Baldwin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JEREMIAH P. BALDWIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:25-cv-1260

Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

SHERYL BROOKS SULLIVAN, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Jeremiah P. Baldwin, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, sues several officials of the State of Ohio and Franklin County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violations of his constitutional rights arising out of a scheduled tax-lien sale of his real

property. Plaintiff has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.)

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who

render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal

of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons

below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up).

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that various special assessments, fines, and delinquency charges have

been improperly levied against his real property, resulting in Franklin County scheduling a tax-

lien sale of the property. Plaintiff alleges that no mechanism exists for him to contest the charges

prior to the sale of his property. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment holding that Franklin

County’s and the State of Ohio’s practices violate his due process and equal protection rights.

Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief to prevent the sale of his property. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s

challenges to the state property tax system by way of claims for injunctive relief are barred by

the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. This statute provides that federal district courts “shall

not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law

where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” Id. To the

extent that Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment instead of injunctive relief, those claims, too,

are barred. See Helmsley v. City of Detroit, Mich., 320 F.2d 476, 478 (6th Cir. 1963) (“[I]t is the

duty of a district judge to withhold relief by way of declaratory judgment where it appears that

the taxpayer has an adequate remedy under state law.”) (citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.

v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300 (1943)). And despite Plaintiff’s complaints that he could not

effectively challenge the amounts levied with the Franklin County Treasurer, he has not alleged,

nor could he allege, that he lacks an adequate remedy at the state level. The United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has expressly held that Ohio’s courts provide an adequate

remedy:

It is quite apparent that, here, Ohio law provides a full, complete and adequate

remedy to the appellant in the state courts. . . . The courts of Ohio are open to

appellant to contest the alleged unlawful discrimination under Ohio taxing statutes;

and in the event that the highest court of Ohio should decide against it, appellant

has the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States upon an allegation

that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution has been violated.

Union Properties, Inc. v. Monroe, 232 F.2d 884, 885 (6th Cir. 1956). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

allegations fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted and Plaintiff’s Complaint must be

dismissed in its entirety.

III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. For

the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE