Opinion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 TERESA LIM, Case No. 2:25-cv-02819-TLN-CSK PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, (ECF Nos. 1, 2)

INC., et al.,

15

Defendants.

16

17

18 Plaintiff Teresa Lim is representing herself in this action and seeks leave to

19 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) For the

20 reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied, and the

21 Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

22 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement,

24 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person

25 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security

26 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the

27

1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.

28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).

1 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient

2 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo,

3 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient

4 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of

5 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis

6 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some

7 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department

8 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not

9 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,650.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service

10 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines).

11 Here, Plaintiff has not made the required financial showing under 28 U.S.C.

12 § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s affidavit in support of her motion shows that

13 Plaintiff receives $4,400 per month in take-home pay or wages. Plaintiff states she has

14 $1,618 in expenses each month and that she contributes $1,200 per month to her

15 mother’s care. Id. Plaintiff also states she has loans totaling $34,600. Id.

16 Plaintiff has indicated a regular source of income. While § 1915(a) does not

17 require a litigant to be “absolutely destitute,” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339, the applicant must

18 nonetheless show inability to pay the fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff has not done

19 so. Accordingly, the Court will recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied for the

20 reasons stated above, and because the action is facially frivolous or without merit. “‘A

21 district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from

22 the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v.

23 Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank &

24 Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child Support

25 Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion

26 by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears from the face of the

27 amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze,

28 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District Court to examine any

1 application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed

2 proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is

3 bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because it

4 appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is frivolous or is without

5 merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP motion be

6 denied.

7 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

8 Even if the Court were to grant Plaintiff’s IFP application, Plaintiff’s Complaint

9 warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s required pre-answer screening.

10 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

11 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to

12 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a

13 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,

14 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

15 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In

16 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual

17 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and

18 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27;

19 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir.

20 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

21 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

22 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal).

23 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

24 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

25 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does

26 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);

27 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

28 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough

1 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

2 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

3 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the

5 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be

6 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

7 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

8 III. DISCUSSION

9 A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

10 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases

11 authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

12 Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction,

13 ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516,

14 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546

15 (1986)); see Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858

16 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the

17 merits of a case or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d

18 at 1380. A federal court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways: actions

19 arising under federal law or those between citizens of different states in which the

20 alleged damages exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subject-matter jurisdiction

21 can never be waived or forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte”

22 subject matter jurisdiction even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565

23 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).

24 The Complaint does not identify the basis for federal court subject matter

25 jurisdiction, and the Court was not able to discern a jurisdictional basis. See Compl.

26 First, the Complaint does not present a federal question. See id. Plaintiff brings claims

27 for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Farmers

28 Insurance Company, Inc., Peter Kubicki, Nancy Kubicki, and Alicia Kubicki resulting from

1 a vehicle collision. Id. ¶¶ 2-6. Plaintiff alleges on October 2, 2024 at approximately 9:20

2 a.m., Defendant Alicia was driving a Hyundai Elantra on Truxel Road in Sacramento

3 County and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle causing damages to Plaintiff’s body. Id. ¶ 6. The

4 vehicle was insured by Defendants Peter and Nancy under a Farmers Insurance policy.

5 Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are

6 state law claims, and therefore do not arise under federal law.

7 Second, the Complaint does not allege diversity of citizenship. See Compl.

8 Plaintiff seeks $125,000 in damages, which is greater than $75,000. Id. at 10-11.

9 However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Farmers Insurance is incorporated under the

10 laws of Kansas “with its principle California place of business” located in California. Id.

11 ¶ 2. Though Plaintiff does not state where Defendants Alicia, Peter, or Nancy are

12 domiciled in the main part of the Complaint, the “Declaration of Service” attached to

13 Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates Defendants Alicia, Peter, and Nancy are California

14 residents. See Compl. at 13. Plaintiff has not alleged that there is complete diversity

15 between Plaintiff and the Defendants. Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter

16 jurisdiction.

17 B. Leave to Amend

18 The Complaint does not present a cogent, non-frivolous claim. In light of the

19 Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it appears granting leave to amend would be

20 futile. The Complaint should therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez,

21 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995).

22 IV. CONCLUSION

23 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that:

24 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED;

25 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend;

26 and

27 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case.

28 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

1 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

2 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

3 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should

4 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any

5 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14

6 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time

7 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

8 || 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

9

10 | Dated: November 26, 2025 C iy S \U

11 CHI SOO KIM

42 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13

14 || 5, lim.2819.25

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28