Mahone

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANDRE JUSTIN ALLEN )

MAHONE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-127-RAH-CWB

)

WAYNE SANDERSON FARMS, )

LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Andre Justin Allen Mahone filed this lawsuit against Wayne Sanderson

Farms, LLC (WSF) asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“RICO”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All of

Plaintiff’s claims center upon his employment with WSF between 2018 and 2022

and his attempt to get rehired in July 2024. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he

faced discrimination, retaliation, and termination during his time working for WSF.

After WSF moved to dismiss, the Magistrate Judge issued a Recommendation

(doc. 36) on September 22, 2025, that the motion be granted. Plaintiff subsequently

filed a timely objection, (doc. 38), WSF then filed a response, (doc. 41), and Plaintiff

filed a reply to the response. (Doc. 42.) The Recommendation is now ripe for review.

When a party objects to a magistrate judge's recommendation, the district

court must review the disputed portions de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive

further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De novo review requires that the district court independently

consider factual issues based on the record. See Jeffrey S. ex rel. Ernest S. v. State

Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Gopie,

347 F. App'x 495, 499 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009). However, objections to a magistrate

judge's recommendation must be sufficiently specific in order to warrant de novo

review. See Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 783-85 (11th Cir. 2006).

Otherwise, a recommendation is reviewed for clear error. See id. And when a party

chooses to raise an argument for the first time at the objection phase, rather than

allowing the magistrate judge to consider it for report and recommendation, it is

within the district court’s discretion to consider those arguments. See Stephens v.

Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Holstick,

810 F. App’x 732, 735 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing a district court’s broad discretion

whether to consider an argument first raised at the objection phase and after the

magistrate judge submitted the report and recommendation).

To begin, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to

dismiss his Title VII retaliation claim. In his Amended Complaint (doc. 19), Plaintiff

alleges that as a result of engaging in protected activity during his employment with

WSF between 2018 and 2022, he was denied rehire in July 2024. “To establish a

prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) he

engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment

action; and (3) there is some causal relation between the two events.” McMillian v.

Postmaster Gen., U.S. Postal Serv., 634 F. App’x 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001)).

While Plaintiff correctly points out that causation is not always synonymous

with timing, Plaintiff has alleged no other conduct evidencing a retaliatory motive

in WSF’s actions. As such, the only factual allegations Plaintiff has given to suggest

retaliation is the temporal proximity between his alleged protected activity and

WSF’s actions. In such a case, “mere temporal proximity, without more, must be

‘very close.’” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). As a

result, “in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, if there is a

substantial delay between the protected expression and the adverse action, the

complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.” Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (citing

Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Here, the protected activity occurred between 2018 and 2022, the time-period

in which Plaintiff was employed by WSF. However, the failure to rehire did not

occur until July 2024. Thus, at best, the time-period between the protected activity

and the retaliatory conduct was almost two years. As such, without more, Plaintiff

has not sufficiently pleaded a “casual relation between the two events.” McMillian,

634 F. App’x at 277. See also Gilliam v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affs., 822 F. App’x

985, 990 (11th Cir. 2020) (three-month gap is not close enough); Brown v. Alabama

Dept. of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1182 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Thomas v. Cooper

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (same).

Next, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to dismiss

his Title VII sex discrimination claim. To establish a prima facie case for failure to

rehire based on sex, Plaintiff must show that “(1) [he is] a member of a protected

class, (2) [he was] qualified for a position and applied for it, (3) [he was] not

considered for the position despite [his] qualifications, and (4) equally or less

qualified individuals outside of [his] protected class were considered or hired for the

position.” Underwood v. Perry Cnty. Comm’n., 431 F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir. 2005).

While Plaintiff is a member of a protected class (Newport News Shipbuilding

& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983) (holding that Title VII protects

men as well as women), he has failed to provide sufficient factual allegations

showing the qualifications for the jobs for which he applied, whether he met those

qualifications, or that there was a less qualified individual outside of his protected

class that was hired for the position. The only thing Plaintiff has alleged is the

conclusory allegation that WSF “denied rehire based on his sex while favoring

similarly situated female applicants.” (Doc. 19 at ¶ 24). This is not enough to

plausibly state a Title VII sex discrimination claim and survive a motion to dismiss.

See Hopkins v. Saint Lucie Cnty. Sch. Bd., 399 F. App’x 563, 566 (11th Cir. 2010)

(dismissing discrimination claim because complaint failed to allege facts suggesting

that defendant treated others outside of plaintiff’s protected class more favorably).

Third, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to dismiss

his ADA retaliation claim. The analysis of a retaliation claim under the ADA is the

same as Title VII. See Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1291–92 (11th Cir.

2002) (“first, the plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected conduct; second, the

plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and finally, the adverse action was

causally related to the protected expression.” (quoting Farley v. Nationwide Mutual

Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff alleges that he “reported

injury-related issues and requested reasonable accommodations under the ADA” and

that his “denial of rehire in July 2024 was causally connected to [his] prior ADA-

protected activity.” (Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 26-27.) That protected activity occurred no later

than 2022 when he was terminated. However, for the same reasons as his Title VII

retaliation claim—causation—Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim fails as well. That

is, his ADA retaliation claim is premised on an event (failure to rehire) that is far too

removed from the allegedly protected conduct to be actionable.

Fourth, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to

dismiss his RICO claim. To establish a civil RICO claim, Plaintiff must plead “(1)

conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”

Omnipol, A.S. v. Multinational Def. Servs., LLC, 32 F.4th 1298, 1309 (11th Cir.

2022) (quotation omitted). Further, because civil RICO claims are “essentially a

certain breed of fraud claims, [they] must be pled with an increased level of

specificity” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Ambrosia Coal &

Constr. Co. v. Page Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2007). To satisfy

Rule 9(b), “RICO complaints must allege: (1) the precise statements, documents, or

misrepresentations made; (2) the time and place of and person responsible for the

statement; (3) the content and manner in which the statements misled the Plaintiffs;

and (4) what the Defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant and its agents engaged in a pattern of

racketeering activity including falsification of documents, wire fraud, and

obstruction of administrative proceedings . . . between 2019 and 2025 through an

enterprise intended to suppress evidence and retaliate against Plaintiff.” (Doc. 19 at

¶¶ 29-30.) The bare allegations in the Amended Complaint not only fail to satisfy

the heightened pleading standard set out in Rule 9(b), but also fail to allege a

plausible civil RICO claim in its entirety. Because of this, as the Magistrate Judge

concluded, Plaintiff’s civil RICO claims under § 1962(c) are due to be dismissed.

Lastly, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to dismiss

his § 1983 claim. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation

of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “[T]he under-color-of-state-law

element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how

discriminatory or wrongful.” Focus on the Fam. v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth.,

344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Only in rare

circumstances can a private party be reviewed as a state actor for section 1983

purposes.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). There are “three

distinct tests for determining whether a private party acted under color of state law:

(1) the public function test, (2) the state compulsion test, (3) the nexus/joint action

test.” Wellington v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 511 Fed. App’x 974, 976 (11th

Cir. 2013). Alternatively, “[a] private person who conspires with state officials

acting under color of state law may be held liable for damages in a § 1983 action.”

Kadivar v. Stone, 804 F.2d 635, 637 (11th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff has not pleaded

any facts showing how WSF acted under color of state law or in conspiracy with

state officials acting under color of state law. Therefore, he does not allege a

plausible § 1983 claim under any of the applicable tests. Because of this, Plaintiffs

§ 1983 claim fails as well.

In the alternative, Plaintiff requests leave to file a second amended complaint.

This request is denied. Plaintiff has already been afforded an opportunity to file an

amended complaint, and he has done so. Yet, his amended complaint again fails to

state a claim for the reasons discussed by the Magistrate Judge and as discussed in

this order. The Court fails to see how another opportunity to amend will remedy the

deficiencies, especially since Plaintiff fails to attach a copy of a proposed second

amended complaint and since, for all practical purposes, he is attempting to revive

time-barred claims.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff's Objections (doc. 38) are OVERRULED;

(2) The Recommendation (doc. 36) of the Magistrate Judge is AFFIRMED

and ADOPTED;

(3) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 22) is GRANTED; and,

(4) This action is DISMISSED in its entirety.

DONE and ORDERED LLL a ecember 2025.

hh bn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE