D.R. Malloy & E.C. Malloy - Hon. H. G. Moulton, Jr., PA Court Administrator

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Malloy and :

Edward C. Malloy, :

Petitioners :

:

v. :

:

Hon. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., :

Pennsylvania Court Administrator, : No. 493 M.D. 2021

Respondent : Submitted: October 7, 2025

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM FILED: December 17, 2025

Before this Court are the Honorable H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., former

Pennsylvania Court Administrator’s (Moulton),1 Preliminary Objections to Deborah

R. Malloy’s and Edward C. Malloy’s (collectively, Petitioners) pro se Petition for

Review in mandamus (Petition) filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction.2

1

Moulton retired on September 30, 2023. Andrea Britt Tuominen, Esquire, succeeded

Moulton and is the current Pennsylvania Court Administrator.

2

Petitioners originally commenced this matter in the Delaware County Common Pleas

Court (Common Pleas). See Common Pleas Docket No. CV-2021-003730. On October 4, 2021,

Petitioners filed their fifth amended complaint and, thereafter, a motion to transfer this matter to

the proper forum. On October 22, 2021, Moulton filed the Preliminary Objections. On December

28, 2021, Common Pleas sustained the Preliminary Objections and dismissed the action with

prejudice. On June 28, 2022, Common Pleas denied Petitioners’ Petition to Recuse Judge. On

September 19, 2022, Common Pleas denied as moot Petitioners’ Petition to Transfer Case.

Petitioners appealed from all three orders to this Court. See Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 971 C.D. 2022,

1342 C.D. 2022, and 133 C.D. 2023, respectively (Moulton I). On April 16, 2024, Petitioners filed

a Motion to Enforce the Code of Conduct for Employees of the Unified Judicial System relative

to each appeal. This Court consolidated the matters and, on May 3, 2024, vacated Common Pleas’

December 28, 2021 order, directed transfer of the matter to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

(Supreme Court), and dismissed the June 28 and September 19, 2022 orders and motion to transfer

as moot. However, by July 16, 2024 Order, the Supreme Court transferred the matter to this Court

Petitioners seek to compel Moulton to notify the Judicial Conduct Board (JCB),

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration (Rule) 703(G)(1),3 that

Delaware County Common Pleas Court (Common Pleas) judges - the Honorable

Barry C. Dozor (Judge Dozor) and the Honorable G. Michael Green (Judge Green)

(collectively, the Common Pleas Judges) - failed to report decisions that remained

undecided after 90 days. Also before this Court is Petitioners’ April 16, 2024 Motion

to Enforce the Code of Conduct for Employees of the Unified Judicial System (UJS

ECOC) (Motion to Enforce). After review, this Court sustains Moulton’s

on the basis that Moulton, as the Court Administrator, is not a jurist but an officer of the

Commonwealth government and, thus, the matter belongs in this Court’s original jurisdiction.

By October 3, 2024 Order, this Court adopted the Common Pleas filings into this docket

as though they were initially filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction. See Oct. 3, 2024 Order at

1. This Court’s Order further declared that it would treat Petitioners’ fifth amended complaint (the

operative pleading), as a Petition for Review pursuant to and governed by Chapter 15 of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. This Court added that the Preliminary

Objections are the operative responsive pleading. See id. at 2. This Court further directed:

The Prothonotary shall transfer Petitioners’ April 16, 2024 “Motion

to Enforce the Code of Conduct for Employees of the Unified

Judicial System” (Motion to Enforce) and [Moulton’s a]nswer

thereto, filed at [Pa. Cmwlth. Nos.] 971 C.D. 2022, 1342 C.D. 2022,

and 133 C.D. 2023, to th[is D]ocket . . . . Petitioners’ request for

oral argument on the Motion to Enforce is DENIED. The Motion to

Enforce shall be listed for disposition with the Preliminary

Objections.

Oct. 3, 2024 Order at 2.

3

Rule 703(A) declared the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s policy that matters before the

Unified Judicial System shall “be brought to a fair conclusion as promptly as possible, consistent

with the character of the matter and the resources of the system[,]” and the Supreme Court

implemented rules to help it “oversee the prompt and proper disposition of the business of the

Pennsylvania courts.” Pa.R.J.A. 703(A). To that end, Rule 703(B)(2) specifies, in relevant part:

“Every judge shall compile a semi-annual report stating whether the judge has any matter that has

been submitted to the judge for decision and remains undecided for [90] days or more as of the

last day of the reporting period.” Pa.R.J.A. 703(B). Rule 703(G)(1) provides: “The Court

Administrator of Pennsylvania shall immediately notify the [JCB] if a judge fails to file a timely

report as required by this [R]ule [703].” Pa.R.J.A. 703(G)(1).

2

Preliminary Objection related to standing and dismisses the Petition. This Court also

dismisses the Motion to Enforce.

Background4

As Pennsylvania Court Administrator, Moulton “serve[d] at the

pleasure of the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court[ (Supreme Court),]” and was

“responsible for the prompt and proper disposition of the business of all courts and

magisterial district judges.”5 Rule 501(a), Pa.R.J.A. 501(a). Rule 703(G)(1)

requires that “[t]he Court Administrator of Pennsylvania shall immediately notify

the [JCB] if a judge fails to file a timely report as required by [Rule 703].” Pa.R.J.A.

703(G)(1).

In 2015, Petitioners filed a lawsuit in Common Pleas at Docket No. CV-

2015-011267 against numerous defendants (2015 Litigation) over which the

Common Pleas Judges, now disqualified,6 previously presided. See Petition at 3-4;

see also Petition ¶¶ 10-12. On October 4, 2021, Petitioners filed a complaint in

mandamus in Common Pleas seeking to compel Moulton, in his role as Pennsylvania

Court Administrator, to notify the JCB pursuant to Rule 703(G)(1), that the Common

Pleas Judges failed to report and/or timely report decisions in the 2015 Litigation

that remained undecided after 90 days.7 See Petition ¶¶ 3-6, 10-20, 58. Moreover,

4

The facts are as alleged in the Petition.

5

Article V, section 10(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution declares: “The Supreme Court

shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and justices of

the peace[.]” PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a). Article V, section 10(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution

adds: “The Supreme Court shall appoint a court administrator and may appoint such subordinate

administrators and staff as may be necessary and proper for the prompt and proper disposition of

the business of all courts and justices of the peace.” PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).

6

Petitioners repeatedly reference in the Petition that the Common Pleas Judges were

removed, but do not state why they were removed.

7

Petitioners declare that they have access to Judge Green’s and Judge Dozor’s Rule 703

Reports, but did not attach them to the Petition due to confidentiality concerns. See Petition ¶ 57.

3

Petitioners maintained that the Common Pleas Judges continued to issue orders in

the 2015 Litigation, see Petition ¶¶ 50-53, and Judge Dozor manipulated decisions

in favor of the parties Petitioners were suing and with a blind eye to attorney

misconduct.8 See Petition ¶¶ 54-56. They also asserted that although Rule

703(G)(1) required Moulton to inform the JCB of the Common Pleas Judges’ multi-

year failures to list decisions that remained undecided after 90 days, he did not do

so. See Petition ¶¶ 58-59. Accordingly, Petitioners sought to have Common Pleas

compel Moulton to comply with his statutorily mandated JCB notification

requirement. See Petition ¶ 59; see also Petition at 15 (Ad Damnum Clause).

On October 22, 2021, Moulton filed the Preliminary Objections to the

Petition, therein asserting that the Petition should be dismissed due to Petitioners’

lack of standing, Petitioners’ failure to state a valid mandamus claim, and Moulton’s

sovereign immunity protection.9 Petitioners opposed the Preliminary Objections.

The parties filed their respective briefs.

8

Petitioners also contend that a Chester County judge who replaced the Common Pleas

Judges in the 2015 Litigation - the Honorable Robert J. Shenkin (Senior Judge Shenkin) - had a

duty under Canon 2, Rule 2.15 of the Judicial Conduct Code to report the Common Pleas Judges’

misconduct but failed to do so and, thus, must be disqualified because any decision he would

render in the 2015 Litigation would be “fatally tainted[.]” Petition at 4; see also Petition at 3.

However, because Senior Judge Shenkin is not one of the Common Pleas Judges whose purported

Rule 703 violations form the basis for Moulton’s purported Rule 703(G)(1) violation, see Petition

at 3-4 and Ad Damnum Clause, Petitioners have failed to state a cause of action against Senior

Judge Shenkin for which this Court may grant relief. Accordingly, this Court will only address

Petitioners’ claims as to the Common Pleas Judges.

