Com. v. Ashford, A.

J-S42023-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

ANTHONY ASHFORD :

:

Appellant : No. 688 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002877-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2025

Appellant, Anthony Ashford, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following his

negotiated plea of nolo contendere to simple assault.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows.

On June 10, 2022, Rahn Jacobs was in his apartment in Steelton when he

heard a knock at the door. Upon opening the door, he encountered Appellant,

who rushed at him, threw a cable box at Mr. Jacobs, and engaged in a physical

fight with him, leaving red marks on the side of Mr. Jacobs’ face. Mr. Jacobs

managed to subdue Appellant on the living room floor until police officers

arrived on the scene. At the time, Appellant appeared to be under the

influence of drugs and was bleeding from a large gash on his forehead. The

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701.

J-S42023-25

altercation ultimately left a large blood stain on the living room carpet.

Officers placed Appellant under arrest.

On February 26, 2025, Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to

the charge of simple assault by mutual scuffle;2 in return, the Commonwealth

withdrew a charge of criminal trespass. On April 16, 2022, the matter

proceeded to sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Jacobs testified that he

had lost $334.00 for damage to personal items that were destroyed during

the incident and to the door. Laura Armstrong, who had been in the process

of purchasing the apartment building when the incident occurred,3 testified

that she paid $4,060.00 to have the carpet in the apartment replaced due to

blood stain damage. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced

Appellant to four months of probation, and ordered restitution in the amount

of $325.00 to Mr. Jacobs, and $4,060.00 to Ms. Armstrong.

On April 28, 2025, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion,

arguing that the $4,060.00 restitution constituted an illegal sentence. On

April 30, 2025, the court denied Appellant’s motion. On May 29, 2025,

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On June 3, 2025, the court ordered

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on

appeal. On June 10, 2025, the court issued an amended Rule 1925(b) order.

____________________________________________

2 As a condition of the plea agreement, the Commonwealth amended the

simple assault to a misdemeanor of the third degree.

3 Ms. Armstrong closed on the property a week after the incident. (See N.T.

Sentencing, 4/16/22, at 15).

-2-

J-S42023-25

On June 20, 2025, Appellant timely complied.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution to the

landlord who was not a victim of a personal injury crime, as

[she was] not the landlord at the time of the crime, and is

not a “victim” under the Crime Victim’s Act?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

Appellant argues that the court erred by ordering him to pay restitution

to a landlord who, knowing there was damage to the property, purchased it

after the criminal event. According to Appellant, only direct victims, as

defined by statute, or other specific entities defined by statute may receive

restitution. Appellant insists that Ms. Armstrong does not qualify as a victim

who is entitled to receive restitution. Appellant concludes this portion of his

sentence is illegal on these grounds, and this Court must vacate the award of

restitution to her. We disagree.

Our review is guided by the following principles:

We note that [i]n the context of criminal proceedings, an

order of restitution is not simply an award of damages, but,

rather, a sentence. As such, [a]n appeal from an order of

restitution based upon a claim that a restitution order is

unsupported by the record challenges the legality, rather

than the discretionary aspects, of sentencing. Accordingly,

the determination as to whether the trial court imposed an

illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review

in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary. This case

will also necessarily call upon us to engage in statutory

construction, which similarly presents a pure question of law

and also implicates the legality of ... sentence. Thus, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.

-3-

J-S42023-25

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 585 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Further:

Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is

plenary. In all matters involving statutory interpretation,

we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501

et seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and

construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the

intention of the General Assembly.

Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best

indication of legislative intent. We will only look beyond the

plain language of the statute when words are unclear or

ambiguous, or the plain meaning would lead to a result that

is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.

Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if

the language is clear, we give the words their plain and

ordinary meaning.

Commonwealth v. Watts, 283 A.3d 1252, 1255-56 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Initially, we note that

the primary purpose of restitution is rehabilitation of the

offender by impressing upon him that his criminal conduct

caused the victim’s loss or personal injury and that it is his

responsibility to repair the loss or injury as far as possible.

For the principles underlying the restitution statute to be

implemented, the victims must be made whole.

Commonwealth v. Solomon, 25 A.3d 380, 389 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citations

and quotations omitted).

The Crimes Code provides the following regarding restitution:

§ 1106. Restitution for injuries to person or property

-4-

J-S42023-25

(a) General rule.--Upon conviction for any crime wherein:

(1) property of a victim has been stolen, converted or

otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially

decreased as a direct result of the crime; or

(2) the victim, if an individual, suffered personal injury

directly resulting from the crime,

the offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in

addition to the punishment prescribed therefor.

* * *

(c) Mandatory restitution.--

(1) The court shall order full restitution:

(i) Regardless of the current financial resources of the

defendant, so as to provide the victim with the fullest

compensation for the loss. The court shall not reduce a

restitution award by any amount that the victim has

received from the Crime Victim’s Compensation Board or

other government agency but shall order the defendant

to pay any restitution ordered for loss previously

compensated by the board to the Crime Victim’s

Compensation Fund or other designated account when

the claim involves a government agency in addition to or

in place of the board. The court shall not reduce a

restitution award by any amount that the victim has

received from an insurance company but shall order the

defendant to pay any restitution ordered for loss

previously compensated by an insurance company to the

insurance company.

(ii) If restitution to more than one victim is set at the

same time, the court shall set priorities of payment.

However, when establishing priorities, the court shall

order payment in the following order:

(A) Any individual.

(A.1) Any affected government agency.

-5-

J-S42023-25

(B) The Crime Victim’s Compensation Board.

(C) Any other government agency which has

provided reimbursement to the victim as a result

of the defendant’s criminal conduct.

(D) Any insurance company which has provided

reimbursement to the victim as a result of the

defendant’s criminal conduct.

(E) Any estate or testamentary trust.

(F) Any business entity organized as a nonprofit or

not-for-profit entity.

(G) Any other business entity.

* * *

(h) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following

words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them

in this subsection:

* * *

“Business entity.” A domestic or foreign:

(1) business corporation;

(2) nonprofit corporation;

(3) general partnership;

(4) limited partnership;

(5) limited liability company;

(6) unincorporated nonprofit association;

(7) professional association; or

(8) business trust, common law business trust or

statutory trust.

-6-

J-S42023-25

* * *

“Injury to property.” Loss of real or personal property,

including negotiable instruments, or decrease in its value,

directly resulting from the crime.

* * *

“Property.” Any real or personal property, including

currency and negotiable instruments, of the victim.

“Restitution.” The return of the property of the victim or

payments in cash or the equivalent thereof pursuant to an

order of the court.

“Victim.” As defined in section 103 of the act of November

24, 1998 (P.L. 882, No. 111), known as the Crime Victims

Act. The term includes an affected government agency, the

Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund, if compensation has

been paid by the Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund to the

victim, any insurance company that has compensated the

victim for loss under an insurance contract and any business

entity.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106 (footnotes omitted).

Section 11.103 of the Crime Victim’s Act defines “victim” as:

(1) A direct victim.

(2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct

victim, except when the parent or legal guardian of the child

is the alleged offender.

(3) A minor child who is a material witness to any of the

following crimes and offenses under 18 Pa.C.S. (relating to

crimes and offenses) committed or attempted against a

member of the child’s family:

Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide).

Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).

Section 3121 (relating to rape).

-7-

J-S42023-25

(4) A family member of a homicide victim, including

stepbrothers or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a

fiancé, one of whom is to be identified to receive

communication as provided for in this act, except where the

family member is the alleged offender.

18 P.S. § 11.103. “A ‘[d]irect victim’ is defined by the same section as ‘[a]n

individual against whom a crime has been committed or attempted and who

as a direct result of the criminal act or attempt suffers physical or mental

injury, death or the loss of earnings under this act.’” Commonwealth v.

Veon, 637 Pa. 442, 465, 150 A.3d 435, 449 (2016) (emphasis in original).

See also 18 P.S. § 11.103 (for definition of “direct victim”).

Therefore, this Court has observed:

[T]he sentencing court is statutorily required to impose

restitution under § 1106(a) when the Commonwealth has

established that the defendant committed a crime, the

victim suffered injury to person or property, and there exists

a direct causal nexus between the crime of which defendant

was convicted and the loss or damage suffered by the

victim. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a); see also

Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 842 (Pa.Super.

2004) (holding that restitution under § 1106(a) may be

imposed only for those crimes to property or person where

the victim suffered a loss that flows from the conduct that

forms the basis of the crime for which the defendant is held

criminally accountable).

Commonwealth v. Weir, 201 A.3d 163, 170-71 (Pa.Super. 2018), aff’d, 662

Pa. 402, 239 A.3d 25 (2020).

Instantly, the trial court observed:

As part of Appellant’s sentence, the court ordered restitution

to Laura Armstrong in the amount of $4,060 for damages to

the apartment following the crime committed by Appellant

on June 10, 2022. Ms. Armstrong testified at the hearing

-8-

J-S42023-25

that she is currently the property owner/landlord of the

apartment in which the crime occurred. In his post-

sentence motion, counsel for Appellant argued that Ms.

Armstrong is not a “direct victim” of the behavior that led to

Appellant’s criminal conviction and, therefore, an award of

restitution to her as part of Appellant’s sentence is illegal.

In addressing mandatory restitution, specifically priority of

restitution payments to victims, section 1106(c)(1)(ii)(G)

lists “any other business entity.” Therefore, a plain reading

of the statute allows a landlord to recover in criminal cases,

provided there is a direct causal connection between the

criminal conduct and the damage, and the restitution

amount is adequately supported by evidence. The

restitution statute obviously envisioned awards beyond

those to direct victims by including the different entities

listed, including insurance companies who are certainly not

victims.

Here, Appellant entered a nolo contendere plea to simple

assault on February 26, 2025. During the restitution

hearing, Laura Armstrong presented a receipt for carpet she

had replaced as a result of Appellant’s crime. The carpet

required replacement due to blood staining that happened

as a result of the June 10, 2022 incident.

Appellant may argue that because Ms. Armstrong was not

the landlord at the time of the incident, she is not entitled

to relief. Ms. Armstrong was in the process of purchasing

the apartment building when the June 10th incident

occurred. Appellant would suggest that Ms. Armstrong

could have chosen not to purchase the building thereby

preventing the pecuniary loss to replace the damaged

carpet. This argument is disingenuous. The policy behind

award restitution, in part, is to assign financial responsibility

for an offender’s criminal behavior. Here, the carpet was

damaged as a direct result of Appellant’s behavior, for which

he was convicted. Certainly, restitution could have been

ordered to Mr. Jacobs, the tenant, but ordering it to the

landlord who was the party that expended the funds to

make the apartment habitable makes much more sense and

complies with the law. While Ms. Armstrong was technically

not the owner of the building at the time, she was in the

process of purchasing the building and public policy would

-9-

J-S42023-25

dictate that Appellant should not avoid responsibility over a

technicality. Further, as the new landlord she would have

the responsibility of replacing the carpet and making the

apartment livable for any tenant.

Also the plain language 42 Pa.C.S.[A §] 9763(10) [relating

to conditions of probation] stresses that a condition of

probation can be restitution for loss or damage as a result

of a crime. There is no qualifying or limiting language in

that statute. As the restitution award was for damage that

was caused as a direct result of Appellant’s criminal conduct,

the award was proper.

(Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 3-5) (some citations omitted).

We agree with the trial court that it was permitted to award Ms.

Armstrong restitution. The sentencing court is required to impose restitution

where the Commonwealth has established the “defendant has committed a

crime, the victim suffered injury to person or property, and there exists a

direct causal nexus between the crime of which the defendant was convicted

and the loss or damage suffered by the victim.” Weir, supra at 170-71.

Here, Appellant entered a plea to simple assault, establishing his guilt for the

commission of a crime. As a result of that assault, Appellant bled on Mr.

Jacobs’ floor, necessitating the replacement of the carpet. Therefore, there

was an injury to the property. Further, because the damage to the carpet

would not have occurred outside of Appellant’s bleeding on it, the

Commonwealth established the required causal nexus to the damage.

Although Appellant claims that Ms. Armstrong does not constitute a

victim for purposes of the restitution statute, we disagree with his analysis.

The statute clearly provides the following. First, restitution is required where

- 10 -

J-S42023-25

real property of the victim has had its value decreased as a result of a crime.

See 18 Pa.C.SA. § 1106. Second, both Section 1106, as well as Section

11.103, provide that restitution may be ordered to individuals, as well as a list

of various business entities. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106; 18 P.S. § 11.103.

Section 11.103 further defines “victim” as “a direct victim,” or an individual

who suffered a loss of earnings under this act. See Veon, supra; 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 11.103.

Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary, the statute does not

provide that the ownership of the property must be established at the time of

the crime or provide any other time frame for ownership.4 Here, Ms.

Armstrong was in the process of purchasing the building when the crime

occurred. The value of the building decreased as a result of Appellant’s

____________________________________________

4 For example, Appellant cites in support of his position Commonwealth v.

Langston, 904 A.2d 917 (Pa.Super. 2006), overruled in part by

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 155 A.3d 69, 85-86 (Pa.Super. 2017). In

Langston, this Court held that the unborn child of a father who was killed in

a car accident and a mother who was rendered comatose as a result of that

accident, was not a “direct victim” of the crime. See Langston, supra at

923. This Court held that although the child was in utero at the time of the

accident, there was no testimony he had suffered physical injuries at the time

of the accident. See id. The death of his father and the injuries to his mother

were “indirect consequences” of the defendant’s criminal conduct, and thus,

the child could not receive restitution. Id. Appellant attempts to analogize

Langston to the instant matter based on the fact that Ms. Armstrong had not

yet purchased the property at the time of the crime. (See Appellant’s Brief

at 18-19). However, Langston stands for the proposition that there must be

“direct consequences” of the criminal conduct to award restitution, which there

were in this instance: Ms. Armstrong was forced to pay to replace the carpet

bloodied by Appellant during the assault. Thus, Langston is distinguishable

to the case at bar.

- 11 -

J-S42023-25

actions. After obtaining ownership of the building, Ms. Armstrong spent

money to replace the carpet, remedy the injury, and as a result suffered a

loss of earnings. To effectuate the purpose of the statute, namely, to remedy

the loss and make the victim whole, it was appropriate to order restitution.

See Solomon, supra. Therefore, the court did not err by ordering restitution

to Ms. Armstrong. See Hunt, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/15/2025

- 12 -