BOULWARE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TYEISHA B.,1 :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

v. : No. 24-6384

:

COMMISSIONER OF THE :

SOCIAL SECURITY :

ADMINISTRATION, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

HON. JOSÉ RAÚL ARTEAGA December 12, 2025

United States Magistrate Judge2

The Commissioner of Social Security, through an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”), determined that Plaintiff Tyeisha B. was not disabled and denied her claim for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 401-433. (Tr. 22, 65.) Tyeisha B. seeks reversal and remand, arguing that the ALJ’s

decision was not based on substantial evidence because he failed to properly (1) consider

evidence of her neuropathy or (2) assess if her fibromyalgia and other impairments

1 Tyeisha B. is referred to solely by her first name and last initial in accordance

with this Court’s standing order. See Standing Order, In re: Party

Identification in Social Security Cases (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2024),

https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/sites/paed/files/documents/locrules/standord/SO_

pty-id-ss.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2025).

2 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge

to conduct all proceedings, including the entry of a final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). (See ECF 5.)

medically equaled a listed impairment.3 (See ECF 9 at 8-18.) The Commissioner responds

that the ALJ reasonably evaluated the overall record and that Tyeisha B. provides no basis

for disturbing the ALJ’s determination. (See ECF 10 at 5-14.)

After careful review of the complete record, Tyeisha B.’s request for review is

DENIED and the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

Tyeisha B. applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on April 28, 2022, alleging

disability beginning on March 11, 2022. (Tr. 65.) Her application was denied initially and

on reconsideration. (Tr. 65, 77.) Tyeisha B. requested an in-person hearing, which the ALJ

held on January 9, 2024. (Tr. 45-64, 106, 180.) The ALJ heard testimony from a vocational

expert (“VE”) and Tyeisha B., who was represented by counsel. (Tr. 50-64.) Tyeisha B.

testified that she had resumed working in October 2023. (Tr. 51-52.) The ALJ determined

that Tyeisha B. was not disabled during the relevant period and denied her application

on April 4, 2024. (Tr. 22-46.)

According to the ALJ, Tyeisha B. met the Social Security Act’s insured status

requirements through December 31, 2028, and had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity4 between March 2022 and October 2023. (See Tr. 26-28.)

3 An extensive list of impairments that warrant a finding of disability based solely

on medical criteria, without considering vocational criteria, is set forth at 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

4 The regulations define “substantial gainful activity” as work activity that is both

substantial and gainful. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. The Social Security Administration

generally presumes that an individual’s past work qualifies as substantial gainful activity

The ALJ found that Tyeisha B. had several severe impairments: “osteoarthritis of

the right hip; status post[-]cervical discectomy and fusion in 2012 and implantation of a

neurostimulator in 2021; degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine; and

fibromyalgia.” (Tr. 28.) According to the ALJ, Tyeisha B. managed her type 2 diabetes,

through treatment and weight loss, and it did not cause “more than minimal work-

related limitations,” so it was non-severe. (Id.) Similarly, the ALJ deemed Tyeisha B.’s

gastroparesis, gastroesophageal reflux disease, obesity, and non-alcoholic fatty liver

disease to be non-severe because they had improved with treatment and did not result in

“more than minimal vocationally-related limitations.” (Tr. 28-29.) The ALJ also noted that

Tyeisha B.’s previous vitamin D deficiency had caused no symptoms. (Tr. 29.) Because

her hypertension was well-managed on medication and did not cause end-organ damage

or complications, the ALJ found that it was non-severe. (Id.) As for Tyeisha B.’s asthma,

the ALJ concluded that it was non-severe because it was mild and intermittent, she

treated it with occasional inhaler use, and her examinations generally showed normal

breathing, clear lungs, and no irregular lung sounds. (Id.) Although Tyeisha B. reported

neuropathy in her upper extremities, the ALJ found the condition was non-severe after

evaluating records from Tyeisha B.’s examinations, her occasional denials of numbness

and neurological symptoms, and her ability to perform activities of daily life. (Tr. 29-30.)

