Perez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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:

ERIC ANDREW PEREZ, :

:

Plaintiff, :

: 24-CV-356 (VSB) (SN)

- against - :

: OPINION & ORDER

DR. NEIL C. EVANS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

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Appearances:

Eric Andrew Perez

San Antonio, FL

Pro se Plaintiff

Rebecca Lynn Salk

United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York

New York, NY

Counsel for Defendants Dr. Neil C. Evans, Carol Johnson, George Reed Grimes, Damian

Williams, and Melanie Jay

Jodyann Galvin

Cheyenne Nicole Freely

Hodgson Russ LLP

Buffalo, NY

Counsel for Defendant Dr. Mark J. Mulligan

Alexander Cousins

Arthur Edward Brown

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP

New York, NY

Counsel for Defendants AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and AstraZeneca

UK Ltd.

VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge:

Before me are pro se Plaintiff Eric Andrew Perez’s objections to Magistrate Judge Sarah

Netburn’s Report and Recommendation, which recommends that I dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED,

Judge Netburn’s Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Eric Andrew Perez (“Plaintiff” or “Perez”), a veteran of the United States

Marine Corps, participated in a clinical trial of AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccine at the

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). (Doc. 37 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 6, 21.) Perez claims that

he received the vaccine in two doses, on December 22, 2020, and January 19, 2021. (Id. ¶ 37;

see also Doc. 132 (“Report”) at 2.) Immediately after receiving the first dose of the vaccine,

Plaintiff states that he began suffering from a host of medical issues, including migraines, non-

alcoholic fatty liver disease, and persistent peroneal vein thrombosis in his right calf, all of which

Plaintiff attributes to the vaccine. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 33.)

In February 2021, the director of the vaccine study informed Plaintiff that he had not

received the vaccine and instead received a placebo. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that the portion

of his medical record indicating he received a placebo is fraudulent and was created as part of a

broader conspiracy. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 29.)

Plaintiff then filed a claim through the Health Resources & Services Administration’s

Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (“CICP”), (id. ¶¶ 27, 35), which is a federal

program that compensates serious injuries or deaths that occur because of the administration of

certain countermeasures during public health emergencies, (see Report at 3 (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 247d-6e; 42 C.F.R. § 110)). The COVID-19 vaccine was declared a “covered countermeasure”

on March 17, 2020, pursuant to the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP

Act”). Id. (citing 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198, at 15202 (Mar. 17, 2020).) CICP requested additional

information and records from Plaintiff about his claim, and Plaintiff in turn filed a HIPPA

request with the VA Medical Records Office requesting documentation of his participation in the

AstraZeneca study. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43–45.) On September 13, 2023, the VA Medical Records

Office denied Plaintiff’s request due to his failure to properly complete the necessary paperwork.

(See Doc. 1-1 at 6.)

Based on these events, Plaintiff asserts that his CICP claim is being “deliberately

obstructed” by members of the federal government. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges the

existence of a widespread racketeering conspiracy between all Defendants to cover up

experimentation on veterans through the COVID-19 vaccination program. (Id. at 9; see also id.

¶¶ 29, 35.) He claims his medical records have been deliberately altered as part of a cover-up of

the conspiracy, and that certain Defendants have illegally cloned his electronic devices and

iCloud, allowing them to delete and alter his records. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 35, 38.)

Procedural History

On January 16, 2024, pro se Plaintiff filed his complaint. (Doc. 1.) That same day,

Plaintiff filed a consent to receive electronic service through the ECF system. (Doc. 4.) On

April 3, 2024, I referred this case to Magistrate Judge Robyn F. Tarnofsky for general pretrial

management. (Doc. 25.) On April 9, 2024, the referral was reassigned to Magistrate Judge

Sarah Netburn. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against various

Defendants, including Dr. Neil C. Evans, Carol Johnson, Dr. Mark J. Mulligan, George Reed

Grimes, Damian Williams, AstraZeneca LP, AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca UK Lmdt, Melanie

Jay, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and AstraZeneca UK Ltd. (Am. Compl.)

On September 6, 2024, Defendant Mark J. Mulligan moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 99.) The same day, Defendants AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca

Pharmaceuticals LP, and AstraZeneca UK Ltd. (collectively, the “AstraZeneca Defendants”) also

moved to dismiss, (Doc. 101), as did Defendants Neil C. Evans, George Reed Grimes, Melanie

Jay, Carol Johnson, and Damian Williams (collectively, the “Federal Defendants”), (Doc. 103).

On December 11, 2024, I referred the motions to dismiss to Magistrate Judge Netburn for a

Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 125.)

On May 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Netburn issued a thorough 27-page Report and

Recommendation (the “Report”), recommending that I grant the motions to dismiss and dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with prejudice. (See Report at 26.) The Report notes that

because Plaintiff cannot allege new facts to cure the deficiencies in the Amended Complaint,

amendment would be futile with respect to all of his claims. (Id. at 24.)

On May 22, 2025, I granted Plaintiff’s request to extend his time to object to the Report

to July 14, 2025. (Doc. 135.) On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. (Doc.

136 (“Obj.”).) On July 28, 2025, Defendant Mark Mulligan filed a response to Plaintiff’s

objections, (Doc. 138), as did the AstraZeneca Defendants, (Doc. 139). On July 29, 2025, the

Federal Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s objections. (Doc. 140.)

On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 141.) On

August 1, 2025, I issued an order informing Defendants that they need not respond to the motion

for a temporary restraining order until after I issue my opinion regarding the pending Report.

(Doc. 142.)

On September 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion “requesting that the Court enter an

emergency order directing the immediate preservation of all evidence and information

potentially relevant to the above-captioned matter,” (Doc. 144 at 1), in addition to another

motion for preservation of evidence, (Doc. 145), and a proposed order granting Plaintiff’s

motions, (Doc. 146).

Legal Standard

After a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation, a district court may

“accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “To accept the report and recommendation of a

magistrate [judge], to which no timely objection has been made, a district court need only satisfy

itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record.” Trs. of Drywall Tapers & Pointers

Loc. Union No. 1974 Benefit Funds v. Cite C Corp., No. 17-CV-9304, 2019 WL 1745743, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where specific objections are

made, the court is obligated to review the contested issues de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

However, when “the objecting party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply

reiterates the original arguments,” the court will review the report only for clear error. Jones v.

Smith, No. 09-CV-6497, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (collecting cases).

“Moreover, parties may not raise new arguments for the first time in objections to a report and

recommendation.” Erickson v. Jernigan Cap., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

In other words, “a party is not to be afforded a second bite at the apple when filing objections to

a Report and Recommendation, as the goal of the federal statute providing for the assignment of

cases to magistrate[] [judges] is to increase the overall efficiency of the federal judiciary.”

Michaud v. Nippon Cargo Airlines, Co., No. 09-CV-3375, 2011 WL 5402642, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.

Nov. 7, 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Even where exercising de novo

review, a “district court need not . . . specifically articulate its reasons for rejecting a party’s

objections or for adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety.”

Morris v. Loc. 804, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 167 F. App’x 230, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary

order).

Pro se complaints are afforded “special solicitude” and must be interpreted to “raise the

strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a pro se litigant is still “obligated to

comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Doe v. Torres, No. 05-CV-

3388, 2006 WL 290480, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006). Accordingly, “where a pro se party’s

objections to a report and recommendation are ‘conclusory or general,’ or where a plaintiff

‘simply reiterates his original arguments,’ the report should be reviewed only for clear error.”

DeGrate v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 12-CV-1700, 2013 WL 639146, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,

2013) (quoting Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F. Supp. 2d 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).

Discussion

Plaintiff filed 81 pages of objections, in addition to 184 pages of exhibits. Without

counting the pages of exhibits, Plaintiff’s objections alone are three times the length of the

Report itself, which is far longer than the permissible length of memoranda under the Local

Rules in this District, see S.D.N.Y. Civ. Rule 7.1, as well as my Individual Rules, see Rule 4.B,

Individual Rules & Practices in Civil Cases for Judge Vernon S. Broderick, and contrary to the

purpose of referrals under the Federal Magistrates Act, which is to create efficiency. See United

States v. Gardin, 451 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).

Plaintiff acknowledges that he “used Chat GPT to draft his first draft of this

submission.”1 (Obj. 2 n.1.) Plaintiff includes seventeen footnote citations to ChatGPT

throughout his objections, including, for instance, a citation to a copy of a conversation in which

an anonymous user, presumably Perez, prompted ChatGPT to “prepare legal memorandum

countering government sovereignty claims.” (See, e.g., Obj. 46 n.28.) ChatGPT generated a

non-case-specific legal memorandum in response, much of which is included in Plaintiff’s

Objections verbatim. (See Obj. 46–47.)

Although I am unaware of any applicable federal or local rules prohibiting the use of AI

during the course of litigation, see Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. Inc., No. 24-CV-388, 2025

WL 1057211, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2025); Nelson v. Wash. Bd. of Indus. Appeals, No. 25-CV-

5551, 2025 WL 1772085, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2025), and my Individual Rules do not

address the use of AI, litigants, including pro se parties, must adhere to their obligations under

Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(b) states, in part, that “[b]y

presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . [an] unrepresented party

certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an

inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions

are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law or for establishing new law; [and] the factual contentions have evidentiary

support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” At the bare minimum, this obligation

requires litigants to carefully review every statement and citation drafted by AI to ensure that it is

legally and factually correct, particularly given that AI tools make it much easier for pro se

1 ChatGPT is a generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) tool.

litigants to submit “voluminous” briefing. See Thornock v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, No. 25-CV-56, 2025 WL 1900314, at *4 n.5 (E.D.

Va. July 9, 2025).

Here, Plaintiff failed to meet his obligations under Rule 11. At least two citations in

Plaintiff’s objections appear to be “hallucinated,” a term used for citations produced by AI “that

conform to the Bluebook, but ultimately are not real.” Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 779

F. Supp. 3d 341, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2025); see also Legal ChatGPT: Tips, Prompts, and Use Cases,

American Bar Association (Mar. 21, 2025),

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/resources/law-technology-today/2025/legal-

chatgpt-tips-prompts-and-use-cases/ (“AI-powered chatbots are prone to hallucinations, have

trouble understanding contextual nuances of the law, and have trained-in biases.”). Since the

advent of generative AI, hallucinated cases have become a disturbing problem in legal filings,

and the “epidemic of citing fake cases has continued unabated.” Benjamin, 779 F. Supp. 3d at

343; see also Hall v. Acad. Charter Sch., No. 24-CV-08630, 2025 WL 2256653, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 7, 2025) (“Regrettably, the number and regularity with which courts have been faced with

hallucinations in court filings continues to rise both in this country and abroad.”); Pegnatori v.

Pure Sports Techs. LLC, No. 23-CV-01424, 2023 WL 6626159, at *5 n.5 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2023)

(“[T]hus far ChatGPT’s batting average in legal briefs leaves something to be desired.”). Not

only do citations to hallucinated cases run afoul of a litigant’s obligation to verify that legal

contentions are “warranted by existing law” under Rule 11(b), fake citations are also a profound

waste of the opposing party’s time, as well as the Court’s time. As one court put it:

When used carelessly, [AI] produces frustratingly realistic legal fiction that takes

inordinately longer to respond to than to create. While one party can create a fake

legal brief at the click of a button, the opposing party and court must parse through

the case names, citations, and points of law to determine which parts, if any, are

true. As AI continues to proliferate, this creation-response imbalance places

significant strain on the judicial system.

Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 778 F. Supp. 3d 879, 880–81 (N.D. Miss. 2025).

Here, Plaintiff’s argument that service of process on Defendant Mark Mulligan was

substantially compliant utilizes the quotation “[w]hen there is actual notice, every technical

violation of the rule or failure of strict compliance may not invalidate the service of process.”

