Zanzarella v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 24-239

Filed: December 15, 2025

MICHAEL ZANZARELLA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Steven M. Wald, with Michael J. Smith, Thomas S. Stewart, and Reed W. Ripley, Stewart, Wald

& Smith, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Emily A. Davis, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Natural Resources Section, with

Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAPP, Judge.

Plaintiffs seek compensation for the United States’ uncompensated taking related to their

New York properties. They now move for partial summary judgment as to liability. (Pls.’ Mot.,

ECF No. 38). Plaintiffs ask the Court to find that: (1) all source conveyances granted easements

to the Railroad; (2) recreational trail use exceeds the scope of those easements; (3) Plaintiffs

regained fee simple ownership of the land underlying the Railroad corridor based on their

adjacency to the rail line; and (4) the issuance of the Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”)

effected a taking. (Id.). The United States objects in part and cross-moves for partial summary

judgment. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 43). The United States variously argues the Plaintiffs cannot

show: (1) that they have an ownership interest in the rail corridor; (2) causation or a right to just

compensation due to the existence of an existing recreational trail; and (3) that the Railroad

would have abandoned the rail line absent the NITU. (Id.).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ source documents conveyed a combination of both

easements and fees simple. The Court also finds that while the pre-existing recreational trail does

not affect causation, it may nevertheless impact just compensation—an issue overlooked by the

Plaintiffs. To that end, the United States has taken a portion of Plaintiffs’ property for public use,

but several claims remain unresolved. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED-IN-PART

and DENIED-IN-PART for both Parties.

I. Background

This rails-to-trails case concerns a 41.1-mile section of rail line running from the

Connecticut/New York State Line (Milepost 71.2) to Beacon, New York (Milepost 0.0)

traversing Dutchess and Putnam Counties (the “Line”). (Compl. at ¶ 3, ECF No. 1; Pls.’ Mot. at

1).

(Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 6 at 7, ECF No. 38-6). The Line was previously owned by the Maybrook

Railroad Company (“MRC”), which in 1992 acquired 157 miles of railroad that included this

segment. (See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 13 (“Danbury Terminal R.R. Co. and Maybrook Properties, Inc.-

Acquisition and Operation Exemption- Consolidated Rail Corp., ICC Docket No. FD 32180

(Sub-No. 1) (served Dec. 29, 1992), available at 1992 WL 383337”), ECF No. 13). In 1995,

ownership of the Line transferred to the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (“MNR”).

(Pls.’ Mot. at 5 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 15, ECF No. 38-15)).

Under the Trails Act, a railroad may initiate abandonment proceedings of a rail line

before the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”). 49 U.S.C. § 10903; see 16 U.S.C. § 10502. It

is not uncommon for a railroad to abandon all or some portion of its line. The Trails Act permits

intervention by qualified private organizations or public agencies to railbank the corridor before

abandonment is consummated by agreeing to serve as a trail operator in the interim. 16 U.S.C. §

1247(d). The railbanking intervention process enables a railroad to negotiate with the intervening

2

entity, which then assumes financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating

it as a recreational trail. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (citing Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 6–7,

(1990) (“Preseault I”)). To allow for this process, the STB may issue a NITU. 49 C.F.R. §

1152.29. If the railroad and trail sponsor agree, then the parties notify the STB, the corridor is

railbanked, the STB retains jurisdiction, and “interim trail use is thereby authorized.” Preseault I,

494 U.S. at 7 n.5 (1990); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(h). If an agreement

is not reached, the railroad may exercise its STB-granted authority to abandon the line. 49 C.F.R.

§ 1152.29(d)(1), (e)(2); see Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. STB, 267 F.3d 1144, 1150–53

(D.C. Cir. 2001).

In December 2023, MNR filed a Verified Notice of Exemption of Abandonment

(“Abandonment Application”) with the STB. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 26, ECF No. 38-26). MNR also

requested a NITU with MNR as the trail sponsor, (id., Ex. 6, ECF No. 38-6), which the STB

issued on February 8, 2024, (id., Ex. 7, ECF No. 38-7). Per the NITU, MNR was required to

notify the STB of a trail use agreement prior to its expiration on February 8, 2025. (Id., Ex. 7 at

3). MNR filed for and was granted an Extension of the Interim Trail Use Negotiation period,

which is now set to expire on February 8, 2026. (Id., Ex. 158, ECF No. 38-158).

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The Parties each move for summary judgment. The Court may “grant summary judgment

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of

demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists

when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id.

While “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion[,]” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962), summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits

evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249–50 (internal citations omitted). However, the moving party “need not produce evidence

showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact but rather may discharge its burden by

showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

Dairyland Power Co-op. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). Courts may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[.]” Matsushita, Elec.

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v.

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). A trial court is permitted, in its discretion, to deny

even a well-supported motion for summary judgment if the case would benefit from a full

hearing. Lowery v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 28, 37 (2023) (citing United States v. Certain Real

& Personal Prop. Belonging to Hayes, 943 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1991)).

3

B. Discussion

In Trails Act cases, a taking occurs when “government action destroys state-defined

property rights[,]” either “by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is

outside the scope of the original railway easement[,]” or by compelling the continuation of a

railroad-purposes easement to accommodate negotiations for a trail-use agreement, even if the

negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful. Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019, 1025 (Fed.

Cir. 2010); see also Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The

determinative issues for takings liability are: (1) whether the railroad acquired full ownership of

the land (fee simple) or merely easements; (2) if only easements were acquired, whether those

easements were limited to railroad use or also permitted future use as public recreational trails;

and (3) whether any such easement permitting recreational trail use expired before the alleged

taking, leaving the landowners with full, unencumbered ownership at that time. Galt Auto.

Warehouse, Inc. v. United States, ___ Fed. Cl. ___, 2025 WL 3012202, *2 (Fed. Cl. October 28,

2025) (“Galt Auto.”) (citing Preseault v. ICC, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also

Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (outlining the

determinative issues for takings liability). Importantly, property rights are determined by the

operation of state law. Castillo v. Diaz, 952 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

This analysis becomes more complicated when a trail use agreement has not been

reached. The Federal Circuit has held that in cases where no trail-use agreement is reached, but

the NITU compels the railroad to delay its abandonment, the issuance of a NITU may effect a

temporary physical taking. Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1023–24. To show causation when no trail use

agreement exists, it must be clear that the railroad “had every intent to abandon the railroad lines

during the period of time that the NITU was in effect and was prevented from doing so by the

existence of the NITU.” Memmer v. United States, 50 F.4th 136, 145 (Fed. Cir. 2022). To

evaluate the railroad’s intent, the Court may look to a variety of circumstances, including: the

railroad’s initiation of abandonment proceedings, its refusal to extend the NITU, the timing of its

abandonment relative to the NITU’s expiration, the scope of authority granted under the NITU,

and whether the railroad undertook physical acts consistent with abandonment, such as removing

track infrastructure, etc. See Galt Auto., 2025 WL 3012202, at *3 (citing Sauer West LLC v.

United States, 151 F.4th 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). These factors are illustrative, not

exhaustive. See Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346.

Plaintiffs categorize their claims into five distinct groups, each defined by the type of

recording instrument used to convey the subject properties. (Pls.’ Mot. at 11). The recording

instruments fall within the following groups: (1) condemnations (“Group 1“); (2) deeds that

reference railroad purposes in the granting clause (“Group 2”); (3) deeds that reference railroad

purposes in the granting clause but also contain broader language regarding use of the easement

(“Group 3”); (4) deeds that reference railroad purposes outside of the granting clause (“Group

4”); and (5) deeds that expressly incorporate the General Railroad Act (“GRA”) (“Group 5”). 1

1

The GRA, passed by the New York legislature, was formally titled “An Act to authorize the

formation of railroad corporations, and to regulate the same[,]” passed on April 2, 1850. See

4

133089-6055-15- Rogers 0-1/497

21 Coyote Two, LLC

668289-0000 PLF000143-000193

133089-6155-11- Rogers 0-1/497

1 Michael Zanzarella

615684-0000 PLF000143-000193

133089-6155-03- Scofield 0-1/448

77 Louis Sebesta

125211-0000 PLF000197-000204

132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142

12 Dana Brown

829254-0000 USZANZ0000130-142

Anthony Chianese, Sr.

132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142

16 & Anthony Chianese,

860314-0000 USZANZ0000130-142

Jr.

James & Jean 132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142

23

DeBonis 880372-0000 USZANZ0000130-142

Homer & Jo Ann 132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142

45

Griffin 831232-0000 USZANZ0000130-142

132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142

76 Jessica Schleicher

870342-0000 USZANZ0000130-142

132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142

87 Brian Van Vlack

875357-0000 USZANZ0000130-142

John & Alexandra 134089-6856-00- W. Worden SC/151

18

Colbert 602005-0000 PLF000212-000215

Joette Forsblom Fero

133089-6356-01- White 0-1/435

49 Kane 2018

315608-0000 PLF001358-001375

Irrevocable Trust

133089-6356-01- White 0-1/435

85b Judith Valentino

272582-0000 PLF001358-001375

(See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 1). These Plaintiffs argue that New York law limits a railroad’s interest in

condemned property to an easement. (Pls.’ Mot. at 12–15). The United States acknowledges that

these properties were acquired via condemnation. (Def.’s Mot. at 18 (“[T]he United States

concedes that, in some cases, [the] Railroad acquired their interest in the corridor via

condemnation proceedings, as described in Plaintiffs’ discussion of their ‘Group 1’ deeds.”)).

The Court agrees with Group 1 Plaintiffs. Under New York State law, condemnations

convey easements limited to railroad purposes. (See The New York Railroad Act of 1850 (“the

GRA”), §§ 14–21, 25–26, 28 (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 8, ECF No. 38-8)). New York courts have

consistently held that the GRA statute does not permit railroads to acquire property in fee

pursuant to condemnation. Crouch v. State, 218 A.D. 356, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926) (“[T]he

general rule is that unless express authority to take a fee is given, the railroad company acquires

title only in the nature of an easement.”) (citing Hudson & Manhattan R. R. Co. v. Wendel, 193

N. Y. 166, 177, 179 (1908)); Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co. v. State, 38 A.D.2d 463, 464 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1972); People v. Helinski, 222 A.D.2d 788, 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding the subject

property was acquired through condemnation and thus the railroad could only acquire a

permanent easement, not title in fee) (citing O&W Lines, Inc. v. St. John, 228 N.E.2d 370, 371

(N.Y. 1967)). The law in New York is clear—a railroad’s interests in land acquired via

6

condemnations can only amount to an easement and not a fee title. Therefore, the Group 1

Plaintiffs succeed on this claim.

ii. Group 2 – Deeds Referencing Railroad Purposes In Granting

Clause.

Plaintiffs argue that for twenty-two 2 of their claims, there is limiting language in the

instruments through which the constructing railroad acquired its rights that limits the grant to

railroad purposes. (Pls.’ Mot. at 15–18). Plaintiffs assert that such language conveyed easements

to the railroad. (Id. at 18). The United States does not dispute Plaintiffs’ assertions. (Def.’s Mot.

at 24–25 (“[A]s described in Plaintiffs’ discussion of their Group 2 deeds. . . this is a clear

limited grant of land for railroad purposes only, and the plain language reflects the grantor’s

intent.) (citing Pls.’ Mot. at 15–18) (emphasis added)). Because the Parties agree that the Group

2 deeds conveyed easements to the original railroad, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are successful

as to this portion of their Group 2 claims.

iii. Group 3 – Deeds Referencing Railroad Purposes In Granting

Clause and Containing Broader Language.

Turning to Group 3, Plaintiffs note that Group 3 is treated separately from Group 2 only

because the Group 3 deeds include broader language about “the type of use allowed.” 3 (Pls.’

Mot. at 18–19). As an example of the “broader language,” Plaintiffs reference the Glenham Co.

Deed, which states in pertinent part:

The said party of the first part . . . have sold and by these Presents do grant

and convey to the said Dutchess and Columbia Rail Road Company their

successors and assigns for the purposes of constructing along and operating

thereon a Freight and Passenger Railroad as aforesaid and for such other

uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply said land that

portion of the lands of said party of the first part upon which said so laid said

Railroad line is so located . . . .

(Id. (citing Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 124, ECF No. 38-124); Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 (emphasis added)).

According to Group 3 Plaintiffs, the cited language affects the breadth of the easement,

not the character of the interest conveyed—i.e., fee versus easement. (Pls.’ Mot. at 18). For this

reason, Plaintiffs assert the deeds could only convey an easement to the railroad. (Id.). Once

again, the United States does not dispute Plaintiffs’ arguments. (Def.’s Mot. at 22 (“[T]he United

States does not dispute that the Group B deeds conveyed an easement to the original

2

The twenty-two Group 2 claims and the associated Plaintiffs are listed in Exhibit 2 of Plaintiffs’

Motion. (Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 38-2).

3

The Group 3 Plaintiffs and their associated documents are listed in Exhibit 3 of Plaintiffs’

Motion. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3, ECF No. 38-3).

7

railroad.”)). 4 Because this issue is undisputed, the Court finds that the railroad only obtained an

easement at the time of the original conveyance.

However, the United States cross-moves for summary judgment as to the Group 3 deeds.

(Def.’s Mot. at 22–29). In doing so, the United States asserts that, though the deeds conveyed

easements, they are “broad, general easements” such that they permit alternative uses, including

implementation of a trail. (Id. at 22). Because of this, the United States argues that use of the rail

corridor as a trail does not exceed the scope of the easement and therefore cannot constitute a

taking. (Id.).

The Court finds Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States to be instructive. 119 Fed. Cl.

