Paldara

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ROBBIE GOODBAR, Case No. 1:21-cv-0001811-KES-BAM (PC)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO

13 v. STATE A CLAIM

14 PALDARA, et al., (ECF No. 38)

15 Defendants. FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

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Plaintiff Robbie Goodbar (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s first

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amended complaint and he was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is

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currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 38.)

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I. Screening Requirement and Standard

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous

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or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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1 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

2 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

3 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

4 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as

5 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

6 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

7 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

8 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

9 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret

10 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully

11 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility

12 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

13 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

14 Plaintiff is currently housed in Valley State Prison in Chowchilla, California. Plaintiff

15 alleges the events in the complaint occurred while he was housed in Pleasant Valley State Prison.

16 Plaintiff names Defendants: (1) Paldara, correctional officer, (2) Mr. Polder, social worker, (4)

17 Martin Djoveski, inmate, (5) Phillip Seippel, federal analyst-military, father of attempted murder

18 victim. Plaintiff alleges as follows:

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On Jan. 21, 2021, Polder and Paldara yelled in my cell (“heart attack,

20 overdose”) in a threatening voice. They repeated this over and over. All the inmates

had bullied me for being placed in a child molester cell (how I had identified

21 incorrectly as a sex-offender. Due to custody staff at PVSP. I reported an overdose

by (Martin Djoveski who lied about/safe dosage of suboxone. (deliberate indifference

22 to harm)(caused severe psychological harm). Paldara placed me in suicide watch cell.

He yelled “defect” “defect” Goodbar “now you have a bomb in your chest” “if your

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not dead by morning we will beat you up” (constitutes assault on inmate.) I heard

24 Paldara reading from a document (instructions) from Seippel (the father of my

attempted murder victim) Seippel had placed a “hit” out on my life by being in

25 contact with a corrections officer at CDCR. I explained to Mr. Polder that a “hit” was

placed on me at PVSP by Seippel. PVSP custody staff then broke my TV, harassed

26 me, and transferred me to various other prisons. Phillip Seippel’s meddling w/PVSP

officers constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the statute. It caused severe

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psychological harm. This should be investigated. (unedited text)

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2 Plaintiff seeks no more meddling by Phillip Seippel and the “hit” on his life by Seippel,

3 Paldara, Polder will be investigated. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.

4 III. Discussion

5 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to

6 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

8 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

9 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations

10 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

11 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must

12 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

13 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations

14 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss,

15 572 F.3d at 969.

16 Plaintiff's second amended complaint is short, but it is not a plain statement of his claims.

17 Plaintiff’s complaint is largely incoherent of possible violations of constitutional rights. The

18 allegations are conclusory as to what happened and who was involved. As Plaintiff was informed,

19 Plaintiff must clearly state factual support for what happened, when it happened, and who was

20 involved.

21 State Actor

22 The term “person[s]” in § 1983 encompasses state and local officials sued in their

23 individual capacities, private individuals, and entities which act under the color of state law—

24 including local governmental entities. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192

25 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (party charged with constitutional deprivation must be a

26 governmental actor because Ҥ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter

27 how discriminatory or wrong”). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law

28 requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state

1 law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”

2 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).

3 Plaintiff cannot assert a § 1983 claim against private individuals Defendants Martin

4 Djoveski, inmate, and Phillip Seippel, federal analyst-military, father of attempted murder victim,

5 unless he can plausibly allege the defendant was acting under color of state law. The Supreme

6 Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized at least four tests that facilitate identification of state

7 action. Namely, “(1) public function; (2) joint action; (3) governmental compulsion or coercion;

8 and (4) governmental nexus.” Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, 975 F.3d 742, 747 (2020)

9 (quoting Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003)); see Pasadena Republican Club

10 v. W. Justice Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021). Satisfaction of any of the tests is enough

11 to find state action, provided no “countervailing” factor defeats a finding of state action.

12 Pasadena Republican Club, 985 F.3d at 1167; Rawson, 975 F.3d at 747. Regardless of the test,

13 the question is simply always whether a defendant has exercised power possessed and made

14 possible because state law. Pasadena Republican Club, 985 F.3d at 1167.

15 Here, Plaintiff alleges an inmate and Plaintiff’s victim’s father engaged in some kind of

16 unspecified wrongdoing. Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that another inmate or the victim’s

17 father acted under color of law.

18 Eighth Amendment

19 Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

20 A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in

21 violation of the Eighth Amendment where the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate

22 indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)

23 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference

24 requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a

25 prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton

26 infliction of pain,’ ” and (2) “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent.”

27 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

28 A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows

1 of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

2 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

3 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a

4 prisoner's pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at

5 1096. In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

6 prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

7 substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause

8 of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S.

9 at 105–06). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious

10 medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

11 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for medical deliberate indifference. First,

12 Plaintiff fails to allege a serious medical need. Assuming an overdose, Plaintiff fails to allege

13 deliberate indifference. Plaintiff fails to allege any individual defendant knew of and disregarded

14 an excessive risk to his serious medical need. Indeed, Plaintiff was put in a suicide watch bed.

15 To the extent Plaintiff is alleges that Defendant Djoveski, a non-state actor, advised Plaintiff of

16 the wrong dosage of medication, Plaintiff’s allegations merely raise potential negligent actions

17 and not deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency.

18 Verbal Harassment

19 To the extent Plaintiff alleges verbal harassment, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim

20 for threats. Allegations of name-calling, verbal abuse, or threats generally fail to state a

21 constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.

22 See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[V]erbal harassment generally does not

23 violate the Eighth Amendment.”), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.

24 1998); see also Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a prisoner's

25 allegations of threats allegedly made by guards failed to state a cause of action). Even in cases

26 concerning “abusive language directed at [a plaintiff's] religious and ethnic background, ‘verbal

27 harassment or abuse is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’

28 ” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830

1 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)) (alterations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur v.

2 Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). However, verbal harassment may violate the constitution

3 when it is “unusually gross even for a prison setting and [is] calculated to and [does] cause

4 [plaintiff] psychological damage.” Cox v. Kernan, 2019 WL 6840136, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16,

5 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Keenan, 83 F.3d 1083 at 1092). The factual allegations do

6 not support a claim. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency.

7 Failure to Protect

8 To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that he was not protected from bullying (assuming that

9 is a viable claim), Plaintiff fails to state a claim. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from

10 inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v.

11 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006).

12 Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are

13 provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson

14 v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish

15 a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with

16 deliberate indifference . . .” Labatad v. Corrs. Corp. of Amer., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir.

17 2013) (citing Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)).

18 Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from

19 violence at the hands of other prisoners or others because being violently assaulted in prison is

20 simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.

21 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir.2009); Hearns v.

22 Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison officials are liable under the

23 Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a

24 substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference

25 occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

26 harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.

27 Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that any of the named Defendants knew of any

28 specific risk of harm to Plaintiff and failed to take corrective action.

1 Housing Assignment

2 Plaintiff is informed that any claim premised on the failure to house Plaintiff at a

3 particular institution or in particular housing fails because Plaintiff is not entitled to be housed in

4 any particular institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano,

5 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In general, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do not

6 give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property

7 guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242

8 (1976) (It is well settled that prisoners have no constitutional right to placement in any particular

9 prison, to any particular security classification, or to any particular housing assignment); accord

10 King v. Lemos, No. 1:20-CV-01837-NONE-BAM (PC), 2021 WL 2038187, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May

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12 Due Process – Fourteenth Amendment

13 Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d

14 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under

15 the Due Process Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v.

16 Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th

17 Cir. 1985). However, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee

18 does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the

19 Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post deprivation remedy for the loss is available.”

20 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

21 Plaintiff contends that some officer destroyed his TV property. It appears that the conduct

22 was an unauthorized deprivation of property. Due process is satisfied if there is a meaningful

23 post-deprivation remedy available to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation

24 remedy available under California law. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994)

25 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810–95). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable due process

26 claim for the alleged deprivation of his property.

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28 Injunctive Relief

1 Requests for prospective relief are limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison

2 Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is

3 narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

4 and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” In cases

5 brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must be narrowly

6 drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary

7 relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

8 Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction that goes beyond

9 maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ about issuing a

10 preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law clearly favor the

11 plaintiff.” Committee of Central American Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir.

12 1986), quoting Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984).

13 IV. Conclusion and Order

14 For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails

15 to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.

16 Despite being provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, and given multiple

17 opportunities to amend, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in his second amended

18 complaint. Further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th

19 Cir. 2000).

20 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this

21 action be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted.

22 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

23 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

24 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may

25 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

26 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed

27 fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page

28 number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page

1 limit may not be considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

2 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual

3 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter

4 v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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7 Dated: October 30, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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