The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1402-24
OLDMANS CREEK
HOLDINGS, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE JOINT LAND USE
BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF WOOLWICH,
Defendant-Respondent.
____________________________
Argued December 11, 2025 – Decided December 17, 2025
Before Judges Mawla, Bishop-Thompson, and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. L-
0177-24.
Clint B. Allen argued the cause for appellant (Archer
& Greiner, PC, attorneys; Clint B. Allen, of counsel;
Jamie A. Slimm, on the briefs).
Matthew P. Madden argued the cause for respondent
(Madden & Madden, PA, and Aimino Law, LLC,
attorneys; Matthew P. Madden and Michael A.
Aimino, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Oldmans Creek Holdings, LLC appeals from a September 27,
2024 order upholding the denial of its preliminary site plan application by
defendant the Joint Land Use Board of the Township of Woolwich and
dismissing plaintiff's complaint in lieu of prerogative writs. It also appeals
from a November 25, 2024 order denying a motion for reconsideration. We
affirm.
In 2022, plaintiff filed an application for preliminary major site plan
approval to build an approximately 850,000 square foot warehouse on its
property situated along a county road. The plan called for "482 vehicle
parking spaces, 166 trailer parking spaces, extensive landscaping, stormwater
management facilities, decorative sound attenuation walls[,] and other such
related site improvements."
The Board held three days of hearings. In addition to testimony from
one of its members, plaintiff presented testimony from seven experts,
including: a civil engineer, a traffic engineer, a landscape architect, an
architect, an acoustical engineer, a professional planner, and an air quality
specialist. Plaintiff also adduced thirty-two exhibits into evidence.
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Plaintiff proposed two driveway entrances onto the county road. One
driveway would have a two-way stop-sign-controlled entrance, and the other a
right-turn-only exit.
The Board's traffic engineer reviewed plaintiff's application and
rendered a report in May 2023. The report noted, among other things,
concerns regarding the volume of traffic. The engineer opined the traffic
volume was underestimated given the loading berths and trailer parking spaces
in the proposal and the range of different possible warehouse operations,
which could affect traffic. The report sought clarifications on several issues,
including the number of loading berth bays, updated traffic pattern and impact
calculations, and whether deceleration and acceleration lanes were "required at
the site driveways."
The hearings on plaintiff's application focused on the traffic issues and
whether the lanes of travel entering and exiting the proposed warehouse
enabled safe ingress and egress of tractor trailers vis-à-vis traffic in the
roadway. Plaintiff's counsel and its civil engineer expressed a willingness to
address the issue by: investigating an acceleration lane; working with the
county, which controlled the road; and widening the road to provide for an
acceleration lane. However, plaintiff's traffic engineer argued it was safer to
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have a controlled driveway, which required trucks to wait until traffic cleared
rather than requiring them to pull into an acceleration lane.
Plaintiff's traffic engineer was also questioned about the traffic volume
and whether his report accounted for school traffic since most of the trucks
would be traveling toward Interstate 295, which required them to traverse a
school zone. The engineer opined the Institute of Transportation Engineers
traffic trip generation manual Code 150 (ITE 150) study accounted for such
traffic. However, his opinion was questioned because the study was conducted
in 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, when traffic was abnormally low.
The engineer disagreed and opined the 2021 conditions were not
aberrant because "schools were back in session . . . under normal conditions"
and the traffic study accounted for higher traffic volumes than any tenant
occupying the property would generate. He explained how the studies are
performed when there is no tenant currently occupying a property and account
for speculative traffic volumes. The engineer concluded the warehouse would
generate approximately 1,470 vehicular trips per day. He rejected the Board's
reliance on a planning guide promulgated by the New Jersey State Planning
Commission Office of Plan Advocacy, which stated a similar warehouse would
generate 8,180 vehicular trips per day.
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Plaintiff's architectural expert discussed whether the warehouse would
become a fulfillment center. He opined it was unlikely a tenant would turn it
into a high-volume fulfillment center. The matter was thereafter adjourned to
a second hearing date.
When the hearings resumed, the Board's traffic expert discussed the
traffic study and recommended a study with a five-year projection on traffic.
Although plaintiff's counsel believed the difference between the projections it
conducted and a five-year projection were insignificant, they reminded the
Board plaintiff was seeking preliminary site plan approval and would submit a
new traffic study for final site plan approval. The Board's traffic expert
disagreed with plaintiff's traffic engineer and expressed concern about the lack
of acceleration and deceleration lanes.
At the final hearing, plaintiff's counsel noted plaintiff received several
comments from the Board's expert, which it incorporated into a revised plan.
However, the Board's traffic engineer noted the changes plaintiff made had no
substantive impact on the prior reports.
Plaintiff's traffic engineer was questioned whether the study's numbers
were accurate if a high-cube fulfillment center were built on the site. He
testified plaintiff intended to build a traditional warehouse.
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The application was denied following a vote because plaintiff had not
met all the requirements to grant preliminary approval. The Board
subsequently issued a lengthy resolution in which it recounted the evidence
and testimony presented.
The resolution observed "the layout of the ingress/egress is an important
and necessary aspect of the site plan approval process that must be determined
at the time of preliminary approval." The Board concluded plaintiff "failed to
establish that the trucks entering and exiting the site . . . can do so safely and
without causing major traffic concerns along" the road. It found the short
acceleration lane for tractor trailers leaving the property and a widened
shoulder, which would cause trucks to sit on the roadway as they waited to
enter the site, had significant potential and probability of causing accidents.
The location, "configuration, grading, speed limit, li[ne] of sight[,] and heavy
traffic on" the road made "it unsafe for tractor trailers to exit from the site
onto" the road.
The resolution also noted concern with plaintiff's traffic study, and
recounted plaintiff's willingness to work with county authorities to widen the
acceleration lane and provide an updated traffic study. Although the off-site
improvements on the road fell into the county's jurisdiction, "the impact those
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issues have on the ingress and egress . . . [were] within the review and
approval powers of the [Board]."
The resolution also noted the Board members' "serious concerns"
regarding the accuracy of the traffic study and "great concern" that plaintiff's
"air pollution study was based upon the flawed traffic study." The Board's
findings also incorporated the planning guide because both parties referenced
it.
The above issues were raised at the subsequent prerogative writs trial.
The trial judge made oral findings in which he discussed the evidence
presented at the hearings and the Board's findings. He noted it was immaterial
whether plaintiff knew the type of tenant who would occupy the proposed
warehouse.
The judge focused on the ingress and egress issue, namely, the amount
of traffic passing the property's driveway, "which reasonably could affect
whether . . . the full stop [proposed by plaintiff] is the safest way for ingress
and egress." He found the property's intensity of use also affected the ingress
and egress. Although the judge did not fault plaintiff for not knowing the
intensity because there was no tenant yet, it was reasonable for the Board to
inquire about the issue, namely: "[H]ow intense is this use going to be? How
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many trucks are going to be leaving and coming from this site? Because that
goes directly to the issue of the ingress and egress and what would be safe
ingress and egress."
The trial judge rejected plaintiff's traffic expert's opinion because he was
not qualified to offer an opinion regarding intensity. He also rejected the
expert's opinion because, considering the prospective tenant was unknown, the
expert "need[ed] to err on choosing the higher volume[,] not the middle of the
road volume" set forth in his report. The judge concluded the intensity of use
was not known and plaintiff's opinion regarding intensity constituted "the
speculation of someone that's not an expert in that particular area." He found
the Board was reasonably concerned about this issue because it "didn't know
the number of cars going past the site [or] . . . the number of trucks that would
be coming and going in and out of the site onto" the road. Therefore, based on
these issues, the judge found the Board reasonably concluded "the full stop
may or may not be a good solution." Under the circumstances, the trial judge
concluded he could not substitute his judgment for the Board's, let alone find it
acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner.
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Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. It argued the judge erred when he
found its 2021 traffic study was inadequate and contested his ruling regarding
its traffic expert's qualifications.
The trial judge rejected these arguments and found the figures in the
2021 traffic study were "stale" and the Board had reasonable concerns about
whether the study's traffic count "actively depicted what the traffic is going
past this site." The judge reiterated his finding the Board "did not act
arbitrarily, capriciously[, or] unreasonably in raising those concerns."
However, the judge retracted his ruling regarding the traffic expert's
qualifications and whether he could opine ont the type of warehousing and its
effect on traffic. He clarified his ruling to note he "defer[red] to the
reasonableness of the Board," which "had reasonable concerns as to the extent
and intensity and the use of this warehouse." The judge found the Board could
reasonably discount the expert's opinion, notwithstanding the additional
testimony adduced about the expert's knowledge of the warehouse industry.
I.
We review municipal board decisions under "the same standard as the
trial court." Cohen v. Bd. of Adjustment, 396 N.J. Super. 608, 614-15 (App.
Div. 2007). This requires deference unless the board acted in an arbitrary,
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capricious, or unreasonable manner. Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284
(2013). "[B]ecause of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions[, zoning
boards] must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated discretion."
Ibid. (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965)).
"[B]oard[] decisions enjoy a presumption of validity, and a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the board unless there has been a clear abuse
of discretion." Ibid. (citing Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002)).
II.
Plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in finding the denial of its
application was reasonable because he ignored the fact its application met all
the criteria of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -
171. It asserts, because its application was by right, the Board had limited
discretion to take the drastic step of denying it. The judge ignored these
principles, and upholding his decision would enable a board to deny a
conforming application based on speculation.
Plaintiff alleges the record does not support the Board's findings
regarding the traffic safety issues. The Board's traffic engineer never testified
the proposed stop-sign control would create unsafe conditions. The Board
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ignored the fact the county had sole jurisdiction over the ingress and egress,
and the trial judge did not address this issue at all. Regardless, plaintiff argues
the driveways proposed in its application complied with municipal ordinances.
"Although municipal authority to regulate land use is limited to the
extent the Legislature delegates such authority through the MLUL, . . . the
Constitution provides that that delegation of authority is to be 'liberally
construed' in a municipality's favor." D.L. Real Est. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Point
Pleasant Beach Plan. Bd., 176 N.J. 126, 132 (2003) (quoting N.J. Const. art.
IV, § 7, ¶ 11). The MLUL requires planning boards to grant preliminary site
plan approvals if the proposed development complies with a municipality's
ordinances and the statute. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-48; Pizzo Mantin Grp. v. Twp. of
Randolph, 137 N.J. 216, 229-30 (1994).
Here, the applicable ordinance states that in the review of "any site plan,
the Board shall consider[ p]edestrian and vehicular traffic movement within
and adjacent to the site. . . . Access to the site from adjacent roads shall be
designed so as to interfere as little as possible with traffic flow on these roads
and to permit vehicles a rapid and safe ingress and egress to the site."
Woolwich, N.J., Code § 149-5(a). For these reasons, even though the Board
acknowledged the adjacent road fell within the county's jurisdiction, its
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decision was based on ingress and egress safety concerns arising from the
development's design.
Indeed, a board may deny preliminary site approval "if an applicant has
failed to provide pertinent information sufficient to assess [issues, which] . . .
may have a pervasive impact on the public health and welfare." W.L.
Goodfellows & Co. of Turnersville, Inc. v. Wash. Twp. Plan. Bd., 345 N.J.
Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2001). The Board's traffic engineer testified about
his concerns with ingress and egress design, notwithstanding plaintiff's traffic
expert expressing his preference for the stop-sign control over an acceleration
lane. Despite the traffic expert's opinion, Board members could still use their
own judgement to form their opinions. See El Shaer v. Plan. Bd. of Lawrence,
249 N.J. Super. 323, 330 (App. Div. 1991). Automatic approval was not
required. The trial judge did not err in finding the Board acted reasonably.
III.
Plaintiff contends the Board and the trial judge improperly focused on
the 2021 traffic study and did not consider its updated 2022 traffic study,
which addressed the issues the Board raised during the hearings. The updated
study was conducted after the end of COVID-19 restrictions and the reopening
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of a nearby school. Each side's traffic expert noted the report likely used
higher estimated volumes of traffic.
We are unconvinced the updated traffic study was a game changer.
Preliminarily, we note the record does not contain the 2022 traffic impact
study, and the record reveals it was based on data collected in 2021. In this
regard, the trial judge's findings the data was stale because it was drawn from a
time when "one could reasonably conclude the traffic was lighter," was not
reversible error. None of the record evidence presented by plaintiff dispels
this conclusion.
The record shows the Board's traffic engineer requested information on
the traffic study on several occasions and plaintiff failed to provide evidence
its study reasonably and contemporaneously assessed the traffic on the road.
The trial judge properly concluded the Board acted reasonably because it was
"left with questions[ and] a lack of information[] as to the extent of the traffic
. . . which reasonably could affect whether or not the full stop is the safest way
for ingress and egress."
IV.
