The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 23-2179V
VICKIE BEARD,
Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner,
v. Filed: November 4, 2025
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Jonathan Joseph Svitak, Shannon Law Group, P.C., Woodridge, IL, for Petitioner.
Camille Jordan Webster, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1
On December 27, 2023, Vickie Beard filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq. 2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration resulting from an influenza vaccine received on November 1, 2022.
Petition, ECF No. 1. On May 16, 2025, I issued a decision awarding compensation to
Petitioner based on the parties’ stipulation. ECF No. 27.
1
Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of
2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
inf ormation, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If , upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material f rom public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section ref erences to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2018).
Petitioner has now filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, requesting an award
of $45,402.94 (representing $44,560.20 in fees, plus $842.74 in costs). Application for
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Motion”) filed July 9, 2025. ECF No. 32. Furthermore,
counsel for Petitioner represents that Petitioner incurred no personal out-of-pocket
expenses, indicating that litigation costs were incurred by Petitioner’s counsel. ECF No.
32 at 2.
Respondent reacted to the motion on July 22, 2025, reporting that he is satisfied
the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case,
but deferring resolution of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Motion at 2-4, ECF
No. 33. Petitioner filed no reply thereafter.
I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner’s request and find a
reduction in the amount of fees to be awarded appropriate, for the reasons stated below.
ANALYSIS
The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to
successful claimants. Section 15(e). Counsel must submit fee requests that include
contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the
number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the
service. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316-18 (2008).
Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are “excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is “well
within the special master’s discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her]
experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done.” Id. at 1522. Furthermore,
the special master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by
respondent and without providing a petitioner notice and opportunity to respond. See
Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). A special master
need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application when reducing
fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).
The petitioner “bears the burden of establishing the hours expended, the rates
charged, and the expenses incurred.” Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl.
Ct. 482, 484 (1991). The Petitioner “should present adequate proof [of the attorney’s fees
and costs sought] at the time of the submission.” Wasson, 24 Cl. Ct. at 484 n.1.
Petitioner’s counsel “should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours
2
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private
practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434.
ATTORNEY FEES
A. Hourly Rates
The hourly rates requested by attorney Jonathan Svitak and supporting paralegals
through the end of 2025, are reasonable and consistent with our prior determinations and
will therefore be adopted. The hourly rates requested by Nathan Marchese, however,
require adjustment.
Mr. Marchese was previously awarded the rate of $445.00 for work performed in
2025, less than requested herein. See Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 24-
0748V, Slip Op. 38 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 24, 2025). I find no reason to deviate from
that determination, and it otherwise is not the practice of OSM to adjust prior rate
determinations upward in later cases. See Jefferson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 19-1882V, 2023 WL 387051 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 9, 2023). Accordingly, I
reduce attorney Marchese’s rates to be consistent with Wood. Application of the foregoing
reduces the fees to be awarded herein by $21.50. 3
B. Excessive Intraoffice communications
Additionally, the billing records reveal a common practice of intraoffice
communications between attorney Marchese and his supporting paralegals. Mr.
Marchese billed approximately 8.50 hours 4 on internal email correspondence, suggesting
some degree of overbilling compounding the excessive fees requested herein. It is well
established that attorney’s fees may be reduced due to excessive and duplicative billing
practices. See Tetlock v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-56, 2017 WL 5664257
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 1, 2017) (reduced counsel’s overall fee award for excessive
3
This amount consists of reducing Nathan Marchese’s 2025 rate and is calculated as f ollows: ($450.00 -
$445.00 = $5.00 x 4.30 hrs.) = $21.50.
4
Examples of excessive intraoffice entries billed by Mr. Marchese include, but are not limited to the
f ollowing: 11/25/23 (three entries); 12/5/23 (three entries); 12/6/23 (two entries); 12/7/23; 12/8/23; 12/27/23
(ten entries); 12/29/23; 1/11/24 (three entries); 1/20/24; 1/22/24 (two entries); 1/23/24 (two entries); 1/24/24
(two entries); 1/25/24 (two entries); 1/29/24 (six entries); 1/30/24; 2/5/24 (eight entries); 2/16/24; 3/4/24 (two
entries); 3/5/24 (f our entries); 4/9/24 (two entries). See ECF No. 32-2.
3
and duplicative billing); Panaitescu v. Sec’ y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-753V,
2017 WL 4876036 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 2, 2017) (reduced counsel’s overall fee
award due to billing for excessive email correspondence with the client and with each
other); See also Ericzon v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10–103V, 2016 WL
447770 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 15, 2016) (reduced counsel's overall fee award by 10
percent due to excessive and duplicative billing).
C. Excessive Amounts Billed to Case Generally
Because Petitioner succeeded in this matter, her entitlement to fees cannot be
disputed – but the fees incurred must still be reasonable. Here, the overall fees sought is
facially high - exceeding both Petitioner’s recovery and what counsel normally bills in
comparable SPU matters. Counsel must in the future ensure not to bill sums to a matter
where the disparity between time expended by counsel and the Petitioner’s award is so
readily evident.
D. Summary of Fee Reduction
In determining a fees award, a special master has discretion to exclude hours
expended that are “’excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,’” based on the
special master’s “experience or judgment.” Hocraffer v. HHS, No. 99-533V, 2011 WL
6292218, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 22, 2011). And in evaluating a motion for attorney’s fees
and costs, special masters “need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade
accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011).
Instead, in appropriate circumstances they may make reasonable, across-the-board
percentage adjustments.
Here, such an overall percentage cut is reasonable, and preferrable to a time-
consuming line-by-line review of the bill. I therefore reduce the total fees to be awarded
herein by ten percent as a fair adjustment to account for the overbilling issue reflected
herein. This results in an overall reduction in the amount of fees to be awarded of
$4,453.87. 5
5
This amount is calculated as f ollows and accounts f or Mr. Marchese’s rate reduction noted above:
($44,538.70 x 0.10%) = $4,453.87.
4
ATTORNEY COSTS
Petitioner has provided supporting documentation for all claimed costs. ECF No. 32-
4. Respondent offered no specific objection to the rates or amounts sought. I have
reviewed the requested costs and find them to be reasonable, and shall therefore award
them in full.
CONCLUSION
The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for
successful claimants. Section 15(e). Accordingly, I hereby GRANT, in part, Petitioner’s
Motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs
in the total amount of $40,927.57 (representing $40,084.83 in fees plus $842.74 in
costs) to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account
for prompt disbursement. In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review (see
Appendix B to the Rules of the Court), the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in
accordance with this Decision. 6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
6
Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by f iling a joint notice
renouncing their right to seek review.
5