Com. v. Giannopoulos, H.

J-A22016-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

HARALAMBOS GIANNOPOULOS :

:

Appellant : No. 255 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-23-CR-0006246-2018

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 17, 2025

Haralambos Giannopoulos (“Giannopoulos”) appeals from the judgment

of sentence imposed following his convictions for two counts of involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) with a person less than sixteen years of

age, one count each of unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault of a

person less than sixteen years of age, and corruption of minors, 1 as well as

the trial court’s determination that he is a sexually violent predator (“SVP”)

pursuant to the Pennsylvania Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(“SORNA”).2 We affirm.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), 6301(a)(1).

2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.75. We note that the Legislature has

amended SORNA several times. Relevantly, through Act 10, as amended by

Act 29 (“SORNA II”), the Legislature divided sex offenses into two

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We glean the following factual history from the testimony and evidence

presented at trial. On the evening of February 17, 2017, twelve-year-old S.B.

snuck away from her home in Chichester, Pennsylvania to meet her thirteen-

year-old friend, Z.H., under the assumption that they were going to go see a

movie. As neither girl was old enough to drive, Z.H. arrived to meet S.B. in a

vehicle driven by her thirty-two-year-old cousin, Giannopoulos — an individual

S.B. had never met before. When S.B. entered the vehicle, however,

Giannopoulos did not drive her and Z.H. to the movies, as planned, but instead

took them “for a ride[.]” N.T., 11/15/22, at 52. Giannopoulos believed it was

“pretty obvious at the time that [S.B.] was about the same age as” Z.H. N.T.,

11/16/22, at 175-76. Approximately “five minutes” into this ride, Z.H. turned

the volume up on the radio and remarked that she “really like[d]” the song

that was playing, and that she could “twerk to it.” N.T., 11/15/22, at 98.

When S.B. playfully responded that she could “twerk better than” Z.H.,

Giannopoulos “reache[d] around” while he was driving, “touched [S.B.’s]

thigh[,]” and stated that he’d “like to see that.” Id.

The ride ultimately “ended up” at Giannopoulos’ house in Springfield,

Pennsylvania, which he shared with his parents. Id. at 52-54, 155-56. After

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subchapters: Subchapter H, which applies to sexually violent offenses

committed on or after December 20, 2012, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-

9799.42; and Subchapter I, which applies to an individual who committed a

sexually violent offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20,

2012, and whose period of registration or registration requirements under a

former sexual offender registration law have not expired, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9799.51-9799.75. Here, because Giannopoulos committed the underlying

offenses in 2017, Subchapter H applies.

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exiting the vehicle, Giannopoulos directed both S.B. and Z.H. to a side-

entrance to the home that led directly to his room in the basement, all the

while instructing them to “be quiet because he didn’t want his mom to know

[they] were” there. Id. “[F]or a good while” after entering the basement,

S.B. and Z.H. spent their time “on [their] phones” and “just sitting there.” Id.

at 55. Eventually, Giannopoulos expressed that he was “mad that [they] were

on [their] phones[,]” and took S.B.’s phone from her and “put [it] in the

drawer.” Id. at 55, 163. Giannopoulos did not similarly confiscate Z.H.’s

phone, as the three instead began “playing [and] messing around[.]” Id. at

55.

As the evening went on, and S.B. became increasingly tired, she would

often recline on Giannopoulos’ bed. Although Z.H. would sometimes join S.B.

by “sit[ting] on the end of the bed” throughout the evening, she was otherwise

“going in and out of the room a lot.” Id. On one such occasion when Z.H.

had exited the room, Giannopoulos “went and locked the door[,]” returned to

sit down on his bed, and told S.B., who was at that point standing nearby,

“oh, you can suck my dick.” Id. at 56. Although S.B. indicated that she did

not want to do so, Giannopoulos “pulled his pants down[,] grabbed [her] by

the back of [her] head, pulled [her] closer” and made her “suck his penis.”

Id. at 56-57. Afterwards, Giannopoulos told her “over and over again[,]” that

they didn’t “have to tell [Z.H. about it] if [she] didn’t want to.” Id. at 56.

When Z.H. returned to the basement, neither S.B. nor Giannopoulos informed

her of the preceding events; instead, S.B. “went into the bathroom” and

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indicated to Z.H. that she “was going to cut” herself — an act which Z.H.

thereafter talked her out of doing.3 Id. at 58.

Throughout the remainder of the night, the three of them would

occasionally rest together on Giannopoulos’ bed, with S.B. lying in between

Z.H. and Giannopoulos. On one of these occasions, Giannopoulos started

“kissing and making out” with S.B., regardless of the fact that Z.H. was right

next to them. Id. at 130. When Giannopoulos eventually left the room, S.B.

informed Z.H. about the kissing and stated that it was “nasty[,]” to which Z.H.

simply responded “eww.” Id. at 130-31. On another such occasion, while

S.B. was turned towards and “playing footsies” with Z.H., who was on her

phone, Giannopoulos “gripp[ed S.B.’s] legs” with his hands to make her

“thrust [against] him[, l]ike a dry hump[,]” so that her “body [was] rubbing

up [a]gainst his penis.” Id. at 59, 130. When Z.H., who was unaware of the

events happening right beside her,4 subsequently left the bed and moved to

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3 We note that in an interview with police following this event, S.B. instead

stated that when Giannopoulos “made [her] suck [his penis] for . . . two to

five minutes[,]” Z.H. was present to witness the event, that she “covered her

mouth and started laughing” in response, and that she began encouraging

S.B. by stating “Oh, just do it. Don’t be a sis.” Exhibit C2, at 8. However,

Z.H. testified at trial that: (1) S.B. told her about the oral sex while they were

in the bathroom immediately after the incident; and (2) Giannopoulos had

previously asked S.B. for “a blow job and . . . anal sex” in her presence, to

which S.B. had responded to him that “she did not want to do it . . . because

it was disgusting.” N.T., 11/15/22, at 165-66.

4 Again, we note that S.B. stated in an earlier interview with police that Z.H.

witnessed this event as well, and that “she kind of just laughed at the whole

thing” and “stared at [them] a lot.” Exhibit C2, at 10. However, Z.H. testified

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the couch, Giannopoulos “turn[ed] the light off[,] lifted [S.B.’s] butt up in the

air[, and] took [her] pants down.” Id. at 60. After S.B. remained in that

position “for a minute” while Giannopoulos “grabbed like lube or something[,]

he came back and . . . rubbed [the lube] all in [her] butt [and] all on him,

[before] he stuck [his penis] in[to]” her anus. Id. at 60. As Giannopoulos

proceeded to anally penetrate her, S.B. “was gripping onto the bed[, the

sheets,] and the pillows[, and] crying [into the pillows] the entire time[, as

she] didn’t know what to do.” Id. at 60-61. S.B. explained that Giannopoulos’

“terrible” actions not only “hurt[,]” but that they made her feel as if she “had

a piece . . . taken away from [her] that [she could] never get back again.”

Id. at 61. Upon the completion of the act, Giannopoulos whispered in S.B.’s

ear once more that they “don’t have to say anything to” Z.H. about what just

happened, and that “[i]t’s okay.” Id.

S.B. remained with Z.H. and Giannopoulos the rest of the night, during

which Giannopoulos again drove them around to various locations, including

the mall, as Z.H. explained that Giannopoulos was “rich” and would “buy

[them] anything.” Id. at 62. Notably, while they were in the mall browsing

merchandise at the Victora’s Secret store, a women’s lingerie retailer,

Giannopoulos explained that “he’s not shopping and buying his little cousin

underwear[,] but [that] he would do it for [S.B.] because [she] would look

____________________________________________

that although she had witnessed S.B. and Giannopoulos in sexual positions

while under the covers in the bed, she claimed she “didn’t know what they

were doing” until S.B. later told her. N.T., 11/15/22, at 159-60, 165-66.

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sexy in it.” Id. Although Giannopoulos nevertheless purchased underwear

for Z.H., he did not purchase anything for S.B., as she did not ask him to do

so. The trio then continued to drive around the Philadelphia area, with S.B.

and Z.H. stopping to take pictures together, before ultimately returning to

Giannopoulos’ basement in the early morning hours. Upon their return, S.B.

drank from a bottle of alcohol to the extent that it “impair[ed her] ability to

remember what happened” the rest of the night. Id. at 68. S.B. returned to

her home later that same day, whereupon she did not tell her mother what

happened, as she did not “think [her mom] would have believed [her, and i]t

would have been a whole big fight between [her] family and all that[.]” Id.

at 70.

A few days later, Giannopoulos, who had made an offer to purchase

things for both Z.H. and S.B., picked them up in his vehicle to drive them

around once more. After initially driving the girls back to his home,

Giannopoulos prompted S.B. to “hav[e] sex again,” with the promise that they

“don’t have to tell” Z.H., as she “could go in the other room[, or they] could

do it in the car.” Id. at 69. When S.B. repeatedly declined Giannopoulos’

suggestion, Giannopoulos became “really mad about it” to the extent that he

“speed drove [them] all the way [back] to [Z.H.’s] apartment[.]” Id. No

further communication occurred between S.B. and Giannopoulos following this

event.

Approximately five months after the sexual assault, and upon returning

home from a two-week commitment at an inpatient mental health facility

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pursuant to Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, 5

S.B. “couldn’t hold it in anymore[,]” screamed at her mother that she “was

raped[,]” and disclosed the above events in detail to her mother and

grandmother. Id. at 71-73. S.B. then reported the incident to police, who

conducted separate recorded interviews of S.B. and Z.H. 6

Following these interviews, police arrested Giannopoulos, seizing his

cellphone in the process. Police obtained and executed a search warrant on

Giannopoulos’ cellphone, which revealed that Giannopoulos made numerous

internet searches for pornography pertaining to the forceful anal rape of

young, teenage girls. See generally Exhibit C15; see also N.T., 11/16/22,

at 68, 79-88, 113-24. Pertinent examples of these internet searches, as

reflected in a web browsing history report (“Web Browsing History Report”)

prepared by police investigators, 7 are as follows:

____________________________________________

5 See 50 P.S. § 7302.

6 We note that police interviewed S.B. twice, as she initially reported the

incident to the Lower Chichester Police Department, who then transferred the

case to the Nether Providence Police Department upon discovering the alleged

crime had instead occurred within its jurisdiction. Further, the Delaware

County Children’s Advocacy Center also conducted a forensic interview of S.B.

in relation to the incident as well, as “several of her therapists [who] knew

about it [also] reported it.” N.T., 11/16/22, at 8.

7 Notably, the Web Browsing History Report consists of ninety-seven pages,

reflecting 397 searches made on Giannopoulos’ cell phone web browser. As

we explain infra, the first thirty pages of this report consist of web searches

for which no date was recoverable by police investigators due to those web

searches having been deleted from the cell phone prior to the search warrant

being executed in this matter. Thus, although the search terms could be

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(1) “search.yahoo.com/ . . . forced[ ]anal[ ]crying[;]”

(2) “search.yahoo.com/ . . . fucked[ ]all[ ]holes[ ]forced[;]”

(3) “search.yahoo.com/ . . . russian-teen-cries-while-being-

forced-to-fuck[;]”

(4) “search.yahoo.com/ . . . painful[ ]crying[ ]screaming[

]brutal[ ]wrong[ ]hole[ ]anal[;]”

(5) “search.yahoo.com/ . . . young[ ]teen[ ]forced[ ]anal[

]porn[;]”

(6) “search.yahoo.com/ . . . girls[ ]gets[ ]fucked[ ]in[ ]both[

]holes[ f]orcefully[;]”

(7) “www.pornhub.com/video/ . . . search=girl[ ]crying[ ]in[

]pain[;]”

(8) “nesaporn.com/ . . . anal_creampie_for_teen_girl[;]”

(9) “www.sexhubhd.com/en/ . . . Helpless-European-Te[e]n-

Force-Fucked-in-Socks-free[;]”

(10) “www.xvideos.com/video . . . /hard[ ]fuck[ ]in[ ]the[ ]ass[

]young[ ]girl[ ]on[ ]the[ ]beach[;]”

(11) “www.xvideos.com/video . . . /guys[ ]force[ ]changing[

]room[ ]to[ ]fuck[ ]asian[ ]teen[ ]full[ ]movie[;]”

(12) “www.xvideos.com/video . . . /anal[ ]pain[ ]cry[ ]for[ ]cute[

]teen[ ]latina[.]”

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recovered following the deletion, the dates of those web searches were not

recoverable. Consequently, no dates for web searches were recoverable until

approximately six months after the incident in question. The twelve searches

provided herein are among the numerous searches included in the Web

Browsing History Report for which a date was recoverable by police

investigators.

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Id. The Commonwealth charged Giannopoulos with two counts each of IDSI

and IDSI with a person less than sixteen years of age, as well as one count

each of unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault, indecent assault with

a person less than sixteen years of age, and corruption of minors.

