Fuentes

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 TIFFANY HARRISON SHABAZZ, et Case No. 2:25-cv-02811-DJC-CSK PS

al.,

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Plaintiffs,

13 ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST AND

v. GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

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FUENTES, et al., (ECF Nos. 1, 3)

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Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff Tiffany Harrison Shabazz is representing herself in this action and seeks

18 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 3.)

19 Plaintiff’s application in support of the IFP request makes the required financial showing.

20 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP request.

21 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

22 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

23 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to

24 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a

25 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,

26 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.

28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).

1 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In

2 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual

3 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and

4 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490

5 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960

6 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

7 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

8 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal).

9 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

10 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

11 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does

12 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);

13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

14 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough

15 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

16 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

17 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the

19 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be

20 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

21 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

22 II. DISCUSSION

23 Plaintiff, “individually and on behalf of” Harold Richardson, N.S. (minor), M.S.

24 (minor), and I.S. (minor) brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants

25 Sacramento Police Department Officers Fuentes and James, and the City of

26 Sacramento. See Compl. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff brings the following claims: (1) unlawful

27 detention and threats under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants

28 Fuentes and James; (2) violation of family integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment

1 against “Defendants”; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress against “Defendants”;

2 and (4) a Monell claim against Defendant City of Sacramento. Compl. ¶¶ 9-12. Plaintiff

3 alleges that on November 18, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to secure the release of Iman

4 Shabazz, who was being unlawfully held against his will at Windsor Care Center located

5 in Sacramento. Compl. ¶ 5. Defendants Fuentes and James responded to the facility

6 and refused to release Iman Shabazz, and threatened Plaintiff and her children with

7 arrest. Compl ¶ 6.

8 A. Pro Se Representation

9 Plaintiff brings this action “individually and on behalf of Harold Richardson, N.S.

10 (MINOR), M.S. (MINOR), and I.S. (MINOR).” Compl. at 1. Plaintiff is not able to bring a

11 claim on behalf of any other party, including her minor children, because she cannot

12 represent others pro se. See Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir.

13 1997) (“[W]e hold that a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor

14 child without retaining a lawyer.”); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d

15 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (pro se party “has no authority to appear as an attorney for

16 others than himself”). It is unclear whether Harold Richardson is a minor. Even if

17 Richardson is not a minor, Plaintiff may not represent him while proceeding pro se. See

18 C.E. Pope Equity Trust, 818 F.2d at 697. If Richardson is not a minor, he may join the

19 action and represent himself pro se, however if he chooses to do so, he must sign all

20 pleadings in addition to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11(a) (“Every pleading . . . must

21 be signed . . . by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”); see also Local Rule

22 131(b). If Plaintiff wishes to bring claims on behalf of her minor children, she will need to

23 retain a lawyer.

24 B. Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983

25 Section 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations, so federal courts

26 apply “the law of the state in which the cause of action arose and apply the state law of

27 limitations governing an analogous cause of action. Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573

28 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007)). For Section 1983

1 actions, federal courts apply the “forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury

2 actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling,

3 except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law.” Butler v. Nat.

4 Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation

5 marks and citations omitted).

6 Under California law, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two

7 years. Butler, 766 F.3d at 1198 (citing Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1). This limitations period

8 is statutorily tolled for a period of two years for person who is, “at the time the cause of

9 action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a

10 criminal court for a term less than for life.” See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 352.1(a); Johnson v.

11 State of California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000). The statute of limitations can be

12 suspended by equitable tolling as well. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir.

13 2004). Under California law, equitable tolling suspends or extends a statute of limitations

14 when an injured person has several potential legal remedies and pursues one

15 reasonably and in good faith. Honchariw v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 530 F. Supp. 3d 939,

16 949-50 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (citing McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist.,

17 45 Cal.4th 88, 99-100 (2008)). To determine whether equitable tolling may extend a

18 statute of limitations, courts look at whether plaintiff has provided timely notice to the

19 defendant, whether there is lack of prejudice to defendant, and whether plaintiff had

20 acted reasonably and in good faith. Id. at 950. Failure to comply with the applicable

21 statute of limitations may be grounds for dismissal at the screening stage if it is apparent

22 from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot “prevail, as a matter of law, on the

23 equitable tolling issue.” Callins v. Mason, 2022 WL 1720951, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 27,

24 2022) (citing Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)).

25 Here, it appears that Plaintiff has brought her claims in this Court well after the

26 two-year statute of limitations period. Plaintiff alleges that on November 18, 2021, at the

27 Windsor Care Center in Sacramento, Plaintiff attempted to secure the release of Iman

28 Shabazz, who was being unlawfully held against his will. Compl. ¶ 5. This would place

1 Plaintiff’s claim outside of the two year statute of limitations timeline. The Complaint in its

2 current form does not allege any facts to suggest equitable or statutory tolling. See

3 generally Compl. Therefore, the Complaint is dismissed as time barred. However,

4 because it is conceivable that Plaintiff may be able to allege facts to justify equitable

5 tolling or some other tolling of the limitations period, the Court will dismiss these claims

6 without prejudice. The Court notes that if Plaintiff amends in an effort to plead cognizable

7 claims, the amended complaint must plead additional facts, including facts regarding

8 tolling of the limitations period.

9 C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

10 Plaintiff brings a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all

11 Defendants. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

12 distress. To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must

13 prove: (1) “extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

14 causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the

15 plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were

16 actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Hayes v. TJX

17 Cos., Inc., 2018 WL 619876, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018) (citing Cochran v. Cochran,

18 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 494 (1988)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Fuentes and James

19 refused to release Iman Shabazz from the Windsor Care Center and threatened Plaintiff

20 and her children with arrest. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ “threats

21 and intimidation were outrageous, intentional, and caused severe emotional distress” to

22 Plaintiff and her children. Compl. ¶ 11. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim

23 because the Complaint fails to allege intent to cause extreme emotional distress.

24 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is dismissed with

25 leave to amend to the extent Plaintiff can allege additional supportive facts.

26 D. Leave to Amend

27 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se

28 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and

1 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In

2 light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is at least conceivable that Plaintiff could

3 allege additional facts to state claims under Section 1983, and state an intentional

4 infliction of emotional distress claim, the Court finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff an

5 opportunity to amend the Complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (indicating that

6 prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and

7 provide an opportunity to cure – if it appears at all possible the defects can be

8 corrected).

9 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading shall allege facts

10 establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction and must contain a short and plain

11 statement of Plaintiff's claim. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in

12 sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than

13 the one before, each paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph number being

14 repeated anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of

15 circumstances” where possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Forms are available to help

16 plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk's

17 Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at

18 www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms.

19 The amended complaint must not require the Court and the defendants to guess

20 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th

21 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally

22 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain

23 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the Court to spend its time

24 “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id.

25 at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the Court and defendants to prepare

26 lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” Id. at 1179.

27 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in

28 order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an

1 || amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a

2 || general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the

3 || amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any

4 | function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012).

5 | Ill. CONCLUSION

6 In accordance with the above, IT |S ORDERED that:

7 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED;

8 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend; and

9 3. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended

10 complaint that complies with the instructions provided above. If Plaintiff

11 fails to timely comply with this order, the undersigned may recommend that

12 this action be dismissed.

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14 || Dated: December 1, 2025 C iy S \U

15 CHI SOO KIM

16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17 || 5, shab.2811.25

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