9

Moulton also objected to the Petition on the basis that Common Pleas lacked subject

matter jurisdiction and previously appealed to this Court on that basis. See Moulton I. In Moulton

I (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 971, 1342 C.D. 2022, 133 C.D. 2023, filed May 3, 2024), this Court

transferred Petitioners’ mandamus action to the Supreme Court, stating that it directly implicated

the Supreme Court’s supervisory and administrative responsibilities. However, on July 16, 2024,

the Supreme Court returned the matter to this Court in its original jurisdiction, declaring that this

Court erred by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction where

4

On April 16, 2024, Petitioners filed the Motion to Enforce, therein

seeking to have the current Pennsylvania Court Administrator, Andrea Britt

Tuominen, Esquire (Tuominen), comply with the UJS ECOC and report the

Common Pleas Judges and their replacement, Chester County Common Pleas Court

Senior Judge, the Honorable Robert J. Shenkin (Senior Judge Shenkin) to the JCB

for violating Rule 703(G)(1), or risk sanctions. On May 1, 2024, Moulton opposed

the Motion to Enforce, declaring that the Motion to Enforce should be dismissed due

to the UJS ECOC, Petitioners’ lack of standing, and because Petitioners could file

complaints with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and JCB if they believe

misconduct occurred.10

The Preliminary Objections and Motion to Enforce are now ripe for this

Court’s disposition.

[Petitioners] . . . are not seeking mandamus relief against a jurist.

Rather, they are pursuing redress against [Moulton] as Court

Administrator, who is not considered a “court.” This mandamus

matter thus does not fall within th[e Supreme] Court’s original

jurisdiction.

Rather, the Court Administrator is an officer of the Commonwealth

government for purposes of the Judicial Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 102

(defining “Commonwealth government” as “including the courts

and other officers or agencies of the unified judicial system”). As

such, this mandamus actions falls within the Commonwealth

Court’s original jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1) (specifying

that the Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction in all

civil actions and proceedings against the Commonwealth

government).

Supreme Ct. July 16, 2024 Order at 1-2. Accordingly, Moulton’s challenge to Common Pleas’

jurisdiction is now moot.

10

Moulton also opposed the Motion to Enforce on the basis that Common Pleas lacked

jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court resolved the jurisdictional issue by transferring the

matter to this Court, see Moulton I, and this Court ordered that Petitioners’ Motion to Enforce

would be decided along with Moulton’s Preliminary Objections. See Oct. 3, 2024 Order.

5

Discussion

Preliminary Objections

Initially,

[i]n ruling on preliminary objections, [this Court] must

“accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the

petition for review,” as well as inferences reasonably

deduced therefrom. Garrison v. Dep’t of Corr., 16 A.3d

560, 563 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Th[is] Court need not

accept as true conclusions of law, “unwarranted inferences

from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of

opinion.” Id. To sustain preliminary objections, “it must

appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery,

and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain

them.” Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010).

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits

well-pleaded facts and inferences reasonably deduced

therefrom in order to test the legal sufficiency of a petition

for review. Id. A demurrer can “be sustained only in cases

where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for

which relief can be granted.” Id.

Robinson v. Pa. Parole Bd., 306 A.3d 969, 972 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), aff’d, 328

A.3d 467 (Pa. 2024). “Thus, th[is C]ourt may determine only whether, on the basis

of the [petitioner’s] allegations, he or she possesses a cause of action recognized at

law.” Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5, by McNesby v. City of Phila., 267 A.3d

531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).

Moulton first objected to the Petition on the basis that Petitioners lacked

standing to bring this mandamus action because they failed to articulate a substantial,

direct, and immediate interest in ensuring that Moulton reported the Common Pleas

Judges to the JCB, particularly when Petitioners were not authorized to know

whether Moulton made such reports. Moulton declared that Petitioners offer only

unsupported allegations against the Common Pleas Judges for which they could have

6

lodged complaints with the JCB, and they supply no examples of how they are

aggrieved by Moulton’s purported failure to comply with Rule 703(G)(1).

“In seeking judicial resolution of a controversy, a party must establish

as a threshold matter that he has standing to maintain the action.” Stilp v. Gen.

Assembly, 940 A.2d 1227, 1233 (Pa. 2007). “[T]he core concept of standing is that

a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge

is not aggrieved thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his

challenge.” Fumo v. City of Phila., 972 A.2d 487, 496 (Pa. 2009). “An individual

can demonstrate that he has been aggrieved if he can establish that he has a

substantial, direct[,] and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Id.

A substantial interest in the outcome of litigation is one

that surpasses the common interest of all citizens in

procuring obedience to the law. A direct interest requires

a causal connection between the asserted violation and the

harm complained of. An interest is immediate when the

causal connection is not remote or speculative.

Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf, 198 A.3d 1205, 1215 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2018) (citations omitted).

Here, Petitioners were dissatisfied with the manner in which the

Common Pleas Judges conducted the 2015 Litigation. As a result, it appears that

they obtained the Common Pleas Judges’ Rule 703 reports. Based thereon,

Petitioners discovered, despite that several of the Common Pleas Judges’ rulings in

the 2015 Litigation remained pending after 90 days, the Common Pleas Judges either

declared in their Rule 703 reports they had no outstanding matters, see Petition ¶¶

48, 51, or they “failed to file timely reports[] for a number of years[.]” Petition ¶ 58.

Although Petitioners spent a significant portion of their Petition declaring how the

7

Common Pleas Judges acted improperly, their mandamus relief relates solely to

Moulton, as the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania.11

Petitioners ask this Court to compel Moulton to comply with Rule

703(G)(1)’s requirement to immediately notify the JCB that the Common Pleas

Judges failed to file and/or timely file reports as required by Rule 703. In a passing

reference in their answer to the Preliminary Objections, Petitioners state: “When a

judge violates [Rule] 703 s[he]/he deprives a party (such as [Petitioners]) of due

process[.]” Ans. to Prelim. Objs. at 14. Although Rule 703(A) declares that its

purpose is to ensure that matters before Pennsylvania courts are concluded “as

promptly as possible,” Pa.R.J.A. 703(A), Petitioners failed to express an interest they

have in their mandamus action “that surpasses the common interest of all citizens in

procuring [Moulton’s] obedience to [Rule 703(G)(1)].” Phantom Fireworks, 198

A.3d at 1215; see also Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346

A.2d 269, 282 (Pa. 1975) (“[T]he requirement of a ‘substantial’ interest simply

means that the individual’s interest must have substance - there must be some

discernible adverse effect to some interest other than the abstract interest of all

citizens in having others comply with the law.”).

While Petitioners may believe if Moulton had reported the Common

Pleas Judges to the JCB, the Common Pleas Judges would either have been

sanctioned or removed from the 2015 Litigation, the Petition clearly reflects that the

Common Pleas Judges no longer presided over the 2015 Litigation as of at least

October 2021, so any sanctions the JCB could impose based on Moulton’s

11

Petitioners also raise that Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Court (AOPC) counsel,

Nicole A. Feigenbaum, Esquire’s representation of the Common Pleas Judges, Senior Judge

Shenkin, and Moulton was an impermissible conflict of interest. Under the Supreme Court’s

direction, the Pennsylvania Court Administrator oversees the AOPC. See Rules 501, 502, 504,

and 505, Pa.R.J.A. 501, 502, 504, 505.

8

notification would have been of no benefit to Petitioners’ 2015 Litigation.12 In

addition, in response to every one of Moulton’s references in the Preliminary

Objections to Petitioners’ 2015 Litigation, see Prelim. Objs. ¶¶ 20-23, 31-32,

Petitioners “denied the pendency of any litigation [wa]s relevant.” See Ans. to

Prelim. Objs. ¶¶ 20-23; see also id. at ¶¶ 31-32. Petitioners also failed to state

whether or how they were harmed if Moulton failed to notify the JCB of the

Common Pleas Judges’ Rule 703 violations, or what they might gain if Moulton did

so. Moreover, because article 5, section 18(a)(8) of the Pennsylvania Constitution

declares that any notifications Moulton would make to the JCB are confidential,13

Petitioners do not know whether Moulton has, in fact, already complied with Rule

703(G)(1). Thus, Petitioners have not pled an interest in the outcome of this

mandamus action that is substantial.

Further, because the Petition does not reflect a causal connection

between Moulton’s purported failure to report the Common Pleas Judges to the JCB

and the 2015 Litigation, Petitioners’ interest is not direct. Moreover, Petitioners’

interests are not immediate but, rather, are remote and speculative, where Petitioners

generally assert that the Common Pleas Judges’ misconduct has been ongoing since

at least 2017, but they did not commence this action against Moulton until 2021,

after the Common Pleas Judges were disqualified from the 2015 Litigation. In

addition, Moulton’s duty to notify the JCB arose only if and when the Common Pleas

Judges failed to submit proper semi-annual reports. Thereafter, the JCB must

12

Pursuant to article 5, section 18(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, sanctions could

include: suspension with or without pay, removal, indictment, disbarment, impeachment, and/or

forfeiture of election for other public office. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d).

