The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM KELLY, UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 2025
Plaintiff-Appellant, 10:32 AM
v No. 374244
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
GRAPHIC PACKAGING INTERNATIONAL LLC, LC No. 2024-000475-CD
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and REDFORD and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this employment action, plaintiff-appellant, William Kelly, appeals as of right the trial
court order granting defendant-appellee’s, Graphic Packaging International LLC’s, motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (res judicata and collateral estoppel), (8)
(failure to state a claim), and (10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We affirm.
I. FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Prior to this case being submitted in the trial court, it was substantially litigated in the
federal court. In June 2020, plaintiff filed an intake questionnaire with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding these matters, and in September 2021, plaintiff filed
a lawsuit against defendant in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan.
Plaintiff alleged 14 counts of employment claims, most pertinently including claims of disability
discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate under the Persons with Disabilities Civil
Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 USC 12101 et seq. Plaintiff made a plethora of complaints regarding his employment with
defendant, spanning from his year of hire, in 2014, through the date of the complaint. Most
pertinently were his complaints regarding personal injuries that caused him to take prolonged
leaves of absences from work, and his allegations that he was discriminated against in his attempts
to return to work.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, which Federal District Court Judge Jane
Beckering granted as to 13 of the claims. The only claim that survived—plaintiff’s ADA
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disability-retaliation claim—proceeded to a bench trial, but the federal court ultimately issued an
opinion and judgment in favor of defendant.
About two weeks after the federal court issued its judgment, plaintiff attempted to be
reinstated. Defendant advised plaintiff that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) required
that his employment be terminated.
II. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
In July 2024, plaintiff filed his trial-court complaint in this matter, alleging claims under
the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.369 et seq.; PWDCRA; and common law
wrongful discharge. Plaintiff’s claims were predicated on allegations of discrimination,
retaliation, and failure to accommodate.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), which
the trial court granted, finding that: (1) res judicata and collateral estoppel barred plaintiff’s claims,
(2) plaintiff failed to state a claim, and (3) there was no genuine issue of material fact. The trial
court explained that plaintiff filed his complaint “with the same similar cause of action and factual
allegations that were part of the prior Federal Court lawsuit,” and his complaint asserted several
allegations that directly contradicted the federal court’s factual findings. Plaintiff now appeals.
III. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in
defendant’s favor. We disagree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the parties raised their appellate issues before the trial court, they are preserved
for our review. See George v Allstate Ins Co, 329 Mich App 448, 453; 942 NW2d 628 (2019).
“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition,
reviewing the record in the same manner as must the trial court to determine whether the movant
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bronson Methodist Hosp v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 295
Mich App 431, 440; 814 NW2d 670 (2012). Our review is limited to the evidence that had been
presented to the trial court at the time the motion was decided. Innovative Adult Foster Care, Inc
v Ragin, 285 Mich App 466, 475-476; 776 NW2d 398 (2009). “To the extent this matter presents
questions concerning the proper interpretation of contractual or statutory language, our review is
also de novo.” Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 275 Mich App 527, 529; 740 NW2d 503
(2007).
“MCR 2.116(C)(7) tests whether a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law.”
Zezula v Brown, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 368261); slip op at
2 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The moving party may support its motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence, the substance of which would be admissible at trial. The contents of the
complaint are accepted as true unless contradicted by the evidence provided.” Id. at ___; slip op
at 2-3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Questions regarding the application of legal
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doctrines, including res judicata and collateral estoppel, are subject to de novo review. Farmers
Ins Exch v Hudson Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369452);
slip op at 8.
“A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint; a court
considers only the pleadings when deciding a motion brought under this section.” Zezula, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When reviewing a motion
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted
as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be granted only where the claims alleged are
so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possible justify
recovery.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that the trial court may grant summary disposition in favor of
the moving party when, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.”
“In reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we review the evidence submitted by
the parties in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there is a genuine
issue regarding any material fact.” Cuddington v United Health Servs, Inc, 298 Mich App 264,
270; 826 NW2d 519 (2012). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open
an issue on which reasonable minds could differ.” Id. at 270-271 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A trial court may not assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes,
and when material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate for the court to grant the motion for
summary disposition.” Cetera v Mileto, 342 Mich App 441, 448; 995 NW2d 838 (2022).
B. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
“Collateral estoppel addresses the preclusion of specific issues within an action.” Id.
at ___; slip op at 9 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The doctrine of collateral estoppel is
designed to avoid relitigation of claims, and to prevent vexation, confusion, chaos and the
inefficient use of judicial resources.” Id. at ___; slip op at 10 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Unlike res judicata, which precludes relitigation of claims, collateral estoppel prevents
relitigation of issues, which presumes the existence of an issue in the second proceeding that was
present in the first proceeding.” Id. Collateral estoppel can generally be invoked when the
following three elements are met: “(1) a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the same parties must have had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there must be mutuality of estoppel.”
Hamood v Trinity Health Corp, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 364627); slip op at 5 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
“The first prong of the collateral estoppel analysis requires that the ultimate issue to be
determined in the subsequent action must be the same as the ultimate issue litigated in the first
action.” Farmers Ins Exch, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10. “The ultimate issues in common
must be identical, and not merely similar, and must have been both actually and necessarily
litigated.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A judgment is considered a determination
on the merits, and thereby triggers the doctrine of collateral estoppel on relitigation, even if the
action has been resolved by a summary disposition.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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“In determining whether a party was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, a
subsequent action is not precluded if the issue is one of law and . . . the two actions involve claims
that are substantially unrelated.” Hamood, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5 (quotation marks,
citation, and alterations omitted). “Mutuality of estoppel requires that in order for a party to estop
an adversary from relitigating an issue that party must have been a party, or in privy to a party, in
the previous action.” Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 684; 677 NW2d 843 (2004)
(quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). In other words, “collateral estoppel precludes
relitigation and imposes a state of finality to litigation where the same parties have previously had
a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate their claims.” Id. at 687 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).1
In this case, plaintiff alleged claims under the PWDCRA, the WPA, and common law
wrongful discharge. But for the reasons that will be discussed next, collateral estoppel bars the
relitigation of whether: (1) plaintiff has a disability recognized under the PWDCRA, (2) plaintiff
is subject to the CBA, and (3) the CBA allows for a two year leave of absence before termination
ensues. As a result, no genuine issue of material fact remains, and plaintiff cannot establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under the PWDCRA, the WPA, or common law.
1. PWDCRA CLAIMS
In the trial court, plaintiff raised the following three claims under the PWDCRA: (1)
disability discrimination, (2) interference and retaliation, and (3) failure to accommodate. All three
of these claims were also raised by plaintiff in the federal court. The only difference was that in
the trial court, plaintiff raised the “additional fact” of his termination as a basis for these claims.
The federal court dismissed all three claims in a summary disposition judgment, importantly
finding that plaintiff failed to establish that he had a disability as defined under the PWDCRA.
“The PWDCRA was enacted with the purpose of ensuring that all persons be accorded
equal opportunities to obtain employment, housing, and the utilization of public accommodations,
services, and facilities.” Chiles v Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 464, 473; 606 NW2d 398
(1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he PWDCRA provides that an employer shall
not discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of a disability that is unrelated to the
individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accordingly, “[b]efore a court can address a plaintiff’s ability to perform his
job, any alleged discrimination and certainly any pretext for the ‘discrimination,’ the plaintiff must
establish that he is the type of person to which the statute was meant to pertain—a person with a
‘disability.’ ” Id.
In this case, the federal court has already found that plaintiff does not have a disability
recognized under the PWDCRA, and plaintiff does not argue that he has developed any new
disability. Because plaintiff has already had the opportunity to argue whether he has a disability
1
We acknowledge that “mutuality of estoppel is not mandatory in every situation.” Hamood, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 5 (quotation marks omitted). But that additional analysis is
unnecessary in this case because the exact same parties were involved in the prior federal case.
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recognized under the PWDCRA, and because the federal court ultimately determined that he did
not, the first two elements of collateral estoppel are met regarding this issue. See Hamood, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. And because the same exact parties were involved in the federal
case, the third element of collateral estoppel—mutual estoppel—is necessarily met in this case.
See Monat, 469 Mich at 684. Therefore, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating this
issue, and his trial-court PWDCRA claims fail as a matter of law. See Chiles, 238 Mich App at
473. As plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim under the PWDCRA, the “additional fact”
of his termination is immaterial. See id. Accordingly, because there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition on plaintiff’s PWDCRA claims.
See MCR 2.116(C)(10); Cuddington, 298 Mich App at 270.
2. THE FEDERAL COURT’S FINDINGS REGARDING THE CBA
Plaintiff’s WPA and wrongful-discharge claims are predicated on the allegation that
plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for reporting workplace safety concerns, filing an EEOC
complaint, and testifying in a federal court proceeding. To the extent that these claims analyze the
CBA and its applicability to plaintiff, the parties have already had an opportunity to address that
question before the federal court, and the federal court decided that: (1) “[t]he terms and conditions
of employment for bargaining unit employees at Defendant’s Mill facility are set forth in [the
CBA]”; (2) “[p]ursuant to the CBA, Defendant may grant a leave of absence for up to two years
(24 months) if the employee was injured outside of work”; 2 (3) “[i]f the employee is unable to
return to work within two years without being able to perform the essential functions of the job or
without a reasonable accommodation, the employee’s seniority and employment will terminate”;
(4) “[p]laintiff has not sought or received any change in his medical restrictions since [his second
leave extension in] September 2019”; and (5) “[a]t no time following the second leave extension
did Plaintiff ever report that his medical situation has changed.”
Because plaintiff has already had the opportunity to argue the terms of the CBA and
whether it applies to his employment, and because the federal court outlined the relevant CBA
terms and determined that the CBA applied to plaintiff, the first two elements of collateral estoppel
are met regarding this issue. See Hamood, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. And because the
same exact parties were involved in the federal case, the third element of collateral estoppel—
mutual estoppel—is necessarily met in this case. See Monat, 469 Mich at 684. Accordingly,
plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue. See id. Taking that fact into account,
plaintiff’s WPA and wrongful-discharge claims fail as a matter of law.
a. WPA CLAIM
The WPA prohibits an employer from discharging, threatening, or otherwise
discriminating against an employee who reports a violation of a federal or state statute or regulation
to a public body. MCL 15.362. To establish a prima facie violation of the WPA, “a plaintiff must
show that (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff
2
Notably, the CBA has been updated, reducing the previous two-year medical leave of absence
provision to eighteen months. Regardless, under either version of the CBA, plaintiff’s period of
absence well exceeded the cap.
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was discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected
activity and the discharge or adverse employment action.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich
177, 183-184; 665 NW2d 468 (2003) (citation omitted). “ ‘Protected activity’ under the WPA
consists of (1) reporting to a public body a violation of a law, regulation, or rule; (2) being about
to report such a violation to a public body; or (3) being asked by a public body to participate in an
investigation.” Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).
“Summary disposition for the defendant is appropriate when a plaintiff cannot factually
demonstrate a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
West, 469 Mich at 184. To prevail, a plaintiff must show that his employer took an adverse
employment action because of plaintiff’s protected activity, not merely that his employer
disciplined him after the protected activity occurred. Id. at 185. “Something more than a temporal
connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show
causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.” Id. at 186.
In this case, plaintiff has failed to establish that his termination occurred because of his
EEOC complaint or federal court testimony. Instead, plaintiff has merely shown that he was
terminated after the protected activity occurred. See id. at 185. As the federal court explained,
the CBA: (1) applied to plaintiff as a bargaining unit employee at defendant’s facility; (2) allowed
defendant to grant a leave of absence for up to two years if an employee was injured outside of
work; and (3) explained that “[i]f the employee is unable to return to work within two years without
being able to perform the essential functions of the job or without a reasonable accommodation,
the employee’s seniority and employment will terminate.” The federal court further explained that
plaintiff’s most recent term of absence began in September 2019, and since then, plaintiff had not
reported that his medical condition had changed. Considering that plaintiff’s leave of absence
began in September 2019, and plaintiff did not seek reinstatement with the submission of a new
return-to-work physical until April 2024, plaintiff had well exceeded the two year leave of absence
allowed under the CBA before he was terminated. Additionally, when defendant terminated
plaintiff, plaintiff was advised that the CBA required that his employment be terminated because
the last medical documentation that defendant had received from plaintiff was in September 2019.
Accordingly, defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment on the basis of an intervening
legitimate reason, and plaintiff’s WPA claim fails as a matter of law. Because there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition on plaintiff’s
WPA claim. See MCR 2.116(C)(10); Cuddington, 298 Mich App at 270.
b. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM
“In general, in the absence of a contractual basis for holding otherwise, either party to an
employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any, or no, reason.”
Suchodolski v Mich Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982). But “an
exception has been recognized to that rule, based on the principle that some grounds for
discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable.” Id at 695. “Most
often these proscriptions are found in explicit legislative statements prohibiting the discharge,
discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or
duty.” Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that “[t]erminating an employee for participating in a civil
rights trial or requesting accommodations violates clearly established public policies.” But as
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previously stated, the federal court has already determined that: (1) the CBA applies to plaintiff,
(2) the CBA allows for a two year leave of absence before termination ensues, and (3) plaintiff’s
leave of absence began in 2019. And because plaintiff did not seek reinstatement until 2024—
long after his allowed two-year leave of absence expired under the CBA—there is no genuine issue
of material fact that plaintiff’s employment was terminable on the basis of an intervening
legitimate reason, and plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim fails as a matter of law. Because there
is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition on
plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim. See MCR 2.116(C)(10); Cuddington, 298 Mich App at 270.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in defendant’s favor. Because
the federal court has already found that: (1) plaintiff does not have a disability recognized under
the PWDCRA, (2) plaintiff is subject to the CBA, and (3) the CBA allows for a two year leave of
absence before termination ensues, collateral estoppel bars those issues. Accordingly, no genuine
issue of material fact remains, and plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim of discrimination
under the PWDCRA, WPA, or common law.
Affirmed. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
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