Ramirez-Bibiano

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JUAN RAMIREZ-BIBIANO Case No.: 25-CV-3429 JLS (SBC)

12 Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Facility

senior warden at the Otay Mesa Detention

15 (ECF No. 1)

Center, et. al.,

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Respondents.

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18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Juan Ramirez-Bibiano’s Petition for Writ of

19 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court

20 is Respondents Christopher LaRose’s (Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center);

21 Gregory J. Archambeault’s (Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

22 San Diego Field Office); Todd Lyons’s (Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs

23 Enforcement); Kristi Noem’s (Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security); and

24 Pamela Bondi’s (U.S. Attorney General) (collectively, “Respondents”) Return to Habeas

25 Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 6) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 7). For the

26 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

27 Habeas Corpus.

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1 BACKGROUND

2 Petitioner, a Mexican national, alleges that he has been detained by the United States

3 Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement

4 (“ICE”) division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center following a routine check in with ICE

5 on July 23, 2025. Pet. ¶¶ 1–2. Petitioner has resided in San Diego with his United States

6 citizen wife and children for over thirteen years and possesses a valid California Driver’s

7 license and an Employment Authorization Document. Id. ¶ 4. He was released on his most

8 recent grant of parole at the time of his detention. Id. ¶¶ 3–5. Petitioner now argues that

9 he is detained in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the accompanying

10 regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 6.

11 LEGAL STANDARD

12 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the

13 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of

14 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial

15 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the

16 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,

17 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.

18 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising

19 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—

20 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales,

21 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,

22 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

23 (citations omitted).

24 DISCUSSION

25 Respondents first argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(g)

26 and § 1225 (b)(9) and that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Ret. at

27 7–9. Respondents then argue, if the Court finds jurisdiction and waives exhaustion, that

28 Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits because Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention

1 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Id. at 10–14. Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his

2 parole and continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, the

3 accompanying regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pet. ¶ 6.

4 I. Jurisdiction

5 Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or

6 claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney

7 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any

8 alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents claim that Petitioner’s claims

9 “necessarily arise from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence

10 proceedings and adjudicate cases.” Ret. at 8 (simplified). The Court disagrees.

11 Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions

12 that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,

13 adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631,

14 2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-

15 Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). Section 1252(g) “does not

16 prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion

17 connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.

18 Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’

19 objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their

20 constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”).

21 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings

22 or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Traverse at 4. Rather, Petitioner is

23 challenging the legality of his parole revocation, alleged wrongful arrest, and continued

24 detention. See id. Petitioner is enforcing his “constitutional rights to due process in the

25 context of the removal proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any

26 removal order.” Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4

27 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction.

28 See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez v. Larose et al., 25-cv-2396 JES (MMP), 2025 WL 2770629,

1 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the Court had jurisdiction in a similar matter);

2 Noori v. Larose et al., 25-cv-1824 GPC (MSB), 2025 WL 2800149, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Oct.

3 1, 2025) (same).

4 Section 1252(b)(9) provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact,

5 including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising

6 from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States

7 under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this

8 section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added). Respondents argue that Petitioner is

9 challenging “the government’s decision and action to detain” during removal proceedings.

10 Ret. at 10. Respondents assert that the decision to detain Petitioner arises from the

11 “decision to commence removal proceedings” and thus is “an action taken . . . to remove

12 [him] from the United States.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)). Respondents conclude

13 that the Court lacks jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9). Id. Again, the Court disagrees.

14 Section 1252(b)(9) “has built-in limits, specifically, claims that are independent of

15 or collateral to the removal process do not fall within the scope” of § 1252(b)(9).

16 Gonzalez v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th

17 Cir. 2020) (citing J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal

18 quotation marks omitted)). “[C]laims challenging the legality of detention pursuant to an

19 immigration detainer are independent of the removal process.” Id.; see also Garcia, 2025

20 WL 2549431, at *3–4; Nielson v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019) (quoting Jennings, 583

21 U.S. at 294) (finding § 1252(b)(9) did not strip the court of jurisdiction because the

22 petitioners were “not asking for review of an order of removal; they [were] not challenging

23 the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal (as opposed to the decision

24 to deny them bond hearings); and they [were] not even challenging any part of the process

25 by which their removability w[ould] be determined”).

26 Here, as discussed above, Petitioner is not challenging the Department of Homeland

27 Security’s decision to commence removal proceedings or to adjudicate removability. See

28 Traverse at 4. Petitioner is instead challenging Respondents’ re-detention and revocation

1 of his conditional parole. See id. at 3–4. Therefore, § 1252(b)(9) also does not strip the

2 Court of jurisdiction.

3 II. Exhaustion

4 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required.” Acevedo-Carranza v.

