M.Z. v. V.R.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1023-24

M.Z.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

V.R.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted October 20, 2025 – Decided December 9, 2025

Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,

Docket No. FM-12-0981-23.

V.R., self-represented appellant.

M.Z., self-represented respondent.

PER CURIAM

1

We use initials to protect the privacy of the minor children. R. 1:38-3(d).

Defendant V.R. appeals from orders entered by the Family Part

concerning post-judgment dissolution issues. She challenges, both procedurally

and substantively, four separate orders, the last two of which were entered

without prejudice, claiming the trial court erred (1) in granting plaintiff sole

custody of the parties' two minor children and providing her supervised

parenting time; (2) in considering expert and lay evidence from a previous

family neglect ("FN") litigation; and (3) in misapplying certain procedural

requirements. After our review of the record and application of the relevant

legal principles, we affirm.