(Obj. 28.) Plaintiff attributes that quotation to Concepcion v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8501

(RJS), 2008 WL 5395720, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2008). (Id.) This citation appears real

because Concepcion v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8501 (RJS), is a real case. However, there

is no December 17, 2008 decision in Concepcion, nor is there any opinion in the Southern

District of New York that corresponds to 2008 WL 5395720. Instead, through research I was

able to find the quoted language in Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Building Systems, Inc., 733

F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984). In Armco, immediately after stating that not every technical

violation invalidates service where there is actual notice, the Fourth Circuit stated “[b]ut the rules

are there to be followed, and plain requirements for the means of effecting service of process

may not be ignored.” Id. The Armco court held that service of process was not valid and

remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the default judgment entered

against the defendant as void on that basis. Id. at 1089–90. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s version of

the Armco quotation is not only falsely attributed to a hallucinated case, but it leaves out crucial

context undermining Plaintiff’s legal argument.

Similarly, in the PREP Act portion of Plaintiff’s objections, (Obj. 38–45), Plaintiff cites

United States v. Peterson, No. 3:17-cr-00065 (D. Conn. 2018), and states that “[i]n this case, the

court found that deception about the officers’ identity and intent undermined the validity of the

consent given.” (Obj. 41.) The case corresponding to No. 3:17-cr-00065 in the District of

Connecticut is actually United States v. Cook, et al., and there is no defendant in that case by the

name of Peterson or any language in that case that support Plaintiff’s statement. I suspect that

Defendant’s hallucinated citation is a scrambled version of United States v. Peterson, No. 3:18-

CR-00049, 2018 WL 6061571 (D. Conn. Nov. 20, 2018), a case which discusses the issue of law

enforcement officers making misrepresentations to a criminal defendant. However, the holding

of Peterson is the opposite of what Defendant claims. The Peterson court found that while

police began their interview with the defendant in a “somewhat misleading” manner, the

defendant nonetheless “voluntarily consented to the officers entering into and remaining in his

home” given the totality of the circumstances. Id. at *6–7. Use of these “hallucinations” are a

violation of Rule 11(b) and a tremendous waste of my time and the parties’ time.2 Nonetheless, I

decline to impose sanctions on Plaintiff for his violation of Rule 11(b), in part due to Plaintiff’s

admission to using ChatGPT. Setting aside for the moment the AI-related issues with Plaintiff’s

submission, the majority of the objections do not warrant my consideration under the law.

Indeed, for the reasons stated below, I would overrule Plaintiff’s objections without the

identified AI issues.

Plaintiff attempts to relitigate nearly every aspect of the motions to dismiss that were

before Magistrate Judge Netburn and which were analyzed and addressed in the Report. In

addition, Plaintiff introduces many new factual contentions and lines of argument. It is well-

settled that when the objecting party “simply reiterates the original arguments,” the court will

review the report only for clear error. See Jones, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1 (collecting cases). It

is equally well settled that “new arguments and factual assertions cannot properly be raised for

2 It is possible that Plaintiff’s brief contains other “hallucinated” citations. Due to its substantial length and the fact

that I find the objections without merit, I have not expended the time to verify each citation in the brief.

the first time in objections to the report and recommendation, and indeed may not be deemed

objections at all.” Piligian v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai, 490 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716

(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing

Adm’r, LLC v. Shen, No. 14-CV-1112, 2023 WL 4348030, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2023) (same).

As most of Plaintiff’s objections seek to rehash arguments considered by Magistrate Judge

Netburn or to introduce new allegations and arguments, I need not and will not consider these

objections on an individual basis. (See, e.g., Obj. 71 (rehashing argument that Plaintiff asserts a

colorable claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act because he alleges unauthorized

access to his electronic health records, a claim which the Report comprehensively examined and

rejected (see Report at 17–20)); Obj. 35 (introducing new and unsubstantiated allegations that

Dr. Mulligan’s defense counsel is colluding with the FBI and Buffalo law enforcement to run a

“coercive harassment system” against Plaintiff)). See also Morris, 167 F. App’x at 232 (“The

district court need not . . . specifically articulate its reasons for rejecting a party’s objections or

for adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety.”). Nonetheless, I

address a few objections individually below.

At the beginning of Plaintiff’s lengthy objections, he asserts that “[t]he R&R

fundamentally misconstrues the factual basis and applicable law in this case” and “adopts the

Defendants’ arguments wholesale without construing the pro se Plaintiff’s claims liberally.”

(Obj. 1–2.) On this basis, he “objects to the R&R in full.” (Id. at 2.) A “conclusory or general

objection[]” will not be considered by a court. See Jones, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1 (collecting

cases). Thus, Plaintiff’s overarching conclusory and general objection to the Report does not

warrant consideration. However, even if I were to consider this objection, Plaintiff’s claim that

the Report fails to construe his claims liberally is simply not true. The Report repeatedly makes

clear not only that Plaintiff’s arguments were considered in their entirety but also that the

arguments were construed liberally. (See, e.g., Report at 18 (“The Court construes Plaintiff’s

pleadings liberally to assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).”); see also Report at 22, 24, 26.)

The Report is replete with citations to the record, as well as to case law addressing the legal

standard for each of Plaintiff’s claims, most of which Plaintiff does not address in his objections.

Plaintiff’s objection to the Report on the basis that it failed to construe his pleadings liberally is

OVERRULED.

Next, Plaintiff objects to the Report’s finding that the action can be dismissed in its

entirety as to Dr. Mark Mulligan for insufficient service of process. (Obj. 28–35.) Plaintiff

argues that “(1) Dr. Mulligan received actual notice; (2) Plaintiff made multiple good-faith

efforts to serve him; and (3) Defense counsel refused to waive service.” (Id. at 28.) Notably,

these are all arguments for why Plaintiff’s failure to serve Mulligan should be excused. In other

words, Plaintiff does not contest that he failed to properly serve Mulligan.

Plaintiff’s arguments fail. First, “actual notice of suit [cannot] cure a failure to comply

with the statutory requirements for serving process.” Sartor v. Toussaint, 70 F. App’x 11, 13 (2d

Cir. 2002) (summary order); see also United States v. Thompson, 921 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2019)

(“Actual notice of the suit does not cure defective service” (alterations adopted and internal

quotation marks omitted)). Second, although Plaintiff did attempt to serve Mulligan, he did not

show “good cause” for his failure to properly serve him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). To the

contrary, the Report describes how, on various occasions, “Plaintiff was instructed by both

opposing counsel and the Court how to properly effectuate service,” and still failed to do so.

(Report at 7–8.) Third, it is true that an individual such as Mulligan “has a duty to avoid

unnecessary expenses of serving the summons” when a plaintiff requests a waiver of service and

complies with the procedural requirements of Rule 4(d) in doing so. However, Perez has not

shown that he triggered Mulligan’s duty to waive service by submitting a request to waive

service in writing with the information required by Rule 4(d). Furthermore, the only case law

Plaintiff cites in support of his argument that his failure to serve Mulligan should be excused is

Concepcion v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8501 (RJS), 2008 WL 5395720, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Dec. 17, 2008), a hallucinated case that does not contain the quoted language Plaintiff attributes

to it. In any event, the Report also analyzes Plaintiff’s claims against Mulligan on the merits and

finds dismissal warranted under Rule 12(b)(6), stating that “Plaintiff should not be granted leave

to serve Dr. Mulligan because the claims against him are without merit.” (Report at 13.) Thus,

even if Plaintiff had properly served Mulligan or were to properly serve Mulligan in the future, it

would not resurrect the claims against him. Plaintiff’s objection regarding his failure to serve

Mulligan is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff also objects to the Report’s dismissal of all claims brought under the PREP Act

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction is proper under the willful

misconduct exception to the PREP Act, and that the willful misconduct standard was satisfied.

(Obj. 38, 45.) Even if this were true, this would not save Plaintiff’s claims. The PREP Act

provides immunity from suit for the United States and manufacturers, distributors, program

planners, and other qualified persons who prescribed, administered, or dispensed a qualified

countermeasure, such as various COVID-19 vaccines. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d. Plaintiff is

correct that there is an exception to this immunity for “death or serious physical injury

proximately caused by willful misconduct.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1). However, the PREP

Act is clear that any suit brought pursuant to the willful-misconduct exception to immunity “shall

be filed and maintained only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” 42

U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(1); see also Palma v. Cabrini of Westchester, No. 22-CV-5430, 2022 WL

4240823, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022) (“[E]ven if plaintiff alleged willful misconduct PREP

Act claims, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia is the exclusive forum for such

claims.”). Therefore, even assuming Plaintiff alleges a viable claim for willful misconduct under

the PREP Act, the Report correctly notes that I lack subject-matter jurisdiction over all PREP

Act claims and must dismiss any such claims under Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiff’s objection

regarding the PREP Act is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff objects to the Report’s recommendation that his Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim against the AstraZeneca Defendants and Mulligan should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff states that his “RICO claims were plausibly

alleged,” (Obj. 60), and that “Plaintiff alleges a coordinated scheme involving multiple predicate

acts including document falsification, fraud, and data manipulation,” (id. at 64). These

objections are conclusory, and I decline to consider them. See Jones, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1.

Plaintiff also asserts new factual allegations regarding an alleged RICO conspiracy. For

instance, Plaintiff states:

Plaintiff states that Astra Zeneca operates like a criminal enterprise. First, they

analyzed The market at hand and the laws which essentially stated that they could

sell poison to the world and face no consequences. Second, they had to enlist key

players in the United States government to enforce their scheme which include and

is not limited to coercion, targeting, Courts, and PRISM on various targets. Third,

emplace a network cyber war specialist within the agencies that would perform

various data replications, data modifications, and deletions within various agency

databases. . . . In this case AG Damian Williams colluded and joined forces with

the Middle District of Florida, Pasco County Sheriff’s Office to coerce and control

plaintiff EAP. Mr. Williams put maximum effort into the coercion and control of

plaintiff EAP through a covert network of confidential informants, con men,

network of Florida & NY Correctional Officers & Cadre, Religious organizations,

realtors, law enforcement owned construction companies, and home builders.

Plaintiff states that the SDNY led by Mr. Williams targeted plaintiff by using the

construction supervisor of his present neighborhood and the home builder DR

Horton to engineer purchases for collaborators, cooperators, and law enforcement

active and retired that are kin to and entered partnerships with Army CID and

Sandusky.

(Obj. 60–61.) I need not consider these allegations because “new arguments and factual

assertions cannot properly be raised for the first time in objections to the report and

recommendation.” WFCM 2016-LC25 W. Bay Area Boulevard, LLC v. Tyler, No. 21-CV-8865,

2025 WL 2424353, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting Garcia v. Lamanna, No. 18-CV-

5454, 2022 WL 3445433, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2022)).

Even if I were to consider these statements, Plaintiff’s new allegations amount to “vague

assertions of fraud and conspiracy” insufficient to make out a civil RICO claim. (Report at 16.)

Among other things, to allege a civil RICO claim Plaintiff must show the existence of an

enterprise, defined as “‘a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of

engaging in a course of conduct,’ the existence of which is proven ‘by evidence of an ongoing

organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a

continuing unit.’” First Cap. Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir.

2004) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). “Plaintiff[’s] conclusory

naming of a string of entities does not adequately allege an enterprise.” Id. at 175 (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 174 (finding that Plaintiffs failed to allege an enterprise

where they “failed to provide . . . any solid information regarding the hierarchy, organization,

and activities of this alleged association-in-fact enterprise, from which we could fairly conclude

that its members functioned as a unit” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, Plaintiff

does not allege a “clear and definite” injury to business or property, as he must to make out a

civil RICO claim. See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 266 (2d Cir. 2006). Instead,

Plaintiff alleges physical and emotional injury, (see, e.g., Obj. 79 (“Plaintiff has experienced

severe neurological symptoms, including paresthesia, muscle dysfunction, and autonomic

dysregulation”)), which are not cognizable forms of injury under RICO. See Williams v. Dow

Chem. Co., 255 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“RICO provides recovery for injury to

business and property; it does not provide recovery for physical and emotional injuries.”); see

also Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir.

1999) (noting “the lack of a RICO damages remedy for even direct personal injuries”). Thus,

Plaintiff’s objection regarding his RICO claim is OVERRULED.

Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Report’s recommendation that Plaintiff should not be

granted leave to amend, stating “[p]ro se plaintiffs should be granted at least one opportunity to

amend absent futility.” (Obj. 80.) This is a correct statement of the law. The Report

acknowledges this, stating that “[g]enerally, a pro se litigant should be granted leave to amend to

cure any deficiencies in a complaint.” (Report at 24.) However, as Plaintiff acknowledges,

leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile. See Kallas v. Fiala, 591

F. App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). Here, the Report correctly found that

amendment would be futile because “Plaintiff cannot allege new facts to cure the deficiencies in

his pleadings.” (Report at 24.) Plaintiff’s objections do not explain what additional facts he

would allege to salvage his claims, describe proposed amendments to his complaint, or assert in

what way the Report’s finding of futility is incorrect.3 Furthermore, as the Report notes, this is

Plaintiff’s fourth lawsuit bringing claims to redress the harm he believes he suffered through his

participation in the clinical trial of AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccine, and each lawsuit has

failed “because of both substantive and procedural defects,” (Report at 26). See Perez v. Oxford

3 I liberally construe Plaintiff’s objection stating that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for claims brought

under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (see

Obj. 46–47), as a motion for leave to amend, as Plaintiff did not bring any claims under the FTCA or Bivens in his

Amended Complaint. As Plaintiff does not indicate what specific facts he would allege to make out a FTCA or

Bivens claim, leave to amend to add such claims is DENIED.

Univ., No. 21-CV-4844, 2022 WL 1468438 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2022); Perez v. Oxford Univ.,

No. 22-CV-1560 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2022); Perez v. Oxford Univ., No. 22-CV-7830, 2022 WL

15523951 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022). There is no reason to believe that Plaintiff can remedy the

substantive and jurisdictional defects identified by the Report. Plaintiff’s objection to the

Report’s recommendation to deny leave to amend is OVERRULED.

Having overruled Plaintiff’s objections, I review the remainder of the Report for clear

error. See Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Finding no error, let alone clear error, I hereby ADOPT the entirety of the Report and DISMISS

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety without leave to amend. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

motions for preservation of evidence are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.

Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff also moves for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the VA from accessing,

modifying, or disseminating Plaintiff’s mental health records or relying upon or referencing a

fabricated diagnosis in any pending or future administrative or medical proceedings. (Doc. 141

at 11–12.) To obtain a temporary restraining order, the movant must show, among other things,

either a likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying claims or sufficiently serious

questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation. See Spencer Trask

Software & Info. Servs., LLC v. RPost Int’l Ltd., 190 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

(citing Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). As all of

Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal, Plaintiff cannot make that showing here. J Bragg v.

Jordan, 669 F. Supp. 3d 257, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Where a party seeking a temporary

restraining order fails to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, ‘there is no need to

address the other prongs of the analysis.’” (quoting Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d

154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011))); Jones v. Healthfirst, No. 18-CV-6834, 2018 WL 6706313, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“Given the dismissal of the Complaint, there is no likelihood of

success on the merits of [pro se] Plaintiff's claims and therefore [the motion] seeking injunctive

relief is DENIED.”). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Netburn’s Report and Recommendation is

ADOPTED in full. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate Docs. 99, 101, 103,

141, 144, and 145, dismiss this action with prejudice, and close the case.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Opinion &

Order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for

purposes of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding

that appellant demonstrates good faith when seeking review of a non-frivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2025

New York, New York J _

Vernon S. Broderick

United States District Judge

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