Baccus

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTIAN BACCUS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:25-cv-00724

v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

CITY OF COLUMBUS DIVISION

OF FIRE,

Defendant.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend/Correct Case (Doc. 18) and Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES without prejudice

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend/Correct Case (Doc. 18). The Undersigned also RECOMMENDS

that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is about discrimination Plaintiff Christian Baccus allegedly experienced at the

hands of the City of Columbus, Division of Fire (the “City”). As told by his pro se Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff—a Black, 47-year-old man—was employed by the City as a firefighter in

“Recruit Class #119.” (Doc. 12 at 4; see also Doc. 1-1 at 3 (Plaintiff’s original complaint alleging

his employment began in October 2023)). He says he “worked hard to earn a seniority rank in the

top of [his] company, to pass all physical fitness tests, all academic subjects[,] and written exams.

[He] progressed through the Training Academy passing [his] 240 skills exam and State Firefighter

Certification.” (Doc 12 at 4). Additionally, as part of his training, he was enrolled in “practical

skills training” called “Fire Assignments.” (Id.).

Though not completely clear, it seems that during Fire Assignments, Plaintiff was

disciplined by his superiors for aspects of his practical performance. (Id.). He also experienced

“ridicule” at the hands of one of his instructors, and he alleges his superiors “lied” about him on

evaluations and elsewhere. (Id. at 4–5). Then on March 14, 2024, the City gave Plaintiff the

“option to resign or be terminated.” (Id. at 4). Initially Plaintiff opted for termination, but he later

“changed [his] decision to resign.” (Id.). Plaintiff further claims that other recruits who were

white or women were not treated similarly. (Id. at 4–5). For some, the City authorized additional

training; and for others, the City allowed enrollment in other recruit classes. (Id.). Plaintiff also

says he was “treated differently” because of his age. (Id. at 3). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the

City’s firefighter recruit evaluation methods are subjective and result in Black male recruits being

dismissed at a higher rate than white or female recruits. (Id. at 5).

While Plaintiff does not specify what claims he brings, his Amended Complaint can be

read generously as raising discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (See generally id.). He also

potentially raises a state law defamation claim. (See, e.g., id. at 6 (“I want the court to see that the

City of Columbus/Division of Fire award me for all of the defamation”)). As relief, he seeks

reinstatement with the City, compensatory damages, and possibly an injunction concerning the

City’s training and evaluation methods for firefighter recruits. (Id. at 6).

Following service of the Amended Complaint, the City filed a partial answer and a partial

Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 15, 16). Plaintiff opposes the latter and separately moves to amend his

complaint. (Doc. 18). Both Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and the City’s Partial Motion to Dismiss

are ready for review. (Doc. 16, 18, 19, 20, 24; see also Doc. 27 (order referring the partial motion

to dismiss to the Undersigned for a report and recommendation)).

II. STANDARD

Two federal rules matter here. First, Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that when a party seeks leave of court to file an amended pleading, “[t]he court should

freely give leave when justice so requires.” This rule, which allows a liberal policy in favor of

granting amendments, “reinforce[s] the principle that cases ‘should be tried on their merits rather

than the technicalities of pleadings.’” Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 388 F.3d 930, 936 (6th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986)). In exercising its discretion,

the trial court may consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part

of a movant, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the

amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Second, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663–64, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

In reviewing the complaint, a court must construe it in favor of the plaintiff and accept all well-

pleaded factual allegations as true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). Additionally, “[a]lthough for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take

of all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, ‘[the court is] not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Further, though pro se complaints are construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972), “basic pleading essentials” are still required, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th

Cir. 1989). Said differently, “[t]he requirement for liberal construction . . . does not translate to

ignoring a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim.” Kidd v.

Neff, No. 1:12-cv-40, 2012 WL 4442526, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2012). The complaint must

still “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain

a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

The Undersigned first considers Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend before turning to the City’s

Partial Motion to Dismiss.

A. Motion to Amend

Plaintiff’s request to file a second amended complaint is brief. He states:

As a result of the discrimination I have endured from [Defendant], I have

experienced a medical emergency that resulted in a break of my emotional well-

being. I was recently terminated from my job due to this medical emergency

without checking to see what my medical status was. This break resulted in damage

to my character. Please allow me to amend my case to reflect the nature of these

events.

(Doc. 18 (citation modified)). Because Plaintiff did not attach a proposed amendment to his

Motion, the Undersigned is uncertain from this scant description exactly what claims or allegations

Plaintiff seeks to add. The City infers from Plaintiff’s Motion that he wants to allege additional

damages and potentially an unspecified new claim. (Doc. 24 (arguing such an amendment would

be alternatively unnecessary or futile)). Without more, though, the Court cannot sufficiently

evaluate Plaintiff’s request. See, e.g., Gales v. Charles, No. 2:21-CV-328, 2023 WL 3984307, at

*4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2023) (denying without prejudice a motion for leave to amend where the

plaintiff did not attach the proposed amendment because “the Court cannot review the same for

futility”)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 18) is DENIED without prejudice. If

Plaintiff still wishes to file a second amended complaint, he must file a motion with the proposed

amendment attached.

Tangentially, Plaintiff recently filed a document entitled “Causes of Action.” (Doc. 26).

The Undersigned is unsure what Plaintiff intends this filing to be. It lists claims and relief with

some elaboration, but not much. (Id.). Additionally, it is unsigned. (Id.). To the extent this is

supposed to be another request to amend, Plaintiff must file a formal motion, attach the proposed

amendment, and sign his filings.

B. Partial Motion to Dismiss

The Undersigned next turns to the City’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16). The City

reads Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as raising state law defamation claims. (Id.; see also Doc.

12 at 5 (“It’s despicable and disrespectful to blatantly lie on someone . . . There are several

Columbus Division of Fire documents (training evaluations and others) that are flat out lies.”) (“I

did not die! This is another lie.”), 6 (“[T]hey lied on me but they knew that they were all lies.”)).

To the extent it does, the City argues, the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

(Doc. 16 at 2–4). The Undersigned agrees.

Under Ohio law, an action for libel and slander must be brought “within one year after the

cause of action accrued.” Ohio Revised Code § 2305.11(A). “The rule has long been that ‘the

statute of limitations begins to run when the allegedly defamatory words are first spoken or

published regardless of the aggrieved party’s knowledge of them.’” Haas v. TruPartner Credit

Union, Inc., No. 1:22-CV-678, 2024 WL 3925724, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2024) (quoting

Friedler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 86 F. App’x 50, 53 (6th Cir. 2003)). A

narrow exception exists for claims of libel “when the publication of libelous statements was

secretive, concealed, or otherwise unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of the publication.”

Weidman v. Hildebrant, 254 N.E.3d 2, 10 (Ohio 2024). In that rare case, the statute of limitations

is subject to the discovery rule, which states “a cause of action does not arise until the plaintiff

discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that he or she was

injured by the wrongful conduct of the defendant.” Id. at 7 (citation omitted). But, “when the

defamed person gains knowledge of the defamatory statements within the statute-of-limitations

period, the discovery rule is not applicable.” Id. at 10.

Here, Plaintiff states that he resigned on March 14, 2024. (Doc. 12 at 4). The City contends

the Amended Complaint alleges defamatory statements that were made only while Plaintiff was

still employed. (Doc. 16). Therefore, any defamation cause of action accrued at the very latest on

March 14, 2024. (Id.). And because Plaintiff did not file this action until June 30, 2025, his

defamation claims are time-barred. (Id.).

To be sure, it is difficult to ascertain from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint exactly when

the conduct underlying the alleged defamation occurred. Plaintiff alleges that the City lied on

evaluations, which the Undersigned can infer were written prior to Plaintiff’s resignation. (See

Doc. 12 at 5). But it is not wholly clear when other “lies” were first spoken or published. (See,

e.g., id. at 6 (asking that the City hold certain officers accountable for lies that made Plaintiff “look

like [he was] incompetent and incapable of doing this job” but not specifying when the statements

occurred)). And Plaintiff’s one-sentence substantive response to the City’s Motion does not help

much. (Doc. 19 at 3 (“The Defendant clearly is aware that some of the facts of this case took place

beyond the inferred statute of limitation.”)).

Ultimately, though, the Undersigned need not designate the exact day any of the allegedly

defamatory statements happened. As stated, Ohio law is clear that an action for defamation must

be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued, and the general rule is the statute of

limitations begins to run when the defendant first speaks or publishes the allegedly defamatory

words. See Ohio Revised Code § 2305.11(A); Haas, 2024 WL 3925724, at *3. The Court need

not depart from the general rule because Plaintiff does not allege published statements were

“secretive, concealed, or otherwise unknowable . . . due to the nature of the publication.”

Weidman, 254 N.E.3d at 10; (cf. e.g., Doc. 12 at 5 (alleging “lies” written on training evaluations)).

And the allegations do not, even liberally construed, allow for an inference that he learned of the

publication of any libelous statements outside of the one-year statute of limitations period. (See

generally Doc. 12). So, the narrow discovery rule cannot apply. Weidman, 254 N.E.3d at 10 (“We

do little more today than recognize, again, though in a new context, that a plaintiff cannot be said

to have slept on his rights when he was unaware that he was injured.”).

Taken together, this means that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint may assert defamation

claims only for statements spoken or published on or after June 30, 2024—within one year of when

he initiated this action. Any prior claims are time-barred. See also Friedler, 86 F. App’x at 55

(“The Ohio courts have consistently rejected efforts to restart the statute of limitations in a

defamation action where allegedly defamatory information, which has already been published or

spoken, is republished or retransmitted to new consumers.”).

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint raises pendant state law

defamation claims for conduct that took place before June 30, 2024, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS those claims be DISMISSED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to

Amend/Correct Case (Doc. 18). The Undersigned also RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) be GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 15, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).