Obienu

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KESIENA DENNIS OBIENU CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-1028

ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW ORLEANS, et al. SECTION M (2)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants The Roman

Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans (“ANO”), erroneously named as

“Archdiocese of New Orleans”; Fr. Colm Cahill, erroneously named as “Father Colm Cahil”; and

Fr. Dan Darmanin, erroneously named as “Father Dan Damani” (collectively, “Defendants”).1

Plaintiff Kesiena Dennis Obienu responds in opposition,2 and Defendants reply in further support

of their motion.3 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law,

the Court issues this Order & Reasons granting the motion because Obienu’s Title VII claims are

barred by the ministerial exception, a component of the church autonomy doctrine.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns claims of discrimination and defamation. Obienu, a United States

citizen of Nigerian origin, moved to New Orleans in 2017 to pursue a Master of Arts degree in

theological studies at the Notre Dame Seminary to prepare for the priesthood.4 Obienu alleges that

he began experiencing discrimination in June 2019, when Fr. Cahill ignored his request for

assistance in purchasing a new car after his old one broke down and Obienu still decided to buy a

1 R. Doc. 28.

2 R. Doc. 31.

3 R. Doc. 34.

4 R. Doc. 1 at 2, 8-9.

used 2019 Buick Encore for himself.5 Obienu alleges that, when Fr. Cahill found out about the

vehicle purchase, he “called [Obienu] and spoke to him in a demeaning way, [and] questioned the

source of his downpayment and insisted that [Obienu] sell his car.”6 After Obienu sold the newly

acquired car, Fr. Cahill refused to help him reclaim his old car, which was in the possession of the

ANO’s vocations office; he threatened Obienu with retaliation for seeking help from the previous

ANO vocations director; and he summoned Obienu to face a disciplinary panel, which included

Archbishop Gregory Aymond, to question Obienu about the source of his funds to purchase the

car.7 According to Obienu, other seminarians had similar or newer cars and were not subjected to

such treatment.8

Obienu alleges that “the abuse” continued when he refused to continue mental health

treatment after one visit.9 He alleges a laundry list of complaints against Fr. Cahill, including: that

in January 2021, Fr. Cahill failed to reinstate Obienu’s medical insurance “all the while showing

his disdain for [Obienu]”; that Fr. Cahill told Obienu he should not hope for priestly ordination;

and that Fr. Cahill caused Obienu to be “laicized, and seek a new diocese where he would

excardinate.”10

According to Obienu, Archbishop Aymond refused his request to leave the ANO.11 Obienu

was then ordained as a priest “against his express wishes,” and, in July 2022, he was assigned to

St. Margaret Mary Church in Slidell, Louisiana, where he experienced more discrimination by Fr.

Darmanin.12 Obienu claims that Fr. Darmanin told him not to leave any leftovers in the refrigerator

5 Id. at 9. The facts from the complaint recounted here are taken to be true at this motion-to-dismiss stage.

6 Id. at 9-10.

7 Id. at 10.

8 Id. at 10-11.

9 Id. at 11.

10 Id. (emphasis in original).

11 Id.

12 Id.

so it would not smell.13 Also, Obienu alleges that his weekly stipend was $20 less than it should

have been, the ANO did not pay his phone bill as it did for other priests, he was refused

reimbursement for continuing education, he was not permitted to be a co-signer on parish accounts

as were his predecessors, and the parish staff refused to follow his instructions.14 Obienu says that

he was subjected to a “retaliatory investigation and then removed from the parish” when he

complained about the treatment he received.15

Then, in January 2023, Archbishop Aymond assigned Obienu to work part-time, without a

specific job description, at two nursing homes and denied him the ability to stay in a rectory, which

forced him to live in a senior-living apartment for six months without a food allowance.16

According to Obienu, the nursing home assignment was “the result of him being terminated by

[the ANO] without notice to him.”17 Obienu contends that he learned of the termination in August

2023, when he was reassigned to the Immaculate Conception Church in Marrero, Louisiana, to

work part-time and accidentally discovered that his 401(k) retirement account had been terminated

by the ANO.18 On April 24, 2024, Obienu received a letter advising him that he was under

investigation for impersonating a chaplain.19 He believes that the letter resulted from his

complaining about the nursing-home posting and other issues related to his “undisclosed”

termination.20 Obienu then took a leave of absence.21

13 Id.

14 Id. at 11-12.

15 Id. at 12.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 12-13.

19 Id. at 13.

20 Id.

21 Id.

Obienu filed this suit on May 22, 2205.22 He brings federal and state-law employment

discrimination claims against the ANO for wrongful termination, failure to promote, failure to

allow him to complete the training necessary for promotion, unequal terms and conditions of

employment, and retaliation.23 Obienu had also asserted Louisiana state-law claims against all

Defendants for libel and slander (defamation), civil conspiracy, negligence, and intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress.24 Upon Defendants’ motion, the state-law tort claims

were all dismissed with prejudice as prescribed.25

II. PENDING MOTION

Defendants move for summary judgment on Obienu’s employment discrimination

claims.26 Citing McRaney v. North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention,

Inc., 157 F.4th 627 (5th Cir. 2025); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of

America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Our Lady of Guadalupe School v.

Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School

v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); and McClure v. Salvation

Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), Defendants argue that the ministerial exception of the church

autonomy doctrine bars secular courts from adjudicating the employment discrimination claims of

ministers against religious organizations.27 They contend that the protection, which arises under

the First Amendment’s Religion Clause, constitutes a complete immunity from suit.28 To that end,

22 Id. at 1-27.

23 Id. at 15-16.

24 Id. at 16-24.

25 R. Doc. 22 (citing R. Doc. 14). Obienu filed a notice of appeal related to the Order & Reasons granting

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. R. Doc. 25. However, because that order was interlocutory and nonappealable, this

Court is not divested of jurisdiction and is thus able to address the remaining claims. See Butler v. Denka Performance

Elastomer LLC, 806 F. App’x 271, 275 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2020).

26 R. Doc. 28.

27 R. Doc. 28-1 at 4-5, 7-13.

28 Id. at 4.

Defendants argue that Obienu’s employment discrimination claims are barred because “this

lawsuit arises out of a disgruntled former priest’s dissatisfaction with how [the ANO] managed his

role as a minister within its system of religious governance.”29 They point out that, at all times

relevant to this litigation, Obienu was minister “as he was employed in extensive training to

become a Roman Catholic priest or serving as an ordained Roman Catholic Priest throughout the

entirety of the events giving rise to this action.”30 Defendants also highlight that Fr. Cahill and Fr.

Darmanin are “employees, managers, officers, and/or directors of the [ANO],” who in their

capacity as “ministers serving within the hierarchal structure of the church” are alleged to have

taken various adverse employment actions against Obienu.31 For these reasons, say Defendants,

it “would constitute an impermissible entanglement in violation of the First Amendment” for this

Court to consider the employment discrimination “claims raised by Obienu, a Roman Catholic

priest, regarding his employment with the Roman Catholic Church of the [ANO].”32

In opposition, Obienu argues that the ministerial exception is “a narrow doctrine” that

applies only when the plaintiff is performing the duties of a minister in “functional reality,”

regardless of title, and that its application requires “a fact-intensive inquiry considering the total

circumstances surrounding the employee’s work.”33 He contends that summary judgment is not

warranted because there are factual disputes whether “the adverse employment actions at issue

stemmed not from religious doctrine but from national-origin discrimination, disparate treatment,

and retaliation after reporting mistreatment.”34 According to Obienu, the ministerial exception is

not a categorical immunity from judicial scrutiny, but rather it allows for claims “grounded in

29 Id.

30 Id. at 8, 12 (quote at 8).

31 Id. at 10-11.

32 Id. at 12.

33 R. Doc. 31 at 1, 7-8 (quote at 1).

34 Id. at 2, 9-10 (quote at 2).

secular workplace discrimination [to] remain adjudicable through neutral principles of law.”35

And Obienu insists that Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that the ministerial

exception applies here because, he says, there are disputed issue of material fact regarding whether

his “duties were predominantly religious and that the challenged conduct was ecclesiastical in

nature.”36 Obienu argues that McRaney and Milivojevich are inapposite because those cases did

not involve Title VII claims and did not consider whether neutral legal principles could be applied

to assess secular workplace conduct.37 He also contends that Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of

Guadalupe do not justify summary judgment because those cases did not “create[] a categorial

rule shielding all employment decisions by religious institutions” from judicial scrutiny.38

According to Obienu, the church autonomy doctrine does not apply because none of his claims

call for the interpretation of church doctrine or ecclesiastical judgment, but rather, turn on the

secular matters of motive, comparative treatment, and the sequence of events.39

Defendants reply, reurging that the ministerial exception bars Obienu’s employment

discrimination claims because at all relevant times he was a minister of the ANO.40 They argue

that Obienu cannot plausibly argue that he was not a minister when he was in training to be, or

was, a priest.41 Further, Defendants emphasize that all of Obienu’s employment discrimination

claims hinge on a comparison of his treatment by the ANO with its treatment of other ministers,

so that any adjudication of such claims would require the court to intrude impermissibly into the

church’s management practices.42 Defendants also contend that all of Obienu’s duties as an

35 Id.

36 Id. at 8.

37 Id. at 8-9.

38 Id. at 9.

39 Id. at 9-10.

40 R. Doc. 34 at 1-8.

41 Id. at 1-4.

42 Id. at 4.

ordained priest place him squarely within the ministerial exception which, under McRaney and

Hosanna-Tabor, “bars the application of even neutral, generally applicable employment

discrimination statutes” like Title VII.43

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A party

moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary

judgment and identifying those portions of the record, discovery, and any affidavits supporting the

conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets

that burden, then the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive

law identifies which facts are material. Id. Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a

rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party upon a review of the record taken as a

whole. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); EEOC

43 Id. at 7 (first quoting McRaney, 157 F.4th at 637, and then discussing the holding in Hosanna-Tabor, 565

U.S. at 196).

v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). Unsubstantiated assertions, conclusory

allegations, and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th

Cir. 1994); Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary-judgment

motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Delta & Pine Land Co.

v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, a court

must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014); Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet,

a court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant “when there is an actual

controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37

F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).

After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmovant must articulate specific facts showing a genuine issue and point to supporting,

competent evidence that may be presented in a form admissible at trial. See Lynch Props., Inc. v.

Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). Such

facts must create more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586. When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essential

element of the nonmovant’s claim in order to satisfy its summary-judgment burden. See Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial that could

support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37

F.3d at 1075-76.

B. The Ministerial Exception

Just two months ago the Fifth Circuit in McRaney outlined the First Amendment’s church

autonomy doctrine, explaining its history and breadth of application. 157 F.4th at 633-47. The

court began by observing that “[c]ivil courts cannot adjudicate ecclesiastical matters.” It then

explained that “[t]he First Amendment’s Religion Clause enshrines that principle within the church

autonomy doctrine, which shields religious institutions from interference by state and federal

courts.” Id. at 633-34 (citing Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746). To that end, “[t]he

‘general principle of church autonomy’ guarantees to religious institutions ‘independence in

matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government.’” Id. at 635

(quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 747). While the doctrine “safeguard[s] religious

institutions’ ‘autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the

institution’s central mission,’” it “does not grant ‘religious institutions a general immunity from

secular laws.” Id. at 635-36 (alteration omitted) (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at

746). However, where it applies, the church autonomy doctrine is a “constitutional immunity from

suit” that “must be resolved at the threshold of litigation.” Id. at 641.

The so-called ministerial exception is a “‘component’ of the church autonomy doctrine.”

Id. at 636 (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746). It is a rule that “commands courts

‘to stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions within

churches and other religious institutions.’” Id. (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746).

The “ministerial exception” applies to persons holding the title of “minister” and also to other

employees “‘who lead[] a religious organization, conduct[] worship services or important religious

ceremonies or rituals, or serve[] as a messenger or teacher of its faith.’” Id. at 637 (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 754). Because the doctrine is intended to

“ensure[] that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful – a matter strictly

ecclesiastical – is the church’s alone,” the doctrine applies even if the church’s decision to fire a

minister was not made for religious reasons. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95);

see also Alicea-Hernandez v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that

it is not the court’s “role to determine whether the Church had a secular or religious reason for the

alleged mistreatment of [plaintiff]” because “[t]he ‘ministerial exception’ applies without regard

to the type of claims being brought”).

With this backdrop, the Fifth Circuit explicitly stated in McRaney that “[t]he ministerial

exception bars the application of even neutral, generally applicable employment discrimination

statutes – such as … Title VII.” 157 F.4th at 637 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 180; Our

Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 760). And the ministerial exception also bars state-law claims

that “litigate the employment relationship between the religious organization and the employee.”

Starkey v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 41 F.4th 931, 945 (7th Cir. 2022)). The

McRaney court cites numerous cases as examples of when “[c]ourts have rejected a wide variety

of torts that attack ministry staffing decisions, including wrongful termination, breach of contract,

tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, conspiracy to commit

defamation, negligent supervision and detention, and retaliation.” 157 F.4th at 637 (collecting

cases).

Any factual distinctions between McRaney, along with the other cases cited by Defendants,

and the case at bar are immaterial in the wake of the Fifth Circuit’s emphatic declaration

concerning the ministerial exception’s application to employment-related claims. Indeed, as early

as 1972, the Fifth Circuit in McClure recognized that applying Title VII to an employment

relationship between a church and one of its ministers “would result in an encroachment by the

State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free

exercise clause of the First Amendment.” 460 F.2d at 560. In so holding, the court noted that, not

only is the selection of ministers exempt from Title VII’s purview, so are “the determinations of a

minister’s salary, his place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform in furtherance of the

religious mission of the church.” Id. at 559. Four years later, in Miliojevich, the Supreme Court

held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids secular courts from reviewing a church’s procedures

affecting employment decisions related to its clergy because those decisions in and of themselves

are ecclesiastical. 426 U.S. at 712-14, 724-25.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals,

929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991), is instructive here. In that case, a dismissed minister brought Title

VII and other employment-related claims against the religious institution, alleging that the

religious reasons the defendant gave as the basis for her termination were a pretext for

discrimination. Id. at 363. In applying the ministerial exception to uphold the dismissal of the

claims, the court stated: “To allow [plaintiff’s] case to continue would necessarily lead to the kind

of inquiry into religious matters that the First Amendment forbids.” Id. The court reasoned that

“[p]ersonnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se religious matters

and cannot be reviewed by civil courts, for to review such decisions would require the courts to

determine the meaning of religious doctrine and canonical law and to impose a secular court’s

view of whether in the context of the particular case religious doctrine and canonical law support

the decision the church authorities have made,” which “is precisely the kind of judicial second-

guessing of decision-making by religious organizations that the Free Exercise Clause forbids.” Id.

With the Fifth Circuit’s broad pronouncement in McRaney – based on a thorough historical

and legal analysis – that the ministerial exception bars secular courts from considering Title VII

and related state-law employment claims brought by a minister against a religious organization,

this Court is bound to conclude that Obienu’s remaining employment discrimination claims against

Defendants must be dismissed. It is undisputed that Obienu was, at all relevant times, either a

Roman Catholic priest or training to be one. All the incidents he alleges constitute “employment

discrimination” arose while he was training or working under the auspices of the ANO either as a

seminarian or as an ordained priest.44 Further, the persons who he says acted unlawfully were

themselves ordained priests or the archbishop. This is not a case where a peripheral church

employee may or may not be categorized as a “minister” depending on whether he or she was a

teacher of the faith. See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703-04 (ultimately applying that

ministerial exception to bar Title VII claims brought by a church’s communications manager

because she “was integral in shaping the message that the Church presented to the Hispanic

community”). Instead, Obienu, as a Roman Catholic priest or priest-in-training, was a minister

charged with leading a religious organization in the various ways assigned and serving as a

messenger of its faith. There can be no doubt, then, that the ministerial exception applies here to

shield the church’s employment decisions from secular scrutiny or interference. See McRaney,

157 F.4th at 653 (observing that courts “‘are bound to stay out of employment disputes’ involving

ministers and ecclesiastical organizations” (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746));

Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting

that the “introduction of government standards [in]to the selection of spiritual leaders would

significantly, and perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and state”).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion must be granted.

44 See generally R. Doc. 1.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (R. Doc. 28) is

GRANTED, and Obienu’s remaining employment discrimination claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of December, 2025.

________________________________

BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE