McCarty

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

BRIANNA MCCARTY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 22-cv-05751

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

VILLAGE OF LAKEMORE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Brianna McCarty (“McCarty”) sued her former employer, the Village of

Lakemoor (“the Village”), alleging that the Village discriminated against her and

created a hostile work environment in violation of the American with Disabilities Act

(the “ADA”), Title VII, and the Illinois Human Rights Act (the “IHRA”). On

September 23, 2024, the Court granted the Village’s motion for summary judgment

on all counts [89]. McCarty filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court denied

on May 14, 2025 [105]. Subsequently, the Village filed a motion for sanctions, [108],

and McCarty appealed the Court’s order denying McCarty’s motion for

reconsideration. [106]. The Court of Appeals suspended appellate briefing pending

this Court’s resolution of the Village’s motion for sanctions. For the following reasons,

the Village’s motion for sanctions [108] is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires attorneys presenting a pleading or

other paper to the court to certify, among other requirements: (1) the pleading or

other paper is not being provided to unnecessarily delay or needlessly increase the

cost of litigation; (2) the claims are supported by existing law or a nonfrivolous

argument for modifying the law; and (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary

support.” Mazurek v. Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc., 110 F.4th 938, 942 (7th Cir. 2024)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). Rule 11 sanctions are designed to deter baseless filings.

Pac. Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Barosh, 22 F.3d 113, 118 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 11 is an

objective standard with its continuing duty at all stages. See Brown v. Nat’l Bd. of

Med. Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 171–72 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The standard for imposing

sanctions under Rule 11 is . . . an objective question of ‘reasonableness under the

circumstances,” and “[u]nder Rule 11 an attorney risks sanctions for failing to make

a reasonable inquiry into both the factual and legal basis for the claim he asserts.”)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P 11 advisory committee note)).

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of the case and recounts only those

facts relevant to resolving the Village’s motion for sanctions.

In 2018, McCarty, then a police officer with the Village, was involved in a shooting.

[70] ¶ 5. Thereafter, she was placed on administrative leave and was diagnosed with

acute stress reaction. [70] ¶ 9. By October of 2018, she was placed on light duty,

which she worked intermittently until she was terminated in August 2019. [62] ¶ 55.

At that time, she could not perform the normal duties of a police officer, but she

maintained that she could perform the responsibilities of her light duty job. [62] ¶ 53.

On April 15, 2019, McCarty submitted a duty disability application to the

Lakemore Police Pension fund. [70] ¶ 52. A hearing on her application was held on

March 17, 2021 (the “Penson Hearing”). [15]. During the hearing, her attorney argued

that she would “never be able to return to work” because of an incident that occurred

in 2018. [62] ¶ 60. McCarty also testified during the Pension Hearing that she had no

issues working on light duty before being terminated. See, e.g., [15] at 108. McCarty

was awarded full duty disability benefits and accepted those benefits on August 4,

2021, [62] ¶ 60.

On October 19, 2022, McCarty filed her first complaint in this action. [1]. She

alleged that she was a qualified individual under the ADA and was able to perform

her job as a police officer with the Village “with and/or without a reasonable

accommodation.” [1] ¶ 7.

On January 9, 2023, counsel for the Village sent counsel for McCarty a Rule 11

safe harbor letter. [11] at 9. The Village wrote to tell McCarty’s counsel that it would

move for sanctions because McCarty’s position in the Pension Hearing was factually

incompatible with McCarty’s position in this action. To wit, the Village argued that

it could not both be true that (1) McCarty would “never be able to work” as she argued

at the Pension Hearing and also that (2) she could work with or without reasonable

accommodation as she alleged in her complaint. Ten days later, McCarty filed an

amended complaint, which omitted the allegation that she could work without any

accommodations and alleged only that she could work with reasonable

accommodations. [13] ¶ 9. In subsequent filings, McCarty explained that her

allegation in the original complaint that she could work without reasonable

accommodations was a clerical error. [20] at 3.

On February 16, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss [14] and a motion for

sanctions [15]. The Court granted in part and dismissed in part the motion to dismiss

and denied without prejudice the motion for sanctions. Although the Court found the

apparent factual inconsistency to be “unusual, even troubling,” [31] at 7, the Court in

its discretion declined to award sanctions based on the then-available evidence.

In its summary judgment briefing, the Village argued that it should be awarded

judgment on McCarty’s ADA claim because, among other reasons, McCarty was

judicially estopped from pursuing her ADA claim in light of her representations in

the Pension Hearing. [63] at 11-12. The Court awarded the Village judgment on the

ADA claim, but it did so on the basis that McCarty was not a qualified individual

under the ADA and that she refused reasonable accommodations; the Court did not

reach McCarty’s judicial estoppel argument. [89] at 16 n.7

In the sanctions motion now before the Court, the Village argues that McCarty

should be sanctioned primarily because she should have known her ADA claim was

frivolous from the start given that she took an inconsistent position during the

Pension Hearing. [108] at 8. The Village also argues that McCarty’s Title VII and

IHRA claims were frivolous because the evidence on summary judgment showed that

she could not satisfy the elements of either claim. Id.

ANALYSIS

In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., the Supreme Court considered

the circumstances in which a plaintiff is barred from bringing an ADA claim based

on representations they made to obtain Social Security disability1 benefits. 526 U.S.

795 (1999). Cleveland explains that “a person who applied for disability benefits must

live with the factual representations made to obtain them, and if these show [an]

inability to do the job then an ADA claim may be rejected without further inquiry.”

Opsteen v. Keller Structures, Inc., 408 F.3d 390, 392 (citing Cleveland, 527 U.S. 795).

McCarty’s testimony in the Pension Hearing undoubtedly demonstrate an inability

to do the job as it existed at the time of hearing. But she also testified that she was

only unable to do the job after the Village eliminated the light duty role that she had

worked in between the time of the shooting in 2018 and her termination in August

2019. See, e.g., [15] at 88. In this action, McCarty argued that the Village violated the

ADA by eliminating that light duty role. See [71] at 8, 10. It is not factually

inconsistent to claim in the Pension Hearing that (1) given the elimination of the light

duty role, she could not work as a police officer and (2) later argue in federal court

the Village violated the ADA by firing her after eliminating the light duty role. This

Court determined that McCarty was ultimately wrong on the law—the ADA imposes

no obligation on the Village to create a permanent light duty role, see Gratzl v. Office

of Chief Judges, 601 F.3d 674, 680 (7th Cir. 2010)—but that does not make it frivolous

for her to have made the argument. See Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria,

1 Although Cleveland deals with Social Security disability benefits, the Seventh Circuit has applied its

analysis to statements made before a local pension board. Butler v. Vill. of Round Lake Police Dep't,

585 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2009).

388 F.3d 990, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The fact that the underlying claim turned out to

be groundless does not necessarily mean that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate

(much less required).”).

The same goes for McCarty’s other claims. For example, the Village argues that it

was frivolous for McCarty to bring a Title VII claim because she did not identify any

similarly situated officers who were treated more favorably. [108] at 8. But McCarty

did identify certain officers who were allowed to stay on light duty longer than

McCarty was. The Court ultimately agreed with the Village that there were relevant

differences with respect to each of those officers such that McCarty could not rely on

them to withstand summary judgment. [89] at 20. But the differences were not so

obvious that McCarty should be sanctioned for attempting to make the argument.

The Village makes much of these kinds of failures in McCarty’s attempt to oppose

summary judgment. See generally [108]. The Village is right insofar as McCarty did

fall short; McCarty’s inability to adequately defend her claims is why the Court

awarded the Village summary judgment on all counts. But the Court does not believe

McCarty’s shortcomings were so obvious as to warrant sanctions.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, the Village’s motion for sanctions [108] is denied.

ENTER:

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Dated: December 10, 2025 Mug Ve bt L/

MARY M. ROWLAND

United States District Judge