HILL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND HILL, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-5678

:

JUDGE MARC J. LIBERMAN, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

PADOVA, J. DECEMBER 8, 2025

Plaintiff Raymond Hill, a pretrial detainee, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge Marc Lieberman,

the West Chester Police Department, three of the department’s officers (Officer Douglas Gilbert,

Officer Aaron Diefenderfer, and Officer Turner), the public defender who was appointed to his

state criminal case (P.J. Redmond), and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.1 (ECF No. 3 at 2.)

Hill seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (See ECF Nos. 1 and 2.) For the following

reasons, the Court will grant Hill leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss his Complaint in

part pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and stay the remaining claims pursuant to the

principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

1 Hill misspelled the judge’s name in his Complaint as “Liberman;” the correct spelling is

“Lieberman.”

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

Hill is a pretrial detainee incarcerated at Chester County Prison awaiting trial on three

criminal matters pending against him in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. See

Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-CR-0001493-2024 (C.P. Chester); Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-

CR-0001496-2024 (C.P. Chester); Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-CR-0002396-2024 (C.P.

Chester). Trial on the pending criminal charges in those cases is currently scheduled for

December 8, 2025. See, e.g., Docket, Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-CR-0002396-2024 (C.P.

Chester), at 3 of 16. Hill’s claims in the instant case apparently pertain to the charges against

him in Docket Number CP-15-CR-0002396-2024. (ECF No. 3-1 at 10.) Hill states that he was

arrested on May 3, 2024, while he stood next to his vehicle in a parking lot waiting for a friend to

return from a nearby store. (Compl. at 3.) Two West Chester police officers approached him

with weapons drawn. (Id.) The officers allegedly told Hill that they were placing him under

arrest pursuant to a felony warrant. (Id.) Hill claims that, sixteen months after the arrest, he

requested a search of records with the Chester County Court Record Room and the search

yielded no records of arrest warrants for him in Chester County. (Id.) Hill also later requested

body cam footage of the arrest and claims that the Chester County Prison possesses the thumb

drive containing the video. (Id. at 4.)

At the time of Hill’s arrest on May 3, officers seized his vehicle and towed it to the West

Chester large evidence room. (Id. at 3.) Police obtained a search warrant of the car, either on

2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Hill’s handwritten

Complaint (“Compl.”) and attached documents. (See ECF No. 3.) The Court deems the entire

submission to constitute the Complaint and adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF

docketing system. The Court may also consider matters of public record when conducting a

screening under § 1915. Castro-Mota v. Smithson, Civ. A. No. 20-940, 2020 WL 3104775, at *1

n.3 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2020) (citing Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.

2006)).

May 4 or 5, 2024. (Id. at 3-4.) He asserts that the West Chester Police Department never

provided paperwork about the vehicle, and he does not know where it is located. (Id. at 5.)

Hill maintains that he told the public defender appointed to his case, Attorney Redmond,

that he should have received a copy of the arrest warrant no later than one day after his

preliminary arraignment pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 515, but he did

not. (Id. at 5.) Hill claims that Redmond informed him that “we don’t go by [the] arrest warrant

to lock you up in Chester County.” (Id. at 5-6.) Redmond allegedly “did nothing” about the

Fourth Amendment violation. (Id. at 4.) Hill filed a motion in April 2025 to remove Redmond

from his case due to ineffective assistance of counsel, but the court denied his motion. (Id. at 6.)

Judge Lieberman set his bail at $750,000, although, Hill alleges, he was falsely arrested. (Id. at

4.) Hill asked Redmond to file a motion for modification of bail, but Redmond never scheduled

a pretrial hearing. (Id. at 6.) Presumably referring to a possible plea deal, Hill asserts that

Redmond kept telling him to “take the deal” because “the DA is a sweetheart of [his].” (Id. at 6.)

Hill also submitted a complaint about Redmond with the Judicial Board of Conduct on June 11,

2025, but it was denied. (Id.)

Hill filed this civil action asserting violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment

rights based on his arrest and prosecution. (Id. at 2-3.) He claims that, as a result of the

allegedly false arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, he has lost his home and all his lifetime

possessions, except for the clothes he was wearing when arrested. (Id. at 4.) Hill’s relationship

with his 22-year-old son has deteriorated due to Hill’s incarceration, and he is suffering from

depression, mental anguish, and extreme paranoia due to his treatment by the West Chester

Police Department. (Id. at 4-5.) As relief, Hill seeks injunctive relief in the form of release from

imprisonment and that the police officers and judge be terminated from employment. (Id. at 5.)

He also requests $20 million in damages. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Hill leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he

does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether

a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher

v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). See also

Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the

Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences

in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a

plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on

other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory

allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Hill is proceeding pro se, the Court

construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala

v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

3 Because Hill is currently incarcerated, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in

installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

IV. DISCUSSION

Hill alleges constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. The

vehicle by which constitutional claims may be asserted in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)

(citations omitted).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs” to be liable. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also

Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government official,

his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” (emphasis in

original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677)); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).

A. Improper Claims for Relief

The Court will dismiss Hill’s requests for injunctive relief, which seek his release from

imprisonment based on pending state criminal charges and ask that the police officers and judge

be terminated from their employment. (See Compl. at 5.) First, Hill’s claims challenging his

imprisonment because of alleged constitutional violations must be pursued in a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus because they are not cognizable in a civil rights action. See Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty.

Prosecutor’s Off., 695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]o the extent Jaffery

seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, such relief is

only available through a writ of habeas corpus.” (citation omitted)); Duran v. Weeks, 399 F.

App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that Duran is seeking dismissal of

the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is essentially asking for relief

only available through habeas corpus.” (citation omitted)); see generally Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (stating that when a prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration

of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to

immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ

of habeas corpus”). Accordingly, to the extent Hill raises claims for relief in this civil rights case

that seek to challenge his imprisonment on pending state criminal charges, he has failed to state a

claim. Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[W]henever a plaintiff pleads a

violation of § 1983 and effectively seeks habeas relief, the plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim.

Instead, the prisoner’s only federal remedy is through a writ of habeas corpus after exhausting

state remedies.”). Furthermore, to the extent that Hill wants the police officers and judge to be

terminated from their employment, the Court has no authority to order such relief in a Section

1983 civil rights case. See Hall v. Carny, Civ. A. No. 22-4094, 2023 WL 187569, at *1 n.3

(E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2023) (dismissing with prejudice the request that defendant be terminated from

his employment); Buskirk v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, Civ. A. No. 22-1826, 2022 WL

4542094, at *2 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2022) (construing plaintiff’s request for the court to

terminate the defendants’ employment as seeking injunctive relief and holding that the court has

no authority to terminate the employment of a state employee (citations omitted)). Hill’s claims

for relief on both grounds will be dismissed.

B. Claim Against Judge Lieberman

Hill asserts that Judge Lieberman set his bail at $750,000 “in a case [in which Hill] was

falsely arrested.” (Compl. at 4.) To the extent that Hill alleges a § 1983 claim against the judge,

it will be dismissed because Judge Lieberman is entitled to absolute immunity. Judges are

entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims based on their acts or omissions taken

within their judicial capacity, as long as they do not act in complete absence of all jurisdiction.

See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (citation omitted); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F.

App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199

(1985)). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a

judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Because judges must

feel free to act without fear of incurring personal liability for their actions in court, judicial

immunity remains in force even if the actions are alleged to be legally incorrect, in bad faith,

malicious, or corrupt, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are taken as a result of a

conspiracy with others, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1980). Likewise, “grave

procedural errors,” “conduct[ing] a proceeding in an informal and ex parte manner,” or acting

“unfair[ly] or controversial[ly]” will not defeat absolute judicial immunity. Gallas, 211 F.3d at

769 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Hill’s sole apparent claim against Judge Lieberman is that he set bail in a case where Hill

was allegedly falsely arrested. (Compl. at 4.) But this claim clearly arises from determinations

made in Judge Lieberman’s judicial capacity where he unquestionably could exercise jurisdiction

as a Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44

(3d Cir. 2000) (“Generally, . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is

sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111,

1122 (6th Cir. 1997))). Accordingly, Hill’s claim against Judge Lieberman for money damages

is barred by judicial immunity and will be dismissed. Friend v. Vann, 614 F. App’x 593, 596 (3d

Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Friend’s allegations against Judge Vann stem from her signing an

arrest warrant and presiding over the trial of one of Friend’s acquaintances. These are official

acts, which were not taken in the absence of jurisdiction, for which she is immune from suit.”);

Mendoza v. Larotonda, 270 F. App’x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Judge Larotonda is

immune from suit for issuing the bench warrant against Mendoza because judges enjoy a

comparatively sweeping form of immunity for official acts taken in their functional capacity as

judges.” (quotation omitted)).

C. Claims Against Attorney Redmond

Hill’s civil rights claims against Redmond for his actions as Hill’s counsel in the state

criminal case are not plausible because a public defender acting within his role as counsel is not

a state actor for the purposes of Section 1983. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)

(“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s

traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”). “Attorneys

performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of

their position as officers of the court.” Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277

(3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Clark v. Punshon, 516 F. App’x 97, 98-99 (3d Cir.

