Eddy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

JULIE ANN EDDY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00975-SEP

)

ARNOLD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is self-represented Plaintiff Julie Ann Eddy’s application for leave to

proceed without prepayment of fees and costs, Motion to Appoint Counsel, and Motion to

Remove her Municipal Court Proceedings. Docs. [2], [3] and [5]. For the reasons set forth

below, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is granted, and her other motions are

denied. Plaintiff will be required to file an amended complaint on a Court-provided form.

LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim

for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal

conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.

Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept

as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court

should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone

v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must “allege facts, which

if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980);

see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged,

just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). And

“procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be “interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by

those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed the instant action against the Arnold Police Department and the City of

Arnold, Missouri, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. [1]. Plaintiff claims that her civil rights

were violated in July 2024 when Arnold Police Officer Unknown Propost “trespassed” onto

Plaintiff’s property “without a warrant to obtain VIN numbers” from two vehicles in her

driveway. Doc. [1] at 6; see also Doc. [3] at 6. Plaintiff claims that Officer Propost was

attempting to see if her vehicles were properly licensed under Arnold’s Ordinance 6.17.

On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff posted a “No Trespassing” sign at the edge of her property

and placed a “For Sale” sign on her truck. Doc. [3] at 6. She asserts, however, that despite the

“No Trespassing” sign, on January 7, 2025, Officer Unknown Zoellner “trespassed” onto her

driveway, “without warrant or notice, conducted a search, and obtained VINs to seize [her]

vehicles.” Doc. [3] at 6. Plaintiff documented the incident by video. Id. She alleges that on

February 21, 2025, Officer Zoellner returned to her property to issue two summonses for vehicle

abandonment, “based solely on his prior illegal search.” Doc. [1] at 5.

In the 110 pages of her Complaint and accompanying documents, Plaintiff appears to

concede that the two vehicles parked in her driveway were unregistered and unlicensed.

Nonetheless, she insists that City of Arnold employees cannot enter her driveway to ticket her for

such unlicensed vehicles. Doc. [1] at 5. Plaintiff claims she has attempted to address this matter

through communications with several members of the Arnold Police Department, both in person

and in writing, to no avail. Doc. [1] at 7; see also Doc. [3] at 6-7.

According to a review of Missouri Case.Net, Plaintiff was charged with two citations in

Arnold Municipal Court on February 24, 2025, based on the two Code Violations issued by

Officer Zoellner. See City of Arnold v. Eddy, Nos. 230711701 and 230711702 (23rd Jud. Cir.,

Jefferson County Court). The cases were assigned to Municipal Court Judge Stephen Hamby,

and a bench trial was set in both cases for February of 2026. Id.

Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges two unlawful searches and seizures in

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights—first, on July 30, 2024, by Officer Propost,

and then on January 7, 2025, by Officer Zoellner. But only the City of Arnold and the Arnold

Police Department are named as Defendants in this action—no individuals.

Plaintiff may also be seeking to have City of Arnold Ordinance 6.17, also known as §

385.070 Access to Abandoned Vehicles – Interference with City Agents, declared

unconstitutional.1 Doc. [1] at 5; see also Doc. [3] at 9-11. But Plaintiff fails to articulate any

basis for the ordinance to be declared unconstitutional.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the Municipal Court actions against her, as well as

compensatory and punitive damages. Doc. [1] at 5-6; see also Doc. [3] at 12-13.

DISCUSSION

Even with the benefit of a liberal construction, the Complaint in its current form cannot

survive initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). But in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status,

Court will give her the opportunity to amend it.

Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of Arnold and the Arnold Police Department. Her

claims against both of those entities fail. The Arnold Police Department is not a suable entity

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003)

(“jails are not legal entities amenable to suit”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 Fed.

Appx. 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department

because they are not suable entities). And Plaintiff has not properly stated a Fourth Amendment

claim for unlawful search and seizure against the City of Arnold. In order to hold a municipality

liable for a § 1983 violation, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality has committed a

constitutional violation through “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of

1 City of Arnold Ordinance 6.17 states in relevant part:

A. No person shall deny access to a member of the Police Department or any authorized agent of the

City to any property upon which is located an abandoned or derelict vehicle.

B. No person shall interfere with any member of the Police Department or any authorized agent of the

City engaged in the removal of an abandoned or derelict vehicle.

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Plaintiff has not indicated why she believes Ordinance

6.17, is unconstitutional; nor has she indicated whether she believes the statute is

unconstitutional as applied to her or on its face. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010) (the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges “goes to the

breadth of the remedy employed by the Court”). Accordingly, Plaintiff will be required to

amend her Complaint on a Court-provided form.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMENDING THE COMPLAINT

An amended complaint will entirely replace the original Complaint. See In re Wireless

Telephone Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litigation, 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005). Any

claims that is not realleged in an amended complaint will be deemed abandoned. See id.

Plaintiff must type or neatly print the amended complaint on the Court’s Civil Rights Complaint

Form, which will be provided to her. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A).

In the “Caption” section of the form, Plaintiff should write the name of any defendant she

intends to sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff must specify whether she sues each defendant

in his official or individual capacity. Failure to sue a defendant in his or her individual capacity

may result in the dismissal of that defendant.

In the “Statement of Claim” section, Plaintiff should begin by writing a defendant’s

name. Then, in separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, Plaintiff should: (1) set forth

the factual allegations supporting her claim against that defendant, and (2) state what

constitutional or federal statutory right(s) that defendant violated. If Plaintiff is suing more than

one defendant, she shall proceed similarly with each one, separately writing each defendant’s

name and, under that name, in numbered paragraphs, the allegations specific to that defendant

and the right(s) that defendant violated. Plaintiff should avoid including unnecessary detail in

the amended complaint. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to present evidence and argument in

support of her claims if the case proceeds to the next stage of litigation.

If Plaintiff names a single defendant, she may set forth as many claims as she has against

that defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If Plaintiff names more than one defendant, she may

include only claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence—that is, claims that are

related to each other. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Plaintiff may file a separate civil action to

assert any unrelated claims.

Plaintiff must allege facts explaining how each defendant was personally involved in or

directly responsible for harming her. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.

1990). Plaintiff must explain the role of each defendant sufficiently to provide notice to the

Defendant regarding what he is accused of doing or failing to do. See Topchian v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d

968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)) (“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a

claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’”).

MOTION TO REMOVE MUNICIPAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

Simultaneously with the filing of her Complaint, Plaintiff moved to remove her

municipal court proceedings to this Court, see Doc. [3]. That request is denied. A defendant

may remove an action brought in a state court that could have originally been heard in a federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Because the municipal violation cases, City of Arnold v. Eddy, Nos.

230711701 and 230711702 (23rd Jud. Cir., Jefferson County Court), relate to whether Plaintiff

violated City of Arnold Ordinance 6.17 and not to the statute’s constitutionality, they could not

have originally been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; see also Georgia v.

Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800 (1966). Accordingly, they cannot now be removed.

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff has also moved for appointment of counsel. Doc. [5]. That motion is denied

without prejudice. An indigent litigant has “neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to

appointed counsel in civil cases.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing

Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006)). A district court may appoint

counsel in a civil case if it is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous

claim and where ‘the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit

from the assistance of counsel.’” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Williams, 788 F.2d

1319, 1322 (8th Cir. 1986)) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). When determining whether to appoint

counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers such factors as “the factual complexity of the

issues, the ability of the indigent person to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting

testimony, the ability of the indigent person to present the claims, and the complexity of the legal

arguments.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 437 F.3d at 794).

On review of the factors, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted at

this time. Plaintiff has yet to file a complaint that survives initial review. There is no indication

that Plaintiff is unable to present her claims, and neither the factual nor the legal issues in this

case appear to be especially complex. Because the Court recognizes that circumstances may

change, the motion is denied without prejudice, meaning that the Court might reconsider

appointing counsel if it becomes appropriate as the case progresses.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Doc.

[2], is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall mail to Plaintiffa blank Civil

Complaint form. Plaintiff may request additional forms as needed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on the

Court-provided form in accordance with the instructions set forth above within 30 days of the

date of this Order. Any amended complaint will replace the original Complaint and will be the

only pleading that this Court will review.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remove her Municipal Court

Proceedings, Doc. [3] is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. [5], is

DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs failure to timely comply with this Order

may result in dismissal of this action, without prejudice and without further notice.

Dated this 11th day of December, 2025.

SARAHE.PITLYK) &

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE