State v. Freeman

No. 1040 December 3, 2025 415

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THOMAS JAMES FREEMAN,

aka Thomas J. Freeman,

Defendant-Appellant.

Multnomah County Circuit Court

20CR26210; A181812

Adrian L. Brown, Judge.

Submitted February 25, 2025.

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate

Section, and Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon

Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,

Solicitor General, and Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney

General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and

Jacquot, Judge.

JACQUOT, J.

Affirmed.

416 State v. Freeman

JACQUOT, J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking his

probation and imposing a sentence of 26 months in prison. In

a single assignment of error, defendant argues that he was

entitled to a jury trial on the allegations that he violated his

probation by committing new crimes. Article I, section 11,

of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part, that, “[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to

public trial by an impartial jury * * *.” Defendant’s assign-

ment of error raises an issue of first impression. Applying

the five-factor test set forth in Brown v. Multnomah County

Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 101-08, 570 P2d 52 (1977), we hold that

a probation violation hearing is not a “criminal prosecution”

under Article I, section 11, so defendant did not have a state

constitutional right to a jury at the hearing. We therefore

affirm.

FACTS

In August 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to

attempted delivery of methamphetamine and recklessly

endangering another person. The trial court dismissed

other charges, dismissed another pending criminal case,

resolved a pending probation violation case, and sentenced

defendant to 36 months of probation, with a condition that

the presumptive sentence of 25 to 26 months of incarcer-

ation would be imposed if his probation was subsequently

revoked. At the hearing on his plea and sentencing, defen-

dant expressly acknowledged that the presumptive sentence

was “hanging over [his] head for a violation of the conditions

of probation.” Those conditions included the general condi-

tions listed in ORS 137.540, as well as special conditions of

probation, including a condition prohibiting the purchase,

possession, or transportation of firearms or ammunition.

About nine months later, defendant’s probation offi-

cer arrested defendant. According to the probation report,

the probation officer learned that defendant had not fol-

lowed through with his substance use treatment, that

defendant was not living where he was supposed to be, and

that defendant was driving a vehicle even though he had

been instructed not to do so without a valid license and

Cite as 345 Or App 415 (2025) 417

insurance. According to the report, when the probation offi-

cer and a sheriff’s deputy went to the motel where defendant

was staying, they observed a handgun in plain view inside

defendant’s vehicle, and in his motel room they could see

a backpack with a box of ammunition inside it. Defendant

refused to consent to a search. After obtaining warrants,

the deputy found several firearms, ammunition, and a large

quantity of suspected methamphetamine in the backpack.

In the vehicle, the deputy found additional weapons, includ-

ing a stun gun and knives. The probation officer recom-

mended revoking probation.

Before the probation violation hearing, defendant

filed a jury trial demand arguing that he had a right to a

jury trial “for any new crime allegations as alleged in the

probation report.” After his arrest, defendant was indicted

for attempted unlawful delivery of methamphetamine,

unlawful possession of methamphetamine, three counts of

felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of felon in pos-

session of a restricted weapon. Defendant expressed concern

about having his probation revoked based on the allegations

forming the basis for those new criminal charges. The state

responded that it was not asking the court to make findings

relating to the new criminal charges, and, in any event, the

state was not required to prove that defendant was guilty of

the new charges to show that he had violated the conditions

of his probation.

The trial court noted that there was a difference

between a probation violation hearing and a criminal pros-

ecution because, although both can lead to “a taking away

of someone’s personal liberties,” a revocation of probation

was not an “additional conviction.” The trial court therefore

denied defendant’s request for a jury.

After hearing testimony from the sheriff’s deputy

and the probation officer, the trial court found that defen-

dant violated several conditions of his probation, including

the requirement to engage in substance use treatment, not

to change residence without prior permission, and to con-

sent to searches. The trial court also found that defendant

failed to obey all laws by driving without a valid license

and insurance, and that he possessed prohibited kinds of

418 State v. Freeman

knives and ammunition in violation of the conditions of his

probation. The trial court revoked probation and sentenced

defendant to 26 months in prison consistent with the origi-

nal sentencing judgment.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, in a single assignment of error, defen-

dant renews his argument that he had a right to a jury at

the probation violation hearing under Article I, section 11,

based on the allegations that he had committed new crimes.

We review a lower court’s interpretation of a con-

stitutional provision for legal error. State v. Rangel, 328 Or

294, 298, 977 P2d 379 (1999). There is “no easy test” for

when the imposition of a sanction is a “criminal prosecu-

tion” within the meaning of Article I, section 11. Brown,

280 Or at 101-02. In making that determination, the Brown

court set out five factors to consider: (1) the type of offense;

(2) the prescribed penalty; (3) the collateral consequences;

(4) the “[p]unitive significance” of the proceeding, including

whether a judgment is “stigmatizing or condemnatory”; and

(5) whether pretrial procedures associated with a criminal

proceeding, including arrest and detention, are allowed. Id.

at 102-08. The Brown court explained that all of the factors

“are relevant, but none is conclusive.” Id. at 102.

In Brown, the court considered the legislature’s

attempt to classify a first offense for driving under the influ-

ence of intoxicants as a noncriminal “traffic infraction” to

which criminal constitutional protections did not apply. Id.

at 97. After applying the five-factor test, the court concluded

that the offense retained “too many penal characteristics

not to be a ‘criminal prosecution’ under Article I, section 11

of the constitution.” Id. at 109.

In State v. Benoit, 354 Or 302, 311 P3d 874 (2013),

the court came to a similar conclusion. The court consid-

ered a charge for the misdemeanor offense of criminal tres-

pass that had been reduced to a violation by the prosecutor’s

election. Applying the five-factor test from Brown, the court

determined that the most important factors under the cir-

cumstances were the type of offense, which the legislature

had declared to be a crime, and the fact that the defendant

Cite as 345 Or App 415 (2025) 419

had been subject to pretrial arrest and detention. Id. at 312.

The court therefore concluded that the defendant was enti-

tled to a jury trial for the offense under Article I, section 11.

The court came to a similar conclusion in State v. Fuller,

354 Or 295, 300-01, 311 P3d 861 (2013), a case in which

the defendant’s theft-related charges had been reduced to

violations.

By contrast, in State v. Whitten, 278 Or App 627,

628, 379 P3d 707 (2016), we determined that the defendant’s

traffic violation proceeding was not a “criminal prosecution”

requiring criminal constitutional protections. Applying

the five-factor test, we explained, among other points, that

the offense of failing to obey a traffic control police officer

was not a crime at common law, the penalty for the offense

was a relatively small fine, the defendant did not identify

any collateral consequences, the offense was not stigmatiz-

ing, and—although the defendant was initially charged with

a misdemeanor and subjected to pretrial criminal proce-

dures—the state subsequently dismissed the misdemeanor

charge. Id. at 632-38.

Here, in arguing that he had a right to a jury trial

under the state constitution at his probation violation hear-

ing, defendant argues that the case “is controlled by Benoit.”

Defendant points out that he was arrested and jailed for

committing new crimes, and, after the hearing, the trial

court revoked his probation and imposed a sentence of 26

months in prison. The state responds that a probation vio-

lation hearing is neither a criminal prosecution nor a pro-

ceeding with the character of a criminal prosecution, so the

trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s request for

a jury.

In addressing those arguments, we begin by briefly

considering the nature of probation and probation violation

hearings. Probation is a type of sentence for a crime, and it is

an alternative to incarceration. See ORS 137.010(4) (describ-

ing a “sentence of probation”).1 Persons placed on proba-

tion are usually subject to general conditions of probation,

1

Although probation was not originally considered a sentence, in 1993 the

legislature amended ORS 137.010 to explicitly make probation a sentence. See Or

Laws 1993, ch 14, § 1.

420 State v. Freeman

including a prohibition on changing residence without prior

permission, and a requirement to consent to searches. ORS

137.540(1). In addition, courts may impose “any special con-

ditions of probation that are reasonably related to the crime

of conviction or the needs of the probationer for the protec-

tion of the public or reformation of the probationer, or both.”

ORS 137.540(2).

“For defendants sentenced for felonies committed

on or after November 1, 1989, the court that imposed the

probationary sentence may revoke probation supervision

and impose a sanction as provided by rules of the Oregon

Criminal Justice Commission.” ORS 137.545(5)(b). In a fel-

ony case, “[t]he decision to revoke probation is discretion-

ary and may be exercised upon a finding that the offender

has violated one or more of the conditions of probation, or

that the offender has participated in new criminal activity.”

OAR 213-010-0001. The function of a probation revocation

proceeding

“is not to punish [the] defendant for a new crime. * * *

Rather, the function is to determine whether to impose or

execute a sentence for the offense of which [the] defendant

has already been convicted and for which probation was

granted. The initial decision to place [the] defendant on

probation was a decision to forego complete denial of liberty

by incarceration in favor of a judicially-supervised period of

restricted liberty in the hope that the purposes of rehabili-

tation * * * and the protection of the public can be achieved

by the lesser deprivation of liberty.”

State v. Eckley, 34 Or App 563, 567, 579 P2d 291 (1978) (inter-

nal citations omitted). “[T]he Criminal Justice Commission

did not intend to authorize revocation absent a violation of a

condition of supervision or the commission of a new crime.”

State v. Kelemen, 296 Or App 184, 191, 437 P3d 1225 (2019).

Under the federal constitution, a probationer has due

process rights at a probation violation hearing including the

“right to confront and cross-examine a witness * * *, unless

the state demonstrates good cause to deny that right.” State

v. Martin, 370 Or 653, 658, 522 P3d 841 (2022). However,

the protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution are “generally not available in

Cite as 345 Or App 415 (2025) 421

probation revocation proceedings. A probation revocation

proceeding is not tried to a jury, and it requires only that

the state prove the probation violation by a preponderance

of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 668.

“Probation revocation hearings are conducted with less for-

mality than a criminal trial.” State v. Donovan, 305 Or 332,

335, 751 P2d 1109 (1988).

Although a defendant does not have a federal right

to a jury at a probation violation hearing, here, defendant

raises the question of whether he has that right under the

state constitution when the probation violation is based at

least in part on allegations of new crimes. To answer that

question, we apply the five-factor test from Brown, 280 Or at

102-08.

Starting with the first Brown factor, we consider the

type of offense, including whether it was “a crime at common

law, or at the time the constitution was adopted, or for a

long time thereafter.” Id. at 102. An allegation of a proba-

tion violation does not resemble a crime at common law. “In

1931 the legislature for the first time gave the trial courts

authority to place criminal defendants on probation.” State

v. Carmickle, 307 Or 1, 8, 762 P2d 290 (1988). Probation is “a

creature of statute” that did not exist in Oregon prior to that

time. Id. at 12. We have previously determined that the first

Brown factor weighed against a defendant charged with the

offense of failing to obey a traffic control police officer in

part because it was not a crime at common law. Whitten, 278

Or App at 632-33. Here, we likewise conclude that the first

Brown factor weighs against defendant.

“[P]robation revocation is not a criminal proceeding.

It does not require proof of an offense and does not punish a

new offense.” State v. Gonzalez, 212 Or App 1, 4, 157 P3d 266

(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A probation vio-

lation can be—but does not have to be—based on allegations

of a new crime. See Kelemen, 296 Or App at 192 (explain-

ing that “the Criminal Justice Commission did not intend

to authorize the revocation of probation in the absence of a

finding that an offender had violated the conditions of pro-

bation either by committing a new crime or in some other

way” (emphasis added)).

422 State v. Freeman

Here, defendant argues that he had a right to a jury

because the state alleged that he violated his probation by

committing new crimes. But defendant was not prosecuted

for those new crimes at the probation hearing. Indeed, the

state indicated that it would not rely at the probation hear-

ing on the allegations underlying the new charges for pos-

session of firearms and controlled substances. And in con-

cluding that the state proved that defendant violated the

conditions of his probation, the trial court relied on evidence

that defendant failed to engage in substance use treatment,

changed his residence without permission, possessed knives

and ammunition, drove without a valid license or insurance,

and failed to provide consent to searches. Thus, a probation

violation hearing does not have to be based on allegations

of new crimes, which is an additional reason why the first

Brown factor weighs against defendant.2

The second Brown factor is the “penalty,” and the

Supreme Court has explained that the “prescribed penalty

is generally regarded as the single most important criterion”

in determining whether a proceeding qualifies as a “crimi-

nal prosecution” under Article I, section 11. Brown, 280 Or

at 103. Certainly, a probation violation can result in a range

of penalties or sanctions against the probationer. See ORS

137.593 - 137.595 (describing sanctions for probation viola-

tions). Here, defendant points out that he was sentenced to 26

months in prison. But that sentence was not a new penalty;

instead, it was the imposition or execution of a preexisting

penalty. See Eckley, 34 Or App at 567 (explaining that the

function of the hearing “is to determine whether to impose or

execute a sentence for the offense of which [the] defendant has

already been convicted and for which probation was granted”).

Because the purpose of the probation violation hearing was to

determine whether defendant’s conduct warranted executing

or imposing a preexisting sentence of incarceration—one that

defendant expressly acknowledged was “hanging over [his]

head” when he entered his plea—we conclude that the second

Brown factor also weighs against defendant.

2

We express no opinion on whether a defendant whose probation is revoked

based only on allegations of new crimes would be entitled to a jury trial under

Article I, section 11. That did not occur here, and, in any event, defendant does

not develop that argument.

Cite as 345 Or App 415 (2025) 423

The third and fourth Brown factors are the “[c]ollat-

eral consequences” and the “punitive significance” of the pro-

ceeding, including whether the judgment “carries stigmatiz-

ing or condemnatory significance.” Brown, 280 Or at 105-06.

Defendant does not address the collateral consequences of a

probation violation hearing, which likely vary from case to

case, and we decline to develop that argument for him. State

v. Bonilla, 358 Or 475, 493-94, 366 P3d 331 (2015) (declin-

ing to consider undeveloped argument). That factor there-

fore weighs against defendant or at least does not weigh

in his favor. With regard to the fourth factor, a judgment

revoking probation can be characterized as carrying “the

stigma of condemnation,” see Brown, 280 Or App at 107, but,

once again, much, if not all, of that stigma derives from the

underlying conviction, not from the decision to revoke pro-

bation. We therefore conclude that the fourth Brown factor

also weighs against defendant or, at least, it does not weigh

in his favor.

Finally, we consider whether the proceeding involves

pretrial practices of arrest and detention. Id. at 108. A pro-

bationer is subject to arrest and detention pending a hear-

ing on the probation violation. See ORS 137.545(2), (3). Here,

defendant was arrested and detained, and he relies on that

circumstance to argue that he was entitled to a jury at the

probation hearing. See Benoit, 354 Or at 316 (determining

that subjecting the defendant to “those uniquely criminal

procedures” weighed in favor of finding that the proceeding

was a criminal prosecution).

However, in Whitten, 278 Or App at 637-38, we

determined that a proceeding was not a criminal prosecu-

tion, even though the defendant was arrested, booked, and

detained for interfering with a peace officer, and, as the court

explained in Brown, 280 Or at 102, no one factor is “conclu-

sive.” Even accepting that the fifth Brown factor weighs in

defendant’s favor, because the others do not or weigh against

him, we conclude that defendant had no right to a jury at

his probation violation hearing under Article I, section 11.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the request.

Affirmed.