In preparation for trial, defense counsel filed an omnibus pretrial motion

solely challenging the admissibility of testimony by a Commonwealth expert,

and the trial court held a hearing on the motion. During this hearing, the trial

court granted defense counsel’s motion. Immediately following this ruling,

however, defense counsel orally requested the court to preclude the admission

into evidence of Giannopoulos’ cellphone web browsing history. In doing so,

counsel argued that the Commonwealth could not “show for the bulk of the

items[:]” (1) “when these websites were accessed or when the searches were

made[;]” (2) “what the content of the websites are anyway beyond just a

name [or] a URL descriptor[;]” and (3) “whether or not it was” Giannopoulos

who conducted the searches at-issue given that “people use each other’s

devices pretty regularly” to the extent that his ownership of the phone alone

“doesn’t mean he is the one who made the searches[.]” N.T., 11/14/22, at

4-5. The Commonwealth did not provide any argument in opposition to this

motion, and the trial court immediately issued the following oral ruling on the

matter:

I have no problem with the admissibility of the web history[,] as

we have all agreed, this is [Giannopoulos’] phone. Regarding the

. . . dates and times of which we have no information regarding

when it was dated, what time it was. Any of those web history

browsing that is undated and there is no information of when they

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were in time will be precluded from testimony. Any web browsing

history that was done during the year of 2017 and was recovered

and presented to defense counsel in the history of this discovery

will be allowed in. The court finds it is relevant under the state of

mind, intent exceptions to [the] hearsay rule.

Id. at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Defense counsel did not raise

any objection to the court’s ruling in this regard.

The following day, Giannopoulos proceeded to a jury trial, during which

the Commonwealth presented testimony from S.B., Z.H., S.B.’s mother, the

lead detective assigned to investigate the case, Detective Michael Erickson

(“Detective Erickson”), and an expert in forensic digital examinations,

Detective Christopher Tankelewicz (“Detective Tankelewicz”). Relevantly, in

the midst of its direct examination of Detective Erickson, the Commonwealth

moved to submit both a stipulation — agreed to by both parties — that “[a]ll

communications and data recovered from [Giannopoulos’] cell[]phone are

authentic and were recovered using appropriate procedures in the field of

digital forensic examinations[,]” as well as the Web Browsing History Report

conducted by a “forensic examiner with the criminal investigation division[.]”

N.T., 11/16/22, at 58-59, 74. The trial court admitted both documents into

evidence, and thus permitted each party to question Detective Erickson about

the significance of the cellphone’s recovered data and web browsing history.

During the Commonwealth’s direct examination of Detective Erickson,

he testified that the web browsing data was significant because “some of the

internet searches . . . could be viewed as akin to the investigation that [he]

was conducting at the time” given that “some of the pornography that was

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searched for and viewed was similar in nature to what [S.B.’s] allegation” was,

as “[t]hey described the same scene . . . about young girls and rape and anal

sex[,]” and they occurred the same “year when this incident occurred[.]” Id.

at 62-63. Detective Erickson added that there were a “significant” number of

these searches “related to sexual assault [and] teen young girls” and that they

occurred over the course of “multiple dates . . . within 2017[.]” Id. at 79. On

cross-examination by defense counsel, Detective Erickson conceded that the

search results with accompanying dates occurred “months after the alleged

incident[.]” Id. at 90.

Both parties additionally questioned Detective Tankelewicz about the

contents of Giannopoulos’ cellphone. During the Commonwealth’s direct

examination, Detective Tankelewicz explained that: (1) although the Web

Browsing History Report did not contain any dated web browsing history

between January 16, 2017, and August 10, 2017,8 it “doesn’t mean

[Giannopoulos] wasn’t using his internet at that time or searching for URLs[;]”

and (2) the relevant search data within the first thirty pages of the Web

Browsing History Report lacked dates due to the fact that “the [iP]hone is very

efficient in getting rid of deleted data” such that “once that database . . .

marks [an item as] set to be deleted[,] some of the information . . . is [then]

deleted actually [while] other[ portions] remain . . . in the database for us to

recover.” Id. at 111-12.

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8 We note that this period encompasses one month before, and approximately

six months after, the February 17, 2017 incident.

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Following the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case, Giannopoulos

testified in his defense and presented character testimony from his older sister

and two longtime friends. Relevantly, Giannopoulos testified that although he

spent time with both Z.H. and S.B. on the night in question, he did not sexually

assault S.B. in any way, specifically asserting that he never hugged her, kissed

her, rubbed his “penis or any part of [his] body up against” her, or “ever put

his penis in [her] mouth [or] butt[.]” Id. at 157-58, 190, 205. Additionally,

as it relates to the recovered web browsing search history, Giannopoulos

conceded that he made the above-referenced pornographic searches, as

reflected in the Web Browsing History Report. Id. at 156-57.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Giannopoulos guilty of two

counts of IDSI with a person less than sixteen years of age, and one count

each of unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault of a person less than

sixteen years of age, and corruption of minors. 9 The trial court deferred

sentencing pending the preparation of a presentence investigation report

(“PSI”), a psychological and psychosexual evaluation, and an evaluation by a

member of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”).

On September 21, 2023, the trial court conducted an SVP hearing, with

each party presenting testimony from an expert in regard to SVP evaluations.

Relevantly, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Kristen Dudley,

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9 Although it appears that the Commonwealth amended its criminal

information prior to trial to remove the two general charges of IDSI, our

review of the record uncovers no such motion or any order granting such a

motion.

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Psy.D., (“Dr. Dudley”), the SOAB’s assigned SVP evaluator for this case. Dr.

Dudley explained that her initial expert report included an opinion that

Giannopoulos was not an SVP, as she believed that he did not “display unusual

cruelty” and there was “no evidence to suggest [he] is sexually aroused by

violence.” N.T., 9/21/23, at 34-35. However, Dr. Dudley explained that she

prepared an addendum reversing this conclusion due to the fact that she had

“received new information[,]” consisting of the Web Browser History Report,

which “necessitated [her incorporation of] an addendum and filing a second

report.” Id. at 6.10

As it relates to why she needed to reverse her opinion, Dr. Dudley

explained that when she reviewed the 397 searches listed within the ninety-

seven-page Web Browsing History Report, including those searches that were

undated, she identified “139 instances that included search terms or

descriptors of anal sex, forced sex, women crying and or helplessness[.]” Id.

at 27. Based on these entries, Dr. Dudley opined that Giannopoulos’ “search

for people who are experiencing pain while being forced to have sex” by using

such terms indicated that he was aroused by “both physical and psychological

humiliation[,] physical pain, [and] physical degradation, which is a component

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10 We note that immediately following Dr. Dudley’s reference to Giannopoulos’

cellphone search history, as reflected in the Web Browsing History Report,

defense counsel objected to its admissibility, arguing that it was

“inappropriate for this expert to consider because of its . . . complete

unreliability in terms of the timing” of the searches. N.T., 9/21/22, at 9. The

trial court noted the objection for the record, but overruled it, reasoning that

it was already “dealt with, argued[,]” and admitted at trial. Id.

