The opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-11193
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
WENDALL JERMAINE HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
VALAIRE,
Nurse,
MARIA GARDNER,
Nurse,
BLANDEN,
Nurse,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00769-SPC-NPM
____________________
Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-11193
PER CURIAM:
Wendall Hall, an involuntarily committed resident of
Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”), appeals pro se from
the district court’s order granting the motion for summary
judgment filed by Antoria Blanding, Beatrix Valere, and Maria
Gardiner (collectively, “the defendants” or “the nurses”)1 on Hall’s
deliberate indifference, conditions of confinement, and retaliation
claims. On appeal, Hall argues that there was a genuine issue of
material fact about whether the nurses purposely delayed his
cystoscopy, whether he had an opportunity to dispose of his used
catheters, and whether there was a legitimate basis for Gardiner’s
incident report against him.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Delayed Cystoscopy
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo, construing all evidence and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Brown v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1990). Summary judgment
is appropriate when the record evidence “shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At summary
judgment, the district “court must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party” and may not weigh the evidence
1 Hall misspelled each of the Defendants’ names. We refer to them by their
proper names.
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or make credibility determinations. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
To show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact,
the movant must show that no facts affect the outcome of the case
that would lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-movant.
Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2014). If the
movant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant
to show the existence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact.
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atl., 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993).
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “a pro se litigant
does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment
standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact
material to his case in order to avert summary judgment.” Brown,
906 F.2d at 670. “[T]he nonmoving party may not rely solely on
the pleadings” to defeat a motion for summary judgment, but
rather, must rely on “affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions” to “show that there are specific
facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.; see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Further, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Likewise,
“mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations, as well as
affidavits based, in part, upon information and belief, rather than
personal knowledge, are insufficient to withstand a motion for
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summary judgment.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir.
2005). When the two parties tell “different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Nonetheless, “[a] non-
conclusory affidavit which complies with Rule 56 can create a
genuine dispute concerning an issue of material fact, even if it is
self-serving and/or uncorroborated.” United States v. Stein,
881 F.3d 853, 858-59 (11th Cir. 2018). A “plaintiff’s testimony
cannot be discounted on summary judgment unless it is blatantly
contradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as
a matter of law, meaning that it relates to facts that could not have
possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of
nature.” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir. 2019)
(citation modified). Otherwise, a plaintiff’s self-serving testimony
based on personal knowledge that contradicts another’s account
“presents a classic swearing match, which is the stuff of which jury
trials are made.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253
(11th Cir. 2013).
We may affirm the district court on any legal basis,
“regardless of the grounds addressed and relied upon by the district
court.” Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir.
2004).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for private citizens
against persons acting under color of state law for violating their
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constitutional rights and other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “This Clause applies
to civilly committed detainees . . . who bring § 1983 actions.” Bilal
v. Geo Care LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (2020). “Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, those who are civilly committed enjoy a substantive-
due-process right to liberty interests in, among other things, safety
and freedom from bodily restraint,” but this right is not absolute.
Id. at 912. We “apply a balancing test to determine whether a
State’s restraints on a civilly committed person violate that
individual’s substantive-due-process rights[,] . . . balanc[ing] the
person’s liberty interests against the reasons the State sets forth for
restricting the individual’s liberty.” Id. Further, the civilly
committed are due a higher standard of care than prisoners because
the “conditions of confinement for the criminally committed are
designed to punish,” while “those of the civilly committed are not.”
Id. (citation modified). Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights of civil detainees “are at least
equivalent to the comparable Eighth Amendment rights of those
incarcerated,” and, thus, Eighth Amendment case law is relevant.
Id. at 915.
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court addressed a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging three constitutional violations
brought by Romeo, an individual in involuntary civil commitment
with “the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child.” 457 U.S. 307,
309-10 (1982). The Supreme Court recharacterized Romeo’s
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claims as claims “to safe conditions,” “to freedom from bodily
restraint,” and to “minimally adequate or reasonable training to
ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.” Id. at 309, 314-
19. Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded the case because the
“jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the
proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment[’s]”
deliberate indifference standard, leading to a finding for the
defendants, when the Fourteenth Amendment’s higher standard
applied. Id. at 312, 320-24. The Supreme Court held that civilly
committed individuals, like Romeo, “retain[] liberty interests in
safety and freedom from bodily restraint,” but “these interests are
not absolute,” as they must be balanced against the State’s
interests. Id. at 309, 319-21. “[T]he proper balance between the
legitimate interests of the State and the rights of the involuntarily
committed to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom from
unreasonable restraints . . . [is] that the courts make certain that
professional judgment in fact was exercised.” Id. at 321.
Under this professional judgment standard, there is a
presumption of validity to any decision made by a professional,
meaning any “person competent, whether by education, training
or experience, to make the particular decision at issue,” and
applying this deferential standard, should minimize judicial
interference “with the internal operations of these institutions.” Id.
at 322-23, 323 n.30. However, liability can still be imposed under
this standard, but “only when the decision by the professional is
such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible
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actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323.
The Supreme Court emphasized that civil detainees “are entitled
to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish.” Id. at 321-22.
More recently, in Bilal, a civilly committed sex offender at
FCCC, Bilal, appealed to this Court the district court’s dismissal of
his § 1983 action for failure to state a claim. 981 F.3d at 907-08, 910.
Bilal asserted that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
were violated based on: (1) his conditions of restraint and
confinement during a 1200-mile roundtrip journey; and (2) his stay
in the county jail. Id. at 907-09. We noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment “applies to civilly committed detainees like Bilal, who
bring § 1983 actions.” Id. at 911. Further, “[u]nder the Fourteenth
Amendment, those who are civilly committed enjoy a substantive-
due-process right to liberty interests in, among other things, safety
and freedom from bodily restraint,” but this interest is balanced
against the State’s interests. Id. at 912. Specifically, “[o]nce the
State articulates a legitimate reason for restraining the civil
committee’s liberty, ‘the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised’ in
the times and way the institution restrains the person’s liberty.” Id.
(quoting Romeo, 457 U.S. at 321). After further summarizing the
professional judgment standard from Romeo, we stated that
Florida’s interest in keeping the public safe from violent sexual
predators is a legitimate state interest, so the next step was to
consider whether “each of the practices Bilal experienced in the
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name of this interest during his” roundtrip to and his stay in the
county jail were “inconsistent with professional judgment.” Id.
Additionally, in finding that Bilal stated a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, we relied heavily on Brooks v. Warden,
800 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2015), which held that a prisoner’s
conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment when
he was required to sit in his own excrement for two days. Id. at
914-15. We stated that “Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-
process rights are at least equivalent to the comparable Eighth
Amendment rights of those incarcerated.” Id. at 915 (citing Dolihite
v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996)). The “relevant case
law in the Eighth Amendment context also serves to set forth the
contours of the due process rights of the civilly committed,” and
that when a conditions-of-confinement violation occurs under the
Eighth Amendment, the same conditions would “undoubtedly
violate the higher standard owed to civil committees under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citation modified).
We have explicitly noted that courts should apply the
professional judgment standard when analyzing a civilly
committed detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, rather than
the deliberate-indifference standard. See Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d
308, 311 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994). Specifically, in Rodgers v. Horsley, the
defendants appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for
summary judgment on a § 1983 claim of an involuntarily civilly
committed individual, who claimed that she was not provided with
“adequate security” at the institution where she was raped. 39 F.3d
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at 309-10. Most of the opinion deals with the defendants’ qualified
immunity defense, noting that while Romeo clearly establishes “that
an involuntarily committed patient has a constitutionally protected
right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement[,] . . . for
purposes of qualified immunity analysis this right is far too
general.” Id. at 311. Nevertheless, we noted that “the deferential
‘professional judgment’ standard” was the proper standard to apply
to the civil detainee, citing Third and Tenth Circuit cases which
distinguished that the “professional judgment standard rather than
the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard” should be
used. Id. at 311 n.3 (quoting Romeo, 457 U.S. at 321-22).
The Eighth Amendment governs the conditions under
which prisoners are confined and the treatment that they receive
in prison. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Accordingly,
the Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials, who
“must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care.” Id. “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation modified). To establish a
claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must first, as a threshold
matter, show that he suffered an “objectively, sufficiently serious”
deprivation. Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024)
(en banc) (citation modified). The objective showing requires a
demonstration of “a substantial risk of serious harm” to the
plaintiff. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020)
(citation modified) (addressing pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth
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Amendment claims via the same test as Eighth Amendment
claims). Second, the plaintiff must show “that the defendant acted
with subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” showing
“that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own
conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.”
Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (citation modified). If the defendant
actually knew about a substantial risk to the inmate, he did not act
with deliberate indifference if he reasonably responded to that risk.
Id.
Here, under both the professional judgment standard,
advocated by Hall, and the deliberate indifference standard, applied
by the district court, Hall failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact that would make the grant of summary judgment to the nurses
improper because his evidence did not refute that the delay in his
treatment was caused by the availability of the medical specialists.
Applying the professional judgment standard, first, the
nurses’ legitimate reason for the delay in Hall’s cystoscopy was the
availability of the outside urology specialist. Bilal, 981 F.3d at 912.
Next, Hall failed to properly allege how the nurses’ actions
departed from accepted professional judgment beyond
conclusively stating that they purposely delayed his cystoscopy.
Bilal, 981 F.3d at 912. Nor did the nurses fall below sound
professional judgment because Hall’s evidence shows that the
nurses responded to his sick call requests and grievances and issued
him medication, and the nurses provided evidence that FCCC
placed an order for his cystoscopy. Bilal, 981 F.3d at 912.
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Moreover, the district court did not weigh the nurses’ evidence
more favorably than Hall’s evidence because he did not provide
any evidence that the nurses purposely delayed his cystoscopy
appointment. Bilal, 981 F.3d at 912.
Furthermore, the district court did not err in granting the
nurses summary judgment based on its deliberate-indifference
analysis. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. With respect to the objective
element of deliberate indifference, there is no genuine issue of
material fact about whether there is an objective showing of “a
substantial risk of serious harm” because the parties agree that Hall
needed a cystoscopy, and the nurses do not dispute that Hall
experienced urinary discomfort while he waited for his cystoscopy.
Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262; Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285; Reeves, 530 U.S. at
150. As noted by the district court, with respect to the subjective
element of deliberate indifference, Hall did not establish a genuine
issue of material fact because his evidence did not refute the fact
that the delay in his appointment occurred because the doctor did
not consider his cystoscopy to be considered an emergency, FCCC
prioritized appointments for residents with emergency needs, and
the urologists had limited availability. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262.
While Hall proved that he placed the nurses on notice of his urinary
discomfort, the nurses did not act with deliberate indifference
because they issued him medication and followed up with the
urologists. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. Thus, we affirm the district
court on this issue.
B. Disposal of Used Catheters
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In Bilal, as stated, we evaluated the civilly committed
plaintiff’s claims regarding the conditions he was subjected to
during transport for whether any of those conditions were
“inconsistent with professional judgment” according to a civilly
committed person’s Fourteenth Amendment due-process interest
in “reasonably safe conditions.” 981 F.3d at 912, 916. When
addressing Bilal’s claim that he was forced to sit in his own
excrement for 300 miles, we relied on analogous caselaw in the
Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement context. Id. at 914-
15. Because caselaw established that refusing to allow a prisoner
to use the bathroom for an extended period violated the Eighth
Amendment, Bilal, who was civilly committed and thus entitled to
“more considerate . . . conditions of confinement,” stated a claim
for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due-process interest
in reasonably safe conditions. Id. at 916 (quoting Romeo, 457 U.S.
at 322).
Under the Eighth Amendment, to prevail on a conditions-
of-confinement claim, the prisoner must prove: (1) objectively,
whether the deprivation is sufficiently serious to constitute a denial
of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
subjectively, whether the prison officials had a culpable state of
mind. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).
When analyzing the objective prong, we weigh evolving standards
of decency against officials’ need to keep the facility safe. Id. at
1307. The subjective showing requires that the defendant had
subjective knowledge of a risk of harm and disregarded that risk by
conduct that was more than negligent. Id. at 1312.
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Here, under both the professional judgment standard,
advocated by Hall, and the deliberate indifference standard, applied
by the district court, Hall failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact that would make the grant of summary judgment to the nurses
improper on the conditions-of-confinement claims because it is
undisputed that the nurses provided Hall with an opportunity to
dispose of his used catheters.
