Gary Wygant v. Bill Lee, Governor

12/10/2025

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

October 3, 2024 Session

GARY WYGANT, ET AL. v. BILL LEE, GOVERNOR, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 22-0287-IV

Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor; J. Michael Sharp, Judge; and

Steven W. Maroney, Chancellor

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No. M2023-01686-SC-R3-CV

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In this case, two Tennessee voters challenge the state House and Senate redistricting maps

the General Assembly passed after the 2020 census. Gary Wygant, a Gibson County voter,

alleges that the House redistricting map violates Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee

Constitution because it splits more counties than needed to comply with federal law.

Francie Hunt, a Davidson County voter, alleges that the Senate redistricting map violates

Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution because it fails to consecutively number

one of the four Senate districts in Davidson County. We hold that Wygant has standing to

challenge only the split of Gibson County, not the entire House map. But his challenge fails

on the merits: Wygant did not prove—as he must to establish a violation of Article II,

Section 5—that the split was unnecessary to comply with federal law and lacked a rational

or legitimate basis. We further hold that Hunt lacks standing to challenge the Senate map

because she did not suffer an injury in fact from the misnumbering of Davidson County’s

Senate districts. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment rejecting Wygant’s district-

specific challenge on the merits, reverse the judgment concluding that Hunt has standing,

and vacate the judgment holding the Senate map unconstitutional.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal by Right; Judgment of the Three-Judge Panel Affirmed

in Part, Reversed in Part, and Vacated in Part;

Case Remanded to the Chancery Court for Davidson County

SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS,

C.J., and MARY L. WAGNER, J., joined. HOLLY KIRBY, J., filed a separate opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part. DWIGHT E. TARWATER, J., filed a separate opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

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Scott P. Tift, David W. Garrison, and John Spragens, Nashville, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Gary Wygant.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General;

Philip Hammersley, Assistant Solicitor General; Pablo Adrian Varela, Assistant Attorney

General; Jacob R. Swatley, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Bill Lee, Governor of

the State of Tennessee, Tre Hargett, Tennessee Secretary of State, and Mark Goins,

Coordinator of Elections.

Scott P. Tift, David W. Garrison, and John Spragens, Nashville, Tennessee, for the

appellee, Francie Hunt.

OPINION

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Each decade—after the Census Bureau releases new population data—the General

Assembly is required to redraw the State’s legislative maps. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 4. The

redistricting process is subject to a complex web of federal and state laws that occasionally

conflict.1 As a result, the legislature must engage in a “delicate balancing of competing

considerations.” Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 187 (2017).

One of the federal requirements the legislature must satisfy is the federal Equal

Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote principle. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568

(1964). In Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Equal Protection

Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in

both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” Id. at 577.

Mathematical perfection is not required, but maps that deviate from the ideal district size

by more than 10% are prima facie unconstitutional. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146,

161 (1993) (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983)). Yet there is no

“safe harbor” for maps with a maximum deviation below 10%. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S.

947, 949 (2004). Maps may depart from a “strict population standard” only “based on

legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy,” such as

“maintain[ing] the integrity of various political subdivisions” and “provid[ing] for compact

districts of contiguous territory.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578–79.

1

We use “redistricting” and “reapportionment” interchangeably throughout this opinion. See

Reapportionment, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining both “reapportionment” and

“redistricting” as “[r]ealignment of a legislative district’s boundaries to reflect changes in population and

ensure proportionate representation by elected officials”).

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The Court acknowledged in Reynolds that the one-person, one-vote requirement

would conflict with certain state constitutional requirements. Id. at 584. In the event of a

conflict, the Court explained, “the [federal] Supremacy Clause of course controls.” Id. But

the Court made clear that any relief granted in apportionment cases should

“accommodate . . . the apportionment provisions of state constitutions insofar as is

possible.” Id. (emphasis added).

Other federal laws further constrain the redistricting process. Enacted to enforce the

Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the federal Voting Rights Act of

1965 (“VRA”) prohibits States from diluting the voting strength of members of a protected

class. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314; see also, e.g., Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 17–18

(2023). Voters have successfully challenged reapportionment statutes under the VRA after

state legislatures eliminated or failed to create majority-minority districts. See Allen, 599

U.S. at 18–19; Rural W. Tenn. Afr.-Am. Affs. Council v. Sundquist, 209 F.3d 835, 837 (6th

Cir. 2000). And while States must be conscious of race when redistricting to avoid

transgressing the VRA, race may not be “the predominant factor” in drawing a district

absent “a compelling reason.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 31 (quoting Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S.

285, 291 (2017)). When race is the predominant factor, States may face racial

gerrymandering suits under the Equal Protection Clause. See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291

(“The Equal Protection Clause . . . limits racial gerrymanders in legislative districting

plans.”).2 As Justice Thomas has explained, federal redistricting precedents put States in a

legally precarious situation by requiring them to “consider race just enough in drawing

districts.” Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 65–66 (2024) (Thomas, J.,

concurring in part).

In this case, both parties agree that the federal equal population requirement

prevents strict compliance with Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution, which

prohibits the legislature from splitting counties when drawing districts for the Tennessee

House of Representatives. Section 5 provides that “[i]n a district composed of two or more

counties, each county shall adjoin at least one other county of such district; and no county

shall be divided in forming such a district.” Tenn. Const. art. II, § 5. The provision was

adopted in 1966, following a limited constitutional convention. Proclamation of Frank G.

Clement, Governor (Dec. 2, 1966) in Journal and Proceedings of the Limited

Constitutional Convention of Tennessee 1066, 1068 (1966). A similar provision governs

Senate districts. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 6. The Senate county-splitting provision has existed

in some form since Tennessee’s founding. Tenn. Const. of 1796, art. I, § 4.

2

In Louisiana v. Callais, the United States Supreme Court will consider whether a State violates

the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally creating a majority-minority district to remedy a violation of

the VRA. See --- S. Ct. ---, No. 24-09, 2025 WL 2180226 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2025) (ordering supplemental

briefing on that question).

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Our Court first discussed the conflict between the federal Constitution and the state

county-splitting provisions in a series of lawsuits brought by voters and county officials in

the 1980s. State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell (Lockert I), 631 S.W.2d 702 (Tenn. 1982); State

ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell (Lockert II), 656 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. 1983); State ex rel. Lockert

v. Crowell (Lockert III), 729 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. 1987). The evidence presented in the

Lockert cases showed that it was impossible for the General Assembly to create a House

plan or a Senate plan that complied with the equal population requirement and did not split

any counties. Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d at 714; Lockert II, 656 S.W.2d at 842–43. In Lockert

I, we held that “the plan adopted must cross as few county lines as is necessary to comply

with the federal constitutional requirements.” 631 S.W.2d at 715. In Lockert II, based on

the evidence presented in that case, we gave the General Assembly more specific

guidelines for drawing the House plan. 656 S.W.2d at 841–45. We instructed that an “upper

limit of dividing [thirty] counties in the multi-county category is appropriate, with the

caveat that none of the thirty can be divided more than once.” Id. at 844.3

Following Lockert II, the General Assembly adopted the House Redistricting

Guidelines. Act of May 17, 1984, ch. 778, § 1, 1984 Tenn. Pub. Acts 510, 510. Those

guidelines have been adopted in every subsequent redistricting statute, including the most

recent one. Act of Jan. 13, 2012, ch. 511, § 1(b), 2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts 13, 13–14; Act of

Jan. 14, 2002, ch. 468, § 1(b), 2002 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1294, 1295; Act of Apr. 23, 1992, ch.

836, § 1(b), 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts 510, 510. The current guidelines are as follows:

(b) It is the intention of the general assembly that:

(1) Each district be represented by a single member;

(2) Districts are substantially equal in population in accordance with

constitutional requirements for “one (1) person one (1) vote” as judicially

interpreted to apply to state legislative districts;

(3) Geographic areas, boundaries, and population counts used for

redistricting are based on the 2020 federal decennial census;

(4) Districts are contiguous and contiguity by water is sufficient, and,

toward that end, if any voting district or other geographical entity designated

as a portion of a district is found to be noncontiguous with the larger portion

of such district, it must be constituted a portion of the district smallest in

population to which it is contiguous;

3

As explained further below, Lockert II did not create a thirty-county safe harbor for county

splitting. See Rural W. Tenn. Afr.-Am. Affs. Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 836 F. Supp. 447, 450–51 (W.D.

Tenn. 1993) (“[N]owhere in the Lockert II opinion does the court purport to establish an absolute numerical

standard, applicable in all redistricting contexts.”).

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(5) No more than thirty (30) counties are split to attach to other

counties or parts of counties to form multi-county districts; and

(6) The redistricting plan complies with the Voting Rights Act and the

fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-1-103(b) (2023).

The General Assembly must comply with other state redistricting requirements too.

It is constitutionally required to create ninety-nine House districts and no more than thirty-

three Senate districts. Tenn. Const. art. II, §§ 5–6. By statute, the number of Senate districts

has been set at thirty-three since 1881. Act of Dec. 22, 1881, ch. 5, § 1, 1881 Tenn. Acts

1st Extraordinary Sess. 9; see Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d at 711 (tracking the sizes of

Tennessee’s House and Senate throughout Tennessee history); Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-1-101

(2023).

As relevant to Hunt’s challenge, Senate districts in multi-district counties must be

consecutively numbered. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 3 (“In a county having more than one

senatorial district, the districts shall be numbered consecutively.”). The consecutive-

numbering requirement ensures that not all of a county’s senators are up for election at the

same time. Elections for senators—who serve four-year terms—are staggered, with

elections in even-numbered districts occurring in presidential years and those in odd-

numbered districts taking place in gubernatorial election years. Id.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2022, the General Assembly enacted legislation establishing the

boundaries of Tennessee’s state legislative districts. Act of Jan. 24, 2022, ch. 596, 2022

Tenn. Pub. Acts 65 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-1-102 (2023)); Act of Jan. 26, 2022,

ch. 598, 2022 Tenn. Pub. Acts 185 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-1-103). Two weeks

later, Tennessee voters Gary Wygant, Telise Turner, and Akilah Moore sued state officials,

claiming that the House and Senate redistricting plans violated the Tennessee

Constitution.4 The voters alleged that the House plan violated Article II, Section 5’s

prohibition on county splitting because it split more counties than necessary to comply with

the federal equal population requirement. To support this argument, the voters asserted that

the House Redistricting Committee had rejected an alternative plan that would have

divided seven fewer counties. The voters also alleged that the Senate plan violated Article

II, Section 3’s requirement that Senate districts within multi-district counties be

consecutively numbered because Davidson County’s four Senate districts were numbered

17, 19, 20, and 21. The voters sought a declaratory judgment under Tennessee Code

4

The complaint asserted claims against Governor Bill Lee, Secretary of State Tre Hargett, and

Tennessee Coordinator of Elections Mark Goins in their official capacities.

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Annotated section 1-3-121, asking the court to declare both plans unconstitutional, to

enjoin the use of the plans, and to order the General Assembly to redraw the maps before

the August 2022 primary elections.