5 Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2004). While 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically

6 require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus,” the

7 Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available

8 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez

9 v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by, Fernandez-

10 Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). Prudential exhaustion may be required if: “(1)

11 agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and

12 reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate

13 bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the

14 agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v.

15 Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d

16 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[A] court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if

17 ‘administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative

18 remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative

19 proceedings would be void.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017)

20 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)).

21 The Court, following other courts in this District, finds that exhaustion would be

22 futile because the Board of Immigration Appeals is obligated to apply the binding

23 precedent of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) to find that

24 detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See, e.g., Garcia, 2025 WL 2549431,

25 at *4–5; Valdovinos v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2439 TWR (KSC), slip op. at 9 (S.D. Cal.

26 Sept. 25, 2025). Therefore, the Court concludes that exhausting administrative remedies

27 would be futile.

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1 III. Merits

2 A. Due Process

3 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or

4 consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. See

5 Pet. ¶¶ 40–51. The Court agrees.

6 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,

7 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due

8 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether

9 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

10 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles

11 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,

12 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the

13 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127

14 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose

15 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their

16 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July

17 25, 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an

18 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to

19 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that

20 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the

21 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).

22 “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending

23 removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected

24 liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing

25 Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).

26 Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

27 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and

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1 constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 11. The Court disagrees. Petitioner has been paroled

2 into the United States on numerous occasions, was granted a one-year parole extension on

3 July 31, 2023, and most recently paroled on February 13, 2025. Pet. ¶ 3. Petitioner is not

4 a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in the

5 United States for over thirteen years. Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for

6 admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty

7 interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4

8 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a

9 determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the

10 community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no

11 longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an

12 ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This

13 substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due

14 process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL

15 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest

16 in his release).

17 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires

18 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,

19 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient

20 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. See

21 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be

22 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

23 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

24 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function

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1 If Respondents unlawfully terminated Petitioner’s parole, which the Court finds to be so, then the Court

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need not address whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), as Respondents

28 cannot detain him without first properly revoking his parole. See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, No. 25-cv-965-SI,

1 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

2 procedural requirement would entail.” Id.

3 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s

4 revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be

5 heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has

6 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his conditional parole.

7 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of

8 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.”

9 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with his family and

10 continuing the process of adjusting status to a lawful permanent resident and seeking a U

11 Visa. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can

12 be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other

13 enduring attachments of normal life.”).

14 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s

15 parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an

16 opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶ 25. Petitioner was paroled on multiple occasions because

17 he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that

18 these findings have changed. Pet. ¶ 29; Traverse at 8; see Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp.

19 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that

20 the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no

21 criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, married a U.S.

22 citizen, and is working towards becoming a lawful permanent resident. Pet ¶¶ 22–24.

23 “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him

24 merely because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760.

25 “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed

26 circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a

27 flight risk. . . .” Id. Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in

28 their Return, do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would

1 warrant reconsideration of his parole. See generally Ret. “Where, as here, ‘the petitioner

2 has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

3 liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to

4 determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921,

5 at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at

6 *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned up).

7 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,

8 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,

9 at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the

10 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps

11 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail

12 to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,

13 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.

14 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in

15 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.

16 Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025)

17 (granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole

18 without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting

19 a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her

20 preexisting parole on due process grounds).2

21 B. Attorney’s Fees

22 Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal

23 Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 15. The EAJA provides in part:

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2 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition can be resolved

26 on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of the APA

based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of

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petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not state any reasons for the

28 revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized

1 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within

thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an

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application for fees and other expenses which shows that the

3 party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award

under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an

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itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or

5 appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended

and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

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computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the

7 United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the

position of the United States was substantially justified shall be

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determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the

9 civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.

10 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

11 The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under

12 the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment.

13 CONCLUSION

14 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

15 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner

16 from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. The Court ORDERS,

17 prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for

18 revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether

19 detention is warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and

20 convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.3

21 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by December 29, 2025, confirming

22 that Petitioner has been released. Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an

23 attorney fee application and corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this

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3 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025

28 WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez

1 |}Order, and Respondents are instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of

2 || Petitioner’s attorney fee application.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 Dated: December 15, 2025 (ee

5 on. Janis L. Sammartino

‘ United States District Judge

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