First, applying the professional judgment standard, there is
a genuine dispute about whether the nurses had a legitimate reason
to prohibit Hall from disposing of his used catheters in the medical
office because Hall’s affidavit states that the biohazard team did not
pick up his used catheters, that he did not visit the medical office
after 5:00 p.m., and that he got staff’s permission to visit the office.
Though the nurses provided evidence that Herbert (the medical
supervisor) did not give Hall permission to visit the medical office,
Hall’s sworn statements contradict that, and the nurses did not
provide evidence that blatantly contradicted Hall’s statements that
he had permission from staff more generally. Reeves, 530 U.S. at
150; Harris, 550 U.S. at 380; Stein, 881 F.3d at 858-59. However,
Hall failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine dispute about
whether the nurses’ actions departed from accepted professional
judgment because the nurses told him that he could request for
catheter supplies to be picked up and dropped off. Bilal, 981 F.3d
at 912. Nor did the nurses fall below sound professional judgment
because Hall’s evidence shows that he used a sick call request to
get more catheter supplies, so the nurses gave him an adequate
avenue to dispose of his catheters. Bilal, 981 F.3d at 912.
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Second, applying the deliberate indifference standard, the
district court erred in finding that Hall did not establish a genuine
issue of material fact about whether the disposal of his catheters
created a substantial risk of harm. In his affidavit, Hall stated that
the biohazard team did not pick up his used catheters, that he had
to store them under his bed, and that they were overflowing with
blood. Bryant, 614 F.3d at 1304. The nurses did not provide
evidence that blatantly contradicted Hall’s statements, thus the
district court should have viewed the evidence as Hall presented it.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Harris, 550 U.S. at 380; Stein, 881 F.3d at 858-
59. Moreover, there is a dispute about whether the nurses had a
sufficient reason to keep the medical office safe because Hall’s
affidavit stated that he did not go to the medical office after 5:00
p.m. and that he always got permission from staff. Bryant, 614 F.3d
at 1307.
With respect to the subjective element, however, the district
court properly found that Hall did not establish a genuine issue of
material fact because the nurses reasonably responded to the risk
of Hall’s catheter disposal by telling him that he could request for
catheter supplies to be picked up and dropped off. Wade, 106 F.4th
at 1262. Hall knew he could request additional assistance because
he submitted a request for new catheter supplies, and it was
fulfilled. Accordingly, the district court properly granted the
nurses’ motion for summary judgment because there was not a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the subjective
element of Hall’s conditions of confinement claim.
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C. Gardiner’s Incident Report
Under the First Amendment, a prison official may not
retaliate against an inmate for exercising the right of free speech.
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); see U.S. Const.
amend. I. An inmate may maintain a cause of action against prison
administrators who retaliate against him for making complaints.
Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1248. To prevail, the inmate must establish the
following elements: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected;
(2) the inmate suffered an adverse action, such that the
administrator’s allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3)
there was a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and
the protected speech. See Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250,
1254 (11th Cir. 2005).
We have recognized that a detainee’s filing of grievances
towards his place of confinement is protected speech. See Smith v.
Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). If an adverse
action―such as a dorm transfer―is taken by the facility against
the detainee in relation to protected speech, we must determine
whether a reasonable fact finder would have found that the facility
would have transferred the resident even in the absence of
protected conduct. Id. at 1278-79. If the facility would have taken
the same action regardless of the protected activity, it is entitled to
summary judgment. See id. at 1278. A prisoner cannot maintain a
retaliation claim when he is convicted of the actual behavioral
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violation underlying the alleged retaliatory false disciplinary report
and there is evidence to sustain the conviction. O’Bryant v. Finch,
637 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011).
Here, Gardiner filed an incident report against Hall for the
rule violation of going to the medical office without permission.
After being afforded due process in the prison setting, Hall was
found guilty of the disciplinary violation. Moreover, both Hall’s
evidence and that of the nurses demonstrate that Hall did not have
the permission he asserted; thus, the evidence demonstrates that
Hall’s non-speech-related behavior caused Gardiner’s incident
report, not Hall’s prior grievances. Accordingly, Hall’s retaliation
claim is foreclosed. Id. at 1215-16.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.