In March 2022, this Court entered an order designating a three-judge trial court

panel to hear this case. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-18-101(a)(1)(A)(i) (2021). The Court

appointed Circuit Judge J. Michael Sharp and Chancellor Steven W. Maroney to serve on

the panel with Chancellor Russell T. Perkins, to whom the case was originally assigned.

Ten days later, the voters filed an amended complaint and a motion for a temporary

injunction. They asked the court to enjoin the State from using the enacted legislative maps,

order the State to redraw the maps within fifteen days, and delay the April 7, 2022,

candidate qualifying deadline “sufficiently to allow for the Court to impose an interim

redistricting plan if the legislature fails to act.” The panel granted a temporary injunction

with respect to the Senate plan. The State filed an application for extraordinary appeal in

the Court of Appeals, and this Court assumed jurisdiction over the appeal under Tennessee

Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(1). We granted the appeal and vacated the injunction,

finding that the voters’ alleged harm was outweighed by the significant harm the injunction

would “have on our election officials who [would be] detrimentally impacted by the

extension of the candidate filing deadline, as well as the public interest in ensuring orderly

elections and avoiding voter confusion.” Moore v. Lee, 644 S.W.3d 59, 60 (Tenn. 2022).

The voters then filed a second amended complaint requesting relief before the 2024

election. Later, they substituted voter Francie Hunt for Moore. The parties then filed

competing summary judgment motions. After a hearing, the panel dismissed Turner as a

party after concluding that she did not have standing to challenge either the House or Senate

maps. The panel concluded that, as a resident of Gibson County, Wygant had standing to

contest the House map. The panel reserved ruling on whether Hunt had standing to

challenge the Senate map.

Following the panel’s summary judgment rulings, the only remaining claims were

Wygant’s challenge to the House map and Hunt’s challenge to the Senate map. The

Davidson County Chancery Court held a three-day trial in April 2023. Because the State

decided not to defend the Senate map on the merits, most of the evidence presented at trial

concerned the House map. The evidence relating to the Senate challenge focused on Hunt’s

standing.

A. House Map

The enacted House map creates ninety-nine districts, splits thirty counties, and

achieves a total population variance of 9.90%. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-1-103. The map

also maintains thirteen majority-minority districts.

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The timeline for the 2022 redistricting process was unusually short. Because of the

COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government did not release the 2020 census data until

August 2021. This meant the legislature had only five months, instead of the usual eleven,

to prepare a map that could be enacted in January 2022—the start of the General

Assembly’s next session.

After receiving the census data, the Speaker of the House of Representatives

appointed the House Select Committee on Redistricting to oversee the redistricting process.

For the first time, the Committee’s membership included both Republicans and Democrats.

Doug Himes, House Ethics Counsel for the Tennessee House of Representatives,

was Counsel to the Committee and the primary mapmaker for the House. The General

Assembly created a website in January 2021 to keep the public informed about the

redistricting process, and Himes uploaded the census data to the website after it was

received.

In anticipation of the Committee’s first public hearing in September, Himes

prepared a concept map using software called Maptitude. Himes explained that the first

step in creating a concept map is to determine how many counties, based on population

size, can be kept whole. To do this, he calculated the size of Tennessee’s ideal House

district. The census numbers showed that Tennessee’s total population had grown to

6,910,840 residents. Himes then divided the total population by ninety-nine and found that

Tennessee’s ideal House district would contain 69,806 residents. Based on this figure, he

determined that ten of Tennessee’s ninety-five counties had a population either large

enough to form a single whole district or capable of being dividing evenly into multiple

whole districts.

Next, Himes considered where population growth and loss had occurred. The census

data revealed uneven growth across the State. Although thirty counties across West

Tennessee, East Tennessee, and the upper part of the Cumberland Plateau lost population,

there was an “explosion” of growth around Nashville, with seventeen counties in Middle

Tennessee growing by 10% or more. Based on the data, Himes concluded that three House

districts would need to shift to Middle Tennessee.

Finally, Himes looked at various redistricting requirements “to see how the puzzle

[would] fit.” Himes testified that when preparing a map, the State considers the following

criteria in order of priority: (1) the equal population requirement, (2) the VRA, (3) state

constitutional provisions such as the county-splitting provisions, (4) state statutory criteria

listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 3-1-103(b), and (5) two non-statutory

criteria—core preservation and minimizing incumbent pairing.

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At the Committee’s first meeting in September, Himes presented an overview of

Tennessee’s census data and explained the House Redistricting Guidelines, as codified at

Tennessee Code Annotated section 3-1-103(b). He explained that the one-person, one-vote

requirement made perfect compliance with the county-splitting provision in the state

constitution impossible and recounted that in Lockert II, this Court had instructed the

legislature not to split more than thirty counties.

After this presentation, the Committee adopted procedures and guidelines for

proposed submissions of alternative maps from the public. Members of the public were

invited to submit proposed redistricting maps between September 8 and November 12,

2021. Himes encouraged the public to submit maps, even meeting with several individuals

to assist in their efforts. Ultimately, only four citizen maps were submitted. None of those

maps were from Wygant. The Democratic House Caucus also submitted a map, though not

until after the November 12th deadline. Himes informed the Caucus that their map had

several potential legal problems, including that it reduced the number of majority-minority

districts from thirteen to eight. So the Caucus submitted a new map.

In December, the Committee held a public hearing to discuss the four citizen maps,

the Democratic House Caucus map, and the map that Himes prepared for the Committee.

Himes discussed the legal deficiencies of each of the alternative maps. Himes

acknowledged that the Democratic Caucus map created only twenty-three county splits—

seven less than his proposed House map. But Himes noted that the Democratic Caucus map

created a “litigation risk” because it would split Shelby County without adequate

justification. In Lockert II, this Court held that “none of the four urban counties can be split

even once unless justified by either (1) the necessity to reduce a variance in an adjoining

district or (2) to prevent the dilution of minority voting strength.” 656 S.W.2d at 843.

Himes opined that the split of Shelby County could not be justified under these criteria.

Himes also believed that the Democratic Caucus map would present a VRA litigation risk

because it reduced minority voting strength. Half of the Caucus plan’s thirteen majority-

minority districts would be left with “bare majorities”—a significant decrease from

previous maps.

The Committee next considered the map that Himes prepared. This map created

ninety-nine districts, split thirty counties, and achieved a total population variance of

9.90%. A few Committee members had questions about the plan. Representative Karen

Camper asked: “Why would we go to this 30-county split, if we could have did [sic] less

than that?” Himes responded:

Lockert gives you an upper limit of 30, and it’s something that—since we

had the Lockert decision, it’s something that we placed in Tennessee code as

one of our criteria. And it’s consistently adopted as one of our criteria that

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our limit is 30. While it is true that you can sometimes draft plans with fewer

county splits, you have the discretion to get to that—to that limit, and that

becomes a policy decision that you all—that you make. . . . I would suggest

that if you—if you kept the plan that was presented earlier, if you kept Shelby

whole, you wouldn’t have 23 splits. You would have more splits. And I think

what Lockert says, keep the urban counties whole. So 23, I think, is—is a

great number. And I don’t know if that is a number that you can get to but

for splitting Shelby County.

At trial, Himes acknowledged that he never conveyed to the Committee this Court’s

instruction in Lockert I that the legislature should divide counties only as necessary to

comply with federal constitutional requirements. He was asked: “In all three of these

hearings . . . you’re not aware of any point where you informed the bodies you were

speaking to of an obligation to divide as few counties as necessary to comply with federal

constitutional requirements; correct?” Himes responded: “I don’t think it would have been

in those words.”

The Committee ultimately approved the map prepared by Himes and recommended

the plan to the General Assembly. On January 26, 2022, the General Assembly enacted the

Committee’s plan into law. Act of Jan. 26, 2022, ch. 598, 2022 Tenn. Pub. Acts 185

(codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-1-103).

Himes testified as an expert witness for the State. In his capacity as an expert, he

reviewed the enacted House map and offered justifications for each county division. He

concluded that “[e]ach split is justified by a legitimate redistricting objective such as

population, the Voting Rights Act, or other criteria utilized by the Tennessee House of

Representatives for state House redistricting.” Himes gave justifications for each of the

thirty county splits. Because we conclude that Wygant lacks standing to challenge the

House map in its entirety, we focus here on the split of Gibson County and its bordering

counties.

Gibson County is bordered by six other counties: Obion and Weakley to the north,

Carroll to the east, Madison and Crockett to the south, and Dyer to the west. Three of those

bordering counties—Carroll, Madison, and Obion—were split in the 2012 House plan and

they remain split in the 2022 House plan. The only new split added to this area in 2022 was

the split of Gibson County.

In his initial expert report, Himes identified “population shift” and “core

preservation” as the justifications for the Gibson County split. Himes explained that “core

preservation” is an attempt to maintain the core of a former legislative district to limit voter

confusion and ease the burden on election officials and incumbents. But the ability to

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maintain the “core” of any district changes with population shifts. The United States

Supreme Court has recognized core preservation as a legitimate state policy that may

justify a State’s deviation from a strict population standard. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.

725, 740 (1983).

Himes testified that all of Gibson’s neighboring counties, except for Madison

County, lost population. That population loss, combined with Middle Tennessee’s

population growth, pushed districts to Middle Tennessee. As a result, “there ha[d] to be

splits in West Tennessee.” Because Gibson County’s population of 50,429 is insufficient

to support an entire district, Gibson had to be combined with at least one other county and

one of those counties needed to be split.

Himes explained that it was not a viable option to keep Gibson whole by simply

attaching it to part of the more populous Madison County. Because Madison County’s

current districts were formed in response to federal VRA litigation, see Rural W. Tenn.

Afr.-Am. Affs. Council, 209 F.3d at 837, 839, 844, adjusting them would risk VRA

noncompliance.

Elaborating on the “core preservation” justification, Himes testified that the new

District 79 retained the core of old District 79. He explained that “[i]t maintains the larger

part of Gibson” and the “same part of Carroll.” He noted that the map “draws [the split] on

Highway 45 West” and “tries to keep the municipalities all in District 79,” with “[o]nly

Humboldt [being] split in Gibson County.”

The other half of Gibson County became part of District 82. The new District 82

keeps Lauderdale and Crockett counties whole and adds parts of Gibson and Obion

counties. Himes testified that “Gibson is a bridge to make sure that enough population

could be in the districts.” He added that “Obion helps District 82 with its population

variance.”

It was Himes’s expert opinion that the General Assembly made an honest and good-

faith effort when enacting the House plan. He observed that each mapmaking decision

creates a domino effect. Given the myriad requirements a map must fulfill, an infinite

number of potential solutions exist. Himes opined that a map should not be deemed

unconstitutional simply because it is theoretically possible to draw a map that divides fewer

counties. In his view, there can be multiple constitutional plans, with differences in overall

deviation from the population ideal and the number of counties divided. He was doubtful

that a “perfect map” could ever be achieved.

Dr. Jonathan Cervas testified as an expert witness for Wygant. Cervas has a Ph.D.

in political science from the University of California, Irvine, and has assisted several courts

in redistricting and voting rights cases. During this litigation, Cervas produced a series of

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illustrative maps. His goal was to produce a constitutional map that split fewer counties

than the enacted House map.

