The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 2025
11:26 AM
In re CARICO/SMITH, Minors.
No. 376009
Hillsdale Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-000805-NA
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and GARRETT and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order assuming jurisdiction over the minor
children, SC, LC, JC, AS1, and AS2, under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (failure to provide proper care and
custody due to neglect) and (b)(2) (unfitness of parental home). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2024, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition
requesting that the trial court exercise jurisdiction over the children—who ranged in age from
approximately 14 years old to a few weeks old—and remove them from respondent’s care.1 DHHS
alleged substance abuse by respondent, as well as neglect by respondent toward the children.
DHHS alleged that AS2, who had been prematurely born a few weeks prior, had been born positive
for methamphetamine and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and that respondent admitted to drug use,
including while pregnant with AS2. DHHS also alleged that respondent failed to take AS2 to
medical appointments following her birth and that AS2 was eventually admitted to the hospital
because she had lost nearly a pound due to insufficient feedings and had developed various
infections. Regarding the other children, DHHS alleged that AS1 had serious dental issues that
had been left untreated; SC had cuts on her arm that appeared to be self-inflicted; JC, who had a
1
The legal father of LC, JC, AS1, and AS2 was initially named as a respondent in the petition but
was subsequently removed as one later in the proceedings. The legal father of SC was deceased
at the time that DHHS filed the petition. Neither is a party to this appeal.
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rare degenerative condition, had not been taken to doctors in Michigan;2 and LC and SC were
truant. DHHS also alleged unsafe living conditions, particularly as it related to AS2, stating that
respondent, on multiple occasions, had left AS2 unattended as AS2 slept on loose blankets.
The trial court issued an ex parte order immediately removing AS2 from respondent’s
custody and placing her into protective custody under the supervision of DHHS, and the court
conducted an emergency removal hearing to determine whether removal of the other children was
appropriate. Following that hearing, the court determined that removal was necessary because
respondent’s home environment presented a substantial risk of harm to the children’s lives,
physical health, and mental well-being. JC, LC, and AS1 were placed in their father’s care, and
SC was placed in a foster home under the supervision of DHHS.3 Following a preliminary hearing
regarding the alleged circumstances, the trial court authorized the petition.
The trial court presided over a nine-hour adjudication bench trial in April 2025. During
the trial, the court received voluminous documentary evidence and testimony from numerous
witnesses, several of whom were qualified as expert witnesses, regarding the alleged facts and
circumstances that gave rise to DHHS’s petition. At the close of proofs, the court concluded that
a preponderance of the evidence supported the exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
and (2). The court thereafter entered an order of adjudication assuming jurisdiction over all five
children that was consistent with the court’s findings on the record and, following a dispositional
hearing, entered an initial dispositional order requiring respondent to comply with a case service
plan provided by DHHS. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by exercising jurisdiction over the
children because DHHS failed to establish a statutory basis for jurisdiction. “Whether a trial court
can assert jurisdiction over a child protective proceeding is a question of law that we review de
novo.” In re Hull, 345 Mich App 562, 567; 7 NW3d 114 (2023). “Challenges to the court’s
decision to exercise jurisdiction are reviewed for clear error in light of the court’s finding of fact.”
In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 371973); slip
op at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
2
Respondent and the children had intermittently lived in Michigan and in Indiana with
respondent’s parents.
3
After the removal hearing, JC was immediately released to his father due to the father’s
experience caring for JC’s extensive needs for nearly JC’s entire life. SC, LC, and AS1,
meanwhile, were initially placed in a temporary foster home. LC and AS1 subsequently joined JC
in their father’s care, where they remained for the remainder of the proceedings, but SC remained
in a foster home throughout the proceedings because she was not related to the other children’s
father and expressly stated that she preferred to remain in a foster home rather than be placed in
his care.
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regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. at ___; slip op at 3
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
To properly exercise jurisdiction, the trial court must find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that at least one statutory basis for jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b) exists. Id. at ___;
slip op at 2-3. “A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that, when weighed with that evidence
opposed to it, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth.” Id. at ___; slip op
at 3 (cleaned up). When determining whether jurisdiction exists, “the trial court must examine the
child’s situation at the time the petition was filed because MCL 712A.2(b) speaks in the present
tense.” In re Leach, 347 Mich App 26, 32; 14 NW3d 178 (2023) (cleaned up).
A court may exercise jurisdiction over a child under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) when the child’s
parent, “when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education,
medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals,” or when the child “is
subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being[.]” The court may exercise
jurisdiction over a child under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) when the child’s “home or environment, by
reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent . . . is an
unfit place for the juvenile to live in.” For both jurisdictional bases, “neglect” means:
harm to a child’s health or welfare by a person responsible for the child’s health or
welfare that occurs through negligent treatment, including the failure to provide
adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so,
or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable means to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care. [MCL 722.602(1)(d); see also MCL
712A.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2).]
As noted, at the conclusion of the adjudication bench trial, the trial court in this case
concluded that DHHS established by a preponderance of the evidence that statutory grounds for
jurisdiction existed under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The court found that, although respondent
was able to provide proper care for her children and had done so in the past, she had relapsed into
methamphetamine use and, as a result, had neglected her children’s needs. The court found that
respondent neglected AS2’s medical needs, emphasizing that AS2 had lost “a significant amount
of weight” and developed infections in the weeks following her birth, but respondent had
repeatedly failed “to get [AS2] to the additional appointments that she needed.” The court also
found that there was “just no question” that respondent neglected SC’s and LC’s educational needs,
noting that both children were “legally truant” based on the significant number of school days they
had missed in the 2024 fall semester. The court found that while respondent did not make “a bad
choice by having [SC] help” care for the other children, it was not appropriate for 14-year-old SC
to act as “the primary” parent for an extended period of time, particularly at the expense of her
own educational needs.
The trial court also found that respondent’s home environment was an unfit place for the
children to live due to respondent’s criminality and neglect of AS2’s, SC’s, and LC’s needs. The
court found that respondent’s neglect of SC’s and LC’s educational needs also constituted
“criminality” because, although respondent “wasn’t charged,” it was a criminal “misdemeanor . . .
for not making sure your children are in school.” The court also found that “there [wa]s zero
question that [respondent] was using methamphetamine” because the documentary and testimonial
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evidence clearly established that respondent had used methamphetamine while pregnant with AS2
and had tested positive for methamphetamine in the months preceding the adjudication trial. The
court further found—by nearly “clear and convincing” evidence given “the level of experts in
terms of testimony”—that respondent’s drug use presented a substantial risk of harm to all of the
children. The court stated that it was “concerned significantly” about AS2’s safety because,
although an average parent “might be able to . . . keep[] a close eye on [his or her] baby” when the
baby is loosely wrapped in blankets, those “unsafe sleep . . . practices” coupled with “an individual
who is testing positive for substances” is “a recipe for disaster.” The court was also very concerned
about the children’s “unintentional exposure to possible methamphetamine” because respondent
was using methamphetamine and there was evidence of drug use found in respondent’s basement.
The court also stated that it was “leaning heavily on the fact [that] evidence of how one child is
treated in the State of Michigan is used as how evidence [sic] of all children are treated.”
The record is consistent with these findings. Regarding respondent’s medical neglect of
AS2, testimony and medical reports established that respondent had not received any prenatal care
until she was 29 weeks pregnant and that AS2 had been born premature at 36 weeks with
methamphetamine and THC in her system. Multiple witnesses, including respondent, testified that
she had missed at least three follow-up appointments for AS2 scheduled after her birth. The
documentary and testimonial evidence also established that, during the weeks of these missed
appointments, AS2 had lost nearly one pound, which was a concerning amount of weight for a
newborn. Respondent’s friend testified that, when she visited respondent’s home a few weeks
after AS2’s birth, AS2 “had a grayish tinge to her skin” and “didn’t act like a normal baby.” AS2’s
weight loss and unhealthy appearance resulted in a “failure to thrive diagnosis” and required AS2
to be readmitted to the hospital for close observation and treatment. AS2’s treating physicians
testified that AS2’s weight loss was due to insufficient feedings and that she was able to regain the
weight she had lost when she was consistently fed each day.
Regarding the unsafe home environment and safe-sleep concerns related to AS2,
respondent’s friend testified that, during her visit with respondent and AS2, respondent “was
around” but had “just sat [AS2] on the couch” on top of a loose throw blanket. The Children’s
Protective Services (CPS) investigator involved in this case similarly testified that she had
observed AS2 lying on loose blankets on the couch while respondent was “outside smoking a
cigarette” where “[i]t wouldn’t have been possible” for her to see AS2. The CPS investigator had
also determined that AS2 was typically sleeping in a wooden bassinet filled with loose blankets,
which was “not [a] safe sleep” practice because AS2 could become tangled in the blankets.
Regarding respondent’s educational neglect of LC and SC, secretaries at LC’s and SC’s
schools testified that students were reported as truant if they missed more than 10 days in any given
semester and that LC and SC had, respectively, missed 13 days and 25 days of school in the 2024
fall semester. Respondent’s friend, who had temporarily cared for some of the children after their
removal, testified that SC “was kept out of school several times” to care for JC and AS1. SC also
testified that she began missing school after AS2 was born to help care for her siblings because
respondent and the children “didn’t have enough stability at that point . . . to take care of a newborn
baby on [their] own.” Although respondent testified that SC was enrolled in an online Indiana
school during this time, there was no testimony or documentary evidence demonstrating that SC
was enrolled in that school, and the secretary at SC’s Michigan school testified that SC was still
enrolled there at the time of the adjudication trial. The CPS investigator testified that she
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confirmed that SC was not enrolled in an online school and that even if she was, she did not have
a laptop to participate in an online school.
Finally, regarding respondent’s drug use, the father of LC, JC, AS1, and AS2 testified that,
while visiting respondent’s home, he found some foil with a substance on it that he believed was
methamphetamine in respondent’s basement, and the CPS investigator testified that respondent
“would not allow access to” the basement during a house visit. There was testimony that the
children typically did not go into the basement, but there was no testimony indicating that the
children were forbidden from doing so, and the children’s former babysitter testified that the
basement was generally accessible to them. Indeed, SC testified that the only room in the house
that she and her siblings were not allowed to enter was their “grandparents’ room,” which was
locked to prevent them from entering. Respondent’s friend testified that she believed that
respondent had been using methamphetamine since around the time of AS2’s birth because, as a
former methamphetamine user, she “used to have the same mannerisms” that respondent was
exhibiting at that time, including extreme agitation, “biting her cheek,” and “constant[ly]
moving . . . her jaw.” And although respondent denied using methamphetamine before, during, or
after AS2’s birth, the CPS investigator testified that respondent had admitted to using THC and
methamphetamine around that time. Additionally, expert testimony and toxicology reports
established that AS2 had been born positive for methamphetamine and THC on November 24,
2024, and that respondent had tested positive for methamphetamine on January 16, 2025, and again
on March 6, 2025, which was approximately six weeks before the adjudication trial.
Although the trial court’s findings regarding medical neglect were related to AS2 and its
findings regarding educational neglect educational neglect were related to LC and SC, the court
believed that this neglect was largely due to respondent’s drug use and, as a result, that JC and
AS1 would also be neglected if left in respondent’s care.4 “[T]he doctrine of anticipatory neglect
allows an inference that a parent’s treatment of one child is probative of how that parent may treat
other children” such that the doctrine “may apply to confer jurisdiction.” In re Kellogg, 331 Mich
App 249, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020). Although the children varied in age and therefore varied in
needs, see generally id., all of the children lived with respondent in her home and exclusively relied
on her for all of their needs. And although the court was unwilling to expressly find that respondent
had neglected JC’s and AS1’s medical needs, there was still testimony establishing: that AS1 had
significant dental issues impacting her ability to eat, as well as what appeared to be a thrush
infection in her mouth, for which respondent had not sought treatment; that respondent often relied
4
Respondent argues on appeal that drug use alone, without any evidence of harm to the children,
is an insufficient basis for a court to assume jurisdiction over child. See In re Richardson, 329
Mich App 232, 255; 961 NW2d 499 (2019) (stating that, in the context of termination of parental
rights, there must be facts in the record sufficiently demonstrating that the parent’s drug use is
“actually harming or presenting an articulable risk of harm to the child”). As discussed above,
however, the trial court in this case did not assume jurisdiction based solely on the fact of
respondent’s drug use. Rather, as the trial court found, respondent’s drug use directly impaired
both her ability to parent and the children’s health and well-being, resulting in neglect as well as
AS2 being born with THC and methamphetamine in her system.
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on then-13-year-old SC to care for JC, who was nonverbal and required a specific diet and an at-
home physical therapy routine due to his degenerative condition; and that, shortly after JC was
removed from respondent’s care, he refused to eat anything other than unhealthy foods that were
outside of his specific diet. Thus, the doctrine of anticipatory neglect further supports the trial
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over all the children. See id.
Resisting this conclusion on appeal, respondent emphasizes portions of the record evidence
that she believes weigh against the assumption of jurisdiction. The trial court, however, was tasked
with determining, based on the entirety of the record before it, whether a preponderance of the
evidence established at least one statutory basis for jurisdiction. Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App
at ___; slip op at 2-3. For the reasons discussed, ample record evidence supported the trial court’s
determination that jurisdiction over the children was warranted under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2),
and respondent has failed to show reversible error in that determination.5
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
5
In finding that assumption of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) was warranted, the trial court
observed that respondent had exposed the children to domestic violence in her home. Although
the record reflects that LC reported that she had, on multiple occasions, witnessed her father and
respondent engaged in instances of domestic violence against each other while SC kept JC and
AS1 upstairs, the record also reflects that LC’s father moved out of respondent’s home in March
2024 and that no domestic-violence incidents between them occurred after then. There was also
no evidence that respondent engaged in domestic violence with any of the children or any other
romantic partner she may have had since that time. It is thus clear from the record that respondent’s
home had been free of domestic violence for approximately nine months at the time that DHHS
filed its petition in December 2024. Because the children were not exposed to domestic violence
at the time that the petition was filed, it was error for the court to rely on these instances of domestic
violence as a basis for its findings under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). See Leach, 347 Mich App at 32. For
the reasons discussed above, however, the trial court’s other findings under MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
and (2) were more than adequate in themselves to support the court’s assumption of jurisdiction,
rendering this error harmless. See MCR 3.902(A); MCR 2.613(A).
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