair wages” and yet

Mentors indicated that, even after being so informed, Defendants continued to pay them only a

monthly stipend far below the appropriate wage total based on their hours worked. (Doc. Nos.

44-35 (LRFC meeting minutes noting “Department of Labor (DOL) comments” that “[w]orkers

need to be paid fair wages” and “[t]hey will further investigate LRF regarding their concerns”);

44-41 (records of Mentor interviews with Department of Labor Investigator Christopher

Harvey); 44-42 (Declaration of Christopher Harvey).) The Court finds that Defendants’

continued failure to pay appropriate wages, even after being informed by the Department of

Labor that they needed to make such payments, accompanied by their failure to take steps to

ascertain their FLSA obligations, demonstrates that Defendants cannot meet their burden of

establishing a genuine dispute of material fact on the question of whether they showed a

“reckless disregard” for the FLSA. See Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. at 133. Accordingly, the

Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to Defendants’ willful violations of

FLSA, thus permitting a three-year statutory lookback period.23

2. Calculation of Appropriate Damages

Considering the Court’s finding supra that Defendants failed to accurately keep records of

Mentor and Minor hours worked, the Court next determines whether to grant summary judgment

as to Plaintiff’s calculation of the appropriate back wages. To that end,

[i]n the absence of adequate employer records of employees’ wages and hours, as

required by the FLSA, the solution is not to penalize the employees by denying

recovery based on an inability to prove the extent of undercompensated work, but

rather to allow the employee or the Secretary to submit sufficient evidence from

23 Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the issue

of Defendants’ willfulness, it will necessarily deny Defendants’ motion on this point.

which violations of the Act and the amount of an award may be reasonably inferred.

See Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s burden is “merely to

present a prima facie case,” and the Court may award damages even if the total “may only be

approximate.” See Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 701 (3d Cir. 1994). Plaintiff must

provide evidence that the employees have “in fact performed work for which [they were]

improperly compensated and . . . to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just

and reasonable inference.” See id. If Plaintiff satisfies her burden, the burden shifts to

Defendants to rebut that inference by coming forward “with evidence of the precise amount of

work performed or with evidence to negat[e] the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn

from the [claimant]’s evidence.” See Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 1297 (citing Anderson v. Mt.

Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946)).

In support of her position that the Court can reasonably infer the amount of back wages

owed at six hundred and sixty-nine thousand, six hundred and seven dollars and eighty-three

cents ($669,607.83), Plaintiff asserts that the evidence of record shows that Minors worked for

four (4) to seven (7) hours daily in furtherance of Defendants’ commercial pursuits, and further

that Mentors and Minors worked, in some capacity, nearly every day besides Sunday. (Doc. No.

44 at 29.) Plaintiff maintains that she looked at Defendants’ admissions, estimated that Minors

worked thirty (30) hours per week, then multiplied those hours worked by the minimum wage to

calculate the appropriate weekly Minors’ salary. (Id. at 30.) Plaintiff further asserts that she

conducted a similar calculation for the Mentors, basing the estimated back wages owed on a

sixty-five and a half (65.5) hour workweek, and calculating both minimum wage and overtime in

accordance with that hour estimation. (Id.) Plaintiff notes that she subtracted the two-hundred

and fifty (250) dollar stipends received by Mentors when calculating Mentor back pay. (Id.)

Plaintiff accordingly argues that, because Defendants have not kept any records, it follows that

they cannot rebut Plaintiff’s inference of the appropriate back wages owed. (Id. at 31–32.)

Defendants do not offer any arguments opposing Plaintiff’s position.

Upon consideration of the foregoing, the Court determines that summary judgment as to

the reasonably inferred calculation of back wages is proper. Plaintiff provides the Court with a

detailed explanation of how she calculated the estimated back wages, which involved analyzing

Defendants’ admissions, interviews with Mentors, and deposition testimony. (Doc. No. 44 at 29–

32.) The Court determines that Plaintiff has pointed to record evidence establishing a “prima

facie” case, as well as “evidence that the employees have ‘in fact performed work for which

[they were] improperly compensated.’” See Reich, 13 F.3d at 701; see also (Doc. No. 44 at 29–

30 (discussing Defendants’ request for admissions, depositions, and Minor interviews, and

including citations to PSUMF and the evidence of record)). Additionally, because Defendants do

not make any attempt to refute Plaintiff’s estimated back wages owed, the Court determines that

Defendants cannot meet their burden to rebut Plaintiff’s reasonably inferred calculation. To that

end, upon review of the record evidence and construing all facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving Defendants, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this

question.