13

Article 5, section 18(a)(8) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in relevant part:

“Complaints filed with the [JCB] . . . shall not be public information. Statements, testimony,

documents, records[,] or other information or evidence acquired by the [JCB] in the conduct of an

investigation shall not be public information.” PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(8). Although Petitioners

claim to have access to the Common Pleas Judges’ Rule 703 reports, they do not know whether

Moulton reported any violations related thereto.

9

undertake investigations and may or may not submit charges against the Common

Pleas Judges to the Court of Judicial Discipline. See article 5, section 18(a)(7) of

the Pennsylvania Constitution.14 If the Court of Judicial Discipline receives charges

from the JCB, it must conduct a hearing to determine whether sanctions should be

imposed. See article 5, section 18(b)(5) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.15 Clearly,

even if Moulton made the necessary notifications, the outcome thereof would be

remote and speculative. Therefore, Petitioners have not pled an interest in the

outcome of this mandamus action that is direct and immediate. In the absence of a

substantial, direct, and immediate interest in having this Court compel Moulton to

act pursuant to Rule 703(G)(1), Petitioners are not aggrieved and, thus, lack

traditional standing to bring this mandamus action against Moulton.

In their answer to the Preliminary Objections, Petitioners claim that

Moulton’s purported violation of Rule 703(G)(1) may escape judicial review if this

Court does not grant them standing as taxpayers. They cite to Seeton v. Pennsylvania

Game Commission, 937 A.2d 1028 (Pa. 2007), to support their position.

14

Article 5, section 18(a)(7) of the Pennsylvania Constitution states:

The [JCB] shall receive and investigate complaints regarding

judicial conduct filed by individuals or initiated by the [JCB]; issue

subpoenas to compel testimony under oath of witnesses, including

the subject of the investigation, and to compel the production of

documents, books, accounts[,] and other records relevant to the

investigation; determine whether there is probable cause to file

formal charges against a justice, judge[,] or justice of the peace for

conduct proscribed by this section; and present the case in support

of the charges before the Court of Judicial Discipline.

PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(7).

15

Article 5, section 18(b)(5) of the Pennsylvania Constitution declares, in pertinent part:

“Upon the filing of formal charges with the [C]ourt [of Judicial Discipline] by the [JCB], the

[C]ourt [of Judicial Discipline] shall promptly schedule a hearing or hearings to determine whether

a sanction should be imposed against a . . . judge[.]” PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b)(5).

10

The Supreme Court in Seeton held: “[T]axpayer standing may be

granted when it ‘ensure[s] . . . judicial review which would otherwise not occur,’ a

circumstance that arises where ‘those directly and immediately affected by the

complained of expenditures are beneficially affected as opposed to adversely

affected.’” Seeton, 937 A.2d at 1032 (quoting In re Application of Biester, 409 A.2d

848, 851 (Pa. 1979)). However, unlike the petitioner in Seeton, Petitioners do not

satisfy all of the taxpayer standing criteria.

Taxpayer standing requires the party asserting it to satisfy

five factors:

(1) the governmental action would otherwise go

unchallenged;

(2) those directly and immediately affected by the

complained of matter are beneficially affected and not

inclined to challenge the action;

(3) judicial relief is appropriate;

(4) redress through other channels is unavailable; and

(5) no other persons are better situated to assert the claim.

Phantom Fireworks, 198 A.3d at 1216 (quoting Pa. Fed’n of Dog Clubs v.

Commonwealth, 105 A.3d 51, 58 (Pa Cmwlth. 2014), aff’d, 115 A.3d 309 (Pa.

2015)).

Even if this Court were to agree that Moulton’s purported Rule

703(G)(1) violations “would otherwise go unchallenged” because the Common

Pleas Judges “are not inclined to challenge” them, id., judicial relief is not

appropriate because Petitioners admit that Senior Judge Shenkin, who replaced the

Common Pleas Judges in the 2015 Litigation, was better situated than Petitioners to

raise Moulton’s failure to comply with the law. See Ans. to Prelim. Objs. at 13-14.

Further, there is redress available to Petitioners in that they could have filed

11

complaints with the JCB pursuant to article 5, section 18(a)(7) of the Pennsylvania

Constitution (authorizing the JCB to receive complaints from individuals) regarding

the Common Pleas Judges’ purported Rule 703 violations, and reported Moulton to

the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which is the body tasked with investigating

complaints by individuals (including private citizens) of attorney misconduct16 and

determining whether the allegations warrant formal disciplinary action before the

Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Board.17 See Sections 85.1 to 95.3 of the Disciplinary

Board Rules, 204 Pa. Code §§ 85.1-95.3. Therefore, because Petitioners failed to

satisfy the necessary criteria, they also lack taxpayer standing.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioners lack standing to bring this

mandamus action against Moulton.18 Accordingly, the Petition is dismissed. 19

16

Although Moulton previously served as a Superior Court judge, he was not a sitting

judge when he was Court Administrator.

17

The Disciplinary Board oversees the professional conduct of attorneys and ensures

compliance with ethical standards.

18

Notwithstanding, this Court cannot grant mandamus relief.

To state a claim for mandamus, a petitioner must establish the

following three elements: (1) a clear legal right to relief in the

petitioner; (2) a corresponding duty in the respondent; and[] (3)

the lack of any other adequate and appropriate remedy. Wilson

v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 942 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

“Mandamus is not available to establish legal rights but only to

enforce rights that have been established.” Smires v. O’Shell, 126

A.3d 383, 387 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citations omitted).

Baron v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 169 A.3d 1268, 1272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (emphasis added), aff’d,

194 A.3d 563 (Pa. 2018). Further, “where any doubt exists, mandamus relief will not lie.”

Kegerise v. Delgrande, 183 A.3d 997, 1004 (Pa. 2018).

Here, although Moulton had a statutory duty to notify the JCB of judicial violations of Rule

703, Petitioners have failed to show they have any clear legal right to relief in Moulton failing to

do so, if in fact he did do so, and they had other adequate and appropriate remedies to ensure that

Moulton complied with Rule 703(G)(1). Therefore, Petitioners failed to satisfy the criteria

necessary for this Court to grant mandamus relief.

19

In light of this Court’s ruling on Moulton’s Preliminary Objection to Petitioners’

standing, this Court need not reach Moulton’s sovereign immunity objection. See Highley v. Dep’t

of Transp., 195 A.3d 1078 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

12

Motion to Enforce

In their Motion to Enforce, Petitioners assert that Tuominen, who

succeeded Moulton as Pennsylvania Court Administrator, continues to violate Rule

703(G)(1) by refusing to report her fellow Administrative Office of Pennsylvania

Courts’ counsel, Nicole A. Feigenbaum, Esquire’s (Attorney Feigenbaum) clients -

the Common Pleas Judges and Senior Judge Shenkin - to the JCB. Petitioners

specifically claim, by failing to do so, Tuominen violated: Section IV of the UJS

ECOC) (Conflicts of Interest and Related Prohibitions), Paragraph C (Special

Treatment and/or Special Favors):20 (1) by improperly permitting her relationship

with Attorney Feigenbaum’s fellow clients, the Common Pleas Judges, to create the

appearance of influencing her not to report their judicial conduct violations to the

JCB, see Motion to Enforce ¶ 4; Section IV of the UJS ECOC, Paragraph E (Misuse

of Employment Position, Equipment, or Supplies); (2) by improperly using her and

Attorney Feigenbaum’s positions to actively cover up the Common Pleas Judges’

and Senior Judge Shenkin’s misconduct, see id. ¶ 5; Section VII of the UJS ECOC

(General Standards of Conduct), Paragraph A (relating to appropriate and lawful

conduct), see id. ¶ 6; Section VII, Paragraph B.i (relating to treating persons with

respect and impartiality); and (3) by disrespectfully treating Petitioners and failing

to act impartially, see id. ¶ 7; Section VII of the UJS ECOC, Paragraph B.iii

(requiring compliance with lawful directives unless such compliance would be

injurious to the health and safety of themselves or others), see id. ¶ 8; Section VII of

20

www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210211/021935-codeofconduct-000212.pdf

(last visited Dec. 16, 2025). “This Court may take judicial notice of public information on an

official government website.” Cunningham v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 330 A.3d 20, 23

n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025).

13

UJS ECOC, Paragraph B.iv (relating to appearances of impropriety), see id. ¶ 9; and

Section VII of the UJS ECOC, Paragraph B.viii (relating to intentionally false and

misleading statements), see id. ¶ 10. Petitioners ask this Court

to stay these proceedings pending potential resolution of

this matter by Teresa Ficken Sachs[, Esquire (Attorney

Sachs),] Counsel to the Supreme Court . . . , acting on

behalf of the Supreme Court . . . , and/or potential

resolution of this matter by applicable disciplinary policies

outlined in the Personnel Policies of the Unified Judicial

System, and/or [Tuominen’s] voluntary compliance with

[Rule] 703(G)(1)[.]

Motion to Enforce at 15.

Moulton opposed the Motion to Enforce on the following bases: neither

Tuominen nor Attorney Sachs are parties to this action; Petitioners lack standing to

ask this Court to stay the mandamus action and/or direct Attorney Sachs to enforce

the UJS ECOC; Petitioners offer no legal authority to support that this Court may

enforce the UJS ECOC; and Petitioners may file complaints with the Office of

Disciplinary Counsel if they believe Moulton committed misconduct.

Notably, the Motion to Enforce does not seek any remedy relative to

Moulton, who is the Petition’s sole respondent and the Pennsylvania Court

Administrator with the duty to notify the JCB of the Common Pleas Judges’

purported violations of Rule 703.21 Petitioners also failed to specify an interest they

have in their enforcement action “that surpasses the common interest of all citizens

in procuring [a Pennsylvania Court Administrator’s] obedience to the [UJS ECOC].”

21

This Court acknowledges that Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Appellate

Rule) 502(c) allows the automatic substitution of a successor when a public officer ceases to hold

office. See Pa.R.A.P. 502(c). However, “[a] person will be deemed a public officer if the person

is appointed or elected to perform duties of a grave and important character, and which involve

some of the functions of government, for a definite term.” Green v. Wolf, 176 A.3d 362, 366 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Werner v. Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331, 1337 (Pa. 1996)). Because he served

at the Supreme Court’s pleasure and not for a definite term, Moulton was not a public officer

whose position was subject to Appellate Rule 502(c).

14

Phantom Fireworks, 198 A.3d at 1215. Even if this Court had some legal authority

to enforce the UJS ECOC against Moulton and/or his successor, Petitioners failed to

express that they or their 2015 Litigation would be harmed or benefitted by this

Court doing so.22 The Motion to Enforce does not reflect that Petitioners have taken

advantage of their opportunity to register a private complaint with the Disciplinary

Board regarding a Pennsylvania Court Administrator’s purported violation of his/her

duties. Therefore, they lack traditional standing to file the Motion to Enforce.

Moreover, because Petitioners do not claim that no one is better situated than they

are to enforce the UJS ECOC and they have the aforementioned administrative

remedies available to them, they lack taxpayer standing.

Thus, for nearly the same reasons Petitioners lack standing to bring the

mandamus action against Moulton, they lack standing to have this Court enforce the

UJS ECOC against Moulton and/or his successor. Accordingly, Petitioners lack

standing to bring the Motion to Enforce.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, this Court sustains Moulton’s Preliminary

Objection based on standing and dismisses the Petition. This Court also dismisses

the Motion to Enforce due to Petitioners’ lack of standing.

22

Section IX of the UJS ECOC (Designated Sanctions) provides, in relevant part:

“Employees of the Unified Judicial System who fail to properly follow these standards of conduct

will be subject to disciplinary action including the termination of their employment. The

applicable disciplinary policies for state-level court employees are outlined in the Personnel

Policies of the Unified Judicial System.”

www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210211/021935-codeofconduct-000212.pdf (last visited

Dec. 16, 2025).

15

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Malloy and :

Edward C. Malloy, :

Petitioners :

:

v. :

:

Hon. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., :

Pennsylvania Court Administrator, : No. 493 M.D. 2021

Respondent :

PER CURIAM

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of December, 2025, the Honorable H.

Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Pennsylvania Court Administrator’s Preliminary Objection

to Deborah R. Malloy’s and Edward C. Malloy’s (Petitioners) Petition for Review

(Petition) based on standing is SUSTAINED. The Petition is DISMISSED.

Petitioners’ Motion to Enforce the Code of Conduct for Employees of

the Unified Judicial System is DISMISSED because Petitioners lack standing.