Lastly, considering Tyeisha B.’s depressive and anxiety disorder diagnoses singly and in

if the individual has earnings above a level set out in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1574, 404.1575.

combination, the ALJ determined that they were non-severe because they caused no more

than mild or minimal limitations in her ability to do basic work activities or in any of the

mental functioning areas set out in the disability regulations. (Tr. 30-31 (citing 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1).)

Next, the ALJ determined that Tyeisha B. did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (See Tr. 31-32 (citing 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).) The ALJ specifically considered listings 1.15,

“Disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in compromise of a nerve root(s),” and § 1.18,

“Abnormality of a major joint(s) in any extremity.” (Id.)

The ALJ concluded that Tyeisha B. had the residual functional capacity5 to perform

a full range of sedentary work during the relevant period.6 (Tr. 33.) He explained that

he rendered the RFC determination after considering “all symptoms and the extent to

which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective

5 Residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is the most a claimant can do in a work

setting despite the physical and mental limitations of their impairment(s) and any related

symptoms (e.g., pain). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ

considers all medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe. Id.

§ 404.1545(a)(2).

6 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (setting forth “physical exertion requirements of work in

the national economy”). Sedentary work “involves sitting” with occasional walking and

standing, “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time,” and “occasionally lifting or carrying

articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” Id. § 404.1567(a).

medical evidence and other evidence” as well as “the medical opinion(s) and prior

administrative medical finding(s).” (See Tr. 33-38.)

Based on a detailed earnings query and Tyeisha B.’s testimony that she worked as

a special assistant for Philadelphia City Council from February 2008 to January 2011, the

ALJ determined that this position was past relevant work. (Tr. 38.) Relying on the VE’s

testimony, the ALJ found that the position corresponded to that of a clerk typist and that

Tyeisha B. had performed the job at sedentary exertion. (Tr. 38-39.) Accordingly, the ALJ

concluded that Tyeisha B. could perform past relevant work and was not disabled under

the Social Security Act from the alleged onset date to the date of his decision.7 (Tr. 39.)

After the Appeals Council denied Tyeisha B.’s request for review (Tr. 12-14), she

filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF 1.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS8

The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine

whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The

Commissioner considers whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful

7 The ALJ noted that even if Tyeisha B. “did not perform past work at the sedentary

exertional level, a finding of ‘not disabled’ would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule

201.21 or 201.22.” (Tr. 39.) See Program Operations Manual System § DI 25025.035.

8 The respective regulations governing claims for DIB, which can be found at 20

C.F.R. Part 404, and claims for Supplemental Security Income, which can be found at 20

C.F.R. Part 416 “are, as relevant here, not materially different.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103,

107 n.1 (2000). Because the test for determining whether a person is disabled “is the same”

for either class of benefits, the Court may consider case law developed under either

provision in reaching a decision. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002).

activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has impairment(s) that meet or medically equal

a listed impairment; (4) has the capacity to do past relevant work, considering the

claimant’s RFC; and (5) is able to do any other work, considering the claimant’s RFC, age,

education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a). The burden of proof is on the claimant

at all steps except step five. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010);

see also Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[D]uring steps two through

four of the inquiry, the claimant always bears the burden . . . by a preponderance of the

evidence . . . .”) (emphasis added).

The limited question before the Court on review of the Commissioner’s final

determination is not whether Tyeisha B. was disabled. Rather, the Court must determine

whether “substantial evidence” supports the Commissioner’s finding that she was not

disabled and whether the Commissioner, through the ALJ, correctly applied the relevant

law. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Courts review the Commissioner’s factual findings to see if

“substantial evidence” exists to support them by looking at the existing administrative

record.9 Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary

sufficiency is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or

considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565

9 Any legal issues the ALJ decides are subject to “plenary review.” Johnson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).

(1988) (citation modified). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than

a preponderance of evidence.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).

Where substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings, courts may not

“re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). In other words, this Court may “not substitute

[its] own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 611. The ALJ’s opinion

need only include “sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to

permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004); see also 42

U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (requiring an ALJ to state the “reason or reasons upon which [a denial

of benefits] is based”). To decide whether the record was sufficiently developed, the

Court reads the ALJ’s decision “as a whole.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.

Following review of the entire record on appeal from a denial of benefits, the Court

can enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing” the Commissioner’s decision

“with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Tyeisha B.

bears the burden to explain how any “error to which [s]he points could have made any

difference” in the ALJ’s determination. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009); see also

Holloman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying this

standard to social security adjudications). Remand is not required if it would not affect

the outcome of the case. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Tyeisha B.’s Fibromyalgia at Step Three.

Tyeisha B. argues that the ALJ erred at step three by failing “to properly follow

SSR 12-2[p]” and consider whether her fibromyalgia medically equaled listed

impairment 14.09(D), “Inflammatory arthritis.” (ECF 9 at 14-18.) She contends that this

alleged error is not harmless “since the evidence could reasonably equal” the listing. (Id.

at 17.) She also asserts that the ALJ’s findings are “conclusory” and “prevent this Court

from determining whether his decision was supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.) The

Commissioner replies that the ALJ was not required to specifically consider listing §

14.09(D) at step three. (See ECF 10 at 9-10.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s

analysis was sufficient to show that he considered the record evidence as it relates to the

listing requirements and that Tyeisha B. has not met her burden to show that she meets

or equals all of listing § 14.09(D)’s criteria. (See ECF 10 at 8-12.) Considering the parties’

respective arguments and upon review, the ALJ’s “development of the record and

explanation of his findings in the decision as a whole permits meaningful review of his

step-three conclusion.” Remaley v. Saul, No. 19-1493, 2021 WL 1224519, at *5 (W.D. Pa.

Mar. 31, 2021) (citation modified) (citing Jones, 364 F.3d at 505). Substantial evidence—

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion”—supports the ALJ’s determination that Tyeisha B.’s fibromyalgia and other

impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.

Social Security Ruling 12-2p provides guidance on how ALJs should evaluate

fibromyalgia in disability claims. See SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *1 (July 25, 2012).

Fibromyalgia is a “common” but “complex medical condition characterized primarily by

widespread pain in the joints, muscles, tendons, or nearby soft tissues that has persisted

for at least” three months. Id. at *2. In addition to “tender points on the neck, shoulders,

back, hips, arms or legs that hurt when touched,” fibromyalgia can cause constitutional

symptoms such as “fatigue, difficulty sleeping, morning stiffness, headaches, and

problems with cognition or memory.” Henderson v. Astrue, 887 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621 n.9

(W.D. Pa. 2012) (citation modified). Fibromyalgia can “interfere with a person’s ability to

carry out daily activities” and “is often considered an arthritis-like condition.” Friedman

v. Berryhill, No. 18-9446, 2019 WL 1418132, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2019) (citation modified);

see also Garda v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-6525, 2022 WL 143169, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 17,

2022) (“[F]ibromyalgia is considered a type of arthritis.”).

An ALJ’s step three analysis must address “whether and why [the claimant’s]

impairments, or those impairments combined, are or are not equivalent in severity to one

of the listed impairments.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir.

2000). Fibromyalgia is not a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. Therefore, once an ALJ finds that a claimant’s fibromyalgia is an impairment

at step two, agency policy directs the ALJ to determine at step three whether fibromyalgia

alone or in combination with at least one other medically determinable impairment

medically equals a listed impairment. See SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *5-6. SSR 12-

2p provides listing 14.09(D), “Inflammatory arthritis,” as an “example” for ALJs to

consider. Id. at *6. Contrary to Tyeisha B.’s assertions, “SSR 12-2[p] does not mandate an

ALJ to consider fibromyalgia as medically equal to inflammatory arthritis; it merely

suggests the listing as one example against which fibromyalgia may be considered.”

Browner v. Berryhill, No. 16-6237, 2018 WL 3031516, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2018).

The ALJ might have erred if he failed to analyze Tyeisha B.’s fibromyalgia

symptoms against any relevant listing. Cf. Kozla v. Colvin, No. 16-631, 2017 WL 4269963,

at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2017) (remanding where the ALJ “failed to mention any specific

listed impairments that could possibly relate to fibromyalgia”). However, he considered

§ 1.18, which addresses abnormality of a major joint in any extremity and lists “chronic

joint pain or stiffness” as a criterion. (Tr. 32.) See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1 § 1.18. His analysis is sufficient to withstand scrutiny, particularly since he considered

Tyeisha B.’s fibromyalgia symptoms throughout his decision, including factoring in her

fatigue when crafting her RFC. (See Tr. 36.)

