LIU

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHINHUA LIU,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 23-3819 (MAS) (JTQ)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KUN LU, et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Kun Lu (“Lu”) and Russell

Lazovick’s (“Lazovick’’) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 53, 56)!

Plaintiff Shinhua Liu’s (‘Plaintiff’) Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) (ECF No. 50)

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure* 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 58) and only

Lazovick replied (ECF No. 59). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and

reaches its decision without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons below,

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 53, 56) are granted.

' Lu’s filing is styled as a “Response” (see ECF No, 56), but advances arguments in favor of

dismissal, and is therefore considered a motion to dismiss.

? All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background?

Plaintiff and Lu were married in China in 1996 and divorced approximately thirteen years

later. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) 10, ECF No. 50.) Following their divorce, Plaintiff and Lu

were involved in multiple state court legal proceedings in the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Family Part (the “State Court”). Ud. 10-18.) In December 2011, Lu was granted sole legal and

physical custody of their only child, Susan Liu (“Susan”), and Plaintiff was ordered to pay child

support. Ud. §[ 10.) About one month later, the State Court issued a Final Restraining Order (the

“FRO”) restraining Plaintiff from contacting Lu, Susan, and other family members. (/d. 11.)

Over the next decade, Plaintiff attempted to vacate the FRO against him, or in the

alternative, amend the FRO to permit his contact with Susan and reinstate his parenting time. (/d.

12-18.) Specifically, Plaintiff moved to vacate the FRO in State Court four times: in May 2013,

March 2014, December 2016, and July 2017, all to no avail. Ud); see KL. v. SL, A-1037-17,

2018 WL 4038312, at *1-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 24, 2018). Notably, in denying

Plaintiffs July 2017 request to modify the FRO, the Court noted that “[nJeither [Lu] nor her family

consented to dissolving the FRO[ and Lu] certified that she still lives in ‘extreme fear’ of

[Plaintiff], as dfid] [Susan] and her extended family.” K.L., 2018 WL 4038312, at *3. The State

3 For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the

SAC as true and considers the exhibits referenced in the SAC. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,

515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008); Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resol., L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772

(3d Cir. 2013) (noting that the court can “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the

complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the

complainant’s claims are based on [those] documents” on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

(citation omitted)).

Court noted that this was Plaintiff's “seventh motion’ to modify . . . the FRO, several of which

were procedurally deficient even after the trial court brought the deficiencies to [Plaintiffs]

attention.” Jd. Plaintiff appealed the State Court’s decision on his July 2017 motion, but the New

Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division did not find in his favor and the New Jersey Supreme

Court denied certification. See id. at 4 (“[W]e are satisfied the record fully supports the [State

Court’s] decision to deny [Plaintiffs] motion in its entirety.”); see also K.L. v. S.L., 203 A.3d 884

(N.J. 2019) (“[T]he petition for certification is denied.”).

Thereafter, in February 2023, Plaintiff made a request to Ridge High School for Susan’s

academic transcripts pursuant to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (the “FERPA”).

(SAC ¥ 19.) On March 6, 2023, Lu’s then-counsel sent correspondence to counsel for the Bernards

Township Board of Education (the “Bernards Township BOE”) stating that Lu intended to make

a formal application to the State Court to limit Plaintiffs access to Susan’s records. (Ex. B to SAC,

ECF No. 50.) On March 13, 2023, counsel for the Bernards Township BOE informed Lu’s

then-counsel that it would provide Plaintiff a copy of Susan’s records “[uJnless [it] receive[d]

specific direction on this issue from a court of competent jurisdiction by March 24, 2023[.]”> (SAC

4 19; Ex. 15 to Compl., ECF No. 1-4.) On March 21, 2023, Lu filed an emergent application with

the State Court to prevent Plaintiff's access to Susan’s school records and cited the FRO. (SAC

The emergent application was granted on March 23, 2023. (d.) Plaintiff then filed a

* After the State Court warned Plaintiff about “harassing” litigation, it entered an order on March

15, 2017 (the “March 15, 2017, Order”) that required Plaintiff to obtain pre-approval before filing

future “FM” motions. (SAC 15, 17.) Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the March 15, 2017,

Order. See K.L., 2018 WL 4038312, at *5 (“Considering the history of repetitive, procedurally

deficient, and meritless filings by [Plaintiff], we cannot conclude the trial court abused its

discretion by continuing the pre-approval process.”).

> Plaintiff alleges that this correspondence showed that the Bernards Township BOE “colluded”

with Lu to “deny [his] parental rights.” (SAC 19.)

cross-motion “arguing that the emergent order should be dissolved or[,] in the alternative[,]

modified by ‘redacting’ all-non public contact information in the transcripts[.]” Ud.) While the

dispute was pending in the State Court, Lazovick and the Bernards Township BOE did not provide

Plaintiff access to Susan’s records. (See id. 19-20.) After holding oral argument on the matter,

the State Court issued an order on May 1, 2023 (the “May 1, 2023, Order”), in favor of Lu, blocking

Plaintiff's access to Susan’s academic records, noting in part that the request was essentially “an

end-run around the restraints of the FRO.” (Ud. §§ 29-30.)

B. Procedural Background on Motion to Dismiss

This is not the first time this Court has addressed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint

in this case. In July 2023, Plaintiff initiated the instant federal action (the “Original Complaint”)

against Lu, “in her individual capacity as a legal person [and] ex-wife,” and Lazovick, in both his

individual and official capacity. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) The Original Complaint

alleged seven purported causes of action:® (1) the State Court’s issuance of the FRO violated

Plaintiff's procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (id. §§ 61-66); (2) the

State Court’s restriction on Plaintiffs filing of FM motions violated Plaintiff's procedural due

process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (id. §] 67-70); (3) the State

Court’s termination of Plaintiffs parental rights violated his procedural and substantive due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (id. Jf] 71-74); (4) the State Court’s issuance of

the FRO constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment (id. { 75-77);

(5) the State Court’s FRO and subsequent order preventing Plaintiffs access to Susan’s education

records violated federal law (id. §] 78-81); (6) the State Court’s FRO violated state law (id.

6 While the allegations are not entirely clear, the Court construes them in the light most favorable

to the pro se Plaintiff. See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 Cir. 2011).

82-85); and (7) Plaintiff is generally entitled to punitive damages (id. [J 86-88). Plaintiff also

sought, among other things, a declaration that the State Court’s FRO and the May 1, 2023, Order

restricting his access to Susan’s education records were unconstitutional. Ud. Jf] A.1-A.2.)

On May 29, 2024, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs Original Complaint in its entirety after

Defendants initially moved to dismiss. (See generally May 2024 Mem. Op., ECF No. 37; May

2024 Order, ECF No. 38.) Specifically, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims: (1)

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because they fail as a matter of law; (2) pursuant to the Eighth

Amendment because Plaintiff is not a prisoner and, therefore, the claim is inapplicable; and (3)

challenging the State Court’s FRO, March 15, 2017, Order, and May 1, 2023, Order for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. (May 2024 Mem. Op. 10-12, 17.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff's

remaining federal claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. (/d. at 16-17.)

Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint. (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 39.)

Plaintiffs allegations in his Amended Complaint remained largely the same as the Original

Complaint.’ (Compare Compl]. with Am. Compl.) Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the

Amended Complaint for many of the same reasons the Court previously dismissed the Original

Complaint. (See generally ECF Nos. 42, 45.) On February 28, 2025, the Court dismissed without

prejudice Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1983 and the state law claims.’ (Feb.

2025 Mem. Op. 14, ECF No. 48; see generally Feb. 2025 Order, ECF No. 49.) In its Opinion, the

7 Rather than amend the Original Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff noted throughout his

Amended Complaint where he disagreed with the Court’s May 2024 Opinion. (See, e.g., Am.

Compl. 1 n.1 (“This amended complaint [is] in response to errors in the Court’s Memorandum

Opinion (doc #37) in both fact finding and law application [and is filed] within the 45 days allowed,

as highlighted in yellow color throughout{[.]’’).)

® The Court also noted that it need not address the claims Plaintiff attempted to bring again that

were previously dismissed with prejudice. (Feb. 2025 Mem. Op. 7, 7 n.7.)

Court noted that it would give Plaintiff “one final opportunity to file a second amended complaint

within forty-five days” and instructed that “Plaintiff must take care to outline specific facts for this

Court and for Defendants as to exactly how the wrongful behavior Plaintiff alleges violates the

Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.” (Feb. 2025 Mem.

Op. 13.)

Plaintiff timely filed the SAC on April 7, 2025. (See generally SAC.) The SAC’s

allegations are largely the same as those of the Original Complaint and Amended Complaint.

(Compare SAC with Compl. and Am. Compl.) Plaintiff once again appears to have opted to note

throughout the SAC where he disagrees with the Court’s previous Opinions, rather than amend his

complaint to address the deficiencies noted by this Court on multiple occasions. (See SAC 1 n.1

(“This is [the SAC] in response to errors in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion (doc #48) in both

fact finding and law application[.]”).) Defendants now move to dismiss the SAC for largely the

same reasons they did for both the Original Complaint and the Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos.

53, 56.) Plaintiff opposed the motions (ECF No. 58), and only Lazovick replied (ECF No. 59).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bel? Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must

identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675

(2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations, accept

them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), The court can discard bare

legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully

harmed the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, the court

must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show

that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556

US. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Ona

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been

presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.

v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

In assessing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court construes a plaintiffs allegations

liberally. Beasley v. Howard, 623 F. Supp. 3d 434, 439 (D.N.J. 2022) (citing Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even under this liberal standard, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala y. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff once again reasserts the same claims previously set forth in both the Original

Complaint and the Amended Complaint. (Compare SAC {§ 61-88 with Am. Compl. §§ 61-88 and

Compl. {ff 61-88.) As the Court noted in its February 2025 Opinion (see Feb. 2025 Mem. Op. 7),

since the Court dismissed some of Plaintiffs claims with prejudice (see May 2024 Mem. Op. 17),

the Court need not address those claims again.’ The Court, therefore, will only evaluate whether

Plaintiff's SAC addresses the deficiencies identified in its February 2025 and May 2024 Opinions

concerning his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. For the reasons

outlined below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has once again failed to correct the deficiencies

previously identified by this Court and, thus, dismisses the SAC.

A. Section 1985 Claims

Section 1985 provides a cause of action against “two or more persons... [who]

conspire... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly any person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws[.|”

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),

a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or

class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of

the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury

to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of

a citizen of the United States.

Lake vy. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted),

Plaintiffs SAC allegations are again insufficient to plead a conspiracy claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries as a result of a

Despite Plaintiff's second attempt to reassert the claims, the Court will not address the claims

previously dismissed with prejudice, as those claims are no longer viable in this or any other

lawsuit. See Progme Corp. v. Comcast Cable Comme ‘ns LLC, No. 17-1488, 2017 WL 5070723, at

*4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2017) (“By its very nature, a dismissal with prejudice means that it is final

and binding.”); Johnakin v. Berringer, No. 19-3484, 2019 WL 4849609, at *1 (E.D. Pa.

Sep. 30, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] may not reassert any claim dismissed with prejudice.”); Doyle v. □ Z

Com. LLC, No, 21-17257, 2021 WL 5882986, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2021) (“A dismissal with

prejudice means that [p]laintiff will be precluded from filing any future suit against [d]efendants

concerning the allegations in the [c]omplaint.”). The Court, therefore, adopts its discussion in its

May 2024 Opinion and its reasoning from is February 2025 Opinion with respect to the claims

previously dismissed with prejudice. (See generally May 2024 Mem. Op.; Feb. 2025 Mem. Op.)

conspiracy because Defendants “‘colluded” to violate [his] constitutional parental rights” in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (SAC 4 66.) Plaintiff, however, has not alleged—as he failed to do

in both the Original Complaint and the Amended Complaint—sufficient facts to show that a

conspiracy existed. (See generally SAC.) “[Ml]ere conclusory allegations that a conspiracy exists

will not survive a motion to dismiss.” Harley v. City of New Jersey City, No. 16-5135, 2017 WL

2779466, at *11 (D.N.J. June 27, 2017) (citing Garlanger v. Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605

(D.N.J. 2002)); see also Campbell v. Gibb, No. 10-6584, 2012 WL 603204, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 21,

2012) (“To survive summary dismissal, conspiracy allegations “must provide some factual basis

to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.”

(quoting Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 Gd Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S.

841 (2010))). “Instead, ‘a plaintiff must set forth allegations that address the period of the

conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and the certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken

to achieve that purpose.’” Harley, 2017 WL 2779466, at *11 (quoting Ivan v. County of Middlesex,

595 F. Supp. 2d 425, 484 (D.N.J. 2009)). Moreover, a § 1985(3) conspiracy requires a “meeting

of the minds.” Campbell, 2021 WL 603204, at *9 (quoting Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533

F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Lazovick, via the Bernards Township BOE counsel, colluded

with Lu, via her then-counsel, by “instigating legal action” as purportedly evidenced by the

correspondence Plaintiff cites in his SAC. (See SAC § 19.) Plaintiff argues that the Court ignored

the “hard evidence” and his argument “that [his] conspiracy claim against Lazovick (with Lu

regarding Susan’s school records) is not only factually sufficient but also legally viable.” 7d.) As

this Court has explained twice before, the correspondence Plaintiff points to for this purported

“conspiracy” does not suggest any wrongdoing by Defendants. (See May 2024 Mem. Op. 13; Feb.

2025 Mem. Op. 9.) After Plaintiff made the request for Susan’s school records, Lu’s then-counsel

informed the Bernards Township BOE that Lu intended to make a “forthcoming application” to

the State Court to limit Plaintiff's access to the records pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. 9:2-4.2, (Ex. B

to SAC.) After Lu’s counsel sent that correspondence, “the Bernards Township BOE merely

advised that it would turn Susan’s records over to Plaintiff ‘[uJnless it receive[d] specific direction

on this issue from a court of competent jurisdiction.’” (Feb. 2025 Mem. Op. 9 (alterations in

original) (quoting May 2024 Mem. Op. 13).) Lu quickly filed an emergent application—as she

represented she would—and successfully obtained both emergent relief and the subsequent May

1, 2023, Order, preventing Plaintiff's access to Susan’s records. (SAC 20, 29.) Lazovick and

the Bernards Township BOE then lawfully complied with the State Court’s May 1, 2023, Order,

by not providing Plaintiff access to Susan’s academic records. (Lazovick Reply Br. 7, ECF No.

59.) Lazovick’s lawful compliance with the State Court’s order can hardly be considered a

conspiracy.!° As Plaintiff has once again failed to allege any additional allegations to support his

conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against Lazovick (compare SAC with Am. Compl.

and Compl.), his claim against Lazovick must be dismissed (see Feb. 2025 Mem. Op. 9 (citing

May 2024 Mem. Op. 14 (“Without more, Plaintiff's allegations do not state a claim against

Lazovick under [§] 1985 and must be dismissed.”))).

Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against

Lu. Once again, Plaintiff generally alleges that Lu and her counsel colluded with the Honorable

Thomas C. Miller, J.S.C. (ret.) to terminate Plaintiffs parental rights and issue the permanent FRO

'0 Plaintiff’s argument that Lazovick’s non-compliance with Plaintiff’s request before the State

Court issued its order amounts to a conspiracy also fails, as this Court has previously found that

the correspondence that Plaintiff relies on for the purported conspiracy “does not suggest any

wrongdoing.” (Feb, 2025 Mem. Op. 9 (alterations in original) (quoting May 2024 Mem. Op. 13).)

10

(SAC ¥ 74 n.24) and colluded with other judges to enjoin Plaintiff from filing future FM motions

(id. 64, 70).'' The SAC’s allegations, however, simply show that Lu resorted to the courts to

obtain lawful orders against Plaintiff. (See generally id.) As the Court has explained twice before

(see May 2024 Mem. Op. 14; Feb. 2025 Mem. Op. 10 n. 9), “merely resorting to the courts and

being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with

the judge.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). Because Plaintiff again fails to provide

additional factual allegations’? to support a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Lu,

the Court must dismiss this claim. See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991)

(“[I]t is a longstanding rule in the Third Circuit that a mere allegation .. . of conspiracy or collusion

without alleging the facts which constituted such conspiracy or collusion is a conclusion of law

and is insufficient [to state a claim].” (third alteration in original) (citations omitted)).

Plaintiff also alleges that Lu conspired with Lazovick to deny him access to Susan’s academic

records. (SAC { 19.) This theory asserted against Lu must fail for the same reasons it fails against

Lazovick.

The Court also notes that even if Plaintiff alleged additional facts to show a conspiracy existed,

the SAC still fails to provide any factual allegations to suggest that Defendants were motivated by

a discriminatory animus to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws, the second element of

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Lake, 112 F.3d at 685 (citations omitted).

11

The Court, accordingly, dismisses Plaintiff's conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

against Defendants with prejudice. !*

B. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 operates as the procedural vehicle by which a plaintiff may bring a claim for

violation of constitutional rights in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “[A] plaintiff seeking to hold an

individual liable under § 1983 must establish that []he was deprived of a federal constitutional or

statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added)

(citing Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004)). There is “no simple

line between states and private persons” so courts look to whether “there is such a close nexus

between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated

as that of the State itself[.]” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

'3 Plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities to amend his complaint to provide sufficient

factual support to adequately allege a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against both

Defendants. Because Plaintiff has once again failed to sufficiently plead a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985 against Defendants and continues to advance the same arguments and allegations (see

generally SAC), the Court finds that permitting Plaintiff any additional opportunities to amend

would be futile. See Baker v. Ahsan, 785 F. App’x 904, 906 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding that the

“d]istrict [c]ourt did not err in holding further amendment would be futile” where the district court

generously construed plaintiff's complaint and gave plaintiff multiple opportunities to amend his

complaint); Smith v. DeJoy, No. 21-706, 2025 WL 240899, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2025) (“When

apro se plaintiff has been afforded multiple opportunities to cure defects of pleading and additional

opportunity to amend appears to be futile, dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend

may be appropriate.” (quoting Singleton v. Harbor Freight Manager, No. 23-2889, 2024 WL

1406420, at *1 Gd Cir. Apr. 2, 2024))); Harris v. Corbett, No. 12-01, 2014 WL 580150, at *8

(W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (“Moreover, ‘if the court determines that plaintiff has had multiple

opportunities to state a claim but has failed to do so, leave to amend may be denied.’” (citation

omitted)).

12

marks omitted) (quoting Brentwood Acad. y. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,

295 (2001)). In answering that question,

[the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by the

Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action

exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are

traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the

private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state

officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a

position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be

recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.

Kach, 589 F.3d at 646 (citation modified).

Lazovick, as a principal, may be a state actor for purposes of § 1983. (SAC 4 2); Lugar v.

Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982) (“[S]tate employment is generally sufficient

to render [a] defendant a state actor[.]”). Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege what federal and/or

state constitutional right of his was purportedly violated. (See generally SAC.) Rather, Plaintiff

seems to argue that he had some constitutional right to compel Lazovick to defy a State Court

order that Plaintiff baselessly contends was illegal.'4 (See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 6, ECF No. 58-1.) This

is not sufficient to allege a claim against Lazovick under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.!°

With respect to Lu, this Court has twice previously recognized that “a private party|, i.e.,

Lu] may qualify as [a] state actor if she conspire[d] with a state official[.|” (Feb. 2025 Mem. Op.

12 (alterations in original) (quoting May 2024 Mem. Op. 16).) As discussed above, Plaintiff has

'4 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege that Lazovick and the Bernards Township BOE’s

nondisclosure of Susan’s academic records was a violation of FERPA, and that serves as the basis

for his § 1983 claim, such a claim must fail. See Freeman y, Allentown Sch. Dist., No. 24-670,

2024 WL 897835, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2024) (‘FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of

action or create rights that are enforceable under 42 U.S.C, § 1983.” (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,

536 U.S. 273, 279 (2002) (“[W]e have never before held, and decline to do so here, that spending

legislation drafted in terms resembling those of FERPA can confer enforceable rights.”))).

Because the Court dismisses both federal claims against Lazovick, it need not reach the merits

of Lazovick’s argument that he is entitled to both absolute and qualified immunity. (See Lazovick’s

Moving Br. 13-16, ECF No. 53-1.)

13

not provided sufficient facts to allege that Lu was involved in a conspiracy or facts “to support an

inference of a ‘close nexus’ between Lu’s private conduct and the state itself such that the

challenged actions can fairly be treated as actions of the state.” (May 2024 Mem. Op. 16 (citing

Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339).) Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against Lu must, therefore, also be dismissed.

The Court, accordingly, dismisses Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendants with prejudice.!°

C. Remaining State Law Claims

Because Plaintiff's federal claims have been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.'’ See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio,

556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“A district court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental]

jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which is had original jurisdiction is purely

discretionary.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c))).

As with the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, Plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities to amend

his complaint to provide sufficient additional factual support to sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Because Plaintiff has again failed to sufficiently plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

continues to advance the same arguments and allegations (see generally SAC), the Court finds that

permitting Plaintiff additional opportunities to amend would be futile. See Baker, 785 F. App’x at

906; Smith, 2025 WL 240899, at *2; Harris, 2014 WL 580150, at *8.

Plaintiff seemingly alleges state law claims under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,

specifically N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18, 19, 29. (SAC ff 31-35.) These allegations continue to be difficult

for the Court to discern, and to the extent Plaintiffis attempting to bring any other state law claims,

the factual underpinnings or legal merit of such claims are not clear from the face of the SAC and

the Court will not speculate as to what theories Plaintiff could allege. See Rayford v. Amazon

Logistics, Inc., No. 21-20591, 2022 WL 4011037, at *3 (D.N.J. Sep. 2, 2022) (“[T]he Court need

not speculate as [p]laintiff, even pro se, bears the burden of adequate pleading.”’).

14

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted. Plaintiffs

claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1983 are dismissed with prejudice. The Court will issue an

Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

MOL beg ye

MICHAEL A. SHTPP

th UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December /O , 2025

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