The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-1238C
(Filed: December 11, 2025)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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KEVIN WILLIAM CASSADAY, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
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OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kevin William Cassaday, proceeding pro se, raises claims relating to
his past litigation in other federal courts. See Compl. (ECF 1). The government moved
to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Mot. (ECF 10).
Plaintiff did not respond. The motion is GRANTED.
This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on
the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort
claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see
also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal
Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Perhaps confusingly for pro se litigants, it
is not a forum for “federal claims” generally. Claims that are outside the Court’s
jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3).
“In determining jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all undisputed facts
asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than those prepared
by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional requirements.”
Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted)
(citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74
Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972))
(explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to a liberal construction of [their]
pleadings”).
The essence of Plaintiff’s claim appears to be that his lawsuits against the
United States have repeatedly been dismissed by federal courts in Michigan. See
Compl. at 11, 13 (ECF pagination). This Court does not have authority to review
decisions of other courts. Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff alleges torts, crimes, and deprivations of civil rights. This Court does
not have authority to hear those types of claims. This Court’s jurisdiction does not
extend to tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d
1195, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1993); cf. Tort, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). United
States district courts, rather, have “exclusive jurisdiction” to determine the liability
of the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674.
This Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to criminal matters. Jones v. United States,
440 F. App’x at 918. “The Court of Federal Claims likewise does not have jurisdiction
to entertain federal civil rights violations[.]” Drake v. United States, 792 F. App’x 916,
920 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of his First Amendment rights.
Compl. at 8, 11. This Court cannot address First Amendment claims. Madison v.
United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 393, 396 (2011); United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882,
887 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 10) is GRANTED. The case is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen S. Schwartz
STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ
Judge
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