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of sexual sadism [—] a [type of] paraphilic disorder.” Id. at 13. Dr. Dudley

elaborated that sexual sadism “is defined . . . as a period of at least six months

of recurrent and intense sexual arousal from the physical or psychological

suffering of another person as manifested by fantasies, urges[,] or behaviors”

where the “individual has [either] acted on these sexual urges with a non-

consenting person, or [they] cause clinically significant distress or impairment

in social, occupational[,] or other important areas.” Id. Accordingly, Dr.

Dudley “emphasized the non-consenting person [portion of the definition in

her report] because the incident/offense includes a [twelve]-year-old child

who was not consenting[,] and [had] stated that she did not want to have

sex” before Giannopoulos nevertheless forced her to do so. Id. at 14.

Pertinently, Dr. Dudley specified that sexual sadism “is a lifetime condition . .

. that . . . predispose[s] someone [to an] increase[d] likelihood of

re[]offending.” Id. at 19.

Dr. Dudley additionally opined that Giannopoulos met some of the

criteria for an “antisocial personality disorder[,]” which she noted was

“unusual [as] it is typically one or the other” in terms of “[e]ither paraphilic

disorder or antisocial personality disorder[,] or nothing[.]” Id. at 17, 19. Dr.

Dudley specifically testified that she formed this opinion based on her review

of Giannopoulos’ “long criminal history dating back to when he was” thirteen,

which indicated that “[h]e has consistently failed to follow the norms of

society[,] shown disregard for others and the rights of others throughout his

life[, and] does not appear to learn from his mistakes.” Id. at 17, 19. Thus,

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Dr. Dudley concluded that because Giannopoulos “suffer[s from] a mental

abnormality and personality disorder[, which includes underlying] traits [and]

criteria [that] increase his risk of reoffending [in a predatory and sexually

violent manner] in the future[,]” he satisfies the statutory SVP criteria. Id. at

21.

In contrast, Giannopoulos presented the testimony of Thomas Haworth,

Ph.D., (“Dr. Haworth”), a licensed psychologist specializing in clinical and

forensic psychology, who testified that Giannopoulos did not meet the SVP

criteria, as: (1) the instant offense did not “include a display of unusual cruelty

by the individual during the commission of the crime” so as to satisfy a finding

that Giannopoulos had a sexual sadism mental abnormality; (2) Giannopoulos’

online behavior was not indicative of his “real time behavior[, as online and

real time behavior] are distinct entities that have to be understood in their

context[;]” (3) his search history is instead “relatively normative” when

compared to the search patterns of normal heterosexual men who view

pornography; and (4) further evaluation of “emotional . . . and psychiatric

components with him . . . ha[d] to be accounted for before we [could] default

to” the level of anti-social personality disorder that Dr. Dudley diagnosed. Id.

at 103-05, 119, 124-25, 130-31, 134-35, 155, 157. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the trial court determined that Giannopoulos met the SVP criteria as

he “suffers from a mental abnormality [and] personality disorder that makes

him likely to engage in predatory sexual offenses[.]” Id. at 204.

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Immediately following this determination, the trial court proceeded to

sentencing, whereupon it imposed an aggregate term of nineteen and one-

half to sixty-three and one-half years’ imprisonment, followed by a three-year

probationary term.11 Giannopoulos thereafter filed a timely post-sentence

motion, which the trial court denied. Giannopoulos then filed a timely notice

of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Giannopoulos raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

web searches and URLs where it misapplied the law under the

state of mind exception?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

irrelevant and prejudicial web searches and URLs?

3. Whether [Giannopoulos’] conviction was against the weight of

the evidence?

4. Whether the evidence was insufficient for the court to make an

SVP determination where it relied on inadmissible and

irrelevant evidence?

Giannopoulos’ Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 12

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11 The trial court indicated that it amended the sentencing order to reflect this

aggregate term because the original sentencing order contained an incorrect

calculation. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/24, at 2.

12 We note with disapproval that Giannopoulos’ brief does not conform to our

appellate rules of procedure. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), “[t]he statement

of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved . . ..”

The rule further provides that “No question will be considered unless it is

stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested

thereby.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, in his statement of questions

involved, Giannopoulos raised the above-identified four issues. See

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Giannopoulos’ first and second issues both concern the admissibility of

his cellphone data as evidence at trial. Prior to conducting this review,

however, we must first determine whether Giannopoulos preserved these

challenges for our review. Generally, “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

To preserve a claim of error related to an evidentiary ruling, a party must not

only raise a timely objection, but must also articulate “the specific ground” for

the objection “unless it was apparent from the context.” Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)(B).

If a timely and specific objection is made, “[a] party complaining, on appeal,

of the admission of evidence in the court below will be confined to the specific

objection there made.” Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d 1014, 1022

(Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Consequently, where an appellant

lodges a general objection at trial but identifies a more specific basis for the

objection for the first time on appeal, the latter challenge is waived. See

Commonwealth v. King, 959 A.2d 405, 419 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that

a nebulous objection that fails to implicate the grounds later argued on appeal

is insufficient to preserve that issue on appeal).

In his first issue, Giannopoulos purports to challenge the trial court’s

ruling that the Web Browsing History Report was admissible under the state

____________________________________________

Giannopoulos’ Brief at 4. However, in the discussion section of his brief, he

identifies five issues, and discusses numerous sub-issues, many of which are

not identified in the statement of questions involved or fairly suggested

thereby. Thus, pursuant to our well-established appellate rules, we decline to

address any additional issues that Giannopoulos raised in this regard. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

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of mind exception to the rule against hearsay. See Giannopoulos’ Brief at 4.13

In addressing this issue, we reiterate that defense counsel objected to the

admissibility of the Web Browsing History Report on the basis that the

Commonwealth could not “show for the bulk of the items[:]” (1) “when these

websites were accessed or when the searches were made[;]” 14 (2) “what the

content of the websites are anyway beyond just a name [or] a URL

descriptor[;]” and (3) “whether or not it was” Giannopoulos who conducted

the searches.15 N.T., 11/14/22, at 4-5. Defense counsel did not object to the

admission of the Web Browsing History Report on any other basis.

Notably, at no point in the proceedings did defense counsel advance any

argument to the trial court that the Web Browsing History Report constituted

____________________________________________

13 Once again, we note with disapproval that Giannopoulos’ brief does not

conform to our appellate rules of procedure. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a),

“the argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to

be argued . . ..” As indicated above, Giannopoulos identified four issues to be

argued in his statement of questions involved. See Giannopoulos’ Brief at 4.

However, in the discussion section of his brief, Giannopoulos divided his

argument into five sections, rather than four. Moreover, in his first argument

section, Giannopoulos purports to challenge the authenticity of the Web

Browsing History Report. See id. at 14-28. Notably, this issue was not raised

in the statement of questions involved. Thus, we may not address it. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). In any event, even if not waived, we would have concluded

that the issue lacked merit, as Giannopoulos stipulated to the authenticity of

the Web Browsing History Report and thereafter admitted that he conducted

the searches contained therein. See N.T., 11/16/22, at 58-59, 156-58.

14 As explained above, this particular pretrial objection was resolved by the

trial court’s ruling that no searches without a recovered search date were

admissible, and that no searches with dates beyond 2017 were admissible.

15 This pretrial objection was resolved by Gianopoulos’ admission at trial that

he conducted the searches reflected in the Web Browsing History Report.

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inadmissible hearsay. Notwithstanding the lack of any objection on this basis,

the trial court ruled sua sponte that the Web Browsing History Report

constituted hearsay, and that the state of mind exception applied to permit

the report’s admission. Defense counsel made no objection to the trial court’s

sua sponte determination that the report constituted hearsay, let alone the

trial court’s sua sponte ruling that the state of mind exception applied to

permit the report’s admission. See N.T., 11/14/22, at 5.

Instead, for the first time on appeal, Giannopoulos raises a challenge to

the trial court’s ruling that the Web Browsing History Report was admissible

under the state of mind exception to the rule against hearsay. In advancing

this argument, Giannopoulos contends that the trial court erred in applying

the exception because “the state of mind [exception] only applies to instances

where it is used to establish a person’s intent going forward and not

backward.” Giannopoulos’ Brief at 30-31. Giannopoulos argues that because

the admitted web searches occurred months after the alleged assault, they do

not qualify for purposes of the state of mind exception. See id. at 35.

In failing to raise this challenge in response to the trial court’s sua

sponte ruling, defense counsel deprived the trial court of any opportunity to

consider this argument and to potentially correct the perceived error at the

time it was committed. See Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 718 A.2d 751,

753 (Pa. 1998) (explaining that the requirement that a defendant make a

timely, specific objection “in the trial court [to preserve an issue for appeal]

ensures that the trial judge has a chance to correct alleged trial errors and

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eliminates the possibility that the appellate court will be required to expend

time and energy reviewing points on which no trial ruling has been made”).

Rather, defense counsel remained silent following the trial court’s sua sponte

ruling. Thus, as Giannopoulos failed to preserve this issue by raising it in the

trial court, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Edmondson, 718

A.2d at 753; King, 959 A.2d at 419. Accordingly, his first issue merits no

relief.

In his second issue, Giannopoulos purports to challenge the admission

of the Web Browsing History Report on the basis that the searches reflected

therein were “irrelevant and prejudicial.” See Giannopoulos’ Brief at 4. As

explained above, defense counsel’s objections to the admissibility of the Web

Browsing History Report were limited, and the only potentially applicable

objection that could apply to this issue is defense counsel’s vague assertion

that the Commonwealth could not show “what the content of the websites are

anyway beyond just a name [or] a URL descriptor.” N.T., 11/14/22, at 4-5.

Notably, defense counsel did not object to the admission of the Web Browsing

History Report on the basis that the web searches were irrelevant or

prejudicial.

Here, even generously viewing the objection made by defense counsel

regarding the admission of the Web Browsing History Report, he essentially

raised an argument that the search terms used did not necessarily reflect the

actual content of the corresponding web addresses. On appeal, however,

Giannopoulos contends that the graphic search terms bore no relevance to the

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sexual assault charges against him and that their admission contravened

Pa.R.E. 401, 402, and 403. See Giannopoulos’ Brief at 43. Giannopoulos

points to specific terms in certain of the web searches, including the terms

“European,” Russian,” “Asian,” and “Latina,” and claims that none of these

search terms relate to the sexual assault in question or any description of S.B.

Id. at 48. Giannopoulos also challenges the relevancy of the web searches

on the basis that the searches were made months after the sexual assault in

question. See id. at 36. Further, Giannopoulos argues that “it is readily

apparent that the searches involved adult ‘teen’ aged women, and not

children.” Id. at 42. Finally, Giannopoulos claims that the probative value of

the searches included in the Web Browsing History Report was outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice, and that it would thus confuse the jury and

divert its attention from determining whether the Commonwealth presented

credible evidence of the crimes charged. See id. at 44.

Here, upon our careful review, we conclude that defense counsel’s vague

one-sentence objection failed to raise the significantly modified, multi-faceted

argument that Giannopoulos presents to this Court on appeal. To be sure,

these numerous additional arguments relating to relevancy and prejudice

were not presented to the trial court for its initial consideration. Accordingly,

Giannopoulos’ second issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also

Konias, 136 A.3d at 1022; King, 959 A.2d at 419; Edmondson, 718 A.2d at

753.

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In his third issue, Giannopoulos argues that each of his convictions was

against the weight of the evidence. As our Supreme Court has explained:

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is

sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is

under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion

of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge

must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and

allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a

juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror.

Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that

“notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight

with all the facts is to deny justice.”

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations and

footnote omitted). “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of

fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine

the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536,

545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (brackets and citation omitted). Thus, in order for a

defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, “the

evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the

conscience of the trial court.” Id. at 546 (citation omitted).

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight

of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the

trial court:

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Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict

is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable

reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s

conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of

the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest

of justice.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted,

emphasis in original).

Giannopoulos argues that each of his convictions was against the weight

of the evidence. In doing so, Giannopoulos initially points to his testimony at

trial, wherein he “adamantly denied any wrongdoing, . . . stressed that ‘[he]

did not sexually assault [S.B.,]’ . . . denied ever putting his penis in her mouth,

. . . rubbing his penis against any part of [her] body, . . . having anal [sex] or

any sexual relations with her[, or] ever being under the blankets with” her.

Giannopoulos’ Brief at 57. Although Giannopoulos acknowledges that both

S.B.’s and Z.H.’s trial testimony contradicted these assertions, he stresses

that this testimony was unreliable, as it “was riddled” with the following

inconsistencies: (1) although S.B. testified that she “began to ‘dry hump’

[Giannopoulos, Z.H.] somehow did not notice this occurrence[;]” (2) while

S.B. “testified that what happened on the bed was ‘over the covers[,]’ . . .

[Z.H. instead] stated that [S.B.] and [Giannopoulos] were ‘under the covers’

and [that] she did not see what happened[;]” (3) although S.B. testified she

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had been crying while she was sexually assaulted in the same room as Z.H.,

Z.H. testified that Giannopoulos “appeared to have his clothes on him[,] that

‘it was pretty dark because the lights were dimmed[,’ and s]he could not hear

any noises or sounds coming from [Giannopoulos] and [S.B.], [including S.B.’s

alleged] cry . . . for help[;]” (4) although S.B. stated that Z.H. was not present

when Giannopoulos “pulled his pants down and” forced her head towards his

penis, S.B. initially “told police . . . that [Z.H.] was present [during the act,]

watched [her] perform oral sex[, and had] ‘covered her mouth and started

laughing[;]’” (5) S.B. “testified at trial that [the] anal rape occurred above the

covers in plain view[, y]et [she] also claimed that [Z.H.] was unaware of what

happened [even though Z.H.] was in close proximity, and [S.B.] was in pain

and crying while this act occurred above the covers[;]” (6) Z.H.’s prior

statement to police that S.B. was happy the night of the incident “contradicted

her sworn trial testimony that [S.B.] appeared upset[,]” as Z.H. admitted she

lied to police at the time due to the fact that “she and [S.B.] were in an

argument[;]” (7) although S.B. “alleged that [Z.H.] was already in the

bathroom when [she] entered[,]” she had previously “told the police that

[Z.H.] came into the bathroom after” she did; (8) S.B. “couldn’t remember if

she drank [alcohol] before or after the road trip[,] what type of alcohol she

consumed, either vodka or red wine[,]” and who specifically consumed alcohol

that night; (9) S.B. “revealed for the first time on cross-examination that she

and [Giannopoulos] were kissing in front of [Z.H.] prior to her sexual acts[;]”

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and (10) “after this painful sexual assault, [S.B.] remained with

[Giannopoulos] until the next morning, and she never called the police or

anyone for assistance.” Id. at 58-61.

Giannopoulos specifically avers that Z.H. was not a credible witness due

to the fact that her admission at trial, that she lied to police about S.B.’s

emotional state, “demonstrate[d her] willingness to lie whenever she desired

to do so.” Id. at 59. In support of this assertion, Giannopoulos points out

that Z.H. evidently lied under oath when she testified that “she would not

purposefully lie to police[,]” as by Z.H.’s own admission, she claimed to have

provided police with an inaccurate statement prior to trial because “‘she did

not want to tell anyone the whole truth[,]’ . . . ‘was scared to tell the truth[,]’

[and] ‘didn’t want anyone to get in trouble or be mad at’ her” for telling the

truth. Id. at 59-60 (brackets omitted). Giannopoulos contends that the

record therefore establishes that Z.H. was motivated to lie about the incident

to “regain her friendship with S.B.” and that she thus lied about the assault at

trial “so S.B. would not remain mad at her.” Id. at 60.

Giannopoulos similarly challenges S.B.’s credibility as a witness due to

the fact that “after [the alleged] incident, [she] was ‘in an inpatient 302

mental commitment program for two weeks[,]’ [during which she] ‘came

across a lot of people who talked about being raped or sexually assaulted by

family members[,]’ [and she had] personally involved [herself] in . . .

discussions concerning these sexual acts.” Id. at 61. Giannopoulos further

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claims that both S.B. and Z.H. were motivated to lie about the assault given

their belief that he was wealthy and “could [thus] use these allegations to

force [him] to buy them things.” Id. at 62. Giannopoulos supports this

contention with the fact that one of the girls’ fathers had previously stolen

$1,000.00 from him. Giannopoulos insists the record instead indicates that

his testimony was credible, as he “had no motive to lie and none of his

testimony was inconsistent.” Id. Thus, Giannopoulos argues that this Court

should find “that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence” and

“award him a new trial.” Id.

After reviewing Giannopoulos’ weight of the evidence claim, the trial

court determined that it was without merit, reasoning as follows:

[Giannopoulos,] in . . . [his concise statement,] attacks the

credibility of the witnesses, specifically indicating that the

testimony of the victim and the eyewitness were contradictory and

inconsistent.

During trial, . . . S.B. testified regarding the sexual assault

by [Giannopoulos]. Defense counsel cross-examined [her]. At

the time of testimony, [S.B.] was [nineteen] years old, with the

sexual assault having occurred when she was [twelve] years old.

During trial, eyewitness, Z.H. testified[,] and defense counsel had

the opportunity for cross[-]examination.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by proving the

crime’s elements with evidence which is entirely circumstantial

and the trier of fact, who determines credibility of witnesses and

the weight to give evidence produced, is free to believe all, part,

or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Jette, 818 A.2d

533, 534 (Pa. Super 2003).

In cases addressing sexually-based offenses, the

uncorroborated testimony of the complainant, if believed by the

finder of fact, is sufficient to warrant a conviction.

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Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super.

2016)[.]

This [c]ourt finds that the jury rendered verdicts in this

matter[] which do not shock one[’]s sense of justice, and the

verdict was not contrary to the sufficiency of evidence admitted at

trial. [Giannopoulos’] appeal is without merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/24, at 8-9 (citations omitted).

Based on our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court

in denying Giannopoulos’ challenge to the weight of the evidence. As

explained above, this Court will give the gravest consideration to the findings

and reasons advanced by the trial court judge when reviewing its

determination as to whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

See Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. Moreover, one of the least assailable reasons for

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was not

against the weight of the evidence. See id.

Here, Giannopoulos is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the

evidence to accord no weight to the testimony provided by either of S.B. or

Z.H. at trial, which established that on the night of the incident, S.B. was

twelve-years-old when Giannopoulos: (1) made her perform oral sex on him

in his basement bedroom; and (2) forced her into having anal sex with him

while she gripped the sheets of his bed in pain and cried into his pillows. This,

we cannot do. See Talbert, 129 A.3d at 545 (holding that the weight to be

accorded to the evidence and testimony presented at trial was exclusively for

the jury, which was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and

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testimony and to determine credibility). Rather, this Court’s role is to review

the exercise of discretion by the trial court in ruling on the weight claim. In

this regard, we discern no abuse of such discretion.

Importantly, we note that the trial court judge determined that

Giannopoulos’ guilty verdicts did not shock his conscience. As the trial court

explained, these events occurred when S.B. was a child, at just twelve years

old, whereas at the time of trial, she was a nineteen-year-old woman.

Similarly, Z.H. was also a child when these events occurred, at thirteen years

of age, whereas she was approximately twenty years old at the time of trial.

The trial court further noted that both S.B. and Z.H. were cross-examined by

defense counsel at trial, and the record reflects that such cross-examination

was directed at the inconsistencies and contradictions in their testimony,

particularly as to the versions of events that they related to police as children.

Finally, as the trial court observed, the jury was free to believe all part or none

of their testimony, despite the inconsistencies and contradictions, and the

testimony of S.B. alone, even if uncorroborated, was sufficient to warrant a

conviction if believed by the jury. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/24, at 8-9.

For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

denying Giannopoulos’ weight challenge, and we conclude that his third issue

is without merit.

In his final issue, Giannopoulos argues that the evidence was insufficient

to support the trial court’s determination that he was an SVP. A challenge to

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the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law for which our

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. See

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en

banc). As this Court has explained:

In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing

court, must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear

and convincing evidence that the individual is an SVP. As with

any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court's determination of

SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and

convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been

satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation and brackets omitted).

As it relates to the procedural requirements underlying an SVP

determination, our Court has elaborated as follows:

The procedure for determining SVP status is statutorily

mandated and well-defined. Under revised Subchapter H of

SORNA, after a person has been convicted of an offense listed in

[42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 9799.14, the trial court orders an assessment by

the SOAB. The SOAB must assess all individuals convicted of

sexually violent offenses to determine whether they should be

classified as an SVP. When assessing whether a particular

offender should be classified as an SVP, the board shall establish

standards for evaluations and for evaluators conducting the

assessments.

Commonwealth v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770, 777 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc)

(citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

An assessment shall include, but not be limited to, an examination of

the following:

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(1) Facts of the current offense, including:

(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to

achieve the offense.

(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

(v) Age of the victim.

(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty

by the individual during the commission of the crime.

(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

(2) Prior offense history, including:

(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.

(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.

(iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs

for sexual offenders.

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

(i) Age of the individual.

(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual.

(iii) A mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.

(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual’s

conduct.

(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment

field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4); see also Aumick, 297 A.3d at 777.

(citation omitted). “Whereas the SOAB member must consider the[se] fifteen

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factors[,] the trial court must determine whether the Commonwealth has

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is an individual

who has ‘a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [them]

likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.’” Aumick, 297 A.3d

at778-79; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (providing the definition of a

“sexually violent predator”).

Relevantly, a “SOAB expert opinion falls within the general rules

regarding expert witnesses” and they may form their opinion with the

assistance of “copies of records and information” provided by “all State,

county and local agencies, offices and entities in this Commonwealth . . . as

requested by the board in connection with the court-ordered assessment.”

Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778 (citations and brackets omitted); see also Pa.R.E.

702 (“Testimony by Expert Witnesses”); Pa.R.E. 703 (“Bases of an Expert’s

Opinion Testimony”). In accordance with this, if an “expert states an

opinion[,] the expert must state the facts or data on which the opinion is

based.” Pa.R.E. 705.

Importantly, this Court has instructed that “[t]he statute governing the

SVP assessment does not limit the expert’s consideration of information only

to that admitted at trial or at the guilty plea proceedings[,]” as their opinion

“may be based on facts or data that the expert has been made aware of or

personally observed so long as experts in [their] field reasonably rely on those

kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.” Aumick, 297

A.3d at 778 (citation omitted). Thus, “these facts or data consulted need not

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be admissible for the expert’s opinion to be admitted.” Id. at 778, 781.

(citation omitted, emphasis added) (holding that “the facts presented at an

SVP hearing” were not considered inadmissible hearsay as they were “not

being offered for the truth of the matter, as would be the case in a true

hearsay scenario[, but instead] constitute[d] information, gleaned from the

records which are reasonably relied on in SOAB evaluations, that is presented

to the trial court solely to supply the basis for the expert’s opinion in

accordance with our Rules of Evidence”). In coming to this determination,

this Court stressed that, “in the context of an SVP hearing, the [trial court]

judge is not tasked with evaluating the veracity of the facts underlying the

expert’s testimony” because “an SVP hearing is not a trial[,] and the primary

purpose of the SVP registration requirements is to protect the public, not to

punish the offender”). Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d

337, 360 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Giannopoulos argues “[t]he evidence was insufficient for the trial court

to make its SVP determination” as it based its determination entirely “upon

the [opinion formed by the] Commonwealth’s expert, [who relied] on the

inadmissible and irrelevant web history data that occurred months after the

alleged assault.” Giannopoulos’ Brief at 63. Giannopoulos contends that

“SORNA II does not authorize an evaluator to substitute allegations for the

‘facts of current offense,’ especially when those allegations occurred months

after the incident and had no nexus to the victim.” Id. at 66.

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Giannopoulos points out that Dr. Dudley admitted that “the second

report ha[d] a different conclusion from her initial report [only because of] the

additional information that she reviewed concerning the web history data

found on [his] phone.” Id. at 67. Giannopoulos asserts that because this

“data was the sole distinguishing factor used by Dr. Dudley to alter her opinion

that [he] was an SVP[,]” and because “[n]othing in the SOAB statute allows

or considers that an expert may rely on this irrelevant and inadmissible

evidence[,]” the Commonwealth failed to establish that he met “the statutory

definition of an SVP.” Id. at 67-68.

Moreover, Giannopoulos argues that Dr. Dudley’s reliance on this data

was misplaced, as she “merely counted the overall number of web searches

without any consideration if they were part of the same temporal instance”

and had “occurred within seconds of each other[.]” Id. at 68. Additionally,

Giannopoulos claims that although Dr. Dudley “conceded that not all ‘force’

used in sexual acts consists of ‘sexual sadism force[,]’” he avers that her

finding of such force here was improperly “based on looking solely for the word

‘force’ in the web searches and counting them[,]” even though she “did not

know the level of force that was used based solely on the web searches.” Id.

Therefore, when Dr. Dudley changed her opinion and “testified that she was

able to somehow perceive solely from the web browser history that”

Giannopoulos had sexual sadism disorder, Giannopoulos contends that she

impermissibly “assumed facts that were not in evidence and might not have

been true.” Id. at 69-70.

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As an example of the above, Giannopoulos asserts that Dr. Dudley

“reached her opinion because some search terms had words consisting of

crying, pain[,] and rape, [which she] assumed . . . contained violent,

hardcore[,] sadistic acts [even though she n]ever actually view[ed] the

content of the search results.” Id. at 70. Consequently, Giannopoulos

maintains that because “the expert’s conclusion was not based on the

statutory requirement to consider the ‘facts of the offense,’ the evidence was

insufficient to support [its] conclusion that [he] is an SVP.” Id. at 71.

The trial court considered Giannopoulos’ sufficiency claim and

determined that it was without merit, reasoning as follows:

Prior to sentencing, this court ordered a [PSI], psychiatric,

and psychosexual evaluations. The court also directed that

[Giannopoulos] be assessed by the . . . SOAB[] to determine if

[he] met the legal criteria to be classified as a[n SVP.] Dr. . . .

Dudley, . . . an SOAB board member and licensed psychologist

submitted her findings to the court, noting a date of assessment

of May 4, 2023, which initially concluded that [Giannopoulos] was

not a[n SVP]; however, Dr. Dudley prepared an addendum, noting

assessment dates of 5/4/23 and 5/12/23. In the cover letter,

dated May 23, 2023[], the Executive Director of SOAB noted that

the addendum was prepared after review of additional information

provided by the District Attorney’s office, and noting that Dr.

Dudley now finds [Giannopoulos] a[n SVP]. More specifically, the

addendum notes a mental abnormality personality disorder

criteria noting [Giannopoulos] meets the four statutory criteria,

including a “condition[,]”[] a paraphilic disorder of sexual sadism

disorder, focused on the type of activities related to

[Giannopoulos’] arousal, and in [Giannopoulos’] situation, that

includes arousal from degradation and humiliation of women, as

is noted from his internet browsing history and instances of his

behavior in the instant offense, and other sexual offenses.

Defense counsel submitted a psychosexual evaluation

authored by Dr. . . . Haworth, [a] licensed psychologist,

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specializing in clinical and forensic psychology noting interview

dates of June 13, 2023 and July 21, 2023. Defense counsel also

submitted psychosexual evaluation — SVP rebuttal 9/17/23,

wherein Dr. H[a]w[o]rth opined that while [Giannopoulos] meets

the predatory behavior requirement of SVP, . . . he does not suffer

from the paraphilic disorder of sexual sadism disorder, and that

as a result [Giannopoulos] does not meet the criteria for SVP. Dr.

H[a]w[o]rth’s report noted that [Giannopoulos] “demonstrated an

Above Average risk for reoffense. Certainly, intervention for his

mood and hypersexuality will greatly impact the risk” but rejects

the notion that [Giannopoulos] “satisfies the diagnostic criteria for

sexual sadism disorder[.]”

This court conducted a thorough review of all reports,

rebuttal reports, evidence and testimony relating to

[Giannopoulos’] status as a[n SVP] and did not err in determining

[him] to be a[n SVP].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/24, at 12-13 (citations and unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

After careful review, we determine the evidence was sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that Giannopoulos is an SVP. Preliminarily, we

note that Giannopoulos stipulated to the admissibility of the Web Browsing

History Report, and to the authenticity of the dated web searches reflected

therein. Giannopoulos also admitted at trial that he had, in fact, made those

searches. Thus, Giannopoulos’ claim that such evidence and testimony was

“inadmissible” at trial is simply meritless.

As it pertains to the undated searches in the Web Browsing history

Report relied on by Dr. Dudley in forming her amended SVP opinion, we

similarly conclude that Giannopoulos’ sufficiency claim is meritless. As

explained above, there was no requirement that Dr. Dudley limit the formation

of her opinion to evidence actually admitted at trial. See Aumick, 297 A.3d

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at 778. Instead, a SOAB member may form their opinion with the assistance

of “copies of records and information” provided by “all State, county and local

agencies, offices and entities in this Commonwealth . . . as requested by the

board in connection with the court-ordered assessment.” Aumick, 297 A.3d

at 778. Here, as the Web Browsing History Report was prepared by

investigating police officers, Dr. Dudley was permitted to review all aspects of

the report, including the undated searches that were excluded from evidence

at trial, so long as individuals in her field would reasonably rely on such

information in the formation of their own expert opinions. See id.; see also

Pa.R.E. 702, 703, 705.

Notably, Giannopoulos does contend that the undated searches in the

Web Browsing History Report are not of the type of information that other SVP

evaluators would reasonably rely on in forming their SVP expert opinions.

Indeed, Giannopoulos’ own SVP expert, Dr. Haworth, plainly considered the

entirety of the Web Browsing History Report and incorporated the search

results into his own professional analysis to dispute Dr. Dudley’s results and

instead opine that Giannopoulos did not meet the statutory SVP criteria. See

N.T., 9/21/23, at 91, 103-05, 111, 119, 124-25, 130-31, 134-35, 155, 157.

Finally, we address Giannopoulos’ argument that the evidence was

insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that he is an SVP because

Dr. Dudley “merely counted the overall number of web searches” in the web

Browsing History Report without considering how close together or far away

in time the searches were made. See Giannopoulos’ Brief at 68. The record

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reflects that Dr. Dudley’s review of this report revealed to her multiple,

distinct instances where Giannopoulos searched for pornography depicting

people experiencing pain while being forced to have sex. These searches,

which are partially reproduced above, included search terms and descriptors

of anal sex, forced sex, women crying, and or helplessness. Dr. Dudley’s

assessment of these terms clearly evidences that her analysis was not limited

to merely counting the number of pornographic searches that Giannopoulos

made, but rather reflects her consideration of the nature of those searches

which were made over several months.

In Dr. Dudley’s opinion, these search terms revealed that Giannopoulos

was searching for people who were experiencing pain while being forced to

have sex, and that he was aroused by physical and psychological humiliation,

physical pain, and physical degradation, which is a component of sexual

sadism – a paraphilic disorder. See N.T., 9/21/23, at 13. Dr. Dudley further

testified that Giannopoulos’ condition of sexual sadism was a lifetime condition

that would predispose him to an increased likelihood of reoffending. See id.

at 19. Such testimony, as credited by the trial court, was sufficient to support

the court’s determination that Giannopoulos met the SVP criteria because he

suffers from a mental abnormality and personality disorder that makes him

likely to engage in predatory sexual offenses. See id. at 204. Thus, for the

reasons explained above, we hold Giannopoulos’ final issue is without merit.

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Consequently, because we determine that each of Giannopoulos’ issues

are either waived or without merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence and

the trial court’s determination that he is an SVP.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 12/17/2025

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