Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

MORENO SALINAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 1:22-cv-00159-AGF

)

STEPHAN V. CLARK, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Plaintiff’s appointed counsel,

Kevin Hormuth and the law firm of UB Greensfelder LLP (collectively, “Appointed

Counsel”), for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54,

42 U.S.C. § 1988, and Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Appointed Counsel’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Moreno Salinas brought this prisoner civil rights action on November 17,

2022, while he was incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center (“SECC”). He

initially proceeded pro se and alleged violations of his constitutional rights by a mix of

named and unnamed SECC officers whom Plaintiff alleged used excessive force against

him and/or failed to protect him from others’ use of excessive force. Following initial

review of his complaint, the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed with his claims against

the officers in their individual capacities. ECF No. 5.

On March 28, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of

counsel, and on April 5, 2024, the Court appointed counsel pursuant to the Court’s Plan

for the Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel. ECF Nos. 55 & 56.

Appointed Counsel then conducted discovery into Plaintiff’s claims and the

identity of the unnamed officers, and on September 17, 2024, Appointed Counsel filed an

amended complaint on Plaintiff’s behalf. The amended complaint asserted two counts:

(I) Eighth Amendment claims against fourteen officers (Defendants Stephan Clark,

Johnny Clubbs, Cole Hansens, Vanissia Lemons, Jerry Walls, Darrel Wilson, Tyler

Womack, James Harmon, Bruce Hanebrink, Steven Smith, David Houtz, George Durrow,

Matthew Short, and Aaron Raines) for their use of excessive force against Plaintiff and/or

their failure to protect Plaintiff from excessive use of force by other officers, and (II)

Eighth Amendment claims against two additional officers (Darcie Bolin and Brandi

Meredith) solely for failure to protect.

Appointed Counsel continued to represent Plaintiff throughout the litigation,

including preparing for and representing Plaintiff in a Court-ordered mediation conducted

on November 7, 2024, and in more than 20 depositions of the parties, treating doctors,

and witnesses by both sides. Appointed counsel also conducted and reviewed discovery

that consisted of more than a dozen security videos and over 4,000 pages of documents,

including Plaintiff’s medical records.

The case ultimately proceeded to a jury trial beginning on October 14, 2025. At

the outset of trial, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Defendants Bolin and

Meredith, who were only charged in Count II. See ECF No. 156. Additionally, although

the Missouri Attorney General’s Office (“Missouri AG”) had represented all Defendants

throughout the litigation, on the second to last day of trial, the Court permitted the

Missouri AG to withdraw from representing Defendant Smith. Smith had refused to

appear at trial and had repeatedly failed to respond to counsel’s inquiries, the Court’s

Orders, and the Court’s rules over the course of the proceeding. For these reasons, along

with permitting the Missouri AG to withdraw from representing Smith, the Clerk of

Court entered Smith’s default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Following

the trial, the Court also granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Smith.

See ECF Nos. 158, 159, 181 & 198.

The trial concluded on October 17, 2025, and the jury found in favor of Plaintiff

on one or both of his claims as to ten of the thirteen Defendants that participated at trial.

Specifically, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Clark, Clubbs,

Hansens, Wilson, Womack, Harmon, Hanebrink, Houtz, Short, and Raines, jointly and

severally, in the amount of $380,000 in actual damages.1 The jury also awarded punitive

damages in the amounts of $5,000 apiece against Clark, Clubbs, Wilson, Harmon,

Hanebrink, Houtz, Short, and Raines, and in the amounts of $15,000 apiece against

Hansens and Womack (totaling $70,000 in punitive damages). However, the jury found

in favor of Defendants Lemons, Walls, and Durrow on Plaintiff’s claims. The Court

entered judgment on the jury verdict on October 20, 2025, with damages totaling

$450,000. See ECF No. 175.

1 As noted above, following the trial, the Court also entered default judgment

against Smith, finding him jointly and severally liable, together with these ten

Defendants, for the $380,000 in actual damages found by the jury. ECF No. 198.

Appointed Counsel now seeks attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), as

limited by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), as well as costs pursuant to Rule 54.

Appointed Counsel has provided evidence of attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$286,580.50, representing approximately 714 hours of work by two attorneys and

paralegals at rates ranging from $255 to $600 per hour. However, recognizing the limits

on attorneys’ fees imposed by the PLRA, including limits on the permissible hourly rate

recoverable, and also excluding hours worked by paralegals and hours spent on the fee

motion itself for which Appointed Counsel does not seek recovery, Appointed Counsel

has reduced the request to $179,544.90 in attorneys’ fees. Appointed Counsel also seeks

$15,040.39 in costs. These requests are supported by Appointed Counsel’s affidavit,

billing records, and receipts attached to counsel’s motion.

Appointed Counsel acknowledges that, under the PLRA, a portion of the judgment

(not to exceed 25 percent), in this case $112,500, must be applied to cover attorneys’

fees. 2 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). Therefore, Appointed Counsel requests that $112,500 of

2 Throughout their briefs, the parties do not distinguish between attorneys’ fees; out-

of-pocket expenses that are normally included as part of an attorney fee request, e.g.,

Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1996); and costs taxable under

statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1920. For example, the parties appear to have assumed that

taxable costs under § 1920 are also subject to the PLRA’s limitations because the parties

have grouped such costs with the attorneys’ fees and expenses before proposing what

portion must be allocated to come from the judgment and what portion must be paid by

Defendants under the PLRA. Although it is not clear to the Court that such costs are

subject to the PLRA’s limitations, the Court need not decide that question. Given the

Court’s conclusion that recoverable attorneys’ fees alone exceed 25% of the judgment,

the PLRA’s allocation provision would be triggered before costs are even considered. In

other words, the total amount owed by Defendants under this Court’s analysis would be

the same regardless of whether taxable costs are subject to the PLRA’s limitations.

the fee request be awarded from the judgment, and that the Court assess the excess of the

fees, expenses, and costs, totaling $82,085.29, against Defendants. 3

All remaining Defendants except Smith, who as noted above is in default, have

opposed Appointed Counsel’s motion. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is the

prevailing party in this case; that attorneys’ fees and expenses are permitted under 42

U.S.C. § 1988(b) and the PLRA; that the hourly rates, number of attorneys employed,

and hours expended were in general reasonable, non-duplicative, and not excessive; or

that the costs requested are recoverable under Rule 54 and § 1920 or other governing

statutory authority.

Rather, Defendants only assert four objections to Appointed Counsel’s motion.

First, Defendants argue that Appointed Counsel should not be permitted to recover for

certain fees that Defendants argue were not “directly and reasonably incurred in proving

an actual violation” of Plaintiff’s rights, as required under the PLRA. 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(d)(1)(A). Defendants point to the following examples of such fees: fees incurred

for mediation or settlement efforts in this case; for attending and defending Plaintiff’s

deposition by Defendants; for post-trial work not involved in enforcing the judgment; for

drafting of interrogatory designations that were not used at trial; for briefing on

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff submitted a letter, pro se, opposing Appointed

Counsel’s fee request. ECF No. 179. Because that letter discussed Plaintiff’s

communications with his attorneys, the Court filed it ex parte and under seal, forwarded a

copy to Appointed Counsel and directed Appointed Counsel to respond ex parte and

under seal. ECF No. 180. Upon review of Appointed Counsel’s response, which

Plaintiff has not disputed, it appears that Plaintiff’s opposition was based on a

misunderstanding of the applicable law, and that while Plaintiff may disagree with the

provisions of the PLRA, he no longer opposes Appointed Counsel’s motion.

“collateral” evidentiary issues such as whether Plaintiff was entitled to an adverse

inference instruction for missing security video footage or whether Plaintiff was able to

recover for medical expenses; and for litigating against those Defendants who were

ultimately dismissed (Bolin and Meredith), who received full defense verdicts (Lemons,

Walls, and Durrow), or who are no longer represented by the Missouri AG (Smith). See

ECF No. 191.

Second, Defendants argue that Appointed Counsel may only recover fees and

costs related to claims on which Plaintiff succeeded, and that fees and costs for claims

against dismissed Defendants or those who received defense verdicts should be excluded.

Third, Defendants contend that the Missouri AG and its legal expense fund should

not be charged with fees and expenses incurred by Appointed Counsel in litigating

Plaintiff’s claims against Smith because the office ultimately withdrew from representing

Smith.

Finally, Defendants argue that attorneys’ fees be reduced to an amount

commensurate with Plaintiff’s success. Defendants assert that because Plaintiff only

proved a violation against ten of the original sixteen Defendants,4 the remaining fee

award—after deducting fees related to Defendants’ first three objections—should be

further reduced by a corresponding percentage of 37.5%. Defendants assert that, after

deducting all amounts based on their four objections, the total award for attorneys’ fees

expenses, and costs would be only approximately $110,699, which is less than 25% of

4 This assertion is incorrect, as Plaintiff proved his claims against not only the ten

defendants who lost to Plaintiff at trial, but also against Smith, who defaulted. Thus,

Plaintiff proved a violation against eleven of the sixteen original defendants.

the judgment in this case, and Defendants therefore would not be liable for any portion of

the fees, expenses, or costs under the PLRA.

DISCUSSION

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), courts may award “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part

of the costs” to a “prevailing party” other than the United States in cases brought under §

1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount

of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

“The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked

and rates claimed,” making a good faith effort to exclude hours that are “excessive,

redundant or otherwise unnecessary.” Id.

However, in suits by prisoners, the PLRA imposes additional limitations on

attorney fee awards under § 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). As relevant here, the PLRA

provides that such fees “shall not be awarded except to the extent that”:

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual

violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a

fee may be awarded under section 1988  of this title; and

(B)

(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered

relief for the violation; or

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief

ordered for the violation.

Id. § 1997e(d)(1).

Further, as noted above, “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent)

shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If

the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess

shall be paid by the defendant.” 5 Id. § 1997e(d)(2). Finally, “[n]o award of attorney’s

fees . . . shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate

established under section 3006A of title 18 for payment of court-appointed counsel.” Id.

§ 1997e(d)(3).

As noted above, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and

that the above-noted provisions apply. Nor do Defendants dispute the applicable hourly

rate under the PLRA, which the parties agree would be $258 for hours worked in 2025,

and $262.50 for hours worked in 2024 (150% of the rate under the Criminal Justice

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, for those years). See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; see also United States

District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri, Criminal Justice Act (CJA), Rates,

available at https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/criminal-justice-act-cja. And Defendants

have not objected that the costs sought are taxable under Rule 54 and applicable statutory

authority, or that litigation expenses such as travel expenses are recoverable. See, e.g.,

Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 113 F. App’x 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that

“travel expenses for attorneys” and other “expenses that a law firm normally would bill to

its client” are “properly characterized as part of an attorney’s fees award”); Sapa Najin v.

Gunter, 857 F.2d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Reasonable expenses of litigation incurred

5 There is no dispute that the attorneys’ fees requested here are far less than 150%

of the judgment.

by counsel on the prevailing side can be awarded as part of the fees due under Section

1988.”).

Therefore, the Court considers these matters conceded and will only address

Defendants’ specific objections below.

(1) Fees Directly and Reasonably Incurred in Proving an Actual Violation

Defendants do not cite a single case or other legal authority for their proposition

that fees incurred in matters such as a Court-ordered mediation and settlement efforts,

discovery regarding closely related claims and parties, briefing on evidentiary issues for

trial, or defending Plaintiff’s deposition by Defendants, are fees not “directly and

reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation” of Plaintiff’s rights under the PLRA.

The Court is intimately familiar with the proceedings in this case and concludes that each

category of fees contested by Defendants was directly and reasonably incurred in proving

an actual violation of Plaintiff’s rights here. See, e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437

(emphasizing the district court’s discretion in determining a fee award based on its

“superior understanding of the litigation”).

For example, the Court cannot fathom how Appointed Counsel could have proven

a violation of Plaintiff’s rights without preparing for, attending, and defending Plaintiff’s

deposition. The Court agrees with Appointed Counsel that it borders on bad faith for

defense counsel to suggest otherwise and to force Appointed Counsel to brief this issue,

particularly where, as here, Appointed Counsel is not seeking fees for litigating the

current fee motion. See ECF No. 200 at 3; see also Volk v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 528, 536

(5th Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1998) (both holding

that fees for litigating a fee motion are recoverable under the PLRA, which interpretation

also deters frivolous litigation over fee awards). Equally unfounded is the suggestion that

briefing of the key evidentiary issues in this case—regarding missing security footage

and recovery for medical expenses—was not directly and reasonably related to proving

the violation of Plaintiff’s rights here.

Likewise, Appointed Counsel’s work on discovery, Court-ordered mediation and

settlement efforts, and post-trial matters are standard aspects of trial preparation that were

inextricably intertwined with Appointed Counsel’s task of proving the violation of rights

in this case. Thus, the Court concludes—with no contrary legal authority cited or

found—that the fees for these tasks are directly and reasonably related to proving the

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g. Skinner v. Uphoff, 324 F. Supp. 2d

1278, 1284 (D. Wyo. 2004) (rejecting defendant’s argument that hours associated with

discovery requests or interrogatories not ultimately used at trial were not recoverable

under the PLRA); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (“A request for attorney’s fees

should not result in a second major litigation.”). Even if the argument otherwise had

merit, the Court would see no basis to deduct nearly $20,000 from the fee award on this

ground, as Defendants request. To the contrary, the Court’s careful review of the billing

records reveals that Appointed Counsel was prudent in using law firm resources to

develop Plaintiff’s claims and, as discussed further below, obtained excellent results.

Defendants also propose to deduct fees and costs that they assert were only related

to claims against the two Defendants who were ultimately dismissed from the case by

stipulation (Bolin and Meredith) and the three Defendants who prevailed at trial

(Lemons, Walls, and Durrow). As an initial matter, this is the same basis for Defendants’

second and fourth objections, and Defendants’ proposed deductions in this respect appear

to be an attempt to, as Appointed Counsel terms it, “double-dip” (ECF No. 200 at 7). But

in any event, for the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees that a deduction (or

double or triple deduction) is warranted for claims on which Plaintiff did not prevail.

(2) Limiting Fees and Costs to Those Claims on Which Plaintiff Succeeded

Although a district court retains discretion to reduce a fee award in mixed-result

cases, such a decision turns on whether the unsuccessful claims “were distinct in all

respects from [the] successful claims.” Emery v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir.

2001) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440). “Claims are related, and hence deserving of

compensation, if they involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal

theories.” Id. In such cases, “[m]uch of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the

litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim

basis,” and district courts should instead “focus on the significance of the overall relief

obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The same standard applies under the PLRA. See C.P.X. v.

Garcia, No. 417CV00417SMRHCA, 2021 WL 302754, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 7, 2021)

(applying same standard to a PLRA attorney fee award), aff’d, No. 21-1206, 2021 WL

5917780 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2021).

Here, the Court is firmly convinced that no reduction is warranted based on the

results obtained. The claims against all Defendants were closely intertwined, as the

incident giving rise to the lawsuit was a single assault by a large group of officers who

were alleged to have either participated personally in the use of force or failed to

intervene with deliberate indifference. And the Court agrees that, even if some officers

were ultimately dismissed by stipulation or found not liable, discovery against all—even

in their capacities as fact witnesses—was necessary in this case. Further, the results

achieved were extraordinary for a case of this type. The Court thus declines to reduce the

fee request based on Plaintiff’s alleged limited success.

(3) Fees and Costs Related to Smith

Likewise, the Court rejects Defendants’ arguments to exclude the fees and costs

associated with Plaintiff’s claims against Smith. Regardless of whether the Missouri AG

was ultimately permitted to withdraw from representing Smith at the eleventh hour, the

work Appointed Counsel performed on discovery and trial preparation regarding Smith

(both in his capacity as a named Defendant and as a fact witness) was closely intertwined

with counsel’s efforts in litigating all of the other claims. There is no question whether

the work related to Smith was directly and reasonably related to proving the violation of

Plaintiff’s rights here. Whether Smith is covered by the Missouri AG’s legal defense

fund or is instead liable out of pocket, jointly and severally with the other Defendants, for

the attorneys’ fees is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of whether the fees requested are

recoverable.

(4) Reduction Based on Limited Success

Finally, the Court rejects Defendants’ duplicative request for an across-the-board

reduction of an additional 37.5% based on Plaintiff’s limited success. As discussed

thoroughly above, no reduction based on mixed results or limited success is warranted in

this case. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a

fully compensatory fee,” and “[i]n these circumstances the fee award should not be

reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the

lawsuit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. “Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal

grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or failure to reach certain

grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what matters.” Id.

Both the quality of representation and the results obtained here were exceptional in

every respect, particularly given the difficult nature of the case, the number of

participants, and the backgrounds of the parties involved. The Court concludes that the

fees, expenses, and costs sought by Appointed Counsel were directly and reasonably

incurred in proving an actual violation of Plaintiff’s rights, and they are sufficiently

proportional to the significant monetary relief Plaintiff obtained. Therefore, the Court

will grant the full fee request, limiting and allocating the amounts as required by the

PLRA and as requested by Appointed Counsel.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Kevin F. Hormuth and the law firm of UB

Greensfelder LLP’s motion to tax costs and attorneys’ fees is GRANTED, and the Court

awards counsel $179,544.90 in attorneys’ fees and $15,040.39 in costs. ECF No. 176.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 25% of the $450,000 judgment obtained by

Plaintiff ($112,500) shall be applied toward the $179,544.90 fee award. Accordingly,

Defendants are responsible for the remaining $67,044.90 in attorneys’ fees and

$15,040.39 in costs, totaling $82,085.29, which shall be taxed and included in the

judgment.

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG =

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 11th day of December, 2025.

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