Opinion

Hatlestad

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Dec 12, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ALISSAN HATLESTAD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:21-cv-2791-CPT

FRANK BISIGNANO,

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,1

Defendant.

_________________________________/

O R D E R

Before the Court is the Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 31). For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintiff’s motion is

granted.

I.

The Plaintiff initiated this action in November 2021 seeking judicial review of

the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits

and Supplemental Security Income. (Doc. 1). In March 2023, the Court reversed the

1 Mr. Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Mr. Bisignano is substituted for a former Commissioner, Ms. Kilolo

Kijakazi, as the Defendant in this suit.

Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings before the

Social Security Administration (SSA). (Doc. 27). The Clerk of Court entered

Judgment for the Plaintiff the next day. (Doc. 28). Roughly one month later, the

Plaintiff sought and obtained $6,973.87 in attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to

Justice Act (EAJA). (Docs. 29, 30). As a result of the subsequent proceedings on

remand, the Plaintiff was granted past-due benefits. (Docs. 31-2, 31-3).

By way of the instant motion, the Plaintiff now asks that the Court enter an

order pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) approving fees in the amount of $17,454 for the

services her counsel rendered in this lawsuit. (Doc. 31 at 5). According to the SSA,

this figure equates to twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits, which is the statutory

fee limit for legal work conducted on remand before a district court. See (Doc. 31-2 at

2); 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). This sum does not conflict with the Plaintiff’s fee contract with

her attorneys, as that agreement provides for a contingency fee of twenty-five percent

of her past-due benefits. (Doc. 31-1). According to the Plaintiff, her lawyers are aware

of their obligation to reduce their contingency fee by the amount of the previous EAJA

fee award. (Doc. 31 at 3). In fact, the actual sum the attorneys request is $10,480.13,

which represents the difference between the total sought-after fee figure of $17,454 and

the EAJA award of $6,973.87. Id. The Commissioner takes no position regarding the

merits of the Plaintiff’s fee motion. Id. at 5.

II.

Section 406(b) governs the authorization of attorneys’ fees in Social Security

actions where, as here, a district court remands the matter to the Commissioner for

further proceedings, and the Commissioner later grants the claimant past-due benefits.

See Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1276–78 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

Under such a scenario, the claimant may return to the district court—as the Plaintiff

has done here—and ask for fees not exceeding twenty-five percent of the past-due

benefits awarded. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 59

(2019).

The requested fee amount, however, must be reasonable. See Gisbrecht v.

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002); Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d 1268, 1271

(11th Cir. 2010). To ensure this is the case, section 406(b) mandates that a court

engage in an independent review of a counsel’s fee arrangement with her client.

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. As part of its oversight role, a court may direct that an

attorney furnish “a record of the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement

of the lawyer’s normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases.” Id. at 808.

A court may also require that the approved fee figure be offset by any previous fee

award or by any fees due to counsel under a contingency fee arrangement. Id.; Jackson,

601 F.3d at 1274.

In addition, an attorney who is successful in claiming fees under both the EAJA

and section 406(b) must refund “to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A lawyer

may do so either by deducting the earlier EAJA award from the subsequent

section 406(b) award or by refunding the smaller EAJA fee and accepting the

section 406(b) payment in full. Jackson, 601 F.3d at 1274.

Here, the Plaintiff’s requested fee figure of $17,454 is predicated upon 31.95

hours of legal services her lawyers, Sarah Bohr and Marjorie Schmoyer, rendered on

this appeal. (Doc. 31 at 2, 3). This sum encompasses all the work Ms. Bohr and Ms.

Schmoyer performed before the Court and—as noted above—is consistent with the

Plaintiff’s contingency fee agreement, as the sought-after amount equates to twenty-

five percent of the total past-due benefits granted to the Plaintiff. (Doc. 31-1). In light

of these facts, as well as the nature of the professional assistance provided, the positive

results achieved, and the Commissioner’s lack of opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion,

the Court finds that the proposed fee figure is reasonable. See Brown v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 2024 WL 4529664, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2024), report and

recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4529245 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2024); Ocasio v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 4135793, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2024); White v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 2012 WL 1900562, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2012), report and recommendation

adopted, 2012 WL 1890558 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2012).

III.

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The Plaintiff’s fee motion (Doc. 31) is granted, and the Plaintiff shall be

awarded a net fee amount of $10,480.13 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). As discussed

above, this sum represents the difference between the total requested fee figure of

$17,454.00 and the previously authorized EAJA fee award of $6,973.87.

2. Given counsel’s deduction of the prior EAJA fee amount from the overall

fee award, the EAJA fee sum (i.e., $6,973.87) shall be deemed refunded to the Plaintiff.

3. This action shall be closed and shall remain closed.

SO ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 12th day of December 2025.

Ohicetvelar Ack,

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. TUITE

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of record

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