76, 79 (2014), aff’d, 815 F.3d 809 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that case, plaintiffs challenged whether,

under New York law, the scope of the easement permitted the government to convert the right-

of-way into an elevated park. 5 Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 78. The applicable deed

contained the following:

[Grantor] does hereby grant and convey unto the Railroad Company, its

successors and assigns forever, the permanent and perpetual rights and

easements to construct, maintain and operate, without interference or right of

interference, its railroad and appurtenances within those portions of the

parcels of land herein described included between an upper plane and a lower

plane drawn at the respective elevations herein provided for as to each such

parcel, together with the exclusive use of the portion of the parcels of land

herein described included between said plane for railroad purposes and for

such other purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and assigns,

may from time to time or at any time or times desire to make use of the

same, subject only to the permanent rights and easement herein specifically

reserved to the [Grantor], its successors and assigns, in the portions of said

parcels of land included between the said respective planes.

Id. at 79 (emphasis added).

The trial court determined the deed “clearly and unambiguously” contemplated that the

easement may be used for purposes beyond the railroad. Id. at 81 (highlighting that the deed’s

4

While the United States declines to accept Plaintiffs’ “Group 3” naming convention, it

encompasses the same Plaintiffs and associated properties as those identified by Plaintiffs as

“Group B.” (Def.’s Mot. at 22 n.8 (“The Group B deeds in the United States’ Motion correlate

with the “Group 3” deeds in the Plaintiffs’ Motion. However, as described above, the United

States declines to adopt the Plaintiffs’ naming convention.”)).

5

For context, this case concerned a railroad built in the airspace rather than on the ground—

hence the term “elevated.” See Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 76, 79

(2014), aff’d, 815 F.3d 809 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (also referring to the recreational trail as the

“Highline.”)

8

language permitted use of the easement “for railroad purposes and for such other purposes as the

Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, may from time to time or at any time desire to

make use of the same.” (emphasis added)). The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, finding

that under New York law, the intent of the parties must be determined based on the language

found within the grant. Romanoff Equities, 815 F.3d at 812 (citing Dowd v. Ahr, 583 N.E.2d 911,

913 (N.Y. 1991)). Further still, when a deed’s language grants such a broad easement, it will be

construed as including “any reasonable use . . . provided the use is lawful and one contemplated

by the grant.” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Jacobsen, 499 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1986)). For these

reasons, the trial court determined, and the Circuit agreed, that utilizing the corridor for a public

trail and park fell within the plain terms of the relevant easement. Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed.

Cl. at 81, aff’d, 815 F.3d at 812–13.

There is no reason to depart from the Circuit’s clear rationale regarding this issue. Under

New York law, the Court looks to the language in the grant, and when the language is not limited

to railroad purposes, but “expressly includes other purposes for which the grantee or its

successors may desire[,]” the Court will not impose additional restrictions. Romanoff Equities,

815 F.3d at 812–13 (“The phrase ‘for such other purposes as the Railroad Company . . . may . . .

desire’ means ‘for any purposes’ or ‘for whatever purposes’ the Railroad Company may

desire[.]”). Plaintiffs cite the Glenham Co. Deed as “exemplary of the Group 3 deeds.” (Pls.’

Mot. at 18). In pertinent part, the granting clause of the Glenham Co. Deed expressly states that

the conveyance would be “for the purpose of constructing . . . [a] Railroad . . . and for such other

uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply to said land.” (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 124). This

language is no different than the language evaluated by the Circuit in Romanoff Equities.

Therefore, this Court finds that to the extent that the Group 3 deeds contain identical or

analogous clauses, conversion of the rail corridor into a recreational trail does not exceed the

scope of the easement.

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the present case from Romanoff Equities by raising two

points: (1) that Plaintiffs can demonstrate that imposition of a trail damaged their existing parcel;

and (2) the broad use language of the Group 3 deeds applies only to the railroad company and

not its “successor and assigns.” (Pls. Mot. at 26–29). The Court will take each point raised in

turn.

Plaintiffs argue that under New York law, a “dominant estate” is not afforded the right to

“significantly burden the servient estate nor its abutting land.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 26). Plaintiffs base

this argument on the Court’s discussion in Romanoff Equities which, after finding the relevant

deed broad enough to encompass use of the rail corridor as a public park or trail, states:

[U]se of the corridor for a public park would by the plain terms of the

easement appear to be clearly within the scope of the easement, absent

evidence that the new easement is not lawful or imposes some significant

new burden on the servient estate. There is no question here that the

Highline is a lawful project. Plaintiff has not made any allegation to

support a finding that use of the corridor for the Highline will impose

significant new burdens on the servient estate.

9

Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 81–82 (citing Gates v. AT&T, 956 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (2012))

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs assert that the recreational trail has “significantly burdened” their

properties, unlike in Romanoff Equities. 6 (Pls.’ Mot. at 27). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue their

remainder parcels are damaged “largely from [a] loss of privacy and security.” (Id.).

To support this claim, Plaintiffs state that their expert appraiser, Luke Nordine (“Mr.

Nordine”), analyzed New York real estate data and determined that, when applied to the Group 3

Plaintiffs, the recreational trail resulted in $693,900 in damages and a reduction in market value.

(Pls.’ Mot. at 27). Plaintiffs provide the Court with several pieces of evidence compiled by Mr.

Nordine including: (1) a spreadsheet purporting to show damages to the remainder of each

Plaintiffs’ existing parcels due to imposition of the trail; (2) a 24-page “damage” study; and (3)

excerpts from Mr. Nordine’s report regarding each Group 3 Plaintiffs’ remainder parcel and the

associated damages. (Id. (citing Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 159)). Nothing in Plaintiffs’ arguments or

evidence sufficiently demonstrates that the construction of a trail is a “significant new burden[.]”

In Lopez v. Adams, plaintiffs sued for damages resulting from the defendants’ repairs to

an easement over plaintiffs’ property. 69 A.D.3d 1162, 1162–63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). The

easement granted the defendants the right to use a private roadway across plaintiffs’ land to

access their own property. Id. at 1163. The court held that the easement permitted the defendants

not only to access the road but also “to carry out work as necessary to reasonably permit the

passage of vehicles and, in so doing, to ‘not only remove impediments but supply deficiencies in

order to construct [or repair] a suitable road[.]’” Id. at 1163–64 (alteration in original). In

reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that easement holders may take actions

“necessary to effectuate the express purpose of its easement[.]” Id. at 1164 (citing Albrechta v.

Broome County Indus. Dev. Agency, 274 A.D.2d 651, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)). Regardless of

this right, the court noted that the defendants were not permitted to materially increase the

burden on the servient estate or impose new and additional burdens on the same. Id.

The defendants did conduct repairs on the private road; however, the court found that

several of their actions during those repairs significantly burdened the plaintiffs’ property. Lopez,

69 A.D.3d at 1164. Specifically, the defendants (1) destroyed land features that had previously

prevented rocks, gravel, and earth from washing into a stream on plaintiffs’ land; (2) altered the

terrain of plaintiffs’ property; and (3) caused flooding on plaintiffs’ property. (Id. at 1164–65).

Although the defendants had the right to repair the road under the easement, these actions

“exceeded the [easement’s] scope.” Id. at 1165.

The Lopez decision illustrates what it means to “significantly burden” a servient estate. In

essence, a significant burden arises when an easement holder undertakes actions that

substantially interfere with the servient owner’s use and enjoyment of the property in a manner

not contemplated by the terms of the easement. Additionally, New York courts have explained,

“[t]he rights of an easement holder are measured by the purpose and character of the easement.”

6

For this argument the Plaintiffs do not assert that the trail itself was illegal, instead they choose

to rely on the argument that this trail has created a new and significant burden on the Plaintiffs’

remainder properties. (See Pls.’ Mot. at 27).

10

Whalen v. Town of Dover, 226 A.D.3d 847, 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024) (quoting Solow v.

Liebman, 175 A.D.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). As previously determined, conversion of

the rail line to a recreational trail is a use fully contemplated by the easement’s terms and

therefore does not, by itself, burden the servient estate. Although Plaintiffs contend that a trail

will diminish their privacy or security, such concerns should have been contemplated at the time

the easement was granted. Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 81 (“Under New York law, the

court’s inquiry into a general easement must focus on what uses were contemplated when the

easement was granted.”) (internal citations omitted). For this reason, Plaintiffs’ allegations of

lost privacy or security provide no evidence of a burden uncontemplated by the original grant

such that it could be construed as significantly burdening the servient estate or imposing a new

and additional burden upon it.

Next, Plaintiffs argue that the language of the Group 3 deeds differs from that in

Romanoff Equities, and is therefore distinguishable. (Pls.’ Mot. at 29–30). Specifically, Plaintiffs

argue that the grant in Romanoff Equities stated that the grant was for “railroad purposes and for

such other purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, may from time to

time or at any time or times desire to make use of the same.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 29 (quoting Romanoff

Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 812–15) (emphasis added)). The Plaintiffs compare this language to the

Group 3 granting language, which generally state that the grants are “for the purposes of

constructing along and operating thereon a Freight and Passenger Railroad as aforesaid and for

such other uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply said land.” (Id. (citing Pls.’

Mot., Exs., 121–130) (emphasis added)). Based on this, Plaintiffs argue that since the Group 3

deeds do not explicitly include the term “successors and assigns,” MNR, as the successor to the

original acquiring railroad, “has no right to use the easement for any purpose and is instead

restricted to use as if the broad language did not exist[.]” (Id.).

The United States rebuts Plaintiffs’ argument by first highlighting that the Circuit in

Romanoff Equities did not analyze the scope of the easement based on the “successors and

assigns” language. (Def.’s Mot. at 28). Second, the United States claims that New York law does

not require “words of inheritance for an easement on the servient estate to be binding.” (Id.

(citing In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Warrensburg Hydro Power Ltd. Pshp., 263 A.D.2d

822, 824 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1999) and Wilcox v. Reals, 178 A.D.2d 885, 886 (App. Div. 3rd

Dept. 1991))). Lastly, the United States points out that many of the Group 3 deeds do in fact

include the “successors and assigns” language, effectively nullifying Plaintiffs’ argument.

On appeal in Romanoff Equities, part of the plaintiff’s principal argument was that the

original easement “did not authorize the successors of the New York Central [Railroad

Company] to use the property for other purposes, such as a park.” Romanoff Equities, 815 F.3d at

812. The plaintiff raised several arguments to this end, first asserting that the scope of the

easement was limited to railroad purposes, but the Circuit found this to be incorrect as the grant

expressly included other purposes. Id. Even still, the Circuit noted that the cases on which the

plaintiff relied to make its argument all concerned easements that were “limited to a specific

purpose[,]” and therefore were distinguishable from the subject deed. Id. In making its analysis,

the Circuit stated that the subject deed did not “limit the purpose[s] for which the easement [was]

granted, but explicitly state[d] that the purposes extend to any purpose for which the grantee and

its successors wish to use the property[.]” Id. Romanoff Equities, however, attempted to drill

down even further by arguing that the ten-page easement document contained “only a single

11

sentence” regarding the “other uses” for which the rail corridor could be used. Romanoff

Equities, 815 F.3d at 813. The plaintiff argued it was impossible to conclude, from this singular

reference, that the original parties to the agreement intended the easement to grant New York

City—the successor—the right to use the property for any purpose it “desired.” Id. The Circuit

disagreed, finding “the document plainly authorizes such a successor to use the property for

such other purposes [as it may] desire to make use of the same.” Id. (emphasis added). From this,

the Circuit concluded that the granting document’s text was “exactly contrary to [plaintiffs]

argument that such a reading is ‘impossible.’” Id.

The Court acknowledges that the Circuit in Romanoff Equities found the text of the

granting clause expressly authorized successors to utilize the rail corridor for “other purposes.”

See Romanoff Equities, 815 F.3d at 812. However, Plaintiffs in this case are essentially asking

this Court to find that if the grant document fails to expressly authorize successors to use the

easement for “other purposes,” then that flexibility extinguishes the moment the property is

conveyed to a successor. The Court does not believe the Circuit in Romanoff Equities intended

such a result. If the Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ argument, it would be establishing a new

rule—that failure to include the “successors and assigns” language is affirmative proof of the

original parties’ intent to limit the easement’s broad language to the railroad. However, this

would require the Court to infer an interpretation of the Circuit’s decision that it did not

expressly state. The Court declines to do so.

Additionally, Plaintiffs do not provide any caselaw to support such an inference but

instead point to cases that simply state broad principles of deed interpretation. 7 (See Pls.’ Reply

at 11, ECF No. 46). In fact, as the United States points out, many New York cases have found

that “words of inheritance” are unnecessary. See Cronk v. Tait, 305 A.D.2d 947, 949 n.1 (App.

Div. 3rd dept. 2003) (“It merits observation that words of inheritance are not necessary to create

an easement[.]”) (quoting Wilcox v. Reals, 178 A.D.2d 885, 886 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1991));

7

Plaintiffs cite to various cases arguing that in New York:

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of deed construction that ‘[w]hen words have

a definite and precise meaning, it is not permissible to go elsewhere in search

of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning.’” BPGS Land

Holdings, LLC v. Flower, 198 A.D.3d 1344, 1346 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)

(quoting Uihlein v. Matthews, 64 N.E. 792, 794 (N.Y. 1902)). “An instrument

creating an estate or interest in real property must be construed according to

the intent of the parties, insofar as their intent can be determined by the

language of the grant.” Hudson Valley Cablevision Corp. v. 202 Devs., Inc.,

185 A.D.2d 917, 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (emphasis added). By the plain

text of the deeds, the parties’ intent was that the broad easement would not

apply to anyone but the Dutchess and Columbia Rail Road. See Edge Mgmt.

Consulting, Inc. v. Blank, 25 A.D.3d 364, 369 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).

(Pls.’ Reply at 11). None of these cases hold that a failure to include “successor or assigns”

language indicates the original parties’ intent to limit a broad conveyance.

12

that Plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated that the Group 4 deeds conveyed easements for

railroad purposes.

v. Group 5 – Deeds Expressing the General Railroad Act of 1850.

For Group 5, Plaintiffs allege that because the railroad acquired its rights in the Line

through recorded instruments “that expressly incorporate the provisions of the GRA[,]” 8 this

demonstrates a “clear intent to limit the conveyance to only . . . an easement.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 21–

22). Stated differently, Plaintiffs claim that regardless of the method through which the railroad

obtains its property interest, if the granting clause incorporates the GRA, then it is limited to an

easement. The United States disagrees and cross-moves for summary judgment, arguing that the

Group 5 deeds “conveyed a fee simple interest” to the railroad under New York law. (Def.’s

Mot. at 15–21). The United States’ argument is primarily based on: (1) the plain language of the

grant; (2) absence of express language limiting the estate granted; and (3) in some instances,

valuable consideration paid. (Id. at 15). Additionally, the United States rejects the notion that

simply referencing the GRA demonstrates an intent to limit the conveyance to an easement. (Id.

at 19–21).

Group 5 consists of nine different deeds for eighteen claims. (See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 5, ECF

No. 38-5). Plaintiffs point to the “Rogers Deed (149/59)” as an example of a deed that “expressly

incorporates” the GRA. (Pls.’ Mot. at 22 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 138, ECF No. 38-138)). Specifically,

the Plaintiffs highlight language that states: “estate title and interest therein of said part of the

first part subject nevertheless to all the duties and liabilities imposed on said party of the second

part of the provisions and conditions of the [GRA] of the State of New York and the Amendment

thereto.” (Pls.’ Ex. 138 (emphasis added)). Citing to O&W Lines, Plaintiffs argue that, by

incorporating the “duties and liabilities” of the GRA, the grant limited the conveyance to an

easement. (Pls.’ Mot. at 22 (citing O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at 371)). The Court cannot

agree with such a broad assertion.

First, while the Court in O&W Lines did find the grant document “[e]xpressly

incorporated by reference . . . the Railroad Act of 1850,” Plaintiffs’ reliance on this fact alone is

misplaced. In reviewing the granting clause, the court in O&W Lines stated that:

Expressly incorporated by reference into this indenture is the Railroad Act of

1850, which provides that, following an appraisal and judgment of

condemnation, ‘the (railroad) company shall be entitled to enter upon, take

possession of, and use the said land for the purposes of its incorporation,

during the continuance of its corporate existence, by virtue of this or any other

act . . .

8

The GRA, also referred to in many cases as the “General Railroad Law,” was the New York

law in effect authorizing the “formation of railroad corporations and regulating the same[.]”

Crouch v. State, 218 A.D. 356, 357 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1926); see also N.Y. Law ch. 140

(1850); Plaintiffs attach a copy of the Act to their Motion. (See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 8, ECF No. 38-8).

14

O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at 371. However, the court did not hold that a mere reference to

the GRA automatically limits a grant to an easement. Instead, the court emphasized that the deed

also incorporated any amendments to the GRA, including one provision stating that “[a]ll lands

acquired by any railroad company by appraisal, for passenger and freight depots, shall be held

by such company in fee.” O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at 371. These distinctions make clear

that whether land was acquired by “appraisal and judgment of condemnation” produces a

materially different outcome than if the land was acquired by “appraisal [specifically] for

passenger and freight depots.” Id. The question of whether the railroad acquired a fee simple

interest or an easement is therefore not governed solely by a reference to the GRA, or lack

thereof; rather, the grant must be considered in its entirety to discern the original parties’ intent.

Notably, in Corning, the plaintiffs argued that the railroad company only acquired an

easement “because of the provisions of the [GRA] under which the [Railroad Company] had

been incorporated.” Corning v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 14 A.D.2d 156, 160 (App. Div. 4th Dept.

1961) (“[Plaintiffs] contend that . . . a voluntary grant to a railroad company incorporated under

the 1850 act can convey to the railroad only a railroad easement, regardless of the terms of the

grant.”). The language of the relevant deed stated:

[T]he said Daniel Valentine, in consideration of the sum of one dollar to him

. . . hereby promises and agrees to and with the said Railroad Company to

grant and convey to said Company, free of encumbrance and by a good and

sufficient deed, all the land that said Company may require for the

construction and convenient use of their Railroad, upon and across the lands

of said Daniel Valentine, along the Lake Shore, situated in the town of Genoa,

County of Cayuga, in the State of New York, and being a part of Lot No. 22

whenever said Company shall have finally built their Railroad . . . and a deed

conveying the same.’

Id. at 159 (emphasis added). The court found that this language was sufficient to convey fee

simple to the railroad, specifically highlighting use of the terms “to grant and convey . . . by a

good and sufficient deed, all the land[.]” Id. (“These are the appropriate terms for the conveyance

of a fee. There is no reference in the agreement to a railroad easement.”). Additionally, the court

found that the provisions of the GRA on which the plaintiff relied did not restrict the railroad’s

interest to an easement, but instead, made the railroad’s interest “depend[ent] upon what the

grant says.” Id. at 161 (citing In re City of Buffalo, 206 N.Y. 319, 330 (1912) (“We can find

nothing in the Railroad Law which contravenes or changes this rule [the rule that a railroad

company may take a fee]”); Holland v. McClusky, 174 A.D.3d 1344, 1345 (App. Div. 4th Dept.

2019) (finding the railroad had only obtained a right of way easement based on the language in

the deed)).

Accordingly, under the GRA, the “duties and liabilities” of condemnation proceedings

arise only after a judgment of condemnation has been issued. O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at

371 (“This particular section, authorizing railroad companies to acquire land by condemnation

for any and all recognized purposes, has been authoritatively construed as giving the railroad not

15

part . . . subject nevertheless to the General Railroad Act of the

State of New York . . . ” PLF000123 – 124 (emphasis added).

Rankin

149/104 Summary

PLF000132- No objection raised; No translation available Judgment

000134 *See Denied

also Table A

“The said parties of the first part . . . do grant and convey to the

said Boston Hartford and Erie RR their successors and assigns

Fee simple

All that piece parcel of land situate in the town of East Fishkill,

conveyed; no

Rogers County of Dutchess, State of New York . . . containing 41/100

limiting

149/59 acres of land be the same more or less . . . with the appurtenances

language /

PLF000195- and all the estate, title and interest therein of said party of the

Summary

000196 first part subject nevertheless to all the duties and liabilities

Judgment

imposed on said party of the second part by the provisions and

Granted.

conditions of the General Railroad Act of the State of New York.”

PLF000195 (emphasis added).

“The said parties of the first part in consideration of the sum of

$1300 to them duly paid by the said railroad company have sold

Fee simple

and by these presents do grant and convey to the said Boston &

Rogers conveyed; no

Hartford Railroad Company their successors and assigns All

47/138 limiting

that piece or parcel of land situate in the town of Patterson,

PLF000193- language /

County of Putnam, State of New York . . . containing two one

000194 *See Summary

hundredths of an acre more or less with the appurtenances and all

also Table A Judgment

the estate title and interest therein of said parties of the first

Granted.

part . . . subject neverless to the General Railroad Act of the State

of New York.” PLF000193 - 194 (emphasis added).

“The said parties of the first part in consideration of the sum of

$1300 to them duly paid by the said railroad company have sold

Fee simple

and by these presents do grant and convey to the said Boston &

St. John conveyed; no

Hartford Railroad Company their successors and assigns All

47/141 limiting

that piece or parcel of land situate in the Town of Patterson,

PLF000205- language /

County of Putnam, State of New York . . . containing 3 55/100

000206 *See Summary

acres more or less with the appurtenances and all the estate title

also Table A Judgment

and interest therein of said parties of the first part . . . subject

Granted.

neverless to the General Railroad Act of the State of New York.”

PLF000205-206 (emphasis added).

“The said parties of the first part . . . have sold and by these presents Fee simple

Storm

do grant and convey to the said Boston & Hartford Railroad conveyed; no

149/68

Company their successors and assigns All that piece or parcel limiting

17

PLF000207- of land situate in the town of East Fishkill, County of Dutchess, language /

000209 and State of New York . . . containing two + seventy six one Summary

hundred acres of land more or less. with the appurtenances and all Judgment

the estate title and interest therein of said parties of the first Granted.

part . . . this conveyance is made subject to the terms, provisions,

and conditions of the General Railroad Act of the State of New

York . . . .” PLF000207 – 208 (emphasis added).

“The said parties of the first part in consideration of the sum of

$2400 to them duly paid by the said railroad company have sold

and by these presents do grant and convey to the said Boston & Fee simple

Tabor Hartford Railroad Company their successors and assigns all conveyed; no

149/75 that piece or parcel of land situate in the Town of Beekman and limiting

PLF000210- County of Dutchess and State of New York . . . containing 11.13- language /

000211 *See 100 acres with the appurtenances and all the Estate, Title and Summary

also Table A Interest therein of said party of the first part subject nevertheless to Judgment

all the duties and liabilities imposed on the parties of the second Granted.

part by the General Railroad Act of the State of New York . . . .”

PLF000210 (emphasis added).

2. Centerline Presumption

The Court next turns to the Parties’ dispute regarding the applicability of the “centerline

presumption. The “centerline presumption” generally assumes that property owners whose land

borders a railroad or road also own the land up to the centerline of that right-of-way, unless state

law or the original deed shows otherwise. Castillo, 952 F.3d at 1311, 1314, 1320 (citing Banks v.

Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 68 (1864)). The presumption is just that—a presumption. It can be rebutted.

New York law provides that where there is sufficient evidence—such as from the deed or

surrounding circumstances—that the original grantor intended to transfer land only up to the

edge of the road, the presumption is inapplicable. Marks v. Gaeckle, 156 N.Y.S.3d 402, 404

(N.Y. App. Div. 2021); Bashaw v. Clark, 699 N.Y.S.2d 533, 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Courts

consider various factors, including the deed’s language, land layout, and actions of past owners,

to determine intent. DiMarino v. United States, __ Fed. Cl. __, 2025 WL 2985441, at *3 (Fed.

Cl. Mar. 24, 2025) (citing Marks, 156 N.Y.S. at 404). When there is doubt as to intent, it can also

be garnered from the practical construction of the grantor and grantee and their successors in

title. Id. (citing Lehrman v. Lake Katonah Club, Inc., 794 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

(internal citations omitted)).

Plaintiffs now seek to establish their ownership of the land adjoining and underlying

those segments of the corridor where the railroad acquired only an easement for railroad

purposes. (Pls.’ Mot. at 30–31). If they can prove adjacency, Plaintiffs then aim to assert a

property interest in the rail corridor under New York’s centerline presumption. (Id.). In its

response, the United States does not raise arguments contesting whether any of the properties are

adjacent to the Line. (See Def.’s Mot.). However, the United States challenges the application of

the centerline presumption with respect to nearly every property and moves for summary

judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs’ “deed instruments do not convey an ownership interest in the

underlying corridor.” (Id. at 29–33). The United States further contends that Plaintiffs’ broad

reliance on the exhibits attached to their motion, as evidence of such an interest, fails to

18

substantively engage with the contents of those exhibits. (Id.). Specifically, the United States

argues that, based on the “metes and bounds descriptions” and “attached maps[,]” the documents

demonstrate an intent of the original grantor “to limit the conveyances to the exterior of the

Beacon Line corridor.” (Id. at 30).

In response, Plaintiffs assert that the United States places to much reliance on the fact that

some of the deeds either describe various properties as running “along” the rail line or identify

particular “lot[s.]” (Pls.’ Reply at 16–19 (“If the government was correct, then any delineation of

a public way of any type or style for any deed would rebut the presumption before it could ever

arise.”)). Plaintiffs also argue that a deed’s reference to directions, boundaries, or mapped lines

does not overcome the centerline presumption under New York law. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiffs

suggest that unless the United States can provide evidence, “in the form of chain of title or

otherwise,” which demonstrates the Plaintiffs’ sought to retain only a reversionary interest in the

rail corridor, then the centerline presumption cannot be rebutted. (Id. at 19).

Plaintiffs’ counter arguments appear to suggest that the boundaries their predecessors

intended to convey cannot be determined from the deeds themselves. This assertion is incorrect.

To clarify, numerous New York cases demonstrate that courts routinely interpret such

boundaries directly from the deeds. Marks, 156 N.Y.S.3d at 404 (stating that the subject deed

defined the properties’ boundary as the “‘[e]asterly line’—i.e., the outer edge—of the 30-foot

private road, supporting the defendant’s contention that the deed expressly excluded the disputed

strip[.]”); see also City of Albany v. State, 270 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1971) (“[W]hen the deed

describes the grant as starting at a corner of an intersection, and then running along parallel to or

bounding on a street or streets to the beginning point , the grant is limited to the exterior line of

the street[.]”). To overcome the centerline presumption, the deed must include language that

affirmatively limits the scope of the conveyance. Town of Clifton Park v. Boni Builders, Inc., 156

A.D.3d 1035, 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 2017) (citing Lamm v. Mauser, 132 A.D.3d. 1120,

1123 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 2015)) (finding that utilization of terms such as “along a curve”

and “the point or place of beginning” are “descriptive reference points” but do not indicate an

intent to limit the conveyance to the edge of the boundary.); Town of Lake George v. Landry, 96.

A.D.3d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 2012) (finding that a deed expressly limiting the

conveyance to the “westerly bounds of a right of way” precluded a determination that the

defendant’s property extended to the eastern boundary of the adjoining parcel). Therefore, mere

reference to metes and bounds, even where those bounds coincide with mapped lines, is

insufficient to establish an intent to exclude the adjacent road’s exterior.

Accordingly, where the deed lacks clear limiting language, the centerline presumption

remains intact; conversely, where such limiting language is present, the presumption is rebutted.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART both the Plaintiffs’ and

Defendant’s motions for partial summary judgment as to the centerline presumption in

accordance with the chart below:

19

along the lands now or formerly the Penn-

Central Railroad Company S 61 ° 43’ 06”

W, 680.53 feet to a point, thence along the

lands, now or formerly of A. D. Tompkins, N

25° 33’ 15” W, 24.92 feet to the point or place

of beginning, containing 0.34 acres more or

less.

(Pls.’ Ex. 107a).

“[B]eginning is North 12° 26’ 15” West 365.15

feet from the Northwesterly corner of lands of

Thomas T. Daniels, formerly Davis; thence

running along the Easterly side of Cushman

Road North 3° degrees 21’ 50” West 508.23

feet to the Northwesterly corner of premises

being described; Thence leaving Cushman

road running along the division line between

premises being described and lands of Martha

Bryan Cushman South 86° 52’ 50” East 454.22

feed and North 54° 36’ 10” East 337.55 feet to

the division line between premises being

described and lands of New York, New

Haven & Hartford Railroad; Thence along

said division line on a curve to the left

Arlene G. having a radius of 2059.53 feet a distance of Rebutted,

Durk: 13.-2- 31/(1 & 5) 55.50 feet; thence south 34° 43’ 00” East does not

63 354.07 feet; thence north 55° 17’ 00” East apply

100.00 feet; thence South 34° 43’ 00” East

294.99 feet; thence on a curve to the left having

a radius of 1383.19 feed a distance of 222.56

feet to the division line between premises being

described and lands of Martha Bryan

Cushman; thence along said division line

North 88° 58’ 20” West 744.30 feet; thence

North 85° 25’ 37” west 293.96 feet and North

87 degrees 20’ 00” West 211.91 feet (the said

last two courses and distances being lone the

center line of a stone wall) to the easterly side

of Cushman Rod the point or place of

beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 53a)

“[T]hence running along lands now or

Coyote Two,

formerly Hull (Liber 1635 pg 646); South 37-

LLC: 21/(1 & 3) Applies

33-10 East 238.41 feet to a point; thence along

133089-

lands now or formerly Texaco South 36-55-21

21

6055-15- West 120.65 feet to a point; thence along

668289-0000 lands now or formerly Consolidated Rail

Corp., on a curve to the left having a radius

of 1004.87 feet for a distance of 93.10 feet to

a point; thence along lands now or formerly

Hancock the following: North 18-00-56 West

103.27 feet, North 16-32-59 West 26.05 feet,

North 01-00-35 West 34.62 feet, and North 27-

02-33 West 69.79 feet to a point; thence along

the southerly line of Old Glenham Road North

67-57-26 East 93.70 feet to the point or place

of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 47a).

“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line

of Kipp Avenue, said point being

distant southwesterly 710 feet from the

intersection of the said southerly line of

Kipp Avenue with the westerly line of Blodgett

Road; and running thence with the said

southerly line of Kipp Avenue, the following

courses and distances: South 70 degrees 11’

40” West 6.57 feet; thence South 75 degrees

Michael

54’ West 103 feet; thence South 81 degrees 36’

Zanzarella: Rebutted,

30” West 12.3 feet to line of lands of Ribera;

133089- 1/(1 & 3) does not

thence with said line of lands of Ribera, South

6155-11- apply

12 degrees 16’ East 144.99 feet to the

615684-0000

northerly line of lands of the New York, New

Haven and Hartford Rail Road Company;

thence with said northerly line of lands of

said railroad company, North 64 degrees 21’

30” East 150.1 feet; thence North 24 degrees

20’ 10” West 116.16 feet to the place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 29a).

Louis

Sebesta: No limiting language identified.

133089- 77/(1 & 3) Applies

6155-03- (Pls.’ Ex. 96a).

125211-0000

Dana Brown:

No limiting language identified.

132200-

12(/1 & 5) Applies

6758-04-

(Pls.’ Ex. 40a).

829254-0000

22

“RUNNING THENCE along said division line

between Lots 31 and 32 South 66 degrees 45’

00” East 312.69 feet to a point on the line of

lands now or formerly New York, New

Haven and Hartford R.R. Co.;

RUNNING THENCE along same, South 31

Anthony

degrees 36’ 30” West 151.61 feet to a

Chianese, Sr.

point on the division line between Lots 32 and

& Anthony

33 as shown on the aforesaid filed

Chianese, Jr.: 16/(1 & 5) Applies

map;

132200-

6758-04-

RUNNING THENCE along same North 66

860314-0000

degrees 45’ 00” West 290.65 feet to a

point on the easterly line of Gold Road;

RUNNING THENCE along same North 23

degrees 15’ 00” East 150.00 feet to the

point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 43a).

“RUNNING THENCE along the easterly side

of said road, North 23 degrees 15 minutes 00

seconds East 150.00 feet; THENCE leaving

said road and running along a parcel designated

as Number 27, South 72 degrees 32 minutes 40

seconds East 289.88 feet to the westerly

James &

exterior line of the NYNH and H Railroad

Jean

Co.; THENCE along said line, South 58 Rebutted,

DeBonis:

23/(1 & 5) degrees 23 minutes 30 seconds East 66.00 feet does not

132200-

and South 31 degrees 36 minutes 30 seconds apply

6758-04-

West 181.00 feet; THENCE leaving said line

880372-0000

and running along a parcel designated as

Number 29, North 65 degrees 06 minutes 20

seconds West 327.51 feet to the point or place

of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 48a).

Homer & Jo

Ann Griffin: No limiting language identified.

132200- 45/(1 & 5) Applies

6758-04- (Pls.’ Ex. 64a).

831232-0000

“RUNNING thence along the southeasterly

Jessica Rebutted,

line of said Gold Road, North 23 degrees

Schleicher: 76/(1 & 5) does not

15’00” East 150.00 feet; THENCE leaving

132200- apply

said road and running along other lands of

23

6758-04- now or formerly Chauncey Gold and Monroe

870342-0000 Gold, South 66 degrees 45’00” East 341.04

feet to the westerly exterior line of the New

York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad

Co.; THENCE along said line, South 17

degrees 42’25” West 64.77 feet and South

31 degrees 36’30” West 66.45 feet;

THENCE leaving said line and running along

other lands of said Chauncey Gold and

Monroe Gold, North 66 degrees 45’00” West

334.73 feet to the point or place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 95a).

“Being known and designated as lot 29 on a

certain map entitled “Indian Hills” filed in the

Dutchess county clerk’s office on June 21,

1963 as map no. 3140 and further described as

follows: beginning at a point on the easterly

side of gold road at the northwesterly corner

of lot no. 30 on said map, running thence

along the easterly side of gold road, north 23-

Brian Van 15 east 150 feet to the southerly side of lot no.

Vlack: 28, running thence along the same, south 65-

132200- 87/(1 & 5) 06-20 east 327.51 feet to the westerly side of

6758-04- lands formerly of the New York New

875357-0000 Haven and Hartford Railroad, now of

Conrail, running thence along the same

south 17-42-25 west 141.26 feet to the

northerly side of said lot no. 30, running

thence along the same, north 66-45 west

341.04 feet to the point and place of

beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 104a).

“BEGINNING at a point the westerly side of

the right of way of the New York, New Haven

and Hartford Railroad Company which point

John &

of beginning is identified as being south 3° 58’

Alexandra

E 502.74 feet measured southerly along said

Colbert:

18/(1 & 5) right of way from the northeasterly corner of Applies

134089-

the lands of Hahn, the southeasterly corner of

6856-00-

lands now reputedly of Cole, formerly James

602005-0000

Holmes; thence running along the lands of

the said railroad North 82° 11’ W 105.13 feet

and continuing on the same bearing 85 feet to

24

the center of a large boulder; thence still

continuing on this same bearing 50 feet to a

point the southwesterly corner of the premises

herein described being 8 feet easterly of a row

of trees; thence running northerly and at right

angles to the last course and at all times 8 feet

from said row of trees 77 feet to a point located

5 feet east from a large maple tree; thence

running westerly through the lands of Hahn

430 feet more or less to a point on the westerly

line of the lands of Hahn and easterly line of

the lands now or formerly of Baker; thence

running along said Baker lands and lands

reputedly of Cole north 41° 24’ E 19, 85 feet

north 27° 28’ E 383.81 feet and south 84° 01’

E 419. 96 feet to a corner in the westerly side

of the right of way of the New York, New

Haven & Hartford Railroad Company;

thence along the said Railroad Company’s

land south 3° 58’ E 502.74 feet to the point

or place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 44a)

“BEGINNING at a stake on the west bank of

Sprout Creek at the northwest corner of Boss

(814 deeds page 490) and running thence along

a wire fence S 55° 41’ W 19.6 feet; Thence S

Joette

44° 54’ W 143.2 feet to a point; thence along a

Forsblom

stone wall and the northerly line of Boss and

Fero Kane

Hupe N 84° 36’ W 389.5 feel to the end of the

2018 Rebutted,

stone wall; thence N 13° 06’ W 5.24 feet to

Irrevocable 49/(1) does not

the southerly line of the New Haven

Trust: apply

Railroad; thence along the southerly line of

133089-

the New Haven Railroad to the west bank of

6356-01-

Sprout Creek aforementioned; thence

315608-0000

southerly along the west bank of Sprout Creek

to the point of beginning;”

(Pls.’ Ex. 68a).

Judith “BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line

Valentino: of Kipp Avenue, said point being

133089- 85b/(1 & 2) distant southwesterly 330 feet from the Rebutted,

6356-01- intersection of the said southerly line of does not

272582-0000 Kipp Avenue with the westerly line of Blodgett apply

Judith Road, and running thence with the said

85a/(3)

Valentino: southerly line of Kipp Avenue South 62

25

133089- degrees 43’ west 120 feet; thence with other

6155-11- lands of Earl T. Ketcham South 30 degrees 7’

644708-0000 10” East 102.19 feet to the northerly line

lands of the New York, New Haven and

Hartford Railroad Company; thence with

the said northerly line of lands of said

Railroad Company North 64 degrees 21’

30” East 115 feet to line of lands of

Prendergast North 27 degrees 17’ West 105.36

feet to the place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 103a).

Haslett/JLD “Commencing at a point on the westerly Right-

Fishkill: Of Way (R.O.W.) line of New York State

133089- 47a/(2 & 3) Route #52, said point also being the

6256-04- southeasterly corner of Parcel I as described

700259-0000 herein, thence; running northeasterly

through said R.O.W. the following course;

N 87°52’37” E a distance of 84.38 feet to a

point on the easterly line of said R.O.W.,

said point also being the TRUE POINT OF

BEGINNING: thence; running northwesterly

along said easterly R.O.W. line the following

three courses; N 32°52’17” W a distance of

Applies

Haslett/JLD 43.16 feet to a point, thence; N 37°45’28’’ W

Fishkill: a distance of 84.60 feet to a point, thence; N

133089- 47b/(2) 41°41’02” W a distance of 109.62 feet to a

6256-04- point, thence; transitioning from said R.O.W.

711305-0000 line to the southerly R.O.W. line of New York

State Route 82 and running northeasterly along

said line the following two courses; N

24°10’31” E a distance of 108.20 feet to a

point, thence; N 67°04’31” E a distance of

47.41 feet to a point, thence . . . .” ;

(Pls.’ Ex. 66a).

“[R]unning; thence along the Southerly line of

said Highway N 70-38 E 25.00 feet;

The Richard thence along the Westerly line of now or

E. Monroe formerly Chiavelli S 19-23 E 405.00 feet,

Rebutted,

Trust: thence along the Southerly line of lands now or

58/(2 & 3) does not

133089- formerly said Chiavelli and now or formerly or

apply

6256-04- Ruppert N 70-38 E 188.24 feet; thence along

960446-0000 the Westerly line of Michaels, the party of the

second part hereto, S 19-23 E 405.59 feet to

the Northerly exterior line of the Dutchess

26

and Columbia Railroad; thence along the

Northerly exterior line and distant 49.50 feet

at right angles and parallel to the

monumented center line of said railroad S

67-38 W 213.54 feet; thence leaving said line

and along the Easterly line of now or formerly

said K. Oscar Carlson N 19-23 W 821.75 feet

to the point of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 77a).

“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line

of Mirras Boulevard, said point being distant

along said street line South 85° 20’ 10” East

224.59 feet from a pipe marking the

intersection of said southerly line of Mirras

Boulevard with the southerly line of Ward

Place and running thence along the first

mentioned street line South 85° 20’ 10” East

Firas Abbasi

105 feet to a point; thence with other land of Rebutted,

133089-

4/(2) Theiss South 3° 25’ 7” East 235.96 feet to a does not

6356-01-

point in the northerly right of way line of apply

189582-0000

New York, New Haven and Hartford

Railroad; thence along the same South 82°

10’ West 105 feet to a point; thence along

other lands of Theiss North 3° 15’ 22” West

258.81 feet of the point or place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 32a).

Lisa Badia:

No limiting language identified.

133089-

7/(2) Applies

6356-01-

(Pls.’ Ex. 35a).

077512-0000

“BEGINNING at the northeasterly corner

of a 3.3 acre parcel by Michael Mirras and

other to Baird and running thence along the

right of way fence of the New York, New

Haven and Hartford Railroad North 80

BR Trust:

degrees 07 minutes East 203.33 feet and

133089-

9/(2) North 82 degrees 05 minutes East about 624 Applies

6356-01-

feet to the westerly side of a proposed road

191540-0000

or street; thence along the westerly line of said

street southerly about 35 feet to an angle; South

36 degrees 05 minutes West about 195 feet;

and South 25 degrees 08 minutes West 183.82

feet; thence leaving said street and running

27

along the lands conveyed by Michael Mirras

and others to Klinga South 43 degrees no

minutes West about 50 feet to the bank of the

cove of the Fishkill Creek; thence along said

bank in the westerly direction about 540 feet to

the southeasterly corner of the above

mentioned Baird parcel; thence along the

easterly line of the same North 07 degrees no

minutes West about 320 feet to the point or

place of BEGINNING . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 37a).

Christopher

& Donna

No limiting language identified.

Consaga:

19/(2) Applies

133089-

(Pls.’ Ex. 45a).

6356-03-

058467-0000

Nicola

Coppola: No limiting language identified.

133089- 20/(2) Applies

6356-03- (Pls.’ Ex. 46a).

012486-0000

“BEGINNING at an iron pin on the southerly

side of the New York, New Haven and hartford

Railroad right of way, said pin being distant

969.13 feet southwesterly along said RR right

of way from the intersection of the westerly

line of McGrath Terrace and southerly side of

Robert &

the RR right of way; THENCE running north

Elisa

66° 09’ 49” East 248.19 feet to a point on the Rebutted,

DeWitt:

25/(2) southerly side of said right of way; THENCE does not

133089-

South 35° 07’ 40” East 246.57 feet to a point; apply

6356-03-

THENCE South 63° 05’ 20” West 300 feet

039448-0000

more or less to the bank of Fishkill Creek;

THENCE northwesterly westerly and

northeasterly along the creek bank to the point

of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 50a).

“[S]outh 03 degrees 01 minutes 10 seconds

Vincent A.

east 301.27 feet to a point on the line of lands

Fernandez &

N/F Midtown Trackage Adventures

Meghan 33/(2) Applies

(ID836251) thence along said Midtown

Bliss:

Trackage Adventures the following two

133089-

courses and distances; 1) South 82 degrees 10

28

6356-01- minutes 00 seconds west 44.00 feet to a point

162573-0000 of curve, 2) On a curve to the left having a

radius of 2914.51 feet an arc distance of 56.00

feet having a curve bearing of south 81 degrees

36 minutes 58 seconds west and a chord length

of 56.00 feet to a point on the line of lands N/F

Guthrie thence along the lands of Guthrie north

02 degrees 44 minutes 50 seconds west passing

through an iron pipe on line at 38.23 feet for a

total distance of 299.41 feet to a point on the

southerly line of said Ward Place thence along

the southerly line of said Ward Place the

following two courses and distances; 1) North

74 degrees 53 minutes 00 seconds east 70.41

feet to an iron pipe found, 2) South 85 degrees

20 minutes 10 seconds east 29.59 feet to the

place and paint of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 55a).

“[R]unning thence along the southerly line

of the consolidated Rail Corporation and

the remains of an old wire fence, N 75-57 - E

52.31 feet, N 76-33-00 E 69.34 feet to a point

in the westerly line of lands now or formerly of

Souers (L. 1424 cp 172); thence along the

Scott & westerly line of lands now or formerly of

Diane Ferris: Souers. S 07-00 E. 320.00 feet to a point on the Rebutted,

133089- 34/(2) northerly bank of the Fishkill Creek: thence does not

6356-01- along the Fishkill Creek N 77-40-05 W. 86.31 apply

154526-0000 feet to a point in the easterly line of lands now

or formerly of Kovach; thence along the

easterly line of lands now or formerly of

Kovach; N 15-05-00 W. 280.00 feet to the

point or place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 56a).

John &

Myrna

No limiting language identified.

Georges:

39/(2) Applies

133089-

(Pls.’ Ex. 60a).

6356-03-

078483-0000

David Kuran “BEGINNING at a point in the Southerly

Rebutted,

133089- line of New York, New Haven and Hartford

51(2) does not

6356-03- Railroad on the westerly side of McGrath

apply

108498-0000 Terrace 50.96 feet Northerly from the end of

29

McGrath Terrace; and CONTINUING

FROM THENCE along the Westerly line of

McGrath Terrace and the Westerly line of

the lands of Baird South 33 degrees 30

minutes East 280 feet more or less to the

bank of the Fishkill Creek; THENCE

Southwesterly along the Northerly bank of said

creek 135 feet more or less to the

Southwesterly comer of the herein described

parcel; THENCE North 37 degrees 45 minutes

00 seconds West 375 foot more or less to the

Southerly line of the New York, New Haven

and Hartford Railroad; THENCE North 67

degrees 38 minutes East 150 feet to the point

of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 70a).

“THENCE along the lands now or formerly

Cowen (Liber 1204 cp 583), South 15 degrees

05’00” East 446.57 feet to a point; THENCE

along the bank of the Fishkill Creek, South 75

degrees 55’52” West 259.85 feet to a point;

THENCE along the lands now or formerly

Pinto (Liber 1795 cp 845), North 20 degrees

Jason A. &

50’00” West 432.72 feet to a point; THENCE

Stacey L.

along the lands now or formerly

Meister:

55/(2) Consolidated Rail Corporation the Applies

133089-

following five (5) courses and distances: 1)

6356-01-

North 68 degrees 51 ‘00” East 9.00 feet; 2)

136518-0000

North 71 degrees 04’00” East 106.88 feet; 3)

North 72 degrees 43 ‘00” East 84.69 feet; 4)

North 74 degrees 28’00” East 64.95 feet and;

5) North 75 degrees 37’00” East 38.00 feet to

the point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 74a).

“BEGINNING at the corner formed by the

intersection of the easterly line of East Court

with the southerly line of McGrath Terrace;

Caroline

Running thence along the southerly line o[f]

Meyer:

McGrath Terrace south 65 degrees 19’ East

133089- 56/(2) Applies

168.57 feet to the westerly line of Lot 20 on

6356-03-

said map; Running thence along same South 24

041494-0000

degrees 41’ west 176.58 feet and South 67

degrees 38’ 56.96 feet to the easterly line of

East Court’ Running thence along same

30

North 2 degrees 22° West 53.35 feet and north

1 degrees 49’ 00” West 203. 28 feet to the point

or place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 75a).

“BEGINNING at a point in the southernly line

of Mirras Boulevard, said point being distant

along said street line South 85 degrees 20’ 10”

East 124 59 feet from a pipe marking the

intersection of said southerly line of Mirras

Boulevard with the southerly line of Ward

Place and running thence along the first

Catherine F. mentioned street line south 85 degrees 20’ 10”

Oken East 100 feet to a point, thence along lands of Rebutted,

133089- 63/(2) Strohecker South 3 degrees 15’ 22” East 258 does not

6356-01- 81 feet to a point in the northerly right-of- apply

180579-0000 way line of the New York, New Haven and

Hartford Railroad, thence along the same

South 82 degrees 10’ West 100 feet to a

point, thence along lands of Emil Theis North

3 degrees 7’ 34” West 280 57 feet to the point

of beginning . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 82a).

“[R]unning thence along said street line North

seventy four degrees fifty three minutes East

one hundred feet; thence leaving said street line

and running along lands of Emil Theiss, South

nine degrees no minutes twenty seconds East

two hundred seventy seven and eighteen

hundredths feet to a point in the northerly

Anthony M.

line of the New York, New Haven and

Ott, III &

Hartford Railroad on a curve; thence along

Tracy Ott

said railroad line, on a curve to the left Rebutted,

(f/k/a

64/(2) radius 2914.511 feet, a distance of one does not

Tracy Smith)

hundred feet (the chord bearing being South apply

133089-

seventy four degrees twenty two minutes

6356-01-

twenty seconds West) to the southeasterly

125554-0000

corner of the abovementioned Partridge and

Knapp lands; thence along said lands North

nine degrees one minute thirty seconds West

two hundred seventy eight and six hundredths

feet to the point of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 83a).

31

“RUNNING THENCE along the southerly and

westerly side of Mirraas Boulevard the

following distances and courses: North 82

degrees 20 minutes East 93.68 feet; South 53

degrees 35 minutes East 37.53 feet and South

17 degrees 19 minutes East 195.53 feet to the

northerly right of way line of the New York,

Jason Payne:

New Haven and Hartford Railroad Rebutted,

133089-

65/(2) Company; THENCE along the North line of does not

6356-01-

said right of way line of said railroad, South apply

212588-0000

82 degrees 10 minutes West 169.20 feet to the

southeasterly corner of lands of Wendover;

THENCE along land of Wendover, North 3

degrees 33 minutes 3 seconds West 219.93 feet

to the place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 84a).

Jeffrey

Roosa &

Stacey Roosa

f/k/a No limiting language identified.

Stacey Van 70/(2) Applies

Den Thoorn: (Pls.’ Ex. 89a).

133089-

6356-03-

056496-0000

“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line

or Ward Place at the most northerly

corner of the herein described parcel said point

is bearing South 58 degrees 30’00” West

120.00 feet from the northwest corner of lands

formerly of Charles Theiss and now or

formerly of Carl J. Frey (Liber 1150 cp 327);

THENCE running with said road line, South 58

Richard

degrees 30’00” West 110.00 feet to a square

Tivnan: Rebutted,

iron bar found at the most northerly corner of

133089- 84/(2) does not

lands now or formerly of John J. Reynolds

6356-01- apply

(Liber 1064 cp 33) THENCE running with the

108542-0000

easterly line of said lands, South 15 degrees

22’50” East 224.00 feet to a point in line with

0.09 feet short of another square iron bar

found; THENCE running with the northerly

line of the lands of the Consolidated Rail

Corp., formerly of the New York, New

Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., along a

curve to the right having a radius of 2914.43

32

feet for a distance of 100.18 feet to the

southwest corner of lands now or formerly

Hugh H. McDowell (Liber 1006 pg. 429);

THENCE running with the west line of said

McDowell (Liber 1006 pg. 429) North 14

degrees 03’20” West 247.71 feet to the

aforementioned road line and the point or place

of BEGINNING . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 102a).

“BEGINNING at a point, said point being the

intersection of the southerly line of Main Street

with the easterly line of Churchill Street, and

running thence along said southerly line of

Main Street the following: North 54 degrees

52’ 00” East 157.00 feet; and North 53 degrees

27’ 10” East 74.90 feet;

Verdi Boy

Realty Group THENCE along the northerly line of lands,

Rebutted,

LLC: now or formerly Con Rail Corp., the

89/(3) does not

130200- following: along a curve to the right, having

apply

6054-37- a radius of 902.19 feet and being distant

113729-0000 westerly 213.47 feet; and North 55 degrees

12’ 00” West 15.27 feet;

THENCE along said easterly line of Churchill

Street, North 47 degrees 55’ 30” West 22.53

feet to the point of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 106a).

“Beginning in the southerly line of the road

from Fishkill to Wiccopee (Route 52) at a point

582 feet more or less westerly from the line of

lands formerly of Christie, which point is the

northwesterly corner of lands of Knapp, and

running thence along the road South 84 degrees

ANK Realty 22’ West 298 feet more or less, and South 77

Rebutted,

Inc.: 133089- degrees 23’ West 51 feet more or less to lands

5/(3) does not

6256-04- of Lanci; thence along side lands of Lanci

apply

516255-0000 South 5 degrees 48’ East 276.6 feet more or

less to the northerly line of the New Haven

Railroad Company; thence along the

railroad line easterly 343 feet more or less to

the line of lands of Knapp; thence along said

Knapp line North 13 degrees 39’ West 280 feet

more or less to the place of beginning. BEING

33

more particularly described by a recent survey

made by J. William Komisar, NYS LLC, dated

06/26/2014 and bounded and described as

follows:

All that tract or parcel of land situate in the

Town of Fishkill, County of Dutchess, and the

State of New York, bounded and described as

follows:

Beginning at a point in the Southerly line of N.

Y. S. Route 52, said point being the

Northwesterly comer of lands now or formerly

Nenni Construction Company, Inc. (Liber

1568, cp 611 ); thence along the Westerly line

of the said lands now or formerly Nenni

Construction Company, Inc. (Liber 1568, cp

611), South 13-39-00 East 250.60 feet to a

point; thence along the Northerly line of

lands now or formerly Midtown Trackage

Ventures LLC (Deed Document Number

22007/986) on a curve to the left having a

radius of 3869.33 feet a length of 388.18 feet

to a point; thence along the Easterly line of

lands now or formerly Gulla (Liber 1650, cp

366) North 5-48-00 West 273.92 feet to a point

in the said Southerly line of N.Y.S. Route 52,

said point being 4.6 feet, more or less,

Southerly from a concrete monument found;

thence along the said Southerly line of N.Y.S.

Route 52 the following two courses: North 70-

01-00 East 52.25 feet to a point and North 77-

00-00 East 298.00 feet to the point or place of

beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 33a).

Ballistic

Bodyworks,

No limiting language identified.

LLC:

8/(3) Applies

133089-

(Pls.’ Ex. 36a).

6256-04-

634245-0000

Stephanie No limiting language identified.

Devine: 24/(3) Applies

133089- (Pls.’ Ex. 49a).

34

6155-17-

012230-0000

“BEGINNING at the southerly line of Petticoat

Lane 225 feet East of the easterly line of

Winterberry Road, as extended and running

Dean &

thence along Petticoat Lane S 46-14-00 E

Deborah A.

273.6 feet to the northerly line of the Penn Rebutted,

DiRubbio:

26/(3) Central Railroad, thence westerly along the does not

133089-

same on a curve to the right (1512.88 feet) a apply

6155-03-

distance of 331+ feet to a point, thence N 40

043256-0000

E 233 feet to the place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 51a)

“[T]hence running along the northerly side of

Park Lane in a westerly direction South 83° 50’

00” West 80 feet to Lot 11 on the aforesaid

map; thence running along the dividing line

between Lot 11 and Lot 10 in Block 1 on the

aforesaid map in a northerly direction North

13° 00’ 40” West 205.74 feet to the lands now

Robert & or formerly of New York - New Haven and

Beverly Hartford Railroad; thence running along

Dross: the lands now or formerly of New York –

30/(a) Applies

133089- New Haven and Hartford Railroad on a

6155-17- curve to the left with a radius of 1612.[]8 feet

003230-0000 and a length of 120.00 feet to Lot 9’ in Block

1 on the aforesaid map; thence running

southerly along the division line of Lot 9 and

Lot 10 in Block 1 on the aforesaid map, South

2° 17’ 11” East 175.46 feet to the northerly side

of Park Lane and the point of beginning.

(Pls.’ Ex. 52a).

Michael J. &

Rosemary

No limiting language identified

Engel:

32/(3) Applies

133089-

(Pls.’ Ex. 54a).

6155-17-

060233-0000

“Thence along the northerly line of Park

Richard &

Avenue, South 83° 50’ 00” West 80.00 feet to

Marie A.

a point; thence along Lot No. 9, Block 1, on

Fonteneou:

35/(3) said Filed Map No. 2461, North 02° 24’ 48” Applies

133089-

West 160.78 feet to a point; thence along

6155-17-

lands now or formerly Conrail Corp., On a

020229-0000

curve to the left having a radius of 1612.88

35

feet for a distance of 80.00 feet to a point;

thence along Lot No. 7, Block 1, on said Filed

Map No. 2461, South 02° 25’ 20” East 150.01

feet to the point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 57a).

“[T]hence N 26° 25’ W 480.37 feet to a point

in a wire fence marking the southerly

boundary of the lands of the New York, New

Vincent Haven and Hartford railroad; thence along

Gaglioti & the last mentioned boundary line N 59° 42’

Mary E 236.76 feet to a stake set in the junction of

Rodriquez wire fences; thence along a wire fence

Rebutted,

n/k/a marking the west line of lands formerly of

36/(3) does not

Mary Mulford, now of Nelson and others S 16° 07’

apply

Gaglioti: E 524.38 feet to a point in the north line of the

132800- New York State Highway Route #82; thence

6457-01- along the north line of the New York State

120505-0000 Highway Route #82 S 71° 24’ W 143.71 feet

to the point or place of beginning . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 58a).

“[T]hence along the northerly line of

Washington Avenue (a/k/a Glenham Avenue)

S 88-26-17 W 80.00 feet to a point; thence

along the lands now or formerly Powell, N

03-49-23 W 204.10 feet to a point; thence

Daniel

along the lands now or formerly

Goodman:

Consolidated Rail Corp., on a curve to the

133089- 42/(3) Applies

right having a radius of 1096.31 feet a distance

6055-16-

of 81.92 feet to a point; thence along the lands

828257-0000

now or formerly Nichols, S 03-02-35 E 200.40

feet to the point or place of BEGINNING . . .

.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 61a).

“THENCE along the said northerly bounds of

N.Y.S. Route No. 82, south 71 degrees 24

Jaime

minutes west, 126.50 feet to an iron rod found;

Gordon &

THENCE turning and running along lands now

Richard

or formerly of Hayden, north 26 degrees 25

Nappi 43/(3) Applies

minutes west, 434.39 feet to an iron rod found;

132800-

THENCE turning and running along lands

6457-03-

now or formerly of Metro North Commuter

099490-0000

Railroad Co., north 59 degrees 42 minutes

east, 98.31 feet to a point; THENCE turning

36

and running along lands now or formerly of

Scott, south 26 degrees 25 minutes 06 seconds

east, 275.0 feet to an iron rod found; THENCE

turning and running along the same, south 75

degrees 54 minutes 49 seconds east, 35.81 feet

to a point; THENCE turning and running still

along the same, south 26 degrees 25 minutes

06 seconds east, 160.00 feet to the point or

place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 62a).

“[B]eginning at the Northwestern corner of

said parcel, N. 64 degrees 30’ E. for a distance

of 610.20 feet to a pole, then running North 69

degrees 8’ E. for a distance of 219.35 feet then

running to a pole; then running N. 70 degrees

50’ E. for a distance of 300.95 feet to a pole;

then running N. 77 degrees 23’E. for a distance

Alfredo &

of 243.42 feet to the Eastern corner boundary

Marie Gulla: Rebutted,

pole; a distance of 276.00 feet; then running

133089- 46/(3) does not

along the Northerly exterior line of the N.Y.

6256-03- apply

N.H. &H.R.R. Co. to the Westerly boundary

440213-0000

pole along an oblique line for 1,462.46 feet;

then running along the tree and fence line of

Rowe to Pulombo Bros., in a Northerly

direction N. 7 degrees 8’E, for a distance of

332.50 feet.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 65a).

“RUNNING THENCE from said point of

beginning along said division line between

Lots Nos. 59 and 58 on the aforementioned

map, South 25° 59’ 30” East 115.00 feet to

lands now or formerly New York, New

Haven & Hartford Railroad; RUNNING

Robert A. THENCE along said last mentioned lands,

Malvarosa: South 64° 00’ 30” West 80.00 feet to the

133089- 53/(3) division line between Lots Nos. 58 and 57 on Applies

6155-10- the aforementioned map; RUNNING

392507-0000 THENCE along said division line, North 25°

59’30” West 115.00 to a point on the southerly

side of Van Steuben Road; RUNNING

THENCE along the southerly side of Van

Steuben Road, North 64° 00’ 30” East 80.00

feet to the point and place of BEGINNING.”

37

(Pls.’ Ex. 72a).

“Thence Westerly along the Northerly line of

Park Lane South 83-50-00 West 100.00 feet to

a point; thence northerly along lands reputedly

of the Town of Fishkill North 11-30-10 West

Mark A. &

233.56 feet to a point; thence easterly along

Christine

lands reputedly of The Consolidated Rail

Matthews:

54/(3) Corporation South 79-57-00 East 101.23 feet Applies

133089-

to a point; thence southerly along Lot 10 South

6055-20-

13-00-40 East 205.74 feet to a point on the

992230-0000

northerly line of Park Lane and the point or

place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 73a).

Robert

“[T]hence from said point of beginning,

Musiello:

running along the southerly side of the

133089- 60a/(3)

aforementioned New York, New Haven &

6155-00-

Hartford Railroad North 64 ° 40’ 40’’

715730-0000

East 645.83 feet to lands now or formerly of

Robert

Fishkill Properties, Inc.; thence along other

Musiello: Rebutted,

lands of Fishkill Properties South 25° 19’

133089- 60b/(3) does not

20”·East 123.23 feet, South 48° 42’ 20” West

6155-00- apply

394.68 feet, South 25° 19’ 20” East 66.04 feet,

738755-0000

South 64 ° 40’ 40” West 230.74 feet and North

Robert

32° 08’ 50” West 300.00 feet to the point and

Musiello:

place of BEGINNING . . . .”

133089- 60c/(3)

6155-00-

(Pls.’ Ex. 79a).

764735-0000

“South fifty-one degrees forty-eight minutes

thirty seconds West thirty-seven and forty-five

hundredths feet; thence South sixty-one

degrees twenty-one minutes thirty seconds

West ninety-eight and forty-six hundredths

feet, thence South sixty-two degrees forty-

Linda Nevels

three minutes West fourteen and nine

f/k/a Linda

hundredths feet; thence with other lands of Rebutted,

Slinskey:

61/(3) party of the first part (Ketcham) South twenty- does not

133001-

seven degrees seventeen minutes East one apply

6155-11-

hundred five and thirty-six hundredths feet to

656717-0000

the Northerly line of lands of the New York

New Haven and Hartford Railroad

Company; thence with the said Northerly

line of lands of said Railroad Company

North sixty-four degrees twenty-one

minutes thirty seconds East one hundred

38

sixty-one and thirty-four hundredths feet to

line of lands of Ainsworth; thence with said

line of lands of Ainsworth North thirty-three

degrees one minute West one hundred twenty

and one tenth feet to the place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 80a).

“[R]unning thence along the westerly line of

said Robinson, South 33-01-00 East 142.01

feet to a point in the northerly line of lands

of New York, New Haven & Hartford

Railroad Co., South 64-21-30 West 100.42

feet to a point marking the most southerly

Barbara corner of the herein described parcel and

Reale: that most easterly corner of lands now or Rebutted,

133001- 67/(3) formerly of Prendergast (Liber 740 cp 559); does not

6155-11- running thence along the easterly line of said apply

665726-0000 Prendergast, North 33-01-00 West 120.10 feet

to a point in the southerly line of the

aforementioned Kipp Avenue; running thence

along the same, N 51-48-30 E 100.00 feet to

the point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 86a).

“South 25 deg. 59’ 30” East from a monument

and point of curvature in the southerly side of

Lot No. 16, as shown on said map, which

monument is South 64 deg. 00’ 30” West 40

feet from the southeasterly comer of said lot

16; thence on a curve to the right having a

Barbara M. radius of 110 feet a distance of 73.89 feet;

Renza 2020 thence South 16 deg. 38’ 28” West 188.88 feet

Irrevocable to a point which is the intersection of the line

Trust: 68/(3) of lands now or formerly of Hammond and Applies

133089- lands now or formerly of New York, New

6155-14- Haven, and Hartford Railroad; thence

378494-0000 North 64 deg. 00’ 30” East along lands now

or formerly of New York, New Haven and

Hartford Railroad, 196.33 feet; thence North

25 deg. 59’ 30” West 115 feet to the point or

place of beginning . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 87a).

Rombout “[T]hence running along said west line of said Rebutted,

Fire District: 69/(3) Lot Number 7, South 03-33-00 East 50 feet to does not

133089- a point on the north line of the right of way apply

39

6256-04- of the Central New England Railway

574274-0000 Company; thence along north line of said

Railroad right of way South 83-53-00 West

75 feet to a point in the east line of lands now

or formerly of Henry Morgenthau1 Jr.; thence

North 03-33-00 West 50 feet along said lands

of said Morgenthau to a point; thence still

along said lands of said Morgenthau North 83-

53-00 East 75 feet to the place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 88a).

Sean

Michael

No limiting language identified.

Rowan:

71/(3) Applies

133089-

(Pls.’ Ex. 90a).

6155-10-

405517-0000

Richard

Runion No limiting language identified.

133089- 72/(3) Applies

6155-17- (Pls.’ Ex. 91a).

044231-0000

“RUNNING THENCE north 26 degrees 25

minutes 06 seconds West, 160.00 feet;

THENCE North 75 degrees 54 minutes 49

seconds West, 35.81 feet; THENCE North 26

degrees 25 minutes 06 seconds West, 275.00

Anthony & feet; THENCE North 59 degrees 42 minutes

Jessica 00 seconds East, 126.29 feet; THENCE South

Russo: 26 degrees 25 minutes 07 seconds East, 480.37

73/(3) Applies

132800- feet to a point on the northerly side of New

6457-03- York State Route 82; THENCE along the

107499-0000 northerly side of New York State Route 82,

South 71 degrees 24 minutes 00 seconds West,

99.70 feet to the point or place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 92a).

Mary Ann “[R]unning thence along the southwesterly line

Schetter of Petticoat Lane S 47 degrees 22’ 20” E 37.50

Irrevocable feet to a point; thence leaving said line and Rebutted,

Trust 74/(3) running through lands of parties of the first part does not

Agreement (Goldsmith) S 38 degrees 51’ 40” W 277.10 apply

dated feet to a point on the northerly line of lands

8/27/2019: of the New York, New Haven and Hartford

40

133089- Railroad, on a curve convex to the south,

6155-03- having a radius of 1512.88 feet and a length

018271-0000 westerly of 42.03 feet to a point; thence

leaving said line and running along the

southerly line of lands of Noel and Patricia

Schetter and along the southerly line of lands

of the party of the second part N 38 degrees 51’

40” E 296.03 feet to the point of beginning . . .

.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 93a).

“BEGINNING at an iron pipe set at the

southernly corner of lands of Gordon Schetter

and running thence with the line of lands of

Archibald S 40 deg. W 161.03 feet to a pipe set

in the northerly line of the New York, New

Haven & Hartford Railroad Company; thence

with lands of said Railroad Company the

following courses and distances on a curve

to the right (radius 1512.88 feet) in a general

westerly direction 140.21 feet; thence N 67

deg. 2’ W 167.49 feet to the easterly bank of

Adolph J. the Fishkill creek; thence down along the

Schetter: easterly bank of the Fishkill Creek the

133089- 75/(3) following course and distances: N 42’ 26” E Applies

6055-16- 125.58 feet; thence N 2 deg. 41’ 39” W 59.99

994262-0000 feet; thence N 44 deg. 56’ 50” W 61.14 feet;

thence N 16 deg. 5’ 10” E 7.79 feet; thence

with line of lands of Archibald S 85 deg. 47’

30” E 238 feed to an iron pin set at the westerly

corner of lands of Fitzgerald; thence with lands

of Fitzgerald and line of lands of Noel and

Patricia Schetter S 41 deg. 2’ 40” E 196.62

feet; thence with line of lands of Gordon

Schetter S 45 deg 43’ E 90 feet to the place of

beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 94a).

Diane

Sherwood: No limiting language identified.

133089- 78/(3) Applies

6155-03- (Pls.’ Ex. 97a).

075268-0000

Cynthia [R]unning with that land South 27° East 117 Rebutted,

Simmons: 79/(3) feet to the exterior line of the New York, does not

130200- New Haven and Hartford Railroad apply

41

6055-04- company; thence with said exterior line in a

625271-0000 parallel line with the center line of said

railroad and 49 1/2 feet distant northwesterly

therefrom westerly about 290 feet to the

southeasterly side of Fishkill Avenue; thence

along the same North 57° East 275 feet to the

place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls. Ex. 98a).

“BEGINNING at a point, said point being the

intersection of the westerly line of Bridge

Street with the northerly line of Washington

Avenue, and RUNNING THENCE along said

northerly line of Washington Avenue S 88-26-

Zachary

17 W 150.00 feet; THENCE along the easterly

Solomon &

line of Moseman N 03-20-35 W 200.40 feet;

Amanda Rebutted,

THENCE along the southerly line of lands

Berman: 81/(3) does not

now or formerly Consolidated Rail Corp.,

133089- apply

along a curve to the right having a radius of

6055-16-

1096.28 feet and being distant easterly

839257-0000

150.00 feet; THENCE along the said westerly

line of Bridge Street S 04-09-05 E 178.00 feet

to the point of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 100a).

“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line

of Kipp Avenue said point being distant

southwesterly 535.00 feet from the intersection

of the said southerly line of Kipp Avenue with

the westerly line of Blodgett Road and running

thence with the said southerly line of Kipp

Avenue the following courses and distances:

South 65° 20’ West 26.4 feet; thence South 68°

Anthony R. 44’ 40’’ West 58.6 feet; thence with lands of

Thomaselli: party of the first part (Ketcham) South 24° 27’ Rebutted,

133089- 83/(3) 40” East 107.47 feet to the northerly line of does not

6155-11- lands of the New York New Haven and apply

631696-0000 Hartford Railroad Company; THENCE

with the said northerly line of land of said

Railroad Company North 64° 21’ 30” East

85.00 feet: THENCE with other lands of party

of the first part (Ketcham) North 24° 30’ 20”

West 102.54 feet to the place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 101a).

42

“BEGINNING at an iron pipe set in the

southerly line of the State Road leading from

Fishkill Village to Brinckerhoff at the

Northwesterly corner of lands of Horton and

running thence with line of lands of Horton the

following courses and distances, South nine (9)

degrees ten (10) minutes East three hundred

(300) feet; thence North seventy two (72)

degrees fifty eight (58) minutes thirty (30)

seconds East two hundred (200) feet to line of

David Van lands of Palumbo; thence with line of lands of

Voorhis, Palumbo South nine (9) degrees ten (10)

Donald Van minutes East one hundred sixty seven (167)

Voorhis, feet to the Northerly line of lands of the New Rebutted,

and Susan 88/(3) York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad does not

Murray: Co., thence with the Northerly line of the apply

133089- New York, New Haven and Hartford

6256-03- Railroad Co. in a general Westerly direction

232018-0000 two thousand one hundred eighty five (2185)

feet more or Less to the Easterly line of lands

of Ursulla Hotel Corporation; thence with the

Easterly line of the Ursulla Hotel Corporation

North thirteen (13) degrees twelve (12)

minutes West one thousand two hundred

seventy (1270) feet more or less to the inter

section of the Easterly line of lands of the

Ursulla Hotel Corporation . . . .”

(Pls. Ex. 105a).

334 Fishkill

Ave., LLC: No limiting language identified.

130200- 2/(4) Applies

6054-23- (Pls.’ Ex. 30a).

284922-0000

“[T]hence running N87° 14’ 46” E 23.00’ to a

point thence running N81° 45’ 46”E 96.82’ to

a point. Thence running S06° 47’16”E 120.85’

along lands now or formerly 334 Fishkill Ave

KAP Realty

LLC to a point. Thence running S67°

NY, LLC:

40’50”W 88.09’ along lands now or

130200- 50/(4) Applies

formerly Metro-North to point. Thence

6054-23-

running N22 ° 19’10”W 24.50’ to a point.

280919-0000

Thence still running along lands now or

formerly Niche Modern LLC S67°31’50”W

32.00’ to a point. Thence running

N06°07’00”W 128.58’ along lands now or

43

formerly 326 Fishkill Avenue LLC to the point

of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 69a).

“BEGINNING in the northerly line of Liberty

Street at the easterly comer of Lot #11, and

running thence along Lot #11 , North 27

degrees 34’ West 225 feet to the back of the

creek; THENCE up and along the creek

easterly 100 feet to the extension of the

Anne Provet: easterly line of Lot #15; THENCE South 27

130200- degrees 34’ East 104 feet to land reserved by

66/(4) Applies

6054-23- Navarro (818 Deeds, page 387); THENCE

374946-0000 along the same South 62 degrees 26’ West 84

feet; and South 27 degrees 34’ East 84 feet to

the northerly line of Liberty Street; THENCE

along the same, South 62 degrees 26’ West 16

feet to the place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 85a).

“THENCE of an iron pin, South 43° 04’ 15”

West 70.21 feet, THENCE on a curve to the

left having a radius of 50’ 46.52 feet to an iron

pin and then the southeasterly comer of

premises being described, THENCE North 47°

59’ 45” West 91.91 feet to an iron pin,

THENCE North 87° 26’ 45” West 34.50 feet

to a point on the easterly side of Pump House

Road, THENCE along the easterly side of

Geraldine Pump House Road, North 2° 33’ 15” East

Cheverko: 15/(4) 98.19 feet to an iron pin, THENCE along Applies

56.8-1-11 lands now or formerly of Penn Central

Railroad, New Haven Division, THENCE on

a curve to the left having a radius of 3174.88’,

85.21 feet to an iron pin, THENCE along the

southerly line of Lot No. 4, South 39° 43 ‘, 30”

East 183.21 feet to an iron pin at the westerly

side of Fairview Road to the point and place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 42a).

Robin No limiting language identified.

Greene: 44/(4) Applies

56.27-1-5 (Pls.’ Ex. 63a).

44

Wilson No limiting language identified.

Morales: 59/(4) Applies

56.27-1-6 (Pls.’ Ex. 78a).

“THENCE along said lands of Peck the

following courses and distances: North 87° 33’

26” West 32.21 feet; North 68° 34’ 29” West

60.17 feet; North 62° 13’ 22” West 10.45 feet

and North 75° 08’ 44” West 82.04 feet to a

point in the easterly side of the right of way

of the New York-New Haven and Hartford

Railroad Company; THENCE along said

lands of said railroad company and along a

post and wire fence the following courses

and distances: North 9° 10’ 35” West 241.86

Robert C.

feet; North 8° 11’ 28” West 32.85 feet; North

Kalbfell

9° 05’ 22” West 262.30 feet to a point in the

Revocable

southerly boundary line of lands now or

Trust and

formerly of Rogers; THENCE along said lands

Nanci Pinto 48/(5) Applies

of Rogers on a course North 86° 09’ 29” East

Kalbfell

206.30 feet passing through two iron pins set

Revocable

in the ground to a third iron pin set in the

Trust:

westerly side of said public highway;

13.-2-12

THENCE along the westerly side of said public

highway, the following courses and distances:

South 2° 04’ 28” East 52.74 feet; South 7° 57’

21” East 147.86 feet; South 3° 21’ 29” West

122.61 feet; South 4 ° 08’ 59” East 14 7 .86

feet; South 3°· 21’ 29” West 122.61 feet; South

4 ° 08’ 59” East 141.55 feet and South 12° 59’

53” East 134.08 feet to the point or place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls. Ex. 67a).

“RUNNING THENCE along said land now or

formerly of Rogers, north 88 degrees 21

minutes 59 seconds west, 91.20 feet, south 88

degrees 10 minutes 01 second west, 168.21

Anthony feet to land now or formerly of the New

Luca & York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad

Filomena 52/(5) Company; THENCE along said land, north Applies

Didomenico: 14 degrees 18 minutes 29 seconds west, 34.23

13.-2-14 feet, north 17 degrees 52 minutes 29 seconds

west, 134.49 feet to a fence post and lands

now or formerly of Cushman; THENCE along

said land now or formerly of Cushman, north

00 degrees 30 minutes 49 seconds west, 132

45

feet to a drilled hole and lands now or formerly

of O’Hara; THENCE along said lands now or

formerly of O’Hara, north 88 degrees 14

minutes 00 seconds east, a distance of 311.01

feet to an iron pin at the westerly side of Route

Nos. 216 and 311; THENCE along said

westerly side of Route Nos. 216 and 311, south

05 degrees 15 minutes 11 seconds west, 7.15

feet and south 00 degrees 00 minutes 01I

second west, 292.85 feet to the point or place

of BEGINNING.”

(Pls. Ex. 71a).

Matthew &

No limiting language identified.

Catherine

14/(5) Applies

Castellano:

(Pls.’ Ex. 41a).

13.-2-19

“Thence along the northerly line of N.Y.S.

Route 52, North 88-07-00 West 51.91 feet to a

point; Thence along lands now or formerly

Silveri (Doc. #2005-10707) and generally

along the remains of a wire fence, North 17-28-

55 East 347.29 feet to a point; Thence

continuing along lands now or formerly Silveri

(Doc. #2005-10707), North 81-41-00 West

250.41 feet to a point; Thence along lands now

or formerly Nicolari (Doc. #2000-1987), along

lands now or formerly Beal (Doc. #1999-

10589), along lands now or formerly Large

Gavin &

LLC (Doc. #2004- 2338) and along a stone

Louise

walk North 13-45-00 East 7.68 feet, North 17-

Skinner:

80/(5) 46-00 East 61.23 feet, North 15-03-00 East Applies

132800-

83.00 feet and North 15-59-00 East 303.95 feet

6557-03-

to a point; Thence along lands now or

435119-0000

formerly Metro North Commuter Railroad

Company (Liber 1956 page 339), South 80-

29-00 East 412.44 feet to a point; Thence

along lands now or formerly Tucker & Gosen

(Liber 1994 page 116) and along a stone wall,

South 70-40-00 East 117.29 feet to a point;

Thence along lands now or formerly White

(Liber 1661 page 217) and along a stone wall,

South 15-23-00 West 77.50 feet, South 11-10-

00 West 21.50 feet, South 17-14-00 West

43.60 feet, South 11-18-00 West 52.00 feet,

South 17-12-00 West 60.00 feet and South 14-

46

19-00 West 168.17 feet to a point; Thence

along Parcel I as shown on said Filed Map No.

3928, North 81-41-00 West 232.62 feet to a

bent iron pin found, South 38-45-50 West

35.93 feet to an iron pin found and South 17-

28-55 West 310.00 feet to the point or place of

beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 99a).

“RUNNING THENCE along the line of said

lands now or formerly of Amanda C. Hoffman

along a stone wall, North 80 degrees l 7

minutes 40 seconds West, 163.18 feet and

North 81 degrees 35 minutes 40 seconds West,

405.14 feet to the easterly side of Cushman

Road; THENCE along the easterly side of

Cushman Road, North 02 degrees 51 minutes

00 seconds East, 210.20 feet, North 01 degree

Brache- 18 minutes 00 seconds East, 201.40 feet and

Lanza North 04 degrees 24 minutes 03 seconds East, Rebutted,

Family 10/(5) 117.69 feet to lands now or formerly of Keith does not

Trust: 13.-2- and Juliet Irvine; THENCE leaving said road apply

61.1 and running along said lands now or formerly

of Keith and Juliet Irvine, North 86 degrees 52

minutes 30 seconds East. 601 .96 feet to the

westerly exterior line of said lands now or

formerly of Con-Rail Corp; THENCE along

the line of said lands, South 06 degrees 13

minutes 10 seconds West, 585.99 feet to the

point of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 38a).

“South 05 degrees 24’ 33” West 184.80 feet;

thence North 81 degrees 50’ 27” West 59.40

feet; thence South 05 degrees 24’ 33” West

178.20 feet to a point; running thence along

lands now or formerly of Metro North

William

Commuter Railroad Company South 77

Antalek:

degrees 58’ 49” West 219.74 feet to a point;

132800- 6/(5) Applies

. . . North 01 degrees 00’ 00” East 445.50 feet

6657-03-

to a point running thence in the midst of

145245-0000

Seaman Road a/k/a Back Road) South 83

degrees 00’ 00” East 243.99 feet; thence South

05 degrees 24’ 33” West 8.59 feet; thence

along the southerly line of Seaman road (a/k/a

Back Road) South 81 degrees 50’ 27” East

47

59.40 feet to the point or place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 34a).

Paul T.

Brady

Revocable

Trust

& Donna R. No limiting language identified.

Brady 11/(5) Applies

Revocable (Pls.’ Ex. 39a).

Trust:

132800-

6657-03-

226236-0000

“[T]hence, South 79 degrees 22’ 30” East

along the southerly side of said highway,

196.90 feet; thence continuing along the

southerly side of said highway, South 77

degrees 41’ 30” East 129.55 feet; thence

continuing along the southerly side of said

Michael

highway, South 77 degrees 02’ 00” East 492.95

Gallo, Jr.:

feet to a point; thence, South 79 degrees 20’

132800- 37/(5) Applies

00” West 930.05 feet to a point; thence along

6657-03-

a fence, North 8 degrees 50’ 10” West 178.20

195259-0000

feet; thence, South 78 degrees 24’ 50” East

59.40 feet; thence, North 8 degrees 50’ 10”

East 184.80 feet to the point or place of

BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 59a).

The Mikiel

Family

No limiting language identified.

Trust:

57/(5) Applies

132800-

(Pls.’ Ex. 76a).

6657-03-

208229-0000

48

3. The Maybrook Trail

The United States also moves for

summary judgment on the basis that

several Plaintiffs are unable to establish

both causation and just compensation

due to the existence of the “Maybrook

Trail.” 10 (Def.’s Mot. at 34–38). The

Maybrook Trail, which runs along

several of the subject properties to this

litigation, was opened in 2020

(predating the NITU), and is currently

being utilized as a pedestrian walking

and biking trail. (Id. at 34; Pls.’ Reply at

20 (“It is not disputed that there is a trail

on part of the corridor that is subject to

the NITU.”)). First, the United States

posits that the Group D Plaintiffs cannot

establish causation, because the

Maybrook Trail makes it impossible for

Plaintiffs to prove “that the STB’s NITU

has taken something from the Group D

landowners . . . [as the] pre-existing use Image of the Maybrook Trail (Def.’s Mot., Ex. 4 at 8,

of the railroad corridor for walking and ECF No. 43-4)

biking” would continue even in the

NITU’s absence. (Def’s Mot. at 35–36). Second, the United States argues that Plaintiffs are

unable to meet their burden of proof on the element of just compensation. (Id. at 36–38).

i. Causation

For its causation argument, the United States first points to Caquelin. (Def.’s Mot. at 35).