Plaintiff contends the trial judge erred in concluding the Board's denial
was reasonable because there was insufficient evidence regarding the intensity
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of the use. It reiterates its application proposed a traditional, singular
warehouse, "not a high[-]intensity[-]use space as inferred by the Board and
trial [judge]." This was further evidenced by the fact plaintiff's traffic
engineer relied on the ITE 150 to measure intensity and the ITE 150 is used for
traditional warehouses, not high-intensity fulfillment centers. Plaintiff's traffic
engineer testified the proposed warehouse was not a fulfillment center and was
unsuitable for high-intensity uses because it did not have enough height or
parking. As a result, the trial judge improperly rejected the traffic engineer's
opinion and incorrectly concluded he should have used a higher intensity
traffic analysis.
We have stated: "A planning board should consider off-site traffic flow
and safety in reviewing proposals for vehicular ingress to and egress from a
site, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7, [-]41(b). Pursuant to ordinance[,] it may condition
site plan approval upon a contribution to necessary off-site street
improvements, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42." Dunkin' Donuts of N.J., Inc. v. N.
Brunswick Plan. Bd., 193 N.J. Super. 513, 515 (App. Div. 1984).
Although the Board's resolution misstated which party proposed the
acceleration lane, the substantive ruling expressed its concerns with the ingress
and egress to the warehouse. Contrary to plaintiff's argument on appeal, the
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trial judge's ruling regarding intensity did not turn on plaintiff's inability to
name a specific tenant. Rather, the judge observed plaintiff failed to provide
the Board with sufficient information to assuage its "reasonable concern" on
the ingress/egress issue. This was not reversible error because the judge's
ruling acknowledged the deference owed to the Board and its concerns about
this issue were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
V.
Plaintiff reiterates the trial judge improperly found its traffic engineer
was unqualified to offer expert testimony about intensity of use. Although on
reconsideration the judge amended his prior opinion about the expert's
qualifications, it claims his decision inferred the traffic engineer was not
qualified.
This argument lacks merit. The trial judge retracted his ruling about the
expert's qualifications when he heard the reconsideration motion, and we are
unconvinced his decision was affected by the retracted ruling.
VI.
Plaintiff argues the trial judge mis-analyzed the Board's resolution
because the resolution was inconsistent with the testimony and record
evidence. The record showed two of the three Board members who voted
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against plaintiff's application relied on non-binding and non-controlling
criteria outlined by the planning guide which are not part of any regulation or
the municipal code. Moreover, the reasons for denial set forth in the resolution
were incorrect and conflicted with the testimony. For example, plaintiff's plan
proposed a stop-sign design and not an acceleration lane, yet the resolution
erroneously stated it proposed an acceleration lane. However, the Board's
engineer and members instead proposed the acceleration lane.
The MLUL requires boards to memorialize decisions made at meetings,
stating its factual findings and conclusions of law. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g); see
also N.Y. SMSA, L.P. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 370 N.J. Super. 319, 332 (App.
Div. 2004). "The factual findings set forth in a resolution cannot consist of a
mere recital of testimony or conclusory statements couched in statutory
language." N.Y. SMSA, 370 N.J. Super. at 332-33. The resolution must
contain sufficient factual findings and statements of law to allow a reviewing
court to know the basis of the board's decision. Id. at 333.
Pursuant to these principles, we have little difficulty concluding the
resolution provided sufficient findings to support the Board's decisions.
Because the Rules of Evidence do not bind boards, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(e), it
was not reversible error for the Board to rely upon the planning guide.
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Moreover, the Board repeatedly expressed its concern regarding the safety of
ingress and egress from the site. And plaintiff's experts testified they would
examine the possibility of an acceleration lane, even though it was not their
brainchild.
Although the resolution mistakenly referred to plaintiff as
recommending the acceleration lane, taken as a whole, the resolution
memorializes the Board's overall concern with the ingress/egress issue,
regardless of design. Ultimately, what mattered was the Board's vote. This is
because "it is well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments
and not from opinions . . . or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion." Do-
Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001); see also Fieramosca
v. Twp. of Barnegat, 335 N.J. Super. 526, 534 (Law Div. 2000) (rejecting a
plaintiff's argument the board's denial of a request for a field change of a
drainage pipe placement despite approval of major site plan application, where
the board's initial resolution did not include the drainage pipe condition, and
ruling a resolution does not constitute a board's decision, "but merely a
memorialization," and that a vote is a board's decision). In short, there was
sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find the Board did not act arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably.
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Affirmed.
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