Figuereo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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FREDERICK FIGUEREO

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against-

1:25-CV-00391 (NRM) (JRC)

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD

OF TEAMSTERS, TEAMSTERS

LOCAL UNION NO. 210, and UNITED

AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendants.

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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Frederick Figuereo brings this action under the Railway Labor Act

(“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., against Defendants International Brotherhood of

Teamsters (“IBT”), Teamsters Local Union No. 210 (“Local 210”) (IBT and Local 210

referred to collectively as the “Teamsters Defendants”), and United Airlines, Inc.

(“United”).

In June 2024, Figuereo was terminated from his position as an airline

technician with United Airlines after twenty-five years of employment. He secured

representation of his union to challenge his termination through the grievance

process set forth in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but, three months later, the

union notified Figuereo that it had concluded that his grievance was unlikely to

succeed and that it would not pursue it any further on his behalf.

In this lawsuit, Figuereo alleges Defendants are unlawfully preventing him

from asserting his statutory right under the RLA to arbitrate his grievance on his

own, without union representation. Compl. ¶¶ 29–32, ECF No. 1 (Jan. 22, 2025).

Figuereo seeks (1) a declaration that Section 184 of the RLA affords that right and

(2) an order compelling arbitration before a System Board of Adjustment (“SBA”)

composed of a single neutral arbitrator. Compl. ¶ 1.

Defendants have moved to dismiss Figuereo’s claims, arguing, inter alia, that

there is no individual right to arbitrate a claim without union participation under the

RLA. Teamsters Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Teamsters Mem.”), ECF

No. 28-1 (July 11, 2025); United Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“United

Mem.”), ECF No. 30 (July 11, 2025). Although neither the Supreme Court nor the

Second Circuit has yet to decide whether the RLA confers such a right, this Court

agrees that Defendants’ interpretation of the RLA is likely the correct one.

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are

GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

IBT and United are parties to the current and applicable Airline Technicians’

Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) negotiated pursuant to the RLA.

Compl. ¶ 13. Local 210 is one of IBT’s affiliated local unions. Compl. ¶ 8. Figuereo

was employed by United as an Airline Technician for almost twenty-five years.

Compl. ¶ 4, 15.

The CBA prohibits discipline of an Airline Technician absent just cause.1

Compl. ¶ 13; see also Gleason Decl., Teamsters Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 3 (“IBT/UAL

CBA”), ECF No. 28-2 at 214–15 (setting forth discharge and disciplinary procedure).2

The CBA also contains a System Board procedure prescribing the Board’s composition

and process. IBT/UAL CBA at 214–215.

On April 13, 2024, Figueroa attempted to clock out at the end of his shift using

his iPad, but the attempt failed. Compl. ¶ 18. He informed his supervisor of the

failure, and the supervisor manually entered a 10:30 P.M. clock-out time to correct

the technological failure. Id. ¶ 19. However, after an investigation, United allegedly

discovered that Figuereo exited the parking lot at 9:17 P.M. Id. ¶ 20. After further

investigation, United allegedly found that, on five different occasions, Figuereo

allegedly clocked in before his shift start time and then parked, causing him to be late

for his shift. Id. United terminated Figuereo on June 11, 2024, on the ground that

1 In support of their motions to dismiss, Defendants submit additional

documents, including the CBA, the IBT and Local 210 Constitutions, the signed

grievance form authorizing the union to settle his grievance, and the notice of

withdrawal of representation from Local 210. See Teamsters Mot. to Dismiss Exs. 3–

7, ECF No. 28-2; United Mot. to Dismiss Exs. 2–3, ECF Nos. 30-2, 30-3. On a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider only the complaint, documents attached to

the complaint or those incorporated by reference, matters of which judicial notice may

be taken, and documents relied upon by plaintiff in bringing the suit or which are

otherwise “integral” to the complaint. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d

147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). Here, the Complaint expressly references the CBA, the

grievance form, and the notice of withdrawal; thus, these documents may be

considered integral to the complaint for purposes of these Rule 12(b)(6) motions.

2 Pincites refer to the pagination generated by the Official Court Electronic

Document Filing System (“ECF”).

Figuereo was allegedly “paid for time not worked,” allegedly amounting to timecard

fraud. Id. ¶¶ 17–20.

On June 17, 2024, Teamsters Shop Steward Carlos Rivera filed a grievance on

Figuereo’s behalf, seeking reinstatement and make-whole relief. Id. ¶ 21. The

grievance form provided: “I hereby authorize the Union to settle my grievance as they

deem proper, and I agree to accept and be bound by the settlement agreed to by the

Union or its designees.” Id. ¶ 22; Gleason Decl., Teamsters Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 4

(“Grievance Form”), ECF No. 28-2 at 380.

On September 10, 2024, Local 210 notified Figuereo of its decision to decline to

pursue the grievance. Compl. ¶ 22. According to the notice, the reason for

withdrawal of representation was “[the union’s] attorney’s legal opinion that any

grievance interposed on behalf of [Figuereo] will be denied and unlikely to be

sustained in a board of arbitration.” Gleason Decl., Teamsters Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 5

(“Notice of Union Withdrawal”), ECF No. 28-2 at 382.

On September 30, October 25, and November 12, 2024, Figuereo wrote to

United, invoking the CBA and requesting that United process his grievance to the

SBA so he may represent himself. Compl. ¶¶ 23–25. Figuereo specifically referenced

Article 19.C of the CBA, which establishes the discharge and disciplinary procedure

to be followed by union members and employers. Id.; IBT/UAL CBA at 214–15. In

the November 12 letter, Figuereo stated that, absent a response by November 20,

2024, he would assume United and the Teamsters Defendants were refusing to

arbitrate his termination grievance. Compl. ¶ 31.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 22, 2025, Figuereo filed this lawsuit, asserting that,

notwithstanding any provisions of the CBA to the contrary, the RLA confers a

statutory right to have his termination grievance heard before the SBA without union

support. Compl. ¶ 1. Figuereo requests arbitration before an SBA consisting of a

single neutral arbitrator, “in the interest of justice and basic due process,” alleging

that United and the Teamsters Defendants’ refusal to process the grievance consists

of “overt hostility.” Id. ¶ 32. In his Response Brief, however, Figuereo contends that,

if the Court declines to order a single neutral arbitrator, it may still compel

arbitration under the existing CBA structure in order not to leave Figuereo without

a remedy. Pl. Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs. Mots. to Dismiss (“Pl. Opp’n.”), ECF No.

29 at 13–14.

On July 11, 2025, Defendants filed fully briefed motions to dismiss based on

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) (all Defendants) and lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) (Teamsters Defendants only). See Teamsters Mem.

at 1, 20; United Mem. at 5, 8.

LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim crosses the plausibility threshold when the pleaded

facts permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. Of Educ. Of City School Dist. Of N.Y., 631

F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009)). At this stage,

courts “must construe [a complaint] liberally, accepting all factual allegations therein

as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff[’s] favor.” Sacerdote v.

N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2021).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to Article III standing, the question

is whether the complaint “alleges facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that

the plaintiff has standing to sue.’” Bloomberg Fin. L.P. v. UBS AG, 358 F. Supp. 3d

261, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56–

57 (2d Cir. 2016)). To establish standing, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must

plausibly allege (1) “an injury in fact”; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and

the conduct complained of”; and (3) the likelihood that “the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision.” Carter, 822 F.3d at 55 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). At the pleading stage, the Court must “assess only

whether the allegations are sufficient to establish that [the plaintiff’s] requested

injunctive relief would theoretically redress the alleged denial of [a legal

entitlement].” Soule v. Connecticut Ass’n of Schs., Inc., 90 F.4th 34, 48 (2d Cir. 2023).

Redressability is satisfied when it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that

the [alleged] injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561

(citation omitted). A plaintiff meets that burden when the relief requested would

“eliminate any effects of” the alleged legal violation. Soule, 90 F.4th at 47 (citation

omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Figuereo’s Complaint fails to state a plausible claim

because the RLA grants no individual right to compel arbitration under Section 184.

See Teamsters Mem. at 1; United Mem. at 5. Alternatively, even assuming such a

statutory right exists, Defendants contend that Figuereo ceded any such right by

authorizing the Union to act unilaterally on his behalf, including by signing a form

agreeing that he would “accept and be bound by” any “settlement” of his grievance

that the Union might see fit to enter into on his behalf. Teamsters Mem. at 1; United

Mem. at 5.

The Teamsters Defendants bring the additional claim that Figuereo lacks

Article III standing because his alleged injury is not redressable. Teamsters Mem.

at 1–2, 19–20. In their view, the Court cannot grant the relief Figuereo seeks ––

arbitration before a single neutral arbitrator –– because the Court does not have

authority to create a new SBA inconsistent with the CBA. Id. at 19–20.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that the RLA does not

provide airline employees with a statutory right to compel arbitration before an SBA

without union participation. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are

granted.

I. Figuereo Fails to State a Statutory Right to Individual Arbitration

Figuereo argues that the RLA grants airline employees an individual right to

arbitrate disputes classified as “minor” under the RLA before a board of adjustment

without union participation.3 Pl. Opp’n at 7–11. His claim turns on an unsettled (but

not entirely novel) question of statutory interpretation — one that has been

addressed by several district courts and circuit courts in recent years, although not

by the United States Supreme Court or the Second Circuit.

For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Defendants have the

more logical interpretation of the text of the RLA as applied to airline employees like

Figuereo. Accordingly, because neither the text of the Act nor any binding precedent

supports Figuereo’s claim that airline employees have the right to arbitrate such

disputes when their union representatives decline to pursue them, the Court agrees

with Defendants that no such statutory right exists, and that Figuereo is bound by

the limitations on access to arbitration set forth in the parties’ CBA.

a. The Statutory Framework

Congress enacted the RLA in 1926 with the major purpose of providing for “the

prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances” in the

railroad labor context. Pyzynski v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 421 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir.

1970) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a). The statutory scheme for dispute resolution in the

railroad industry is codified in Title I of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–165. Section 153

3 “The Act contemplates two types of disputes, major and minor, and provides

different procedures for handling each.” Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Bhd. of Locomotive

Eng’rs, 307 F.2d 21, 31 (2d Cir. 1962). Minor disputes arise under an existing

collective agreement and concern “the meaning or proper application” of its terms,

whereas major disputes involve “the formation of collective agreements or efforts to

secure them.” Id. (quoting Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945)

(“Elgin I”), adhered to on reh’g, 327 U.S. 661 (1946)). Plaintiff’s grievance is a minor

dispute because it challenges whether the employer properly applied the CBA’s just-

cause provision. See Compl. ¶ 13.

(First) establishes the National Railroad Adjustment Board (“NRAB”), which

exercises mandatory jurisdiction over minor disputes, though Section 153 (Second)

permits unions and carriers, by agreement, to create special adjustment boards to

resolve minor disputes. Thus, railroad employees and employers may arbitrate

grievances before the NRAB or before a mutually established SBA.

However, none of these Section 153 provisions applies to the airline industry.

Instead, Title II of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181–188, governing air carriers,

incorporates all of Title I except § 153. See § 181 (“All of the provisions of [Title I]

except section 153 . . . are extended to and shall cover every common carrier by

air . . . .” (emphasis added)). Congress bridged that statutory gap by enacting Section

184, which requires carriers and “[their] employees, acting through their

representatives,”4 to establish contractually created SBAs. 45 U.S.C. § 184. Unlike

railroad employees, airline employees thus have no direct statutory access to the

NRAB, and their arbitral rights, and attendant procedural rights, arise solely

through agreement.

Further, Section 184 provides that a System Board’s jurisdiction in the air

carrier context may “not exceed[] the jurisdiction which may be lawfully exercised by

system, group, or regional boards of adjustment, under [Section 153].” 45 U.S.C.

§ 184. The organic interpretation of this provision is that the NRAB’s jurisdiction, as

defined in Section 153, is a ceiling, not a floor: it prevents SBAs created pursuant to

4 A “representative” is defined in the statute as a “any person or persons, labor

union, organization, or corporation designated either by a carrier or group of carriers

or by its or their employees, to act for it or them.” 45 U.S.C. § 151 (Sixth).

Section 184 from exercising greater jurisdiction than NRAB-related tribunals, but it

does not automatically supply to airline workers every procedural right available in

the railroad context.

Section 185 authorizes the National Mediation Board (“NMB”) to establish a

National Air Transport Adjustment Board (“NATAB”) when “necessary to have a

permanent national board of adjustment in order to provide for the prompt and

orderly settlement of disputes between said carriers by air [and] their employees.” 45

U.S.C. § 185. Yet the NMB has never exercised its discretionary authority to create

one. See Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 917 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018)

(“Congress provided for the possibility of a National Air Transport Adjustment Board,

but no such body was ever formed.” (citation omitted)); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v.

U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 609 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2010) (“To date, the NATAB has

not been established.”); Whitaker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 285 F.3d 940, 944 & n.4 (11th

Cir. 2002) (“[T]he National Air Transport Board [] has never been established.”). As

a result, no statutory national tribunal exists for airline employees, whose only

available arbitral forum is a contractually created adjustment board. See Int’l Ass’n

of Machinists v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 686 (1963) (“Until and unless the

[NMB] determined to create a national board, the parties were placed under the

statutory duty of establishing and utilizing system, group, or regional boards of

adjustment for the purpose of adjusting and deciding disputes arising under existing

contracts.”).

b. The Individual Right Recognized in Elgin I Does Not Extend to

Section 184

Figuereo argues that (1) in Elgin I, 325 U.S. at 711, the Supreme Court

recognized an individual right of employees in the railroad industry to pursue

grievances individually, and (2) this right should carry over to the airline context.

See Pl. Opp’n at 7–9. Figuereo contends that the language in Section 184 (“The

disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers by air

growing out of grievances . . . .”) is nearly identical to language in Section 153

(First)(i) (“The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or

carriers growing out of grievances . . . .”), and, since the Supreme Court

in Elgin I interpreted Section 153 (First)(i) to encompass individual employees,

Section 184 must be read the same way. Id.

However, Elgin I did not rely on Section 153 (First)(i) to establish an individual

right to settle grievances. Rather, the Court grounded its holding in Section 152

(Fourth), which preserves an employee’s ability to confer individually with

management, and — most critically — in Section 153 (First)(j), which expressly

affords employees notice and the right to appear “in person, by counsel, or by other

representatives.” 325 U.S. at 734–36 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153 (First)(j)). Although

Section 152 (Fourth) does apply to air carriers, Elgin I expressly cautioned that

“[r]ights of conference are not identical with rights of settlement.” Id. at 735. And

Section 153 (First)(j), the provision at the core of Elgin I’s reasoning, is explicitly not

applicable to airlines; as discussed supra, Congress excluded all of Section 153 from

Title II of the RLA. Because Section 184 contains no comparable language securing

an airline industry employee’s right to notice, appearance, or representation,

extending Elgin I’s reasoning to Section 184 would import statutory protections that

Congress deliberately omitted.

c. Persuasive Authority Is Divided and Does Not Override the

Statutory Text

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has yet addressed the

question of whether Section 184 creates an individual statutory right to arbitrate

grievances absent union participation.5 And the courts outside this Circuit that have

thus far addressed this issue have reached divergent conclusions. Courts recognizing

a right of individual access under the RLA generally emphasize the danger of leaving

employees without a remedy if a union declines to act on their behalf. See, e.g.,

Capraro v. UPS, 993 F.2d 328, 335–36 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a collective

bargaining agreement may not categorically exclude probationary employees from

the grievance process); Stevens v. Teamsters Local 2707, 504 F. Supp. 332, 334 (W.D.

Wash. 1980) (interpreting Section 184 to permit individual arbitration and observing

that, in any event, the applicable CBA in that case contemplated individual

settlement of grievances); Bumpus v. ALPA, 606 F. Supp. 3d 845, 853–55 (N.D. Ill.

2022) (acknowledging circuit split, but interpreting Section 184 to include an

individual right to arbitrate); Wood v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 24-CV-53 (SLG), 2025

5 The Second Circuit has recognized this right as applied to railroad employees

but has not addressed the issue in the airline context. See Schum v. S. Buffalo Ry.

Co., 496 F.2d 328, 329–30 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing implicitly the individual

right to arbitrate for railroad employees under Section 153, which does not apply to

airline employees).

WL 2938685, at *2, *4 (D. Alaska Oct. 16, 2025) (reaffirming its holding in an earlier

decision on a motion to dismiss, in which the court interpreted Elgin I to mean that

the RLA does not require individual interests to be submerged in collective processes).

Courts that have dismissed suits by airline employees seeking individual

access to arbitration have generally held that Section 184 provides no statutory right

to compel arbitration absent union participation, although some have rejected the

employees’ claims on other grounds. See Mitchell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 481

F.3d 225, 233–34 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that employee lacked standing to compel

arbitration absent a viable claim for breach of duty of fair representation); Whitaker

v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 285 F.3d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 2002) (declining to extend Elgin I

to Section 184 but deciding the case on other grounds); Scheffler v. IAM, 768 F. Supp.

3d 193, 194–5 (D. Mass. 2025) (holding that “there is no individual right to compel

arbitration absent union participation under [Section 184]”).

The Court has considered the out-of-circuit cases on which Figuereo relies but

ultimately reaches a different conclusion. While there are certainly plausible

arguments to be made on both sides, this Court is persuaded that interpreting the

RLA to confer an individual right to arbitrate upon airline industry employees would

take Elgin I beyond its statutory foundations in Sections 152 (Fourth) and 153

(First)(j). It is true that the Supreme Court in Elgin I stated that a collective

agreement cannot “deprive the employees of their individual rights.” 325 U.S. at 744.

But that statement presupposes the existence of a statutory individual right that the

collective agreement could not displace. While the Supreme Court recognized such a

right under Title I for railroad employees, its reliance on § 153 — language Congress

expressly removed from the air carrier framework — renders that reasoning

inapplicable to Title II. In other words, Congress appears to have made a deliberate

choice to omit Section 153 from Title II, precluding this Court from extrapolating such

rights into Section 184 where Congress has opted to exclude them.

d. Remedy

Figuereo argues that compelling arbitration is “necessary to preserve the

jurisdiction of the grievance process.” Compl. ¶ 34 (quoting BNSF Ry. Co. v. SMART-

TD, 973 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2020)). However, under Section 184, system boards

established by agreement between employees and carriers have jurisdiction “not

exceeding the jurisdiction” of Section 153. 45 U.S.C. § 184. The jurisdiction Figuereo

seeks to “preserve” –– over claims brought by individuals without union participation

–– falls outside the authority Section 184 confers on SBAs.

Thus, because the RLA confers no statutory individual right to arbitrate

Figuereo’s grievance, any right he seeks to enforce must arise from the CBA. The

CBA, however, similarly provides no individual right to pursue employees’ grievances

and instead appears to give the Union exclusive authority to take a grievance to

arbitration. See IBT/UAL CBA art. 19.C(3) (“If the decision of the Company’s

representative is not acceptable to the Union, the decision may be appealed by the

Union to the [SBA.]” (emphasis added)); id. art. 19.C(5) (“In the event the Union

appeals the disciplinary action to arbitration the Company and the Union shall

attempt to agree on a mutually acceptable impartial arbitrator.” (emphasis added));

id. art. 19.D(1) (“The [SBA] shall be composed of two (2) members designated by the

Company and two (2) members designated by the Union.” (emphasis added)). These

provisions reflect a bargained-for allocation of authority, and nothing in the

Complaint alleges that the CBA was negotiated unlawfully, nor that the Teamsters

Defendants exercised their authority in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.

Here, Defendants did not deny Figuereo any right that Congress conferred

upon him and his fellow airline employees when enacting the relevant provisions of

the RLA. They complied with the Act’s requirement to establish an SBA by

agreement, and no party disputes that such a Board exists under the relevant CBA.

To the extent Figuereo’s argument reflects dissatisfaction with the Union’s

decision to withdraw representation, his remedy is to bring a claim asserting a breach

of the duty of fair representation (“DFR”). The Supreme Court has expressly

recognized that “an order compelling arbitration should be viewed as one of the

available remedies when a breach of the union’s duty is proved.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386

U.S. 171, 196 (1967).6

The Second Circuit has found that DFR claims have become “broadly

applicable to . . . the settlement of grievances” since the Elgin decisions. Ollman v.

Special Bd. of Adjustment No. 1063, 527 F.3d 239, 249 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting

Pyzynski, 421 F.2d at 862). The Ollman Court specifically recognized that a DFR

6 Although Vaca arose under the Labor Management Relations Act, its

reasoning is widely cited in RLA cases. See, e.g., Bryan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 988 F.3d

68, 76 (1st Cir. 2021); Martin v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 390 F.3d 601, 608–09 (8th Cir.

2004); Capraro, 993 F.2d at 336.

claim “‘provides a more effective means of protecting the employee against arbitrary

abuses of settlement procedures’ than assuming that an individual employee can act

on her own to settle her grievance and then vacating an award when that assumption

proves flawed.” Id. (quoting Pyzynski, 421 F.2d at 862). The Court’s decision today

does not leave individuals like Figuereo without a remedy, as some courts have

asserted. Plaintiffs who allege, as Figuereo does, that a bargaining representative

has acted with “overt hostility,” Compl. ¶ 32, or other forms of alleged arbitrary,

discriminatory or bad faith conduct may pursue a DFR claim to vindicate their rights.

Here, however, Figuereo brings no DFR claim. He proceeds solely on the

theory that he possesses an independent statutory right to arbitrate under the RLA.

Because, as discussed supra, no such right exists under the RLA provisions applicable

to air carriers, his claim cannot proceed.

II. Waiver

In the alternative, Defendants argue that, even assuming arguendo that the

RLA provided airline employees with a statutory right to arbitrate their grievances,

Figuereo waived that right here. They argue that he did so when he specifically

delegated authority to the Union by signing a grievance form giving the Union full

authority to “settle” the claim on his behalf, as well as through provisions in the IBT

and Local 210 Constitutions which give the Union exclusive discretion over the

prosecution of their members’ grievances. Teamsters Mem. at 17–19; United Mem.

at 14–15.7 Figuereo argues that neither the form he signed in connection with this

particular grievance, nor the constitutions of the unions to which he belongs,

constituted a waiver of his right to pursue his own grievances to arbitration. Pl.

Opp’n at 10–11. He argues that individual rights are statutory and cannot be “lightly

abrogated.” Id. at 11 (quoting Stevens, 504 F. Supp. at 335).

Because the Court concludes that no statutory right to arbitrate an individual

grievance exists under Section 184, it need not and does not reach Defendants’ waiver

arguments here.8

CONCLUSION

Congress anticipated that circumstances might arise in which it would become

“necessary to have a permanent national board of adjustment in order to provide for

the prompt and orderly settlement of disputes” in the air-carrier industry. 45 U.S.C.

§ 185. Whether the current statutory framework continues to serve that purpose is

a question for Congress or the National Mediation Board. Under existing law,

7 As discussed supra, the Court may only consider documents outside the

complaint if they are incorporated by reference, or regarding matters of which judicial

notice may be taken, or relied upon by plaintiff, or which are otherwise “integral” to

the complaint. See Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153. The IBT and Local 210 Constitutions

are neither referenced nor relied upon, and the Court does not deem them necessary

to resolve the claims. Accordingly, the Court treats those Constitutions as “outside

the pleadings” and proceeds without considering them. See id.

8 For the same reason, the Court need not and does not reach the Teamsters

Defendants’ argument that Figuereo cannot satisfy the redressability requirement of

Article III standing because the relief he seeks –– arbitration before a “single neutral

arbitrator,” Compl. at ¶ 1 –– is unavailable to him, since the SBA created by the

carrier and Union in the CBA is a four-member Board. See Teamsters Mem. at 2, 19.

however, this Court lacks authority to create an arbitration process — and an

individual union member’s right to access it — that the statute does not provide or

require.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Railway Labor Act does not

grant airline employees a statutory right to compel arbitration before a System Board

of Adjustment without union participation. Because Section 184 provides no such

right, because the CBA does not supply one, and because Figuereo does not allege

that his union breached its duty of fair representation, the Complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are therefore GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: December 10, 2025

Brooklyn, New York