The ALJ did not have to explicitly examine listing § 14.09(D) at step three because

he implicitly determined that Tyeisha B. had not shown that her impairments medically

equaled its criteria. (See Tr. 31-38.) Listing § 14.09(D) requires evidence of (1) “repeated

manifestations of inflammatory arthritis,” (2) “with at least two of the constitutional

symptoms or signs (severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary weight loss),” and

(3) “one of the following at the marked level: (a) limitation of activities of daily living,

(b) limitation in maintaining social functioning, or (c) limitation in completing tasks in a

timely manner due to deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace.” 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 14.09(D) (emphasis added) (citation modified). The

regulations define “malaise” as “frequent feelings of illness, bodily discomfort, or lack of

well-being that result in significantly reduced physical activity or mental function.” Id.

§ 14.00(C)(2). They define “severe fatigue” as a “frequent sense of exhaustion that results

in significantly reduced physical activity or mental function.” Id. Additionally, a “marked

limitation” “means that the signs and symptoms of an immune system disorder interfere

seriously with a person's ability to function.” Garda, 2022 WL 143169, at *10; see also 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 14.00(I)(4)-(5) (“Although we do not require the

use of . . . a scale, ‘marked’ would be the fourth point on a five-point scale consisting of

no limitation, mild limitation, moderate limitation, marked limitation, and extreme

limitation. . . . [A claimant] need not be totally precluded from performing an activity to

have a marked limitation, as long as the degree of limitation seriously interferes with

[their] ability to function independently, appropriately, and effectively.”).

Tyeisha B. argues that she met her burden to show that her impairments medically

equaled listing § 14.09(D) by pointing to her full-body pain, her history of medication and

physical therapy to treat fibromyalgia, and examinations “showing 18 of 18 positive

trigger points.” (ECF 9 at 17 (citing Tr. 1387).) She also contends that she suffered from

extreme fatigue and that her fibromyalgia affected “her interactions with other people”

and resulted in her “performing few activities of daily living.” (Id. (citing Tr. 828).)

Whether Tyeisha B. suffers from fibromyalgia is not at issue. The ALJ determined

at step two that she did and that it was a severe impairment. (Tr. 28.) Nevertheless,

presuming that this condition medically equals “repeated manifestations of

inflammatory arthritis,” Tyeisha B. has not carried her burden to establish the listing’s

other requirements. Starting with the constitutional symptoms criterion, the ALJ accepted

Tyeisha B.’s complaint of fatigue and factored it into her RFC. (See Tr. 36.) Yet his

decision did not find her fatigue severe, or “result[ing] in significantly reduced physical

activity or mental function.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 14.00(C)(2).

Rather, the ALJ concluded that Tyeisha B. only had “mild” limitations in her mental

functioning (Tr. 30-31) and included no mental limitations in her RFC. (Tr. 35.) Further,

his determination that Tyeisha B.’s fatigue did not preclude her from doing sedentary

work or many activities of daily life contradicts any finding that she had significantly

reduced physical activity. (See Tr. 33-38.)

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions. A vast majority of the

medical records show that Tyeisha B. reported no fatigue. (Compare Tr. 307, 321, 329, 335,

345, 352, 360, 367, 402, 1533, 1556, 1584, 1647, 1719, 1766, 1835, 1874, 1912 (reporting no

fatigue), with Tr. 349, 1373 (complaining of fatigue).) While she testified that she had to

lie down twenty-two to twenty-three hours out of the day, she attributed this to pain, not

fatigue. (See Tr. 60-61.) Regardless, the ALJ found this testimony incredible because it

was inconsistent with record evidence showing that Tyeisha B. drove, cooked, shopped,

cleaned, read, paid bills, attended religious meetings via Zoom, exercised on an elliptical

machine and exercise ball, used resistance bands, and rode a recumbent bike. (See Tr. 36,

38 (citing Tr. 247-54 (Ex. 5E), 273-80 (Ex. 10E), 1336 (Ex. 10F at 137), 1385 (Ex. 12F at 3),

1762, (Ex. 17F at 10, 119)).) Additionally, medical evidence showed that Tyeisha B. was

“generally in no acute distress.” (Id. (citing Tr. 839 (Ex. 7F at 6), 1207, 1215, 1222, 1241,

1252, 1261, 1274, 1292, 1303 (Ex. 10F at 8, 16, 23, 42, 53, 62, 75, 93, 123), 1386 (Ex. 12F at 4),

1514 (Ex. 15F at 3), 1766, 1836, 1875, 1912 (Ex. 17F at 14, 84, 123, 160)).) This evidence falls

short of establishing that her fatigue was severe. Cf. Risser v. Astrue, No. 11-1173, 2012 WL

3682366, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2012) (determining that a claimant had shown that her

fatigue and malaise were severe where her treating physician’s notes supported their

seriousness).

Further, even if her fatigue was severe, Tyeisha B. makes no argument that she

suffered from fever, involuntary weight loss, or malaise. (See ECF 9 at 16-17.) The record

would not support such arguments in any event. (See, e.g., Tr. 307, 389, 1835, 1874 (logging

no unexpected weight change or fever), 331, 1217, 1871 (noting that she felt “well” or

“pretty well”).) Tyeisha B. has failed to establish the constitutional symptoms criterion.

See Tolan v. Kijakazi, No. 20-1675, 2022 WL 905550, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2022)

(determining that a claimant failed to show that her medical conditions equaled a listed

impairment where she “cited no evidence to support her position that she exhibited two

constitutional symptoms” (citation modified)); see also Goodwin v. Astrue, No. 10-1506,

2011 WL 3844156, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2011) (denying claimant’s summary judgment

motion where he “failed to point to evidence” of constitutional symptoms to satisfy

listing § 14.09(D)).

Furthermore, Tyeisha B. has not shown that she had a marked limitation in her

social functioning or activities of daily living. For the former, she testified that she did

not “have any quality of life” outside of going to doctor visits and occasionally talking to

family members on the phone. (Tr. 60-61.) She claimed that she could not manage the

pain of traveling to see people because she could only sit for thirty seconds at a time. (See

Tr. 60.) Nevertheless, the ALJ determined that Tyeisha B. only had a “mild limitation” in

interacting with others caused by her physical symptoms, depression, and anxiety.10 (See

Tr. 30-31, 36-38.) He found that her “explanation of ‘pain’ for these limits [was] not

adequate” and that her claims were inconsistent with the overall record. (See Tr. 36-38.)

Likewise, he determined that her claimed physical limitations were inconsistent with her

ability to “perform many activities of daily living.” (See Tr. 35-38.) Substantial evidence

supports these determinations.

Starting with her social capacity, Tyeisha B. reported spending time with others in

person and telephonically. (See, e.g., Tr. 251, 277, 825.) A consultative examination

showed that she “was cooperative and responsive to all questions posed by [an]

examiner” and “had adequate social skills, . . . normal motor behavior, appropriate eye

contact, normal speech, no psychosis, positive affect, and ‘pretty good’ mood.” (Tr. 37

(citing Tr. 824 (Ex. 6F at 5)).) Medical records revealed that she “was generally pleasant,

conversant, and well-groomed with normal mood and behavior.” (Id. (citing Tr. 695, 701,

708, 715, 722, 728, 734, 740, 746, 752 (Ex. 4F at 3, 9, 16, 23, 30, 36, 42, 48, 54, 60, 72), 859, 869

(Ex. 8F at 5, 15), 1284 (Ex. 10F at 85), 1585, 1648, 1720 (Ex. 16F at 57, 120, 192), 1836, 1875,

1913).) The ALJ also was persuaded by the opinion of Amanda Anderson, Psy.D., who

concluded that Tyeisha B. had only mild limitations in interacting with other people after

examining her and considering that her mood had improved with medication. (See Tr.

10 Because the ALJ found that Tyeisha B.’s depression and anxiety were medically

determinable (Tr. 30-31), he appropriately considered these non-severe impairments in

combination with her physical limitations. See Sibe K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL

4319211, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2024).

37-38 (citing Tr. 859, 869, 1277 (Ex. 10F at 78), 1284, 1370-82 (Ex. 11F), 1585, 1720, 1836,

1875, 1913).)

Turning to Tyeisha B.’s pain, medical records showed that she was “generally in

no acute distress.” (Tr. 36 (citing Tr. 1207, 1215, 1222, 1241, 1252, 1261, 1274, 1292, 1303,

1514, 1766, 1836, 1875, 1912).) Consultative examiners likewise described her “as in no

acute distress,” and the ALJ reasoned that the examinations “most likely required [her]

to sit for more than” thirty seconds at a time. (Id. (citing Tr. 839, 1386).) Additionally, the

ALJ considered that many of Tyeisha B.’s documented activities of daily living—driving,

shopping in person, cooking, cleaning, doing laundry, virtually attending religious

meetings, paying bills, and exercising11—were inconsistent with her claimed sitting

limitations. (Tr. 36 (citing Tr. 247-54, 273-80, 838 (Ex. 7F at 5), 1336, 1385, 1762, 1871).)

Given that the regulations obligated the ALJ to consider the medical evidence,

opinion evidence, and Tyeisha B.’s daily activities when determining if she was disabled,

see 20 CFR § 404.1529(c), the ALJ’s discussion of these factors was relevant because it

“highlight[ed] the inconsistencies between [her] subjective symptoms and the record as

a whole.” See Moon v. Berryhill, No. 18-323, 2018 WL 7002038, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19,

2018). Substantial evidence supports his decision to discredit her subjective complaints.

See Timmons v. Colvin, 6 F. Supp. 3d 522, 534 (D. Del. 2013) (affirming an ALJ’s

determination that a claimant was not credible where her testimony that “she was able

11 Further references to Tyeisha B.’s activities of daily living include these actions.

to engage in several activities of daily living” undermined the credibility of her subjective

complaints).

Consequently, Tyeisha B. has not shown that her fibromyalgia and other

impairments caused a marked limitation on her social functioning or activities of daily

living. Because Tyeisha B. has not shown that her fibromyalgia, alone or in combination

with her other impairments, medically equaled “all of the specified medical criteria” of

listing § 14.09(D), she has not carried her burden to establish that the ALJ erred at step

three. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). There is no need for remand based

on this argument. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Determination.

Tyeisha B. argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC

determination because he “cherry-picked evidence” which reinforced his decision. (ECF

9 at 10-11.) She maintains that he “substantially ignored” record evidence establishing

neuropathy, including her complaints that she had numbness, tingling, and sensory

deficits in her hands and “difficulty holding . . . small objects for a long time.” (Id. at 11

(citing Tr. 353, 360, 368, 389, 693, 837, 840).) She asserts that Monique Slade, N.P.’s,

opinion that she could only occasionally reach bilaterally due to back pain and

neuropathy also supported additional RFC limitations. (Id. (citing Tr. 844).) The

Commissioner counters that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination

and that the ALJ appropriately discounted Tyeisha B.’s subjective complaints as

inconsistent with the record. (See ECF 10 at 12-14.) The Commissioner argues that the

ALJ did not determine that Tyeisha B. could perform full-time work solely from her

activities of daily living and “properly considered this evidence as one relevant factor in

evaluating [her] claim.” (Id. at 13.) Considering the parties’ respective arguments and

the record, substantial evidence—again, not necessarily “a large or considerable amount

of evidence”—supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit Tyeisha B.’s subjective complaints

in appropriately formulating her RFC. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.

That some “evidence in the record supports a finding that Tyeisha B.’s neuropathy

caused her physical limitations does not undermine the ALJ’s RFC determination so long

as the record provides substantial support for his decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

306 F. App’x 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation modified); see also Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d

193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that an ALJ was “entitled to weigh all evidence in making

[her] finding,” even where there was record evidence “suggesting a contrary

conclusion”). Tyeisha B.’s complaints of numbness or tingling in her hands comprise

most of the record evidence of neuropathy. (See Tr. 236 (Ex. 3E at 2), 353, 360, 368, 389,

693, 837, 1384 (Ex. 12F at 2).) N.P. Slade’s September 2022 physical examination also

revealed tingling and sensory deficits to fine touch in Tyeisha B.’s fingers bilaterally

(Tr. 840), and Tyeisha B. later reported that it was “hard for her to grasp objects in her

hands for long periods of time.” (Tr. 1384.)12

12 Tyeisha B. faults the ALJ’s decision for not citing to more examples in the record

indicating that she “was experiencing numbness and tingling in her hands.” (ECF 9 at

11.) However, the ALJ did not have to explicitly “mention every piece of evidence in the

record” to make his determination. See Beety-Monticelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x

743, 747 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We do

not expect the ALJ to reference every relevant treatment note in cases with voluminous

medical records.” (citation modified)). The ALJ cited to N.P. Slade’s examination findings

and a few examples of Tyeisha B.’s subjective complaints. (See Tr. 36.) This was sufficient

However, the ALJ found that other evidence counseled against finding limitations

based on neuropathy. (See Tr. 29-30, 36-38.) N.P. Slade and Anne M. Greenberg, M.D.,

observed that Tyeisha B. had intact hand and finger dexterity and “no limitations” with

fine motor activity of her hands. (See Tr. 840, 1387.) They also noted that Tyeisha B. had

good strength in her arms and full grip strength bilaterally. (Tr. 840, 850, 1387.) By March

2023, Dr. Greenberg found that Tyeisha B. had “no sensory deficit to cold or vibration”

in her hands. (Tr. 1387.) Tyeisha B. also occasionally denied numbness to providers.

(Tr. 1221, 1283, 1340 (Ex. 10F at 22, 84, 141).) By crediting this evidence, the ALJ complied

with his “obligation to weigh the medical evidence and make choices between conflicting

data.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1187 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation modified).

Additionally, although N.P. Slade opined that Tyeisha B. could not perform

“postural maneuvers” and could only occasionally use her hands bilaterally due to

neuropathy of her hands and back pain, the ALJ found her opinion unpersuasive because

it was unsupported and inconsistent with the record. (See Tr. 38, 844-45.) Supportability

and consistency are the “most important” persuasiveness factors. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(b)(2); see also Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639-40 (3d Cir.

2024) (stating the regulations only require ALJs to discuss the supportability and

consistency factors and explain dispositive reason(s) for their decisions).

“[S]upportability relates to the extent to which a medical source has articulated support

for his analysis. Additional references to Tyeisha B.’s complaints would have been

redundant.

for the medical source’s own opinion, while consistency relates to the relationship

between a medical source’s opinion and other evidence within the record.” Nolf v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 22-368, 2023 WL 8437872, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2023).

Addressing supportability, the ALJ noted that N.P. Slade’s examination showed

that Tyeisha B. had full strength in her upper extremities, full grip strength bilaterally,

and intact hand and finger dexterity. (Tr. 38 (citing Tr. 840, 850).) Regarding consistency,

the ALJ considered that Dr. Greenberg’s opinion contained these same findings as well

as a determination that Tyeisha B. had no sensory deficit to cold or vibration. (Id. (citing

Tr. 1387).) He also explained that Tyeisha B. “performed activities of daily living that

likely involved . . . carrying things . . . [and] postural maneuvers.” (Id. (citing Tr. 247-54,

273-80, 825 (Ex. 6F at 6), 838, 1374).) Because the ALJ addressed the supportability and

consistency factors by examining the record evidence, he appropriately rejected N.P.

Slade’s opinion that Tyeisha B. had physical limitations resulting from her neuropathy.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2); Schuster v. Astrue, 879 F. Supp. 2d 461, 467-68 (E.D. Pa.

2012) (finding that substantial evidence supported an ALJ’s rejection of a physician’s

opinion that the claimant had a marked limitation in ability to interact with coworkers

where the opinion was inconsistent with the record evidence).13

13 Tyeisha B. relies on three cases to support her argument that the ALJ

impermissibly “cherry-picked” evidence, but they are inapposite. (ECF 9 at 10-11.) Two

—one from within the Third Circuit, and one from outside—stand for the proposition

that ALJs may not make summary conclusions at step three without identifying listed

impairments or explaining their reasoning. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20 (charactering

such “hopelessly inadequate” analysis as “beyond meaningful judicial review”); accord

Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (same). Here, however, the ALJ

explained at step four why he discounted Tyeisha B.’s complaints of neuropathy. (See

The ALJ also considered that Tyeisha B.’s reported activities of daily living

involved “good use of the upper extremities” and noted that she “read[] on a regular

basis, which generally involves holding reading material or a tablet or other electronic

device.” (Tr. 36 (citing Tr. 247-54, 273-80, 838, 1385).) Again, the ALJ complied with the

regulations by evaluating Tyeisha B.’s activities of daily living while determining her

RFC, and this discussion was appropriate because it highlighted inconsistences between

her subjective complaints and the record. See 20 CFR § 404.1529(c)(3); Moon, 2018 WL

7002038, at *12; Timmons, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 534.

Tyeisha B. complains that the ALJ provides “no meaningful analysis” as to why

her activities establish that she has no “limitations resulting from neuropathy in her

hands” (ECF 9 at 12), but his decision, considered as a whole, permits meaningful judicial

review. See Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. He repeatedly explained that her regular activities, such

as driving a car up to four times a week and shopping in stores weekly (see, e.g., Tr. 276)

belied the intensity of her claimed symptoms. (See Tr. 35-38.) The ALJ did not determine

from this evidence alone that Tyeisha B. could “use her hands for eight hours per

[work]day,” as she argues. (ECF 9 at 12-13.) Instead, the ALJ appropriately considered

Tr. 36.) And the third—also not from the Third Circuit—held that an ALJ erred in finding

that a claimant’s impairment was not presumptively disabling at step three where the

ALJ failed to consider (1) the combined effects of the claimant’s impairments, (2) a

treating physician’s determination that the claimant was fully disabled, and (3) the

“overwhelming evidence” of the claimant’s mental and physical impairments. Loza v.

Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 394 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ specifically considered the combined

effects of Tyeisha B.’s impairments. (See Tr. 31-32.) Moreover, he did not disregard

“overwhelming” evidence of physical limitations resulting from her neuropathy and

properly considered and rejected N.P. Slade’s opinion. (See Tr. 36, 38.)

this evidence as one relevant factor in evaluating her claims. See Miller v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 20-3642, 2021 WL 3137439, at *3 (3d Cir. July 26, 2021) (holding that an ALJ

properly relied on evidence of the claimant’s ability to do “minor household activities”

where they were not “‘sporadic or transitory’” and “appropriately indicative of how her

pain affect[ed] her daily activities and ability to work” (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d

968, 971-72 (3d Cir. 1981))); see also Irelan v. Barnhart, 82 F. App’x 66, 73 (3d Cir. Dec. 4,

2003) (holding that an ALJ adequately considered lifestyle evidence, specifically the

claimant’s “shopping, driving, [and] traveling,” in determining the intensity and

persistence of her symptoms); 20 CFR § 404.1529(c)(3) (allowing for consideration of such

evidence). Even if the Court were to credit Tyeisha B.’s argument that evidence of her

daily activities is not inconsistent with her subjective complaints, the ALJ’s consideration

of the countervailing medical evidence satisfies the substantial evidence standard. See

Booker v. Colvin, No. 14-4984, 2017 WL 914911, at *11 n.18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017).

Tyeisha B. has not met her burden to show that the ALJ erred by concluding that

her complaints about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her neuropathy

were not entirely consistent with the record. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 363. As substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination, remand is not required based on this

argument either. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553.

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon review of the record, substantial evidence—“such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate”—exists to support the ALJ’s determinations

that Tyeisha B.’s impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment and

that the neuropathy in her upper extremities did not warrant additional limitations in her

RFC. Substantial evidence is a “low threshold.” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 640. Because

Tyeisha B. has not shown that her complaints about the ALJ’s consideration of the record

evidence would have changed the outcome of his case under the governing regulations,

remand is not required to further consider it. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409. Therefore,

Tyeisha B.’s request for reversal and remand is DENIED. The Commissioner’s final

decision is AFFIRMED, and this matter is DISMISSED.

An appropriate Order follows.