Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARY HURD BROWN,

Plaintiff,

-against- 20-CV-2424 (JGLC) (OTW)

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

EDUCATION, AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant.

JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge:

This case was referred to Judge Ona Wang for general pretrial purposes and all

dispositive motions. See ECF No. 23. Defendant New York City Department of Education

(“DOE”) filed a motion for summary judgment on December 6, 2024. ECF No. 143. Plaintiff

Mary Hurd Brown (“Plaintiff”) then cross-moved for summary judgment on December 27, 2024,

simultaneously alleging issues of material fact. ECF Nos. 154, 155. In a Report and

Recommendation (the “Report and Recommendation” or “R&R”) filed on August 29, 2025,

Judge Wang recommended that Defendant’s motion be granted and Plaintiff’s motion be denied.

See ECF No. 161. On September 12, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report and

Recommendation. ECF No. 162 (“Objections”). Defendant filed its opposition on September 26,

2024. ECF No. 164 (“Opp.”). For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its

entirety, GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

In reviewing a Report and Recommendation, a district court “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A district court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate

judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also United

States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997). To accept those portions of the report to

which no timely objection has been made, however, a district court need only satisfy itself that

there is no clear error on the face of the record. See, e.g., Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., 262 F.

Supp. 2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). This clearly erroneous standard also applies when a party

makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates her original arguments. See,

e.g., Ortiz v. Barkley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

Here, Plaintiff fails to assert any viable objections. Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is

against the DOE for failure to accommodate a disability under the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”). R&R at 7; ECF No. 63 at 4.

She argues that DOE failed to accommodate her disability with respect to her request to use her

“personal car to make home visits” for the period between December 2018 and February 2019.

Id. But her objections focus largely on issues outside the scope of this narrow claim, including

those that have long ago been decided. See ECF Nos. 29, 30, 61, 63.

Nonetheless, in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court reviews her objections liberally

and considers them in turn. See Massie v. Metro. Museum of Art, 651 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93

(S.D.N.Y. 2009). The Court adopts the recitation of facts set forth in the Report and

Recommendation and assumes the parties’ familiarity therewith.

First, Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation on the basis that the DOE’s

evidence is “questionable,” “incomplete [and] inaccurate,” and contains “misinformation.”

Objections at 1, 4, 6. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that when

attorneys or pro se parties file any papers with the court, they “certify” that “any factual

contentions in the filing are supported by available evidence.” Odermatt v. Mount Sinai Hosp.,

No. 24-CV-5250 (JLR), 2025 WL 2650139, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2025) (cleaned up); see

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). The Court has no reason to distrust the DOE’s representations here.

Plaintiff’s “conclusory statements, devoid of specifics,” are thus “insufficient to defeat

[Defendant’s] properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Snellinger v. Fed. Nat’l

Mortg. Ass’n (“Fannie Mae”), 785 F. Supp. 3d 3, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting

Transflo Terminal Servs., Inc. v. Brooklyn Res. Recovery, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 397, 399

(E.D.N.Y. 2017)).

Second, Plaintiff argues that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and RA, and

was denied access to her “Workman Compensation file” to demonstrate as much. Objections at

2. DOE “assumed,” however, “at least for purposes of its Motion for Summary Judgment, that

Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Opp. at 3. And

the Report and Recommendation’s analysis did not turn on Plaintiff’s disability status; indeed,

the R&R found that the evidence “weigh[ed] in favor of Plaintiff being disabled under the

ADA.” R&R at 10.

Third, Plaintiff repeats her claim that her superiors discriminated against her by denying

her requests to use her personal vehicle to make home visits. Objections at 2. She focuses

specifically on an alleged denial “in 2017.” Id. However, DOE records show that the one

instance in 2017 when Plaintiff asked her supervisor, Eric Friedman, for permission to use her

personal vehicle to make home visits, he approved her request. See ECF No. 144 ¶¶ 10, 49–51;

ECF Nos. 146-2 ¶ 27, 146-6, 146-9. On February 10, 2017, Plaintiff also submitted five

additional requests to Mr. Friedman’s supervisor, Tracey Collins—but, as the R&R correctly

makes clear, “Ms. Collins informed Plaintiff that these requests were improperly submitted and

directed Plaintiff to cancel those requests and resubmit them to Mr. Friedman, which she did

not.” R&R at 3 n.3; see ECF No. 144 ¶¶ 55–58; ECF Nos. 146-6, 146-10.

“The only accommodation Plaintiff claims that she requested, but was not provided,”

came in December 2018, when Plaintiff again requested permission to use her personal vehicle

for home visits. R&R at 12. Three months later, in February 2019, Plaintiff was reassigned “to a

position that no longer required home visits.” Id. To the extent that Plaintiff objects to the R&R’s

central conclusion that this three-month delay was not a constructive denial—in part, because

Plaintiff presented no evidence to show that it “was motivated by discriminatory intent”—

Plaintiff again fails to provide any new facts, evidence, or arguments to conclude otherwise. The

Court therefore adopts Judge Wang’s analysis in full.

Fourth, Plaintiff appears to object to her travel reimbursement for taking public

transportation. Objections 3–4. This new concern falls beyond the scope of the one remaining

claim in this case: whether DOE failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability with respect to her

request to use her personal car for home visits between December 2018 and February 2019.

Fifth, Plaintiff resurfaces numerous discovery disputes, arguing that her requests for

answers to interrogatories or attempts to schedule depositions “fell on deaf ears.” Objections at 3.

To the contrary, the docket is replete with efforts to ensure that Plaintiff had access to the

discovery she needed, and was entitled to, to argue her case. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 97 (order setting

deadline for DOE to respond to Plaintiff’s second set of document requests), 110 (order

explaining that the Court held a status conference and directed DOE to produce emails relevant

to Plaintiff’s claims), 123 (same, and directing Plaintiff to schedule requested deposition); see

also ECF No. 116 at 1–2 (DOE counsel explaining that Plaintiff has “declined to indicate her

availability” to schedule the deposition she requested).

Sixth, Plaintiff reiterates her arguments alleging generalized “workplace retaliation and

maltreatment,” which she calls “unfair” and “inappropriate.” Objections at 4. More than four

years ago, Judge Caproni prompted Plaintiff to provide “facts surrounding any retaliatory acts”

to support her claims. ECF No. 30 at 3. One year later, after Plaintiff filed her Second Amended

Complaint, ECF No. 34 (“SAC”), Judge Caproni found that Plaintiff had still “not provide[d]

any additional facts in her SAC curing the deficiency at issue,” and dismissed Plaintiff’s claim,

ECF No. 63 at 8 n.3. Judge Wang likewise highlighted that Plaintiff “did not plead such facts in

her Second Amended Complaint and does not point to evidence in her 56.1 Statements to support

the facts identified by Judge Caproni.” R&R at 5. The Court need not revisit this issue further.

Finally, Plaintiff questions this case’s reassignment to the undersigned. Objections at 1, 3,

4-6; see ECF No. 95. Plaintiff contends that this issue was under-discussed in the Report and

Recommendation yet remains “very significant.” Objections at 5. Judge Wang properly

explained that Plaintiff's arguments on this issue are “without support.” R&R at 6 n.3 (citing

ECF No. 155 § 2).

Having reviewed the motion papers, the Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiff's

objections, the Court finds the Report and Recommendation to be well-reasoned and grounded in

fact and law. Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary

judgment is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the case and to mail a copy of this

Order to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2025

New York, New York

rESBICA G. L. CLARKE

United States District Judge