The Caquelin court held that “a NITU does not effect a taking if, even in the absence of a NITU,

the railroad would not have abandoned its line (a necessary prerequisite for termination of the

easement under state law) during the period of the NITU.” Caquelin, 959 F.3d. at 1363. This is

because, in such circumstances “the NITU takes nothing from the landowner that the landowner

would have had in the absence of the NITU.” Id. Relying on this principle, the United States

argues that “there can be no taking if the Plaintiffs would never have their land back

unencumbered by a trail but for the NITU[.]” (Def.’s Mot. at 35). However, the land’s current

encumbrance by the Maybrook Trail does not constitute evidence that the Railroad would not, in

10

The United States asserts this argument for twenty-three (23) of the claims in this matter

(“Group D”). (See Def.’s Ex. 4, ECF No. 43-4). This grouping does not correlate with any of

Plaintiffs’ groupings.

49

fact, have abandoned its line absent the NITU. Instead, the Court must consider a variety of

factors to properly discern the Railroad’s intent. See Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346.

Pursuant to the Trails Act, the “railbanking” process typically begins when the rail carrier

files either an abandonment application or a request for an exemption with the STB. Caldwell v.

United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 10903, 10502)). Upon

the STB’s approval and publication of the notice of exemption, any potential trail operator can

file a railbanking petition which must include “(1) a map of the right-of-way, (2) a statement

indicating that the trail operator will assume financial and legal liability for the right-of-way, and

(3) an acknowledgement that the right-of-way may be reactivated for railroad use in the future.”

Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)). Assuming the petition meets the proper criteria, and the

railroad agrees to negotiate with the petitioner, the STB will issue a NITU which permits the

railroad “discontinue service, cancel tariffs, and salvage track and other equipment . . . without

consummating abandonment[.]” Id. A taking is accomplished when the NITU blocks state law

reversionary property interest that would otherwise take effect pursuant to normal abandonment

proceedings. Caquelin, 959 F.3d at 1363 (citing Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236)). When no trail-use

agreement has been reached, but the NITU compels the railroad to delay its abandonment, the

issuance of a NITU may effect a temporary physical taking. Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1023–24. In the

absence of a trail use agreement, it must be clearly shown that the railroad intended to abandon

its lines during the NITU period but was prevented from doing so by the existence of the NITU.

Memmer, 50 F.4th at 145.

In order reach the question of whether the Plaintiffs here have established causation, the

Court must first determine the proper analytical framework as set forth by the Federal Circuit. A

NITU alone is not sufficient to establish that the government has caused a taking; the Court

should take a totality of the circumstances approach to discern “whether [the railroad] would

have consummated abandonment in the absence of the NITU.” Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346. In

Sauer West, the Circuit discussed many different factors that the Court could consider when

seeking to discern the railroad’s intent; these factors included things such as (1) the railroad’s

request to abandon the line; (2) refusing to consent to an extension of the NITU; (3)

abandonment of the line within months of the NITU’s expiration; (4) whether the NITU

authorized track removal during the NITU period; and (5) whether the railroad did in fact

remove tracks. Id. (citing Caquelin, 959 F.3d at 1373; Memmer, 50 F.4th at 145 (comparing

different factors considered in Caquelin and Memmer)). The Circuit, however, pointed out how

in Sauer West the Claims Court considered additional factors beyond those listed in Caquelin,

including: (1) six one-year extensions to negotiate the trails agreement; (2) improvements to the

Line; (3) no removal of tracks; (4) railcar storage on the line; (5) negotiations with other parties

to reopen the Line, and (6) the eventual decision not to abandon. Id. (citing Sauer West v. United

States, 168 Fed. Cl. 49, 68 (2023) (finding plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the railroad

would have abandoned the line and therefore failed to establish causation)).

Notably, none of these cases state that a plaintiff is unable to recover damages due to

their land being encumbered by a trail that pre-existed the NITU. The Circuit’s focus has always

been on the NITU’s issuance and, in the absence of a trail use agreement, the railroad’s intent, or

lack thereof, to abandon the rail line. For these reasons, the Court does not find the United

States’ arguments persuasive, as they appear to suggest that real-world conditions—namely, the

Maybrook Trail—eliminate the need to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach

50

articulated by the Circuit. The United States’ reliance on Loveridge only heightens the Court’s

concerns with its position.

The United States contends that the “real-world conditions” of this case are comparable

to the circumstances in Loveridge v. United States. (Def.’s Mot. at 34 (citing Loveridge v. United

States, 174 Fed. Cl. 379, 389–90 (2024), appeal docketed, No. 25-1244 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2024)).

Specifically, the United States argues that “[t]he construction of and continued maintenance of

the Maybrook Trail is inconsistent with an intent to abandon MNR’s property rights in this

corridor.” (Id. at 36). To start, the United States’ suggestion that MNR’s “construction and

continued maintenance” of the Maybrook Trail is somehow indicative of MNR’s intent not to

abandon the rail line is simply illogical. (Id.). The purpose of the Trails Act is to “preserve the

right-of-way for future use, and, in the interim, convert the corridor into a recreational trail[;]” a

railroad acting in accordance with the Act’s stated purpose does not preclude the Court from

finding a taking occurred. Dimarino, 2025 WL 2985487, at *2 (Fed. Cl. May 13, 2025) (quoting

Chicago Coating Co. LLC v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal

citation omitted)). 11 It is hardly surprising that MNR—having volunteered to assume financial

and legal responsibility for the proposed trail—would take steps to ensure that its pre-existing

trail remained serviceable. Moreover, had a trail-use agreement already been executed and a trail

constructed pursuant to that agreement, MNR’s actions would be entirely consistent with, if not

expected of, a trail sponsor. In any event, maintenance of the Maybrook Trail is fundamentally

distinct from the continued maintenance of the rail line itself, and the former provides no basis

for concluding that the Railroad would not have abandoned the line.

The Court also finds United States’ comparison of the present case to Loveridge lacking.

In Loveridge, the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad (“POTB”) entered a third-party contract to

operate a scenic train known as the “Oregon Coast Scenic Railroad” (“OCSR”) prior to the

issuance of the NITU. Loveridge, 174 Fed. Cl. at 388. OCSR did not conduct freight services but

instead was established to educate the public about railroad’s logging history. Id. Because the

language of POTB’s easements were broad, the decision to enter a third-party contract with

OCSR would most likely not have exceeded the scope of their easement. See id. at 390 (citing

Loveridge v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 143, 150 (2020)). 12 However, this issue was never

properly before the Court.

11

The United States also argues that there can be no causation because “MNR has not elected to

consummate abandonment of [the rail] line.” (Def.’s Mot. at 40). But this argument fails for the

same reasons, namely MNR has not consummated abandonment because it continues to pursue a

trail-use agreement, but this is an expected part of the railbanking process and does not resolve

the question of whether a taking occurred. See Galt Auto., 2025 WL 3012202, at *4.

12

Interestingly, during the liability phase of the litigation, neither party disclosed OCSR’s

existence which resulted in a finding by Judge Firestone that a taking had occurred. Loveridge, at

389. During a subsequent site visit to the rail line, the Court was surprised to find the scenic train

operating on the subject rail line. Loveridge, 174 Fed. Cl. at 389. The existence of the scenic

51

To be clear, Loveridge was concerned with the possibility that the railroad’s third-party

agreement with OCSR was a use contemplated by the broad scope of the subject easement.

Loveridge, 174 Fed. Cl. at 390 (“[T]he scenic rail was in operation on the same rail corridor prior

to and after the issuance of the NITU . . . I certainly think it impacts the decision of whether

there was a taking to begin with.”). This is not the same scenario, and the United States’

arguments fail to comport with the Court’s analysis in Loveridge. Here, the United States is not

arguing that the Maybrook Trail is a use contemplated by the underlying easement, rather it

asserts that the mere existence of the trail prevents the Plaintiffs’ from establishing causation

because their land would remain encumbered. (Def.’s Mot. at 35). Again, the government’s

position elevates the effects of “real-world conditions” over the express terms of the railroad’s

deed. Under this reasoning, a railroad could hypothetically construct a trail despite deed

language limiting its interest to railroad purposes, and later, when seeking to abandon the line,

argue that the plaintiffs cannot establish causation because their property would remain

encumbered even in the absence of the NITU. The Loveridge decision made no such finding, and

the United States has not cited any case supporting this approach. Adopting it would create a

loophole that would allow the United States to avoid paying just compensation after depriving

property owners of the reversionary interests to which they are entitled. Having clarified the

proper analysis set forth by the Circuit, the Court proceeds to determine whether the Plaintiffs

have established causation.

First, MNR filed an abandonment application with the STB, reflecting its intent to

abandon the rail corridor. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 6, ECF No. 38-6). It is clear from the filings that MNR

is filling the shoes of the trail operator. MNR states that it acknowledges that use of the line “is

subject to MNR, as owner and sponsor of the proposed trail,” and that it is assuming

responsibility for any financial and legal liability that may arise. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 6 at 4). MNR

also acknowledged that the right-of-way will be subject to potential reactivation of the rail line.

(Id. at 5). MNR’s application was accepted, which led to the STB’s issuance of a NITU. (Pls.’

Mot., Ex. 7, ECF No. 38-7). Upon approving MNR’s Abandonment Application, the STB

specifically notes that “MNR is both the owner of the Line and the trail sponsor, [therefore] the

negotiations that normally take place to reach a trail use agreement as contemplated under 49

C.F.R. § 1152.29 may not be needed.” (Id. at 2).

Second, MNR has on several occasions stated its intent to abandon the line to pursue

recreational trail use to the STB. (See Pls.’ Ex. 26 at 4 (“This Verified Notice concerns MNR’s

planned abandonment of the [rail line]”), 5 (“MNR intends to consummate the proposed

abandonment[.]”), and 6 (“MNR is seeking abandonment of the Line”)). 13 In the absence of

convincing evidence to the contrary, these statements strongly indicate MNR’s intent to abandon

the rail line. See Galt Auto., 2025 WL 3012202, at *4 (“MNR’s self-expression of its intent to

train, previously unknown during the liability stage, raised questions about whether a taking had,

in fact, occurred. Id. at 390. The Court expressed significant concern that this information had

not been expressly presented during the liability phase and noted that the scenic train “may have

altered the liability outcome.” Id. at 390.

13

Citations to page numbers are those assigned by CM/ECF.

52

abandon, and the United States failure to rebut the presumption of abandonment, left no doubt

that a taking had in fact occurred.”) (citing DiMarino, 2025 WL 2985441, at *3).

To rebut this presumption, the United States submits a Declaration from Susan Sarch,

former Vice President and General Counsel for MNR, in which she states:

MNR uses the existing rail yard near Hopewell Junction and portions of the

Beacon Line property for storage of equipment and materials used in MNR’s

provision of commuter rail service on its active rail lines; however, MNR

does not use the Beacon Line for any other purposes except for fiber optic

communication (there is a fiber optic cable spanning the entire Beacon Line).

(Decl. of Susan Sarch, at ¶ 19, ECF No. 43-6). There also does not seem to be any evidence that

MNR has removed any tracks, even from along the areas alongside the Maybrook Trail. (Def.’s

Mot. at 41). Even so, while MNR has sought and obtained a one-year extension of the NITU, the

United States acknowledges that service on the rail line has been discontinued for some time

now. (Def.’s Mot. at 40 (“[T[here is no dispute that service on the Beacon Line has only been

discontinued[.]”)).

The Court finds that the United States has not presented evidence “affirmatively

indicating the railroad would have delayed abandonment . . . had there been no NITU[.]” Sauer

West, 151 F.4th at 1346. MNR’s fiber optic cable and use of one rail yard are insufficient to find

in favor of the United States. Plaintiffs, however, have demonstrated that MNR would have

abandoned the rail line absent the NITU. Again, MNR’s statements and reaffirmance support this

finding. (See Pls.’ Ex. 26). Therefore, the Court DENIES the United States’ Motion as to

causation. Additionally, while the United States moved for summary judgment as to causation

specifically as to Group D Plaintiffs, the Court’s finding is also applicable to any Plaintiffs

outside of this Group who have successfully demonstrated an interest in the rail corridor.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS partial summary judgment, as to causation, for any Plaintiff who

has demonstrated a property interest as discussed earlier in this decision. 14

ii. Just Compensation

Next, the United States argues that the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proof as to

just compensation because their expert reports failed to account for the Maybrook Trail. (Def.’s

Mot. at 36–38). According to the United States, Plaintiffs’ expert (“Mr. Nordine”) was expressly

instructed by legal counsel “not to consider [the Maybrook Trail] in the ‘Before’ scenario of his

appraisal reports.” (Id. at 37 (emphasis in original)). Therefore, the United States claims that Mr.

Nordine’s reports fail to provide an opinion of market value that incorporates the Maybrook Trail

but instead are based on a “counter-factual Hypothetical Condition” that the land within the

corridor is unencumbered. (Id.).

14

For Plaintiffs whose property interests have not yet been determined, this finding would be

instructive if those interests are established.

53

Where a taking has been established, property owners bear “the burden of proving an

actual loss has occurred” to determine just compensation. Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United

States, 779 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Landowners bear the burden of establishing a

railroad corridor’s value, which is a factual inquiry. Memmer v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 706,

753–54 (2024). Landowners bear the burden of establishing the value of the railway corridor.

Hyatt v. United States, 170 Fed. Cl. 417, 432 (2024) (internal citations omitted). Property owners

meet this burden if they show actual damages “with reasonable certainty.” Ind. Mich. Power Co.

v. United States, 422 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This “requires more than a guess, but less

than absolute exactness.” Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 833

(Fed. Cir. 2010).

The Federal Circuit has recognized that traditional compensation methods are not

exclusive, and that alternative valuation approaches may be appropriate in cases involving the

taking of an easement. See Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1285–

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.