Cervas’s maps were reviewed and critiqued by Himes and the State’s other expert,

Sean Trende, a Ph.D. candidate at The Ohio State University and an analyst for

RealClearPolitics.com. Himes and Trende identified several problems with the maps,

including contiguity issues, increased risk of VRA litigation, double splitting of counties

in violation of Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution, and increased risk of

equal protection litigation. Cervas altered his maps in response to these critiques. Nearly a

year into litigation, he produced a map—Map 13d_e—that Himes agreed would be

constitutional if a minor contiguity problem were corrected.

Map 13d_e splits twenty-four counties (six fewer than the enacted House map) and

achieves a population variance of 9.89% (.01% less than the enacted House map). The map

does not divide Gibson County. The map contains the same thirteen majority-minority

districts as the enacted House map, pairs the same number of incumbents, and retains the

same percentage of old district cores. The parties agreed that Map 13d_e has a contiguity

problem that could be corrected without affecting the overall population variance.

Cervas acknowledged that there are “lots of tradeoffs in redistricting” and admitted

that “there are no perfect plans.” He testified that out of all the maps he produced for this

litigation, there is no “best” map because “[b]est is not a quantity that can be defined in

redistricting.” In Cervas’s opinion, however, “[i]t’s unequivocal that the legislature can

create a 99-district plan that splits fewer than 30 counties, including plans that have

substantially fewer county splits than 30.”

Gary Wygant has resided in Gibson County since 2015. Wygant testified that he

votes in every election and plans to continue doing so. He is the chairman of the Gibson

County Democratic Party.

Wygant resides in House District 79. The new House map did not change Wygant’s

district number, but it did change his district’s boundaries. House District 79 previously

included all of Gibson County plus part of Carroll County. The new House map splits

Gibson County from north to south and creates two House districts. The first—House

District 79—contains the eastern part of Gibson County, the southern part of Carroll

County, and the northern part of Henderson County. The second—House District 82—

contains the western part of Gibson County, a southern part of Obion County, and all of

Crockett and Lauderdale Counties.

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Under the former map, Wygant’s district was represented by a Gibson County

resident—Representative Curtis Halford.5 Now, after the 2022 election, neither House

District 79 nor House District 82 is represented by a Gibson County resident. According to

Wygant, this was “a big change” for Gibson County. He conceded, however, that the

former House map did not guarantee that Gibson County would be represented by a Gibson

County resident, because the district included part of Carroll County.

Wygant testified that, after redistricting, Gibson County’s “representation is

fractured from an east/west perspective.” Because of this fracture, voters are unsure whom

they should call when an issue arises in Gibson County. He stated: “So, if we’ve got an

issue that pertains to Gibson County, who do we call? We’ve got to call both and say, ‘Hey,

we have an issue we need to address . . . .’”

Wygant wished that the redistricting process had been more transparent. But he

acknowledged that he never investigated ways to provide input on the process. He was

unaware of the General Assembly’s public hearings on redistricting and did not know there

had been an opportunity to submit maps to the General Assembly.

Wygant understood that Gibson County, with a population of about 50,000, was too

small to get its own House district. He also acknowledged that the State could not simply

combine Gibson and Carroll counties without splitting one of them because together their

population was too large to form a single House district. When asked if he knew whether

any alternative plans provided to the General Assembly during the redistricting process

kept Gibson County whole, he said that he did not.

Wygant testified that the split of Gibson County was “foremost in [his] mind” and

the only one of the thirty county splits that he had “experience[d].” When asked if he had

been personally or individually impacted by the other county splits, he said: “Well, I do

hear about it from the other county chairmen, yes. But that’s really them relaying their

feelings.” He testified that his opinion about county splits was “now inclusive of the

counties that have been attached to the county that [he] represent[s] as chairman of the

democratic party” because he “ha[s] to pay attention in some way to what’s happening

there in order to work with legislators with regard to what’s happening in Gibson County

and what could happen in Gibson County.”

5

Representative Halford retired and did not run for reelection in 2022.

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B. Senate Map

The challenged Senate map creates four nonconsecutively numbered senatorial

districts in Davidson County, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-1-102(d)(17), (19)–(21), even

though Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution requires that “[i]n a county

having more than one senatorial district, the districts shall be numbered consecutively,”

Tenn. Const. art. II, § 3. The Davidson County senatorial districts are numbered 17, 19, 20,

and 21.

Francie Hunt has resided in Davidson County since 1999. Hunt testified that she

votes in every election and plans to continue doing so. She is the executive director of

Tennessee Advocates for Planned Parenthood.

Hunt resides in the new Senate District 17. Under the former Senate map, she

resided in Senate District 18. The previous map consecutively numbered Davidson

County’s four senatorial districts. As a result, two Davidson County senators were up for

election in presidential election years and two were up for election in gubernatorial election

years. Now, because Davidson County’s four senatorial seats are nonconsecutively

numbered, three senators—including Hunt’s senator—are up for election in gubernatorial

election years while only one is up for election in presidential election years.

Hunt testified that she is a registered Democrat who disagrees with “what the

governor and the State of Tennessee has done.” She expressed her displeasure that there is

a “Republican supermajority at the state level.” She testified that she brought this suit to

ensure that “the word of the Constitution was being followed to the letter.”

Hunt agreed that “the benefit of consecutive numbering within Davidson County, if

there is any, is that at any one election, only two Davidson County senate seats can turn

over.” In the 2022 election, three of Davidson County’s four senate seats, including the

seat in Hunt’s district, were up for election. Hunt acknowledged, however, that only one of

those three seats turned over.

This is not the first time Davidson County’s senatorial districts have been

nonconsecutively numbered. The plans enacted following the 1990 and 2000 census both

created nonconsecutively numbered districts in Davidson County. Hunt lived in Davidson

County when both those maps were in place, but she was unaware of the numbering issue

at that time.

The State did not offer testimony regarding the merits of the Senate plan. Cervas

testified that, in his opinion, there is “no justification” for Davidson’s districts to be

nonconsecutively numbered. Cervas presented three alternative maps that would correct

the numbering of districts in Davidson County. His proposed plans showed that the enacted

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Senate map could be minimally altered by swapping the numbers of two even-numbered

districts and swapping the numbers of two odd-numbered districts. These swaps would

ensure that no incumbent senator’s term would be cut short.

C. Trial Court Opinion

In November 2023, the three-judge panel issued a divided opinion holding that: (1)

Wygant had standing to bring a district-specific challenge to the House plan; (2) the House

plan was constitutional; (3) Hunt had standing to challenge the Senate plan; and (4) the

Senate plan was unconstitutional.6 The panel dismissed Wygant’s challenge to the House

plan with prejudice. The panel entered judgment for Hunt as to the Senate plan and, under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-18-105(a), ordered the General Assembly to adopt

a constitutionally compliant Senate plan by January 31, 2024.

As for Wygant’s standing, the panel majority held that Wygant had standing to bring

a district-specific challenge but not a statewide challenge. The panel reasoned that the only

individualized harm Wygant suffered flowed from the Gibson County split. Wygant

testified that he was injured by the split because his county was now represented by two

different representatives, neither of whom resides in Gibson County. When asked whether

he had been personally injured by the splits of other counties, Wygant said that he had

heard complaints from other county chairmen. The panel explained that “[s]econd hand

relation of complaints from residents of other counties does not constitute individualized

harm to Wygant.”

Turning to the merits of Wygant’s challenge, the panel majority noted that this

Court’s decisions in Lockert I and Lincoln County v. Crowell, 701 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn.

1985), appeared to impose different burdens of proof. Lockert I required the State to prove

that it had created the map containing the split in good faith, while Lincoln County required

the challenger to prove that the State had acted in bad faith or with an improper motive.

The panel found that the law was unsettled and decided to apply both standards. And it

concluded that the House plan was constitutional under either standard.

First, the panel majority concluded that the State had met its burden under Lockert

I by proving that it had acted in good faith when creating the Gibson County split. The

Court credited Himes’s expert testimony regarding the justifications for the Gibson County

split, finding that the split was justified by both federal equal protection and VRA concerns.

The Committee’s public outreach and request for the submission of alternative maps

provided further evidence of good faith. The lengths to which Wygant’s expert mapmaker

6

Chancellor Maroney and Judge Sharp constituted the majority as to the ruling on the

constitutionality of the House plan. Chancellor Perkins and Judge Sharp constituted the majority as to the

ruling on Hunt’s standing.

-14-

had to go to produce one constitutional map, after many months of effort, also supported a

finding of good faith. Finally, the panel credited Himes’s expert opinion that the House

plan “represent[ed] an honest and good faith effort by the General Assembly to adopt a

constitutionally compliant map.”

Next, the panel majority concluded that Wygant had failed to meet his burden under

Lincoln County because neither Wygant nor Cervas testified that the General Assembly

acted in bad faith or with improper motive.

Chancellor Perkins dissented as to the constitutionality of the House plan. In the

dissent’s view, the burden was on the State to prove that the House plan crossed as few

county lines as necessary to comply with federal constitutional requirements. The State,

the dissent argued, had failed to meet this burden because “the legislature treated the thirty-

county split as a safe harbor.”

As for Hunt’s standing, the panel majority concluded that Hunt had asserted a

distinct and palpable injury that could be redressed by the enactment of a constitutional

Senate plan. The panel found that “the Senate map has infringed upon Ms. Hunt’s

constitutional right to vote in a senatorial district consecutively numbered with the other

senatorial districts in her county of residence.” Hunt’s injury was individualized, the panel

reasoned, because it caused Hunt to be “treated differently from a larger group of voters in

populous counties in Tennessee.” The panel concluded that “[t]he General Assembly has

the power to swap the numbers of two Senators’ districts during the term of office without

affecting their abilities to serve their full terms” and ordered the General Assembly to do

so.

Chancellor Maroney dissented as to Hunt’s standing. He disagreed with the

majority’s assertion that Hunt’s right to vote had been diluted. In Chancellor Maroney’s

view, Hunt had articulated only a generalized injury—that the nonconsecutive numbering

of Davidson County’s Senate seats increased the possibility of turnover in the delegation.

Wygant and the State appealed to this Court as of right. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-

18-105(c) (2021). Wygant appealed the panel’s judgment that he lacked standing to

challenge the statewide House map and that he failed to prove the unconstitutionality of

the Gibson County split. The State appealed the panel’s judgment on Hunt’s standing. Both

Wygant and Hunt moved to expedite the appeals. The State also sought to stay the panel’s

judgment to the extent it held the Senate plan unconstitutional and ordered the General

Assembly to adopt a new Senate plan. This Court denied both motions to expedite and

granted the State’s stay motion.

-15-

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review questions of law de novo, without giving the trial court’s legal

conclusions any presumption of correctness. E.g., Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384,

390 (Tenn. 2006) (constitutionality of a state statute); see also City of Memphis v. Hargett,

414 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tenn. 2013) (standing); Bredesen v. Tenn. Jud. Selection Comm’n, 214

S.W.3d 419, 435 (Tenn. 2007) (political question). When a case is tried by a judge instead

of a jury, we presume the trial court’s factual findings are correct unless the evidence

preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); King v. Anderson Cnty., 419 S.W.3d 232,

245 (Tenn. 2013).