3. Liquidated Damages

The award of liquidated damages is mandatory under the FLSA, should a plaintiff

prevail. See 29 U.S.C. § 260. To avoid liquidated damages, “an employer must show that it

acted in good faith and that it had reasonable grounds for believing that it was not violating the

Act.” See Sec’y United States Dep’t of Lab. v. Am. Future Sys., Inc., 873 F.3d 420, 433 (3d Cir.

2017). “The good faith requirement is ‘a subjective one that requires that the employer have an

honest intention to ascertain and follow the dictates of the Act.’” Id. (citing Martin v. Cooper

Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1991)). However, the reasonableness inquiry is

objective, insofar as the employer must provide evidence permitting a reasonable finder of fact to

conclude that that the employer objectively believed they complied with the FLSA. See

Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing the objective nature of the

reasonableness inquiry). The Third Circuit has held that “a defendant employer bears the ‘plain

and substantial’ burden of proving he is entitled to discretionary relief from the FLSA’s

mandatory liquidated damages provision” which generally requires an employer to show that “he

took affirmative steps to ascertain the Act’s requirements, but nonetheless, violated its

provisions.” See Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d at 907–08. Defendants bear a heavy burden

because upon a finding of liability, “[d]ouble damages are the norm, single damages the

exception.” See id. at 908 (citing Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th

Cir. 1986)).

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment as to the issue of Defendants’

lack of good faith compliance with the FLSA. (Doc. No. 44 at 33–34.) Plaintiff asserts that

Defendants cannot and have not shown any affirmative steps taken to ensure that they

understood their FLSA responsibilities, simply assuming that because they operated as a

religious 501(c)(3), then they did not have to pay workers. (Id. at 33.) Plaintiff maintains that

Defendants’ admission that they “took no steps” to ensure compliance “makes liquidated

damages mandatory in this case.” (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants also

cannot demonstrate that their belief—that they had no FLSA obligations—was objectively

reasonable. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that no reasonable employer could believe that having

Mentors, who effectively worked “almost every waking hour,” earn only two-hundred and fifty

dollar ($250) monthly stipends was legally sufficient. (Id. at 34.)

In response, Defendants argue that they reasonably believed that Mentors and Minors

were not covered by the FLSA. (Doc. No. 52 at 12.) Defendants cite their status as a religiously

affiliated non-profit in arguing that they genuinely believed that FLSA did not apply to them or

those who worked at Liberty Ridge. (Id.)

Upon review of the record evidence and construing all facts in the light most favorable to

the non-moving Defendants, the Court determines that Defendants fail to raise a genuine dispute

of material fact on the issue of their lack of subjective good faith or objective reasonableness in

failing to comply with the FLSA. First, as it pertains to good faith, the Court determines that

Defendants have not cited sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable finder of fact to conclude

that they subjectively believed that their actions complied with the FLSA. See Am. Future Sys.,

Inc., 873 F.3d at 433 (discussing how an employer must have “an honest intention to ascertain

and follow the dictates” of the FLSA). There is nothing in the record indicating that Defendants

attempted to contact anyone at the Department of Labor, nor did Defendants consult with “any

individuals or third parties, including accountants, attorneys, and representatives of other

business” pertaining to their FLSA obligations. (Doc. No. 44-9 at 4.)

However, even if Defendants could satisfy their burden of demonstrating subjective good

faith, the Court further determines that Defendants have failed to present evidence that they

objectively believed that they were complying with the FLSA. As discussed supra, the

reasonableness inquiry requires an employer to provide evidence permitting a reasonable finder

of fact to conclude that that the employer objectively believed they complied with the FLSA.

See Brunner, 668 F.2d at 753. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Defendants,

the Court still determines that Defendants have not carried their burden. The evidence of record

indicates that, even after being informed by the Department of Labor that they needed to pay

workers “fair wages,” Mentors indicated that Defendants continued to only pay them a monthly

stipend far below the appropriate wage total would be based on their hours worked. (Doc. Nos.

44-35 (LRFC meeting minutes noting that “Department of Labor (DOL) comments” that

“[w]orkers need to be paid fair wages” and “[t]hey will further investigate LRF regarding their

concerns”); 44-41 (Mentor interviews with Department of Labor Investigator Christopher

Harvey); 44-42 (Declaration of Christopher Harvey).) Accordingly, because Defendants have

not met their burden, and observing that “[d]ouble damages are the norm, single damages the

exception,” see Cooper, F.2d at 908 (citation omitted), the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment on the question of Plaintiff’s entitlement to liquidated damages in the amount

of six hundred and sixty-nine thousand, six hundred and seven dollars and eighty-three cents24

($669,667.83).25

4. Injunctive Relief

The question of whether injunctive relief is warranted “rests within the Court’s sound

discretion.” See Walsh v. E. Penn Mfg. Co., 555 F. Supp. 3d 89, 137 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (citing 29

U.S.C. § 517). “Factors that district courts consider in deciding whether to issue an injunction

include the employer’s past conduct, current conduct, and, most importantly, whether the

24 Defendants’ total backpay owed is as follows: six hundred and sixty-nine thousand, six

hundred and seven dollars and eighty-three cents ($669,607.83) in minimum wage and overtime

back wages for Mentors and Minors and six hundred and sixty-nine thousand, six hundred and

seven dollars and eighty-three cents ($669,607.83) in liquidated damages, for a total of one

million, three hundred and thirty-nine thousand, two-hundred and fifteen dollars and sixty-six

cents ($1,339,215.66).

25 Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the issue

of liquidated damages, it will necessarily deny Defendants’ motion on this point.

employer can be counted on to comply with the FLSA in the future.” Mosluoglu, Inc., 2023 WL

5972044, at *5 (citing Solis, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 815). Accordingly, the Court may permanently

enjoin Defendants from violating the FLSA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 517. “Some courts have

recognized that FLSA violations should be enjoined when the court is not fully convinced that a

recurrence of the violation is not probable.” Solis, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 815.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ behavior reflects an ongoing disregard for labor laws

and cruelty towards children. (Doc. No. 44 at 35.) Plaintiff maintains that Defendants: (1)

forced children deemed “troubled” to work in “furtherance of their commercial activities;” (2)

punished these children if they did not comply with rules or work at a sufficient pace; (3) paid

Mentors substandard wages, despite being forced to work roughly six (6) days per week; and (4)

were aware of the Department of Labor’s investigation and still chose not to pay workers

appropriate wages. (Id. at 34–35.)

The Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that permanent injunctive relief is

warranted here. In undertaking this inquiry, the Court considers “the employer’s past conduct,

current conduct, and, most importantly, whether the employer can be counted on to comply with

the FLSA in the future.” See Mosluoglu, Inc., 2023 WL 5972044, at *5. Here, the employer’s

past conduct is troublesome. While the Court need not recite facts that have been repeated

throughout this memorandum, the Court finds most telling the fact that, after the Department of

Labor informed Defendants that they needed to pay workers “fair wages,” Defendants continued

to pay Mentors only a monthly stipend far below the appropriate wage total based on their hours

worked, according to several Mentors. (Doc. Nos. 44-35 (LRFC meeting minutes noting that

“Department of Labor (DOL) comments” that “[w]orkers need to be paid fair wages” and “[t]hey

will further investigate LRF regarding their concerns”); 44-41 (Mentor interviews with

Department of Labor Investigator Christopher Harvey); 44-42 (Declaration of Christopher

Harvey).) The Court also reiterates that, as discussed supra, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment as to Defendants’ engagement in oppressive child labor because

Defendants failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on that issue. Thus, viewing all

evidence in the light most favorable to Defendants, the Court concludes that, in light of their

open defiance of the Department of Labor’s investigation, Defendants cannot “be counted on to

comply with the FLSA in the future.” See Mosluoglu, Inc., 2023 WL 5972044, at *5.

Accordingly, injunctive relief is warranted here, and the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion on

this issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

and will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane

Yvette Kane, District Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania