United States v. Jerome Brown

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 23-3184

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JEROME BROWN, a/k/a Jerome F Brown,

Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 2:21-cr-00374-001)

District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan

__________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on February 3, 2025

Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and

SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 11, 2025)

Donovan J. Cocas

Laura S. Irwin

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

Western District of Pennsylvania

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellee

Ray Kim

Renee Pietropaolo

OFFICE OF FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Western District of Pennsylvania

1001 Liberty Avenue

1500 Liberty Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellant

_________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

A plea agreement is a negotiated contract between the

Government and a defendant. 1 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure governs criminal pleas and expressly

1

United States v. Cruz, 95 F.4th 106, 110 (3d Cir. 2024)

(citing United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361

(3d Cir. 1989)).

2

forbids judicial participation in plea negotiations. 2 But

improper judicial participation is not enough to vacate a plea.

A defendant must also show that he “would have exercised his

right to go to trial.” 3 Although the District Court improperly

intervened in the parties’ plea negotiations, we will affirm

because Brown cannot show a violation of his substantial

rights.

I.

Jerome Brown was indicted for drug trafficking and

illegally possessing a firearm after law enforcement raided his

car, home, and storage unit as part of a drug-trafficking

investigation near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Police found over

13 kilos of fentanyl, a handgun, and ammunition, as well as

$136,000 in cash. Shortly after his arrest, Brown confessed.

Instead of going to trial, Brown entered into plea negotiations

with the Government.

The parties presented two different stipulated plea

agreements to the District Court. In the first plea agreement,

the parties negotiated the mandatory minimum sentence of 180

months’ imprisonment. But the District Court rejected the

plea, finding the sentence to be inconsistent with the

guidelines 4 and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). So,

Brown withdrew his plea.

2

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in

[plea agreement] discussions.”).

3

United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 612 (2013) (“Davila

I”).

4

Given Brown’s criminal history and the charges, his

Sentencing Guidelines range was 292–365 months

imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of 180 months’

imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(2), 4B1.1(b).

3

The parties went back to the drawing board to negotiate

a second plea agreement. The new agreement proposed a

sentence of 198 months—18 months longer than the original

deal. Instead of simply rejecting the plea as permitted under

Rule 11, 5 the District Court proposed its own “sentence [of] no

greater than 235 months.” 6 Brown postponed his scheduled

change-of-plea and filed a supplemental memorandum to

address the District Court’s continued concerns. But the

District Court remained doubtful and reiterated its proposed

sentence of 235 months.

The Government and Brown proceeded to request a

sentence of 198 months, noting Brown’s early cooperation and

acceptance of responsibility. Ultimately, the District Court

rejected the second plea and presented Brown with three

options: (1) try to renegotiate a third plea agreement; (2) enter

an open guilty plea with the promise of a sentence not less than

235 months; or (3) go to trial. After discussing the options with

his attorney, Brown chose to proceed directly to an open plea

with the understanding of the District Court’s position. 7 His

plea was knowing and voluntary, and he ultimately received a

sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment followed by ten years

of supervised release. This appeal followed.

5

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3), (5).

6

JA 140.

7

JA 180 (“Mr. Brown is prepared to proceed with a change of

plea without a plea agreement today in light of the Court’s, I

guess, preliminary ruling on the plea agreement and proceed

without a plea and just do an open plea to Counts One and

Two of the indictment.”).

4

II. 8

Brown argues that the District Court’s promise of a

sentence of not less than 235 months violated Rule 11(c)(1),

which should result in a vacatur of his plea. To resolve this

issue, we must decide two questions: First, did the District

Court violate Rule 11(c)(1)? If so, can Brown show substantial

prejudice because of the violation? Because he failed to raise

the objection below, we review for plain error. 9

Rule 11’s mandate against judicial participation in plea

negotiations is clear: “The court must not participate in these

discussions.” 10 Such interference raises concerns for coerced

guilty pleas and strips the process of judicial neutrality. The

Supreme Court has recognized that the prohibition was

adopted “out of concern that a defendant might be induced to

8

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231,

and this Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

9

See United States v. Davila, 749 F.3d 982, 993 (11th Cir.

2014) (“Davila II”) (finding that plain-error review applies

when a defendant fails to contemporaneously object to a Rule

(11)(c)(1) violation); see also United States v. Brown, 595

F.3d 498, 519 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To succeed under this standard

of review, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the asserted

violation of Rule 11(c)(1) was error, (2) the error was plain,

and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; if

these three conditions are met, then a court may exercise its

discretion to notice the forfeited error, but only if (4) the error

seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” (internal quotation and citations

omitted)).

10

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added).

5

plead guilty rather than risk displeasing the judge who would

preside at trial.” 11

The District Court unquestionably violated Rule

11(c)(1)’s bright-line rule prohibiting judicial interference.

Here, the violation is straightforward: the court engaged in plea

negotiations and induced Brown to accept a plea of not less

than 235 months. On more than one occasion, the District

Court proposed its own sentence and therefore “took the lead

in orchestrating the plea agreement ultimately entered into by

[Brown] and the government” 12—a point the Government

concedes. 13 But the District Court’s error alone is not enough

to vacate Brown’s plea, 14 as he suggests. Brown must also

show that “but for the [District Court’s] exhortations, [he]

would have exercised his right to go to trial.” 15 He fails to meet

this burden.

Instead, the record demonstrates Brown’s consistent

intent to plead guilty. From the outset, Brown admitted the

drugs belonged to him, reaffirming that admission under oath

at his guilty plea. Before the District Court rejected the second

plea agreement, both parties made it clear that Brown intended

to plead guilty. Brown’s attorney told the District Court, “He

intends to plead guilty today. He intends to, like he did on the

day of his arrest, to accept full responsibility for his actions and

11

Davila I, 569 U.S. at 606.

12

United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir.

2014).

13

See Appellee’s Br. at 23 (“[T]he United States believes that

the court’s Rule 11(c)(1) violation in Brown’s case is

obvious.”).

14

See Davila I, 569 U.S. at 609–10.

15

Davila I, 569 U.S. at 612.

6

he understands the gravity of this offense . . . .” 16 Likewise,

the prosecutor urged the District Court to accept the below-

guideline sentence due to Brown’s “very early” 17 cooperation:

“[W]ithin six months of this all happening, Mr. Brown said,

I’ll plead guilty, I’ll go away with the plea agreement for 15

years.” 18 The parties shared a mutual understanding from the

beginning, one that Brown did not refute: “it was relatively

clear this would be a plea, that Mr. Brown was not really going

to fight this.” 19 Because the record unequivocally

demonstrates that Brown never intended to go to trial, we must

affirm despite the District Court’s violation of Rule 11(c)(1).

III.

Alternatively, Brown also argues that his plea must be

vacated because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. But

we need not address this argument, because our precedent is

clear: Ҥ 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to convicts on

parole or probation” 20 and “[a] convict completing his sentence

on supervised release does not have a Second Amendment

right to possess a firearm.” 21 Because Brown was on probation

at the time of the offense, he does not have a Second

Amendment right to possess a firearm.

16

JA 157.

17

JA 173.

18

JA 174.

19

JA 177.

20

United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2025).

21

United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2024).

7

IV.

The District Court erred by violating Rule 11(c)(1) when

participating in plea negotiations. But the error did not affect

Brown’s substantial rights, so we will affirm.

8