We presume that statutes enacted by the legislature are constitutional and “indulge

every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of constitutionality.” Lynch, 205

S.W.3d at 390 (quoting Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 937 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn.

1996)).

IV. ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis by considering whether the claims here are justiciable. We

first consider whether Wygant’s claim presents a nonjusticiable political question. We then

consider whether Wygant and Hunt have standing to bring their respective challenges.

Finally, having concluded that only Wygant’s district-specific challenge to the House plan

is justiciable, we address the merits of that claim and hold that Wygant has failed to

establish a violation of Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution.

A. Justiciability

Tennessee’s justiciability doctrines are by now well known. They include ripeness,

standing, mootness, the prohibition against advisory opinions, the political question

doctrine, and the requirement that plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies. Case v.

Wilmington Tr., N.A., 703 S.W.3d 274, 281 n.5 (Tenn. 2024); see also Norma Faye Pyles

Lynch Fam. Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196, 203 (Tenn. 2009).

Justiciability doctrines “guide courts in determining whether to hear and decide a particular

case.” Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 281 (citing Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 203).

Although the doctrines are not included in the text of the Tennessee Constitution, they are

rooted in our dual separation of powers provisions. Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 281;

Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 202–03; see also Tenn. Const. art. II, §§ 1–2. The first of those

provisions—Article II, Section 1—provides that “[t]he powers of the Government shall be

divided into three distinct departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.” Tenn.

Const. art. II, § 1. The second—Article II, Section 2—instructs that “[n]o person or persons

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belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging

to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted.” Id. art. II, § 2.

Our justiciability doctrines safeguard the separation of powers by ensuring that the

judiciary exercises the judicial power, not powers belonging to the legislative or executive

branches. See Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 202–03 (explaining that Tennessee’s

justiciability doctrines “are based on the judiciary’s understanding of the intrinsic role of

judicial power” and “respect for the separation of powers doctrine”). Two justiciability

doctrines are at issue here: the political question doctrine and standing. Our review is de

novo as to both doctrines because justiciability is a question of law. See Rainwaters v.

Tenn. Wildlife Res. Agency, No. W2022-00514-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 2078231, *4

(Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2024).

1. Political Question Doctrine

The State contends that whether the House reapportionment statute impermissibly

splits counties in violation of Article II, Section 5 is a nonjusticiable political question.

In “rare cases,” our political question doctrine “precludes consideration of the

particular issue or claim raised by the party.” Bredesen, 214 S.W.3d at 434. To determine

if an issue is a “political question,” Tennessee courts rely on factors borrowed from the

United States Supreme Court’s political question precedents. Id. at 435–36 (citing Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). We consider whether the case involves “a textually

demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;

or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Mayhew v.

Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217); see

Bredesen, 214 S.W.3d at 435 (quoting Mayhew, 46 S.W.3d at 773). These two factors are

“not completely separate,” as “the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen

the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993); see Bredesen, 214 S.W.3d at 436.

The State previously argued, in Lockert I, that a county-splitting challenge to a

reapportionment statute presented a nonjusticiable political question. 631 S.W.2d at 705.

This was so, the State claimed, because reapportionment is a legislative function and courts

were unable to “grant the ultimate remedy of formulating their own reapportionment plan.”

Id. We rejected this argument. Id. at 706. Although we acknowledged that “apportionment

is primarily a legislative function,” we held that if the legislature “fails to act

constitutionally after having had a reasonable opportunity to do so,” a court may “devise

its own constitutional plan.” Id.

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Recently, Tennessee adopted a statute requiring courts to give the General

Assembly at least fifteen days to enact a new apportionment plan if the current plan is held

unconstitutional. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-18-105(a) (2021). If the General Assembly fails to

act in the allotted time, “then the court may impose an interim districting plan for use only

in the next election cycle.” Id. § 20-18-105(b).

The State raises a different political question argument here. The State asserts that

the third sentence of Article II, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution “commits to the

General Assembly the authority to choose whether and to what extent it will elevate

county-line preservation over other redistricting criteria.” According to the State, this text

“expressly authorizes the General Assembly in its discretion to subordinate the county-

splitting provision to ‘other [redistricting] criteria.’”

Section 4 of Article II provides in full as follows:

The apportionment of Senators and Representatives shall be substantially

according to population. After each decennial census made by the Bureau of

Census of the United States is available the General Assembly shall establish

senatorial and representative districts. Nothing in this Section nor in this

Article II shall deny to the General Assembly the right at any time to

apportion one House of the General Assembly using geography, political

subdivisions, substantially equal population and other criteria as factors;

provided such apportionment when effective shall comply with the

Constitution of the United States as then amended or authoritatively

interpreted. If the Constitution of the United States shall require that

Legislative apportionment not based entirely on population be approved by

vote of the electorate, the General Assembly shall provide for such vote in

the apportionment act.

Tenn. Const. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added). Article II, Section 4 was ratified in 1966.

Proclamation of Frank G. Clement, Governor (Dec. 2, 1966) in Journal and Proceedings

of the Limited Constitutional Convention of Tennessee 1066, 1067 (1966). This Court has

never considered the meaning of the third sentence of this section.

Our task when interpreting a provision of the Tennessee Constitution is to determine

its “original public meaning.” McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tenn. 2025);

see also State ex rel. Doyle v. Torrence, 310 S.W.2d 425, 427–28 (Tenn. 1958). That is,

we ask “how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood

the text at the time it was issued.” McNabb, 710 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Antonin Scalia &

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012)). To answer

that question, we may consult dictionaries, apply well-established canons of construction,

-18-

and employ other traditional tools of interpretation to discern how the public would have

understood the text. Id.; see also State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 924–25 (Tenn. 2022);

Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 621–22 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).

Because constitutional interpretation should not occur in a vacuum, we also consider the

historical context in which the provision was adopted. See McNabb, 710 S.W.3d at 658,

661; Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., 710 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Tenn. 2025).

Moreover, we “construe the Tennessee Constitution as a single, unified document,” taking

care not to interpret any provision in a way that would “impair or destroy any other part.”

McNabb, 710 S.W.3d at 659 (quoting Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 792 S.W.2d 446, 448

(Tenn. 1990)).

The third sentence of Section 4 has two clauses. The first clause provides that

“[n]othing in this Section nor in this Article II shall deny to the General Assembly the right

at any time to apportion one House of the General Assembly using geography, political

subdivisions, substantially equal population and other criteria as factors.” Tenn. Const. art.

II, § 4. The word “deny,” in the sense used here, means “to refuse to grant” or “withhold.”

Deny, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 353 (1973); see also

Deny, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 334–35 (3d ed. 1969) (“To deny means to withhold, to

refuse to grant.”). The meaning of the first clause is straightforward: it makes clear that

neither Section 4 nor Article II withholds from the General Assembly “the right at any time

to apportion one House of the General Assembly using geography, political subdivisions,

substantially equal population and other criteria as factors.” Tenn. Const. art. II, § 4.

The second clause of Section 4 is a proviso that conditions the first clause. See Scalia

& Garner, supra, at 154. The General Assembly may apportion according to the first clause

“provided such apportionment when effective shall comply with the Constitution of the

United States as then amended or authoritatively interpreted.” Tenn. Const. art. II, § 4.

Taken together, the two clauses mean that nothing in Section 4 or Article II withholds from

the General Assembly the right to apportion one house of the General Assembly using the

listed factors, so long as the apportionment complies with the federal Constitution.

Contrary to the State’s argument, this language does not grant the General Assembly

discretion to ignore or subordinate Section 5’s prohibition on county splitting. Although

the phrase “[n]othing in this Section nor in this Article II shall deny” is properly understood

as superordinating language, this language “merely shows which provision prevails in the

event of a clash” and “does not necessarily denote a clash of provisions.” Scalia & Garner,

supra, at 126.

Here, Section 4 and the county-splitting prohibition in Section 5 do not clash.

Section 4 preserves the General Assembly’s authority to consider a range of factors

including “political subdivisions” when apportioning one house of the legislature, while

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Section 5 mandates that “no county shall be divided” in the forming of multi-county

districts for representatives. Tenn. Const. art. II, §§ 4–5. Section 5 does not deny or

withhold from the General Assembly the right to apportion based on the listed factors.

Quite the opposite: it requires the General Assembly to apportion based on “political

subdivisions” by mandating that counties be kept intact. See Tenn. Const. art. II, § 5.

Because Section 4 and Section 5 do not clash, we will not construe the former to “impair

or destroy” the latter. McNabb, 710 S.W.3d at 659. We therefore reject the State’s assertion

that Section 4 grants the General Assembly discretion to ignore Section 5’s county-splitting

prohibition.

The historical context in which Section 4 was adopted further supports our reading.

Tennessee voters approved the current version of Section 4,7 as well as the county-splitting

prohibition in Section 5, in the election of 1966. Proclamation of Frank G. Clement,

Governor (Dec. 2, 1966) in Journal and Proceedings of the Limited Constitutional

Convention of Tennessee 1066, 1067–68 (1966). That was two years after the United States

Supreme Court held in Reynolds v. Sims that both houses of a bicameral state legislature

must be apportioned based “substantially on population.” 377 U.S. at 578.

Before Reynolds, courts understood the federal Equal Protection Clause to require

only one house of a bicameral legislature to be apportioned “based, fully and in good faith,

on numbers of qualified voters without regard to any other factor.” Baker v. Carr, 206 F.

Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); see Baker v. Carr, 222 F. Supp. 684, 687 (M.D. Tenn.

1963) (citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions). Apportionment of the other house

could “take into account other interests and objectives” including “the policy of providing

adequate legislative representation to the rural population whose special interests might

otherwise be overridden by ‘sheer weight of numbers.’” Baker, 222 F. Supp. at 687.

Reynolds was thus viewed as a significant restriction of state apportionment power. See,

e.g., Clayton Knowles, Redistricting Will Have Wide Impact on Most States, N.Y. Times,

June 21, 1964, at E3 (“Nothing in many years has quite shaken up state government like

last week’s Supreme Court decree that districts of both houses of state legislatures must be

‘substantially equal.’”).

In the wake of Reynolds, efforts were made to amend the United States Constitution

to restore power to the States. Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois introduced a

constitutional amendment that would grant the States the right to “apportion one house of

a bicameral legislature using population, geography, or political subdivisions as

7

The previous version of Section 4 read: “An enumeration of the qualified voters, and an

apportionment of the Representatives in the General Assembly, shall be made in the year one thousand

eight hundred and seventy-one, and within every subsequent term of ten years.” Tenn. Const. of 1870, art.

II, § 4.

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factors . . . if . . . such plan of apportionment has been submitted to a vote of the

people . . . .” 111 Cong. Rec. 18856 (1965). The final two sentences of Article II, Section

4 of the Tennessee Constitution contain language strikingly similar to that of the proposed

Dirksen amendment. See Tenn. Const. art. II, § 4. Indeed, the final sentence of Section 4

instructs the General Assembly to provide for a vote of the electorate on apportionment

acts if the Constitution should require such a vote. Id.

Records from the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1965 confirm that Section

4 was drafted in response to the proposed Dirksen amendment.8 The Chairman of the

Apportionment Committee, Allen J. Strawbridge, told the Convention that Section 4 was

designed as a means of allowing the legislature “a chance to take advantage” of the Dirksen

amendment. Debates of December 1, 1965, Ltd. Const. Convention of 1965 (Dec. 1, 1965)

in Journal and Proceedings of the Limited Constitutional Convention of Tennessee 850,

863 (1966). And Delegate Charles Hill Anderson, a member of the Apportionment

Committee, described the third sentence of Section 4 as “an accommodation in the event

the so-called ‘Dirksen Amendment’ is adopted.” Id. at 868.

This historical context lends no support to the State’s proposed reading of Section

4. Section 4 was adopted to permit the General Assembly to take advantage of any eventual

expansion of state apportionment power by preserving the General Assembly’s authority

to reapportion one house of the legislature according to factors other than population. But

this preservation of the General Assembly’s authority did not destroy Section 5’s more

detailed directive requiring that counties be kept intact. We therefore reject the State’s

argument that Section 4 gives the legislature unfettered discretion to ignore or subordinate

Section 5’s prohibition on county splitting.

The State also argues that there is “no judicially manageable standard . . . for courts

to decide whether a county split violates the Tennessee Constitution.” We disagree on that

score as well. To be sure, the clear standard provided in Article II, Section 5—that “no

county shall be divided in forming a [multi-county] district”—cannot be strictly applied

given the General Assembly’s obligation to comply with the federal one-person, one-vote

principle and other federal requirements. See Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d at 715. But that does

not mean that a judicially manageable standard is altogether lacking. Tennessee’s courts

adjudicated county-splitting challenges in the Lockert cases and Lincoln County. To the

extent those cases created uncertainty about the applicable legal standard, we address that

conflict below by clarifying the standard.

8

We consider the convention records because they are part of the historical context of the relevant

language in Article II, Section 4, not because we view the statements of individual delegates as dispositive

evidence of that language’s meaning. See, e.g., Perez v. City of S.A., 715 S.W.3d 709, 716 & n.8 (Tex.

2025); Barnett v. Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 766–67 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., concurring specially).

-21-

It bears repeating that only in a “rare case[]” will we find that “the doctrine of

separation of powers precludes consideration of the particular issue or claim raised by the

party.” Bredesen, 214 S.W.3d at 434. And this case is easily distinguishable from that

narrow category of cases. For example, compare this case with Bredesen v. Tennessee

Judicial Selection Commission. Bredesen involved an equal protection challenge to the

Governor’s decision to reject a panel of judicial nominees at least partly because none were

minority candidates. Id. at 428, 432. This Court held that this challenge presented a

nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 436. We found that Article VII, Section 4 of the

Tennessee Constitution textually commits the power of filling judicial vacancies to the

legislature. Id. at 435. That provision instructs that “the filling of all vacancies not

otherwise directed or provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such manner as the

Legislature shall direct.” Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 4. By statute, the legislature had

empowered the Governor alone to make appointments to fill judicial vacancies. Bredesen,

214 S.W.3d at 435. We thus concluded that there was a “lack of judicially discoverable

and manageable standards for resolving [the issue].” Id. at 436.

Here, by contrast, there is no textual commitment of apportionment decisions to the

legislative or executive branches. And there is a judicially manageable standard for

determining whether the State has violated the county-splitting provision, to the extent it

has not been preempted by federal constitutional and statutory requirements. If the court

finds that the provision has been violated, moreover, it can remedy that violation by

allowing the legislature to redraw the map or, failing that, providing an interim map. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-18-105(a)–(b) (2021). We therefore conclude that Wygant’s

challenge to the House map does not present a nonjusticiable political question.9

2. Standing

Standing is a threshold inquiry that determines “whether the particular plaintiff is

entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” City of Memphis, 414 S.W.3d

at 97 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)); see also Wilmington Tr., 703

S.W.3d at 281; ACLU of Tenn. v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tenn. 2006). Until

recently, Tennessee’s constitutional standing doctrine “was adopted wholesale” from

federal judicial precedents and required all plaintiffs to satisfy a three-element test to

establish standing. Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 282. Under that test, a plaintiff must

show (1) that he suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the

9

The State does not argue that Hunt’s challenge to the Senate map presents a nonjusticiable political

question. This Court has never squarely considered whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional

in nature and therefore not subject to waiver. Because we conclude that Hunt lacks standing to bring her

challenge, we have no occasion to consider that question in this case.

-22-

challenged conduct; and (3) that a favorable judicial decision would redress the injury. See

City of Memphis, 414 S.W.3d at 98.

In Wilmington Trust, however, we reconsidered our standing doctrine in light of the

specific requirements of the Tennessee Constitution. 703 S.W.3d at 282–92. We explained

that the federal standing doctrine is grounded in Article III of the United States

Constitution—namely, the language in Section 2 limiting the exercise of the federal judicial

power to “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies.” Id.; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Spokeo, Inc.

v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). But the Tennessee Constitution lacks a similar

limitation, so federal standing precedents are of limited relevance to justiciability in

Tennessee’s courts. See Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 286.

Tennessee’s standing inquiry must instead be guided by the relevant provisions of

the Tennessee Constitution: the Open Courts Provision in Article I, Section 17, and the

Separation of Powers Provisions in Article II, Sections 1 and 2. Id. The Open Courts

Provision states in relevant part “[t]hat all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury

done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of

law.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17. In Wilmington Trust, we interpreted this provision to mean

that “a person asserting an injury to their land, goods, person, or reputation—i.e., private

rights claims” must “allege an injury in law in order to have standing in court” but need

not show an injury in fact. 703 S.W.3d at 288.

Tennessee’s separation of powers provisions require the judicial branch to exercise

only judicial power and prohibit it from usurping authority that belongs to the legislative

and executive branches. See Tenn. Const. art. II, §§ 1–2. Claims involving public rights—

those that are “common to all[] and incident to citizenship itself”—present a significant

risk that the judiciary will overstep the bounds of its authority and intrude on legislative

and executive prerogatives. Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Patten v. City of

Chattanooga, 65 S.W. 414, 420 (Tenn. 1901)). That’s because the protection of public

rights is generally entrusted to public officials, not private citizens. Id. at 289–91; see also

Patten, 65 S.W. at 419–20. Accordingly, to safeguard the separation of powers, we have

long required plaintiffs asserting public rights claims to show a special injury. Wilmington

Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 289–91; see also, e.g., Darnell, 195 S.W.3d at 626; Skelton v. Barnett,

227 S.W.2d 774, 775–76 (Tenn. 1950); Schultz v. Lewallen, 217 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tenn.

1948); Buena Vista Special Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Carroll Cnty., 116

S.W.2d 1008, 1009 (Tenn. 1938); Patten, 65 S.W. at 419. We thus confirmed in

Wilmington Trust that plaintiffs asserting public rights claims still must satisfy the three-

element standing test that we borrowed from federal precedent. Wilmington Tr., 703

S.W.3d at 291.

-23-

Because Wilmington Trust “clearly concern[ed] only private rights,” we did not

attempt to more precisely define public rights or private rights or to articulate a test for

distinguishing between the two categories of claims. Id. at 291 n.16.10 We need not attempt

that here either because, whatever the exact contours of the public rights category, the

claims asserted by Wygant and Hunt easily fit within it.

Wygant alleges that the House map violates Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee

Constitution by impermissibly splitting counties. The right that he asserts is the right to

have a House map drawn in compliance with Article II, Section 5. That right is “common

to all” Tennessee citizens. Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Patten, 65 S.W. at

419). And its enforcement is entrusted to public officials in the legislative and executive

branches: the legislators who must redraw the legislative maps following the census and

executive branch officials charged with administering elections. See Tenn. Const. art. II,

§ 4; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-11-201(a)–(b), 2-11-202 (2023). Wygant is suing government

officials and asking the judiciary to grant equitable relief against them. Wygant’s claim is

a quintessential public rights claim that threatens to intrude on the authority of other

branches of government. Thus, we may adjudicate that claim only if Wygant satisfies the

three-element standing test.

The same goes for Hunt. Hunt alleges that the Senate map violates Article II, Section

3 of the Tennessee Constitution by failing to consecutively number the Senate districts in

Davidson County. The right she asserts—the right to have a Senate map drawn in

compliance with Article II, Section 3—is common to all Tennesseans, and its enforcement

is the responsibility of public officials in the legislative and executive branches. See Tenn.

10

As the Georgia Supreme Court recently noted, “[t]he case law and scholarship wrestling with

how to define these categories is substantial.” Kennestone Hosp., Inc. v. Emory Univ., 897 S.E.2d 772, 779

n.3 (Ga. 2024). Our decision in Wilmington Trust suggested at least two possible distinctions between

public rights and private rights. The first considers whether the asserted right belongs to society as a whole

or instead to a specific individual or group of individuals. See Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 284–85; see

also Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 344 (Thomas, J., concurring); Ann Woodhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History

Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 693 (2004). A second considers whether the suit is

brought against the government rather than a private party. See Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 290–91; see

also Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 347 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]here one private party has alleged that another

private party violated his private rights, there is generally no danger that the private party’s suit is an

impermissible attempt to police the activity of the political branches.”); Thomas P. Schmidt, Standing

Between Private Parties, 2024 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 7–9 (2024). Another potential distinction turns on the nature

of the remedy sought. See Patten, 65 S.W. at 421 (“It is a well-settled rule that equity will not interfere by

its injunctive process in a case like this unless the complainants show that they will suffer some special

injury, and not merely an injury in common with the body of the citizens. This rule is, we believe, without

exception.”); see also Ernest A. Young, Standing, Equity, and Injury in Fact, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1885,

1904–10 (2022); Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Getting into Equity, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1763,

1776–95 (2022).

-24-

Const. art. II, § 4; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-11-201(a)–(b), 2-11-202. Hunt is suing

government officials and asking the judiciary to grant equitable relief against them. Like

Wygant’s claim, Hunt’s claim is a textbook public rights claim that threatens to upset the

balance of power among the branches. Accordingly, we may not adjudicate that claim

unless Hunt satisfies the three-element standing test.

Our three-element standing test from City of Memphis requires plaintiffs to show

(1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and (3) is capable

of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See 414 S.W.3d at 98. To satisfy the

injury in fact requirement, a plaintiff must show an injury that is “distinct and palpable.”

Id. (quoting Darnell, 195 S.W.3d at 620). Injuries that are conjectural, hypothetical, or

based on an interest shared by the general public are not enough. Id. If the plaintiff is not

presently suffering an injury, the injury faced must be “imminent.” Wilmington Tr., 703

S.W.3d at 283 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).

a. Wygant’s Standing to Challenge the House Map

Wygant contends that he has standing to challenge the entire House map, including

county splits in districts outside of House District 79 where he resides. The State argues

that Wygant has standing to challenge only House District 79. We agree with the State.

According to Wygant, the House map injures him by “denying him the full-county

representation the Constitution guarantees.” Wygant testified at trial that the Gibson

County split “fractured” representation of the county. Because no House member

represents the entire county, residents are unsure which representative to contact when an

issue arises and often must contact the representatives for both districts that contain a part

of Gibson County. In essence, Wygant is alleging that the split of Gibson County reduces

the effectiveness of his representation in the House.11

11

Wygant also complains that Gibson County is no longer represented by a Gibson County resident.

But this injury fails to satisfy the second and third elements of the City of Memphis standing test—causation

and redressability. Because Gibson County’s population is significantly less than the ideal size of a House

district, it must be combined with another county to form a district, whether the county is split or not. That

means it will always be possible that Gibson County’s representative could reside in a different county. The

injury Wygant identifies was caused not by the Gibson County split, but by Gibson County’s size. A

favorable judicial decision in this case would not redress this injury because it would only eliminate the

split, not suddenly increase the county’s population. Justice Kirby’s partial dissent calls this reasoning

“corrosive,” but it is a straightforward application of the causation and redressability requirements.

Moreover, her concern about how this reasoning would apply in racial gerrymandering cases is misplaced:

standing in those cases is premised on the stigmatic and representational injuries caused by the racial

classifications themselves. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995).

-25-

Whether this injury is sufficiently “distinct and palpable” to constitute an injury in

fact for purposes of constitutional standing is a close question. City of Memphis, 414

S.W.3d at 98 (quoting Darnell, 195 S.W.3d at 620). Our past cases that considered

challenges premised on the county-splitting provision did not address whether the plaintiffs

had standing. See Lockert III, 729 S.W.2d 88; Lincoln Cnty., 701 S.W.2d 602; Lockert II,

656 S.W.2d 836; Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d 702. Because those cases did not actually discuss

standing, they provide no precedential support for Wygant’s position. See, e.g., Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[S]tanding was neither challenged nor discussed in

that case, and we have repeatedly held that the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional

defects has no precedential effect.”); Univ. of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka, 715

S.W.3d 734, 744 (Tex. 2025); Ward v. Westerfield, 653 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Ky. 2022).12

In the context of racial gerrymandering challenges, the United States Supreme Court

has held that the denial of effective representation is a sufficiently concrete injury to

support a plaintiff’s standing to bring a district-specific challenge to a redistricting plan.

See Hays, 515 U.S. at 739. In Hays, the Court explained that racial classifications used in

redistricting may cause “representational harms” by causing “elected officials . . . to

believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of [the favored]

group, rather than their constituency as a whole.” Id. at 744 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509

U.S. 630, 648 (1993)). A voter residing in the allegedly gerrymandered district has standing

to challenge that gerrymander because he has personally suffered those representational

harms. Id. A voter residing outside that district, by contrast, lacks standing because he

“assert[s] only a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he or she

does not approve.” Id. at 745; see also Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 66 (2018). The harms

that underlie a racial gerrymandering claim “directly threaten a voter who lives in the

district attacked,” but “they do not so keenly threaten a voter who lives elsewhere in the

State.” Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 263 (2015).

This case of course is not a racial gerrymandering case. Still, Wygant’s alleged

representational injury in some respects resembles the representational harm that was at

issue in those cases. The split of Gibson County “fractured” the representation of that

county such that it is no longer represented by a single House member. This injury—the

denial of a single representative to represent all of Gibson County—is sufficiently “distinct

and palpable” to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. And Wygant is presently suffering

that injury—it occurred as soon as a representative was elected for Wygant’s new district.

12

In her separate opinion, Justice Kirby asserts that cases addressing the merits of redistricting

claims “implicitly” support standing even if they do not discuss that issue. But “implicit acquiescence” to

standing “ha[s] no precedential effect” either. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 845 n.7 (2025) (alteration

in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).

-26-

See Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 283 (noting that a plaintiff’s injury must be “actual or

imminent”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61)).

The Texas Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Abbott v. Mexican

American Legislative Caucus, Texas House of Representatives. 647 S.W.3d 681 (Tex.

2022). There, the plaintiff alleged that a redistricting map violated Texas’s so-called county

line rule in Article III, Section 26 of the Texas Constitution by “providing only one district

wholly contained within Cameron County even though the county’s population [was]

sufficient to support two such districts.” Id. at 687. The Texas Supreme Court concluded

that “Cameron County’s residents [were] being deprived of their right . . . to two

representatives fully devoted to serving the interests of those residents rather than the

residents of both Cameron County and a neighboring county.” Id. at 693. The court rejected

the notion that, because this harm was “shared among county residents,” it was a

“generalized grievance” that could not confer individual standing. Id. To amount to a

“generalized grievance,” the court explained, the harm must be “not only widely shared,

but . . . also of an abstract and indefinite nature.” Id. (quoting Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Akins,

524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998)). The harm alleged in that case—that Cameron County was

deprived of one of the whole representative districts to which it was entitled—was “not

abstract but quite specific.” Id. Here, too, the alleged harm is not abstract but specific: the

Gibson County split deprives Wygant of the full-county representation to which he is

entitled under Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution.13

We agree with the State, however, that this harm provides standing only for a

district-specific challenge, not a challenge to the entire House map. Because Wygant is a

resident of Gibson County in House District 79, the split of Gibson County injures him

directly. That injury allows him to challenge that split but nothing more. The map’s other

county splits do not injure Wygant, so he lacks standing to challenge them.

Wygant retorts that he must have standing to challenge the entire House map

because it is impossible to evaluate a single county split in isolation or to remedy a split

without revisiting the map as a whole. But that argument wrongly conflates injury with

remedy. See Gill, 585 U.S. at 67–68. The fact that resolving Wygant’s claim could require

13

Justice Tarwater’s separate opinion contends that Abbott is “easily distinguishable” because

voters in Cameron County suffered “classic ‘representational dilution.’” We struggle to see how the

representational injury in Abbott was materially different from the injury here. In both cases, a county was

divided to form legislative districts, allegedly depriving voters of a representative sufficiently devoted to

that county’s interests. See Abbott, 647 S.W.3d at 693 (explaining that “Cameron County’s residents are

being deprived of their right . . . to two representatives fully devoted to serving the interests of those

residents rather than the residents of both Cameron County and a neighboring county”). Cameron County

was split because its population was too large to comprise a single district, while Gibson County was split

because its population was too small. Whatever the reason for the split, the resulting injury was the same.

-27-

discussion of other parts of the map or that any remedy may entail redrawing lines in other

districts is irrelevant to the standing question. Standing focuses on a plaintiff’s injury, not

the merits of his claim or the scope of the remedy. See Metro. Gov’t of Nash. & Davidson

Cnty. v. Tenn. Dep’t of Educ., 645 S.W.3d 141, 148–50 (Tenn. 2022) (noting that standing

does not depend on the merits of a plaintiff’s claim); Gill, 585 U.S. at 68. As explained,

Wygant’s harm flows exclusively from the Gibson County split in House District 79. His

standing must be limited accordingly.

Wygant’s district-specific challenge also satisfies the second and third elements of

the City of Memphis standing test. His injury—the denial of full-county representation—is

fairly traceable to the Gibson County split and would be redressed by a favorable decision

here requiring elimination of the split.

b. Hunt’s Standing to Challenge the Senate Map

Hunt advances two slightly different theories for why she has standing to challenge

the Senate map. In her briefs, she asserted that the misnumbered district in Davidson

County injures her by “diluting the political weight of [her] vote as compared to the votes

of the citizens of the State’s other populous counties.” At oral argument, she framed her

injury as the loss of a staggered-term representative. Whether framed as vote dilution or

the loss of a staggered-term representative, Hunt’s purported injury is not the kind of

“distinct and palpable” injury necessary to establish standing.

Take her vote dilution theory. It is well settled that “the right of suffrage can be

denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as

by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555. Vote

dilution can occur when an apportionment scheme violates the one-person, one-vote

principle—that is, “the idea that each vote must carry equal weight.” Rucho v. Common

Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 709 (2019). In Baker v. Carr, for example, the United States Supreme

Court held that Tennessee voters in urban counties had standing to challenge an

apportionment scheme that allocated Senators and Representatives arbitrarily rather than

based on population. 369 U.S. at 207–08. The Court reasoned that the scheme “effect[ed]

a gross disproportion of representation to voting population,” which “disfavor[ed]” voters

in the urban counties where the plaintiffs resided. Id. at 207. Vote dilution also occurs when

a legislative district is gerrymandered in a way that reduces a minority group’s ability to

elect their preferred candidate—for instance, when a district is “cracked” so that there are

too few minority voters or “packed” so that minority votes are wasted. See, e.g., Gill, 585

U.S. at 66; Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 153.

Although Hunt describes her injury as vote dilution, it is in fact nothing of the sort.

The misnumbering of Davidson County’s Senate districts does not implicate the one-

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person, one-vote principle, which requires that representatives be allocated proportionate

to population. Nor does it involve gerrymandering that would dilute the voting strength of

an identifiable minority group. At bottom, Hunt’s complaint is simply that she lives in a

non-consecutively numbered Senate district, while other Tennessee voters do not. But that

difference does not affect the weight or strength of her vote, so it is not vote dilution.

Framing the injury instead as the denial of the right to vote for a staggered-term

representative does not help Hunt. To be sure, the consecutive numbering requirement of

Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution is designed to promote political stability

by preventing all the Senate positions in a particular county from turning over at the same

time. But even assuming that experiencing greater-than-usual turnover would constitute

the sort of “distinct and palpable” injury that suffices to establish standing, City of

Memphis, 414 S.W.3d at 98 (quoting Darnell, 195 S.W.3d at 620), Hunt has not shown

that this injury is “actual or imminent” in this case, Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 283

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). To the contrary, the record here shows that only one

of the three Davidson County Senate seats up for election in 2022 turned over. At best,

Hunt has established a mere possibility that this sort of harm could occur in the future. But

our precedents make clear that “conjectural” or “hypothetical” injuries are insufficient to

establish standing. City of Memphis, 414 S.W.3d at 98.

Other courts have allowed voters to challenge the misnumbering of a legislative

district when it caused a voter to wait longer than usual to vote. See, e.g., State ex rel.

Steinke v. Lautenbaugh, 642 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Neb. 2002) (concluding that voter had

standing to challenge renumbering of legislative districts where his vote was delayed). But

Hunt did not experience any delay here. The new map moved Hunt from District 18, which

voted for state senators in presidential election years, to District 17, which voted for state

senators in gubernatorial election years. Hunt thus had the opportunity to vote for a senate

candidate in 2020 and again in 2022. Her opportunity to vote was accelerated, not

delayed.14

In sum, Hunt has failed to prove that the misnumbering of Davidson County’s

Senate district caused her any “distinct and palpable” harm. Because she lacks standing to

challenge the Senate map, her claim is not justiciable and must be dismissed.

In her separate opinion, Justice Kirby disagrees with our conclusion that Hunt lacks

standing. In her view, a voter always has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the

14

We cite Steinke only as an example of a situation where standing might exist, not to prove that

standing is lacking here. We therefore see no need to respond to Justice Kirby’s inapt logical syllogisms

about the weather.

-29-

voter’s own voting district, regardless of the nature of the voter’s claim or alleged injury.

Respectfully, that approach would eviscerate the injury-in-fact requirement that applies in

public-rights cases under Wilmington Trust. Perhaps that is why Justice Kirby makes no

real attempt to reconcile her position with that precedent.

Rather than evaluate Hunt’s standing under Wilmington Trust and other controlling

precedents, Justice Kirby surveys redistricting cases from other jurisdictions and concludes

that allowing voters to challenge the constitutionality of their own voting districts is “the

norm in state redistricting jurisprudence.” As the partial dissent acknowledges, however,

some States have expressly granted voters standing by constitutional provision or statute.

And many redistricting cases addressed voters’ claims on the merits without first

considering whether they had standing.15 This is hardly a situation where we should follow

the national “norm” rather than adhere to our Tennessee-specific standing framework.

The partial dissent’s fleeting argument that Hunt satisfies Tennessee’s actual

standing framework fares no better. Justice Kirby maintains that Hunt suffered a concrete

injury because “[t]he redistricted map places [her] in a different Senate district with a new

senator whom she perceives as not connected to her county.” Yet even if that injury is

sufficiently distinct and palpable, it fails the causation and traceability elements of our

standing test because it has nothing to do with the consecutive numbering violation that

Hunt alleges. Recall that, to establish standing, a plaintiff must establish a “causal

connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct” and show that “the

alleged injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of the court.” Darnell,

195 S.W.3d at 620 (emphasis added). Hunt’s placement in a different Senate district,

represented by a different Senator, stems not from the misnumbering of her district but

from the larger redistricting process. Accordingly, a judgment in Hunt’s favor on her

consecutive-numbering claim would not redress that injury; it would merely require that

her new district be renumbered, not that she be returned to her old Senate district.16

The partial dissent’s attempt to equate Hunt’s injury with Wygant’s representational

harm also fails. Wygant’s representational harm was sufficient to establish standing

because he suffered a concrete injury when Gibson County was split and he was placed in

15

As explained above, cases in which “standing was neither challenged nor discussed” provide no

support for the partial dissent’s position that voters always have standing to challenge the constitutionality

of their own district. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352 n.2.

16

In Pereira v. Town of North Hempstead, 682 F. Supp. 3d 234, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2023), the plaintiff

alleged that the town violated the federal Constitution by arbitrarily swapping the numbers of two districts.

There was no dispute there that the causation and redressability elements of the standing test were satisfied,

because “the prior District lines would be restored” if the plaintiff prevailed. Id. at 241 n.6. That easily

distinguishes Pereira from this case.

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a fractured House district containing only part of Gibson County. He experienced not only

the legal injury of residing in an unconstitutional House district, but also the resulting

denial of effective representation. Hunt experienced only the legal injury of residing in a

misnumbered Senate district. She did not suffer any concrete factual injury from that

constitutional violation.

Justice Kirby maintains that, even if Hunt did not suffer concrete harm in the most

recent election, Hunt faces imminent injury in future elections because “we know for sure

that turnover in representation for District 17 and Davidson County” will occur “[o]ne way

or another” when the legislator eventually retires, resigns, gets voted out, or passes away.

That reasoning misunderstands the imminence requirement. An injury is imminent if it is

“certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). That

means that the injury must be “likely to occur soon,” not just that it will happen at some

unknown future time. FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). And

plaintiffs cannot rely on “statistical probability” alone to make that showing; rather, they

must set forth “specific facts” and “concrete details” to prove that injury is sufficiently

likely in the near future. Tenn. Conf. of NAACP v. Lee, 139 F.4th 557, 567–68 (6th Cir.

2025). Hunt failed to make that showing here.

Our conclusion that Hunt lacks standing to challenge the misnumbering of Senate

District 17 does not mean that violations of Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee

Constitution are immune from judicial review. Other plaintiffs—whether voters,

candidates, or public officials—may be able to establish standing based on different facts

in future cases.17 We hold only that Hunt lacks standing based on the record before us.

B. Wygant’s District Specific Challenge to the House Map

Before we evaluate the constitutionality of the Gibson County split in the House

plan, we must resolve a dispute between the parties regarding the legal standard and burden

of proof. We address that issue first and then turn to the merits of Wygant’s challenge.

1. Legal Standard

Wygant contends that our decision in Lockert I requires us to apply a burden-shifting

standard. The plaintiff has the burden to show that the challenged map divides a county.

The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the legislature made an honest and

17

Regardless, the concern that no one will have standing to bring a claim “is not a reason to find

standing.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 396 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the

War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)) (explaining that “some issues may be left to the political and democratic

processes”).

-31-

good-faith effort to cross as few lines as necessary to comply with federal law. If that

burden is met, then, under Lincoln County, the plaintiff must prove bad faith or improper

motive. The State contends that Lincoln County—not Lockert I—governs this district-

specific challenge and requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted in bad faith

or with an improper motive. According to the State, requiring the defendant to prove good

faith would conflict with the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to all legislative

action.

We begin by revisiting our previous decisions involving county-splitting challenges

to reapportionment statutes. The plaintiffs in Lockert I challenged the Senate

Reapportionment Act of 1981 on the ground that it crossed county lines in violation of

Article II, Section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution. 631 S.W.2d at 704. We acknowledged

in that case that, “[i]f there is an unavoidable conflict between federal and state

requirements . . . the state requirements become secondary to the necessity of complying

with the equal protection clause.” Id. at 708–09. But we instructed that “[t]he prohibition

against crossing county lines should be complied with insofar as is possible under equal

protection requirements.” Id. at 709. Although “a state constitutional provision may be

violated to an extent” to satisfy federal requirements, it “still must be given due

consideration and all possible effect.” Id. at 710.

Because the plaintiffs had “show[n] that the Act violates the state’s constitutional

prohibitions against crossing county lines,” the “burden [then] shifted to the defendants to

show that the Legislature was justified in passing a reapportionment act which crossed

county lines.” Id. at 714. We held that material questions of fact remained regarding

whether “the state made an honest and good faith effort to construct senatorial districts

which comply with both federal and state constitutions.” Id. We therefore reversed the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings.

Id.

The following year, in Lockert II, we considered county-splitting challenges to a

revised Senate reapportionment plan that was passed in 1982 and to the House

Reapportionment Act of 1981. The defendants in that case urged us to “reconsider our

holding” in Lockert I “that the State’s constitutional prohibition against crossing county

lines must be enforced insofar as is possible and that any apportionment plan adopted must

cross as few county lines as is necessary to comply with federal constitutional

requirements.” 656 S.W.2d at 838. We declined to do so. Moreover, we were “not

persuaded by . . . defendants’ arguments that we should sanction a single county line

violation not shown to be necessary to avoid a breach of federal constitutional

requirements.” Id. at 839.

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With respect to the Senate map, we held that the split of Washington County was

unconstitutional because it was done solely to avoid having two incumbents in the same

district, not to reduce the map’s population variance. Id. We also concluded that splits in

Knox, Davidson, and Shelby Counties could be reduced without risking noncompliance

with federal requirements. Id. at 839–41. We faulted the legislature for seeking to

“achiev[e] near perfection in responding to the one person, one vote federal mandate,”

explaining that “a constitutionally backed state policy of preserving county boundaries will

clearly be given high priority in the table of legitimate state policy considerations to justify

variances from the ideal.” Id. at 840. The House map, which split fifty-seven counties,

suffered from the same flaw. The Court found that it “was drafted with the objective of

achieving a very low percentage of total deviation” and that “virtually no effort was made

to comply” with Article II, Section 5. Id. at 842. We affirmed the trial court’s holdings

finding the Senate and House plans unconstitutional but made “slight modifications” to the

specific limitations the trial court had imposed when providing instructions for remedial

maps. Because the record in that case showed that it would be difficult to keep the total

population variance below 10%, we raised the variance limit from 10% to 14%. Id. at 844.

And although the trial court had imposed an upper limit of twenty-five county splits for the

House plan, we thought a limit of thirty counties was more appropriate. Id. But we added

two caveats to that limit: no single county could be divided more than once, and the four

urban counties could not be divided unless necessary to reduce a variance in an adjoining

district or to prevent minority vote dilution. Id.

Two years later, in Lincoln County, we considered a county-splitting challenge to

the House Reapportionment Act of 1984, which was passed in response to Lockert II.

Unlike Lockert I and Lockert II, which involved statewide challenges, the challenge in

Lincoln County “attacked only the division of Marshall County and sought a different

division of Lincoln County.” 701 S.W.2d at 603. There was “no question” in that case that

the reapportionment statute complied with the limits articulated in Lockert II. Id. Moreover,

a three-judge federal court had already held that the statute satisfied federal constitutional

requirements. Id. at 602–03. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants “offered any

testimony at trial” in the state action. Id. Instead, they presented the case “on a stipulation

of facts,” with each side “insist[ing] that the other had the burden of proof.” Id. at 603.

We reversed the trial court’s judgment that held the Lincoln County split

unconstitutional. Id. at 604. We deemed the proof “insufficient” to support that holding,

noting that the plaintiffs “ha[d] offered no evidence to demonstrate bad faith by the General

Assembly or to establish deliberate gerrymandering.” Id. at 603. Taken together, the federal

court’s holding that the House plan satisfied federal requirements and the parties’

agreement that the plan satisfied Lockert II persuaded us “that it would be improper to set

aside individual district lines on the ground that they theoretically might have been drawn

more perfectly, in the absence of any proof whatever of bad faith or improper motives.” Id.

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at 604. We cautioned that “to permit separate, minute piecemeal attacks” on a

reapportionment plan “would involve both the courts and the General Assembly in needless

and protracted litigation over a subject for which the General Assembly has principal

responsibility and in which it has primary authority.” Id.

Two years after that, in Lockert III—otherwise known as “chapter three in the

tortured history of the intractable reapportionment problem”—we considered a claim

alleging that the Senate Reapportionment Act of 1984 was unconstitutional because it split

Shelby County. 729 S.W.2d at 89. Although the plaintiffs had argued that the county was

split to “serve the interests of incumbents,” they presented no proof on that issue. Id. at 90.

The defendants, on the other hand, presented testimony that if a portion of Shelby County

were not combined with Tipton and Lauderdale Counties, the map for all of West

Tennessee and some of Middle Tennessee would have to be redrawn, potentially affecting

a majority-minority district in Davidson County. Id. Based on that evidence, we affirmed

the trial court’s finding that the legislature “had acted in good faith in its efforts to comply

with both federal and state constitutions” in enacting the 1984 Senate plan. Id.

It is understandable that the trial court panel was unsure what legal standard and

burden of proof to apply to Wygant’s claim. We made no attempt in Lincoln County to

reconcile the bad-faith standard we applied there with the burden-shifting approach we

applied in Lockert I. Nevertheless, three clear principles emerge from our precedents that

must inform our consideration of the appropriate legal standard.

First, the provisions of the Tennessee Constitution that prohibit the General

Assembly from dividing counties when apportioning the number of representatives and

senators into multi-county districts—Sections 5 and 6 of Article II, respectively—must be

enforced to the extent they are not preempted by conflicting federal constitutional or

statutory requirements. As we put it in Lockert I, “where necessary to meet federal

constitutional requirements, a state constitutional provision may be violated to an extent,

but still must be given due consideration and all possible effect.” 631 S.W.2d at 710; see

also id. at 715 (“[T]he plan adopted must cross as few county lines as is necessary to

comply with the federal constitutional requirements.”). This principle is consistent with

federal preemption doctrine: when a federal law preempts state law because of a conflict

between the two, “state law is displaced only ‘to the extent that it actually conflicts with

federal law.’” Dalton v. Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996) (quoting

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.

190, 204 (1983)).

Second, notwithstanding its obligation to comply with the Tennessee Constitution,

the State must be afforded discretion in determining how best to thread the needle between

conflicting federal and state requirements. The mere fact that district lines “theoretically

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might have been drawn more perfectly” will not justify “set[ting] aside individual district

lines.” Lincoln Cnty., 701 S.W.2d at 604; see also Moore v. State, 436 S.W.3d 775, 788

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (“A redistricting plan will not be set aside on constitutional grounds

merely because a slightly ‘better’ plan can be devised . . . .”). Our Constitution gives the

legislature “principal responsibility” and “primary authority” for redistricting. Lincoln

Cnty., 701 S.W.2d at 604; see also Tenn. Const. art. II, § 4. The legislature’s exercise of

that authority is not wholly immune from judicial oversight, but the judiciary should not

micromanage the legislature or be too quick to second-guess the legislature’s decisions in

this exceedingly complex process. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915–16 (1995)

(acknowledging that “[e]lectoral districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures” and

admonishing courts to be “sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a

legislature’s redistricting calculus”).

Third, courts must “presume that acts of the legislature are constitutional” and

“‘indulge every doubt in favor of constitutionality.’” Gilliam v. Gerragano, --- S.W.3d ---,

2025 WL 617603, *4 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2025) (first citing Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455,

459 (Tenn. 2003); and then quoting Lynch, 205 S.W.3d at 390); see also Fisher v. Hargett,

604 S.W.3d 381, 397 (Tenn. 2020); Willeford v. Klepper, 597 S.W.3d 454, 465 (Tenn.

2020). It is well settled that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute “bears

[the] heavy burden of overcoming that presumption.” Helms v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 987

S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tenn. 1999); Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at 460.

Given this presumption of constitutionality, we must reject Wygant’s proposed

burden-shifting standard, which would require the State to prove that it made an honest and

good-faith effort to enact a redistricting plan that crosses as few lines as necessary. The

presumption of constitutionality requires that the burden of proof in a redistricting

challenge—whether statewide or district-specific—remains at all times on the party

challenging the statute. We therefore overrule Lockert I to the extent it adopted such a

burden-shifting approach.

So what exactly must Wygant show to establish the unconstitutionality of the

Gibson County split? Because federal law preempts the Tennessee Constitution’s county-

splitting provisions in part, it is not enough to simply show that a reapportionment plan

divides counties. The county-splitting provisions “may be violated” to the extent necessary

to meet federal constitutional requirements. Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d at 710. That means a

plaintiff must, at a minimum, present evidence that the challenged split or splits were not

necessary to comply with federal law. Ordinarily, a plaintiff will meet this burden by

presenting an alternative map that divides fewer counties and satisfies federal

requirements. In a district-specific challenge, the alternative map should split fewer

counties total and eliminate the specific splits being challenged.

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But because we must give the legislature leeway to carry out its reapportionment

responsibilities without constant judicial second-guessing, proof that a map “might have

been drawn more perfectly” will not by itself establish a constitutional violation. Moore,

436 S.W.3d at 788. The plaintiff’s ultimate burden “is not to establish that some other

preferable plan exists, but to demonstrate the absence of a rational or legitimate basis for

the challenged plan’s failure to satisfy” state constitutional requirements. In re

Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor, & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 327 (Vt.

1993). If the legislature’s reconciliation of conflicting federal and state requirements “is

fairly debatable and not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted,” the

legislature’s plan must be upheld. Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 108 (Va. 2002).

Our past redistricting decisions framed the inquiry as whether the legislature made

“an honest and good faith effort” to split as few lines as necessary, Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d

at 714, or instead acted with “bad faith or improper motive,” Lincoln Cnty., 701 S.W.2d at

604. We overrule those precedents to the extent they require courts to assess the subjective

motivations of the legislature in a county-splitting challenge. Determining whether a

collective body such as the legislature acted in good faith is difficult in any circumstance,

but it is especially challenging in the redistricting context, where the legislature’s decisions

are often based on a host of competing considerations.18

To sum up: a plaintiff challenging a state reapportionment statute based on the

county-splitting provisions in Sections 5 and 6 of Article II of the Tennessee Constitution

bears the burden of proving that the challenged split or splits were unnecessary to satisfy

federal requirements. If that burden is met, the plaintiff must also prove that the

legislature’s decision to split the county was not rationally or legitimately related to

achieving compliance with federal law.

2. Constitutionality of the Gibson County Split

The trial court panel held that Wygant’s challenge to the Gibson County split under

Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution failed. Applying the standard explained

above, we reach the same conclusion.

18

This holding does not foreclose Tennessee’s courts from examining good faith in other

redistricting challenges based on the federal Equal Protection Clause. See Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579,

603 (2018) (explaining that a plaintiff bringing a racial gerrymandering claim must overcome the

presumption of good faith by proving discriminatory intent); Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,

578 U.S. 253, 258 (2016) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires States to ‘make

an honest and good faith effort to construct [legislative] districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is

practicable.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577)).

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It is undisputed that the House map divided Gibson County to form House Districts

79 and 82. At trial, Wygant’s expert presented Map 13d_e as evidence that the House map

divided more counties than necessary to comply with federal constitutional requirements.

Map 13d_e split only twenty-four counties, six fewer than the enacted House map, but it

did not split Gibson County. And it achieved a population variance of 9.89%—.01% less

than the enacted House map— while maintaining the same number of majority-minority

districts. Wygant thus proved that the legislature could have complied with federal law

without dividing Gibson County. Notably, however, Wygant’s expert did not present Map

13d_e until well after the legislative session ended and more than a year into this litigation,

and only after the State’s experts identified constitutional problems with earlier alternative

maps.

Although Wygant established that the legislature could have drawn a more perfect

map, he failed to prove that the State’s decision to split Gibson County was not rationally

or legitimately related to achieving compliance with federal redistricting requirements. The

record here overwhelmingly establishes that the legislature split Gibson County in an effort

to comply with the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA.

Tennessee’s population grew by nearly 9% between 2010 and 2020, to nearly seven

million residents. Each of Tennessee’s ninety-nine House districts would need a population

of 69,806 to achieve equal population. But the population growth that occurred between

2010 and 2020 was uneven, with suburban counties in Middle Tennessee experiencing

double digit growth and many counties in West and East Tennessee losing population.

Because of this uneven growth, many existing districts fell above or below the ideal

population size. To even things out, the legislature needed to move three House seats from

the West and East “toward Middle Tennessee.”

Because Gibson County’s new population of 50,429 was too small to form a single

district, it had to be attached to a neighboring county. The legislature considered leaving

Gibson County whole and combining it with a portion of Madison County, to its south, but

that option presented VRA concerns. In 1998, a federal court held that a previous House

map violated section 2 of the VRA by diluting the votes of minority voters in rural West

Tennessee. See Rural W. Tenn. Afr. Am. Affs. Council, Inc. v. Sundquist, 29 F. Supp. 2d

448, 462–63 (W.D. Tenn. 1998). Himes testified that Madison County’s existing voting

districts had been formed in response to that litigation, so adjusting those boundaries would

present a risk of new VRA litigation.

The other contiguous counties that could theoretically be combined with Gibson

County were Carroll, Crockett, Dyer, Obion, or Weakley Counties. But combining all of

Gibson County with the entirety of one of these other counties would not achieve a district

with ideal population size. For example, combining Gibson County’s population of 50,429

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with the least populous of these counties—Crockett County, which has a population of

13,391—would still fall short of the ideal population size. And combining Gibson County

with any of the other counties would lead to a district above the ideal population size.19

In light of Madison County’s VRA concerns and the need to achieve equal

population, Himes determined that Gibson County must be combined with another county

or counties, and that at least one of those counties would need to be divided. The legislature

ultimately decided to divide Gibson County. Although another county conceivably could

have been divided instead, the legislature could split Gibson County while keeping most

of its municipalities in District 79. This configuration also benefitted Carroll County.

Carroll County had been divided in the 2012 plan, and by splitting Gibson County the

legislature could maintain the same district boundary within Carroll County.

Faced with the “complex interplay of forces” that must necessarily “enter a

legislature’s redistricting calculus,” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915, Tennessee’s General

Assembly acted rationally in deciding to divide Gibson County. That decision left Madison

County’s boundaries intact, avoiding additional VRA litigation. And it achieved equal

population while keeping most of Gibson County’s municipalities in the same district and

maintaining Carroll County’s existing within-county boundary. These considerations were

undoubtedly legitimate.

Wygant points out that Himes repeatedly advised the House Redistricting

Committee—incorrectly—that it could divide up to thirty counties under Lockert II. To the

extent that either Himes or the legislature understood our decision in Lockert II as creating

a thirty-county safe harbor for county splitting, that understanding was incorrect. The

guidelines we provided in Lockert II were based on the specific evidence presented in that

case, including population figures that are no longer accurate and alternative plans that

addressed the unique concerns at issue there. See Rural W. Tenn. Afr.-Am. Affs. Council,

Inc., 836 F. Supp. at 450–51 (“[N]owhere in the Lockert II opinion does the court purport

to establish an absolute numerical standard, applicable in all redistricting contexts.”). But

that misunderstanding—by itself—does not establish that the legislature lacked a rational

or legitimate basis for dividing Gibson County. As explained above, the record proves that

the legislature’s decision to split the county was based on legitimate considerations.

In sum, Wygant failed to prove that the legislature lacked a rational or legitimate

basis for dividing Gibson County. We therefore hold that Wygant’s district-specific

challenge to the House apportionment statute under Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee

Constitution fails. And we affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to that claim.

19

Carroll County’s population was 28,400; Dyer County’s population was 36,801; Obion County’s

population was 30,787; and Weakley County’s population was 32,902.

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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse in part. We agree with the

trial court’s conclusion that Wygant has standing to bring a district-specific challenge to

the House reapportionment statute, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing that

claim because Wygant failed to prove that the Gibson County split is unconstitutional. We

reverse the trial court’s holding that Hunt had standing to challenge the Senate

reapportionment plan, and we vacate the trial court’s judgment to the extent it held that

plan unconstitutional. Finally, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

_____________________________

SARAH K. CAMPBELL, JUSTICE

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