2013) (per curiam) (concluding that court-appointed attorney was not a state actor for purposes

of § 1983); Webb v. Chapman, 852 F. App’x 659, 660 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“[A]ttorneys

representing individuals in criminal proceedings generally are not state actors for purposes of §

1983.”). Because Redmond was not a state actor when he represented Hill in his criminal action,

he is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the claims against him will be dismissed

with prejudice.

D. Claims Against the West Chester Police Department

Hill claims that West Chester Police Department did not provide him with paperwork

following the seizure of his car, and he generally states that he is fearful of the Department.

(Compl. at 4-5.) But these claims cannot proceed because the West Chester Police Department

is not a proper defendant under § 1983. Following the decision in Monell v. Department. of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), courts concluded that a police department is a sub-

unit of the local government and, as such, is merely a vehicle through which the municipality

fulfills its policing functions. See e.g. Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79

(W.D. Pa. 1993) (citations omitted). Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a

police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not. Id.; Martin v. Red Lion

Police Dep’t, 146 F. App’x. 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (stating that police

department is not a proper defendant in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is a

sub-division of its municipality (citing Johnson, 834 F. Supp. at 878-79)); Bonenberger v.

Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and

its police department as a single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability” (citing Colburn v.

Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 671 n.7 (3d Cir.1988)); Hadesty v. Rush Twp. Police Dep’t,

Civ. A. No. 14-2319, 2016 WL 1039063, at *9 n.4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2016) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the West Chester Police Department and any claims alleged against it will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

E. Claims Against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Although Hill names the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a Defendant, states are not

considered “persons” for purposes of Section 1983 lawsuits. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Furthermore, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is immune

from suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment and has not waived that immunity

for lawsuits filed in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

100 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or

departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” (citations

omitted)); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pennsylvania has

not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.”); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§

8521-22. Accordingly, the claims for money damages Hill seeks to assert against the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not proceed.

F. Claims Stayed Pursuant to Younger

Hill asserts Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious

prosecution (see Compl. at 3), but, critical to the analysis here, Hill’s state criminal prosecutions

are ongoing. He awaits trial on the state criminal charges at the basis of this civil action,

currently scheduled to begin on December 8, 2025. See Hill, CP-15-CR-0002396-2024. Under

Younger abstention principles, this Court has an obligation to abstain from considering cases

“that would interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of

State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77-

78 (2013); Younger, 401 US. 31). When assessing whether Younger abstention is appropriate,

the Court “proceeds in two sequential stages.” Greco v. Bruck, No. 21-1035, 2022 WL 1515375,

at *2 (3d Cir. May 13, 2022). At the first stage, the Court must examine the underlying state

court litigation to determine whether it falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) criminal

prosecutions, (2) quasi-criminal state civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) “civil proceedings

involving orders in furtherance of the state courts’ judicial function.” See PDX N., Inc. v.

Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting

ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F. 3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2014)); ACRA Turf Club, 748

F.3d at 138 (“[T]he threshold requirement for applying Younger abstention is that the state civil

enforcement proceeding must be ‘quasi-criminal’ in nature” (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81)).

Because Hill’s criminal prosecution is the underlying state court litigation here, the first stage of

the analysis is met.

At the second stage, courts consider three factors articulated by the Supreme Court in

Middlesex County. Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432

(1982),4 whether: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding

“implicates important state interests”; and (3) “there is an adequate opportunity . . . to raise

constitutional challenges” in the state proceeding. See PDX N., 978 F.3d at 883 (quoting

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432). Each of these factors is satisfied here. First,

publicly available dockets reflect that there is an ongoing criminal prosecution in the Court of

Common Pleas in Chester County. Second, the state proceedings implicate the important interest

of enforcing the Commonwealth’s criminal laws. Third, Hill has an opportunity to raise his

constitutional challenges to the validity of the charges against him in the state proceedings. See

Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 40-41 (3d Cir. 2017) (Younger applied

where “[t]here are ongoing state criminal proceedings in the Superior Court of New Jersey that

are judicial in nature, the state proceedings implicate the important state interest in prosecuting

criminal behavior, and the state proceedings provide [the § 1983 plaintiff] an opportunity to raise

federal constitutional defenses to prosecution”); Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670-71 (3d

4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that when the state

court proceeding is quasi-criminal, the Middlesex factors must be met, but when the state-court

proceedings are criminal, it is not necessary to consider the Middlesex factors. See Samaritano v.

New Jersey, No. 24-1889, 2025 WL 1554932, at *2 n.1 (3d Cir. June 2, 2025). In an abundance

of caution, the Court will nonetheless consider the Middlesex factors.

Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining that Younger requires only an opportunity to present federal

claims in state court, and the burden rests with plaintiff to show that state procedural law bars

presentation of the claims (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1987)).

Further, Hill has not alleged, nor is there anything in the Complaint to suggest, that his claims

fall within any of the narrow exceptions to the Younger doctrine. See Stagliano v. Coll, No. 22-

2691, 2023 WL 3943732, at *4 (3d Cir. June 12, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming application of

Younger doctrine where plaintiff failed to plausibly plead that the state criminal proceedings

were “being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment,” or some other extraordinary

circumstances existed (quoting Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Because the state criminal proceeding affords Hill an opportunity to raise his

constitutional challenges, and because the claims raised in the instant civil action appear to

implicate rulings that will likely be made in the state proceeding, the Court will stay the

remainder of this case until that proceeding has resolved.5 See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

393-94 (2007) (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any

other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it

is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil

action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” (citations omitted));

Rex v. Fisher, No. 12-4045, 2012 WL 3537846, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2012) (staying false

arrest and illegal search claims for damages in light of pending criminal prosecution when

plaintiff “ha[d] the opportunity to raise his Fourth-Amendment challenges in the course of his

5 In the future, when the Younger stay is lifted, the Court may conduct additional

screening of the remaining claims in the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(i)-(iii) (providing

that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the complaint is

frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks damages from an

immune defendant).

criminal proceeding.”); Zimmerman v. Leek, Civ. A. No. 23-220, 2024 WL 3695334, at *3 (W.D.

Pa. July 18, 2024) (holding that, because plaintiff was still awaiting trial on underlying arrest, his

false arrest, false imprisonment, illegal search and seizure, and malicious prosecution claims

were subject to Younger abstention), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3691889

(W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2024); see also Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 855 (3d Cir. 2023)

(“[D]ismissal of a damages claim on abstention grounds is no longer permissible.” (citation

omitted)).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Hill’s Motion to Proceed in forma

pauperis. All claims against Judge Lieberman, Attorney P.D. Redmond, the West Chester Police

Department, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Hill’s requests for release from custody and the termination of

certain Defendants’ employment will also be dismissed with prejudice. The dismissal of his

claims seeking release from imprisonment does not preclude Hill from challenging his criminal

charges in state court or, if appropriate, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after

exhausting state remedies. The relief sought in Hill’s “Notice” at ECF No. 6 will be denied

without prejudice.6 All further proceedings with respect to the remaining claims in this matter,

6 In ECF No. 6, Hill seeks to amend his Complaint to add Chester County Prison and its

Warden as Defendants. Hill cannot proceed in this fashion because the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure do not contemplate piecemeal pleadings or the amalgamation of pleadings, even in the

context of a pro se litigant. See Bryant v. Raddad, Civ. A. No. 21-1116, 2021 WL 2577061, at

*2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021) (“Allowing a plaintiff to file partial amendments or fragmented

supplements to the operative pleading, ‘presents an undue risk of piecemeal litigation that

precludes orderly resolution of cognizable claims.’” (quoting Uribe v. Taylor, Civ. A. No. 10-

2615, 2011 WL 1670233, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2011)); Brooks-Ngwenya v. Bart Peterson’s

the Mind Tr., No. 16-cv-193, 2017 WL 65310, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2017) (“Piecemeal

pleadings cause confusion and unnecessarily complicate interpretation of a movant’s allegations

and intent[] . . . .”). If Hill wants to amend his complaint, he must do so consistent with the

including the screening of Hill’s remaining claims for damages, will be stayed pursuant to

Younger, 401 U.S. 37. Hill may move to lift the stay when his state court criminal proceeding is

finally resolved, including any appeals. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John R. Padova, J.

__________________________________________

JOHN R. PADOVA, J.

Court’s order. Additionally, to the extent Hill seeks to add the Chester County Prison as a

defendant, the Prison is not a proper party to a § 1983 action because it is not a “person.”

Edwards v. Bucks Cnty. Corr. Facility, Civ. A. No. 19-4923, 2019 WL 5579486, at *2 (E.D. Pa.

Oct. 29, 2019) (“Bucks County Correctional Facility is not an entity susceptible to suit under §

1983.”); see also Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, Civ. A. No. 09-6014, 2010 WL

2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010). Moreover, Hill has not alleged any factual bases for

establishing that the Warden was personally involved in the events that give rise to his claims, as

would be required to state a claim against the Warden. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.