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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 OBDULIO REYES BENITEZ, Case No.: 25-cv-3298-JES-DEB

12 Petitioner,

ORDER:

13 v.

(1) GRANTING COUNT ONE OF

14 Kristi NOEM, Secretary, U.S.

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

Department of Homeland Security;

15 HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO

Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;

28 U.S.C. § 2241; AND

16 Todd LYONS, Acting Director,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

17 (2) DENYING AS MOOT COUNTS

Gregory J. ARCHAMBEAULT, Director,

TWO, THREE, AND FOUR OF

18 San Diego Field Office,

THE PETITION, AND MOTION

Immigration and Customs, Christopher J.

19 FOR TEMPORARY

LACROSE, Senior Warden, Otay

RESTRAINING ORDER.

20 Mesa Detention Center; EXECUTIVE

OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION

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REVIEW; IMMIGRATION AND [ECF Nos. 1, 2]

22 CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

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SECURITY Respondents.

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25

26 //

27 //

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1 Before the Court is Petitioner Obdulio Reyes Benitez’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for

2 Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and Motion for a Temporary

3 Restraining Order (“TRO”). ECF Nos. 1, (“Pet.”), 2. Petitioner seeks habeas relief by

4 asserting that Respondents’ application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) with respect to his

5 detention violates the: (1) Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); (2) Administrative

6 Procedure Act (“APA”); and (3) Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.

7 Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 64-79. Petitioner also alleges that (4) he is a member of the nationwide

8 Bond Eligible Class that was established in Maldonaldo Bautista v. Santacruz, and is

9 therefore, entitled to a bond determination hearing. See --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL

10 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025).

11 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition and

12 DENIES AS MOOT Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Petition, and the Motion for a

13 TRO.

14 I. BACKGROUND

15 A. Factual Background

16 Petitioner, a Mexican national and citizen, entered the United States without

17 inspection nearly three decades ago and is currently detained at the Otay Mesa Detention

18 Center. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 56. Petitioner has no criminal record and has built a successful life with

19 his wife and three children. Id. ¶¶ 57-58; ECF No. 2-2 at 26-27. In May 2022, Petitioner’s

20 asylum claim was denied which led him to apply for Cancellation of Removal and

21 Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents with the Executive Office for

22 Immigration Review (“EOIR”). Pet. ¶ 4. This required him to cooperate with Immigration

23 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) by properly checking in as required. Id. On October 9,

24 2025, and during a scheduled “interview”, ICE arrested Petitioner. Id. ¶ 60. Following his

25 arrest, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Id. ¶ 61.

26 Thereafter, ICE issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner’s detention without

27 an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

28 1225(b)(2). Id. ¶ 62.

1 In this action, Petitioner contends that he has been illegally detained by the

2 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the EOIR, which have adopted a new

3 interpretation of the INA which treats all individuals who entered the country without

4 inspection as “applicants for admission.” Id. ¶ 5. This subjects such persons to mandatory

5 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2). Id. Petitioner argues that he has lived in the United

6 States for years, and therefore, Section 1225(b) does not apply to him. Id. ¶ 65. Further,

7 that to the extent he remains in custody, his detention should proceed under Section

8 1226(a), which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. Id. Accordingly,

9 Petitioner seeks habeas relief from the Court because his continued detention, resulting

10 from Respondents’ application of Section 1225(b), violates: the INA; the APA; Zadvydas;

11 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 64-77.

12 B. Procedural Background

13 The Petition and TRO were filed on November 25, 2025. Id. On November 26, 2025,

14 the Court issued an Order: (1) Staying Removal of Petitioner to Preserve Jurisdiction; (2)

15 Setting Briefing Schedule; and (3) Requiring a Response to Petition and TRO. ECF No. 3.

16 Respondents filed their Response on December 2, 2025. ECF No. 7, (“Res.”). Petitioner

17 filed the Traverse on December 3, 2025. ECF No. 8. Thereafter, the Court took the matter

18 under submission.

19 II. LEGAL STANDARD

20 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United

21 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).

22 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that

23 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

24 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

25 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal

26 law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means

27 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections

28 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges

1 to immigration-related detention are within a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas

2 v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).

3 Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law

4 ... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or

5 confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps

6 the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives

7 prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d

8 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

9 III. DISCUSSION

10 The Court finds that the parties’ arguments with respect to whether the Court has

11 jurisdiction to hear this petition; and Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. §§

12 1225(b)(2) or 1226(a), are analogous to those raised in the Court’s recent decision,

13 Martinez Lopez v. Noem, et al. No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457, at *2 (S.D.

14 Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow its reasoning in Martinez Lopez

15 and incorporates it by reference. Id.

16 A. Jurisdiction

17 In this action, Petitioner challenges the propriety of his detention, pursuant to

18 Respondents’ application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), not the merits of his removal

19 proceedings. The Court, therefore, finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1252's jurisdiction stripping

20 provisions do not bar this Court from considering this Petition. The Court also finds that

21 the prudential administrative exhaustion requirement for habeas claims under 8 U.S.C. §

22 Section 2241 is excused. This is because imposing this requirement would be futile due to

23 the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N

24 216 (BIA 2025) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens such as

25 Petitioner). Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to hear the Petition.

26 B. Count One

27 The Court finds that prior to his arrest, Petitioner resided within the United States

28 for more than two years, which occurred within the interior of the country. Therefore, 8

1 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), applies to Petitioner and governs his detention.

2 The Court finds further that Respondents’ errant application of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to

3 Petitioner’s detention violates the INA. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Count One

4 of the Petition. Further, the Court will ORDER Respondents to provide Petitioner with an

5 individualized bond determination hearing by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), who may not

6 deny him bond on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) governs his detention.

7 C. Counts Two and Three, and Temporary Restraining Order

8 Since the Court granted Count One of the Petition, it declines to address Counts Two

9 and Three of the Petition or apply the Winter factors to determine whether to issue a TRO.

10 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Court, therefore,

11 DENIES AS MOOT Counts Two and Three of the Petition and the Motion for Temporary

12 Restraining Order.

13 D. Count Four

14 Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a bond hearing because he clearly falls

15 within the Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class. See Bautista, 2025 WL 3289861, at

16 *11; see also Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F.R.D. ----, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal.

17 Nov. 25, 2025). The Bautista court granted partial summary judgment to petitioners after

18 it found that DHS’s mandatory detention policy, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), is

19 unlawful. Pet. ¶ 41; Bautista, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11. That court later certified a

20 nationwide Bond Eligible Class, which it defined as “[a]ll noncitizens in the United States

21 without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without

22 inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not

23 be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the

24 Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.” Bautista, 2025

25 WL 3288403, at *9.

26 The legal effect of the Bautista decision is disputed among the parties. Respondents

27 concede that Petitioner appears to be a Maldonado Bautista class member. Res. at 1. They

28 also agree that the Bautista court granted class certification and partial summary

1 judgment—solely to the petitioners in that case. Id. Respondents, however, argue that the

2 Bautista Court did not issue a class-wide declaratory judgment. Id. And in the absence of

3 such a judgment, regardless of whether Petitioner is a Bond Eligible Class member, he is

4 not entitled to the same remedy as the Bautista petitioners. Id.

5 Petitioner argues that when the Bautista court certified the Bond Eligible Class, it

6 extended the same declaratory relief—that it provided when granting partial Summary

7 Judgment—to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole. Bautista, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9. He

8 argues further that this authorizes the Court to order Respondents to provide Petitioner a

9 bond hearing governed by Section 1226(a), upon its finding that he is a member of the

10 Bond Eligible Class. Pet. ¶¶ 42, 79.

11 The Court need not decide whether Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible Class

12 or the effect of the Bautista decision on Petitioner because it has already found that

13 Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief under Count One. Therefore, any such analysis would

14 be unnecessary. Thus, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Count Four of the Petition.

15 IV. CONCLUSION

16 Based on the foregoing:

17 (1) The Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition;

18 (2) The Court DENIES AS MOOT Counts Two, Three, and Four of the

19 Petition, and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order;

20 (3) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with an

21 individualized bond hearing by an IJ, who may not deny him bond on the

22 basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) governs his detention, as 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

23 applies, within ten (10) days of this Order, or otherwise release him from

24 custody, under the same conditions that existed before his detention; and

25 (4) Respondents are ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance within ten

26 (10) days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing.

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I IT IS SO ORDERED.

2 Dated: December 12, 2025

4 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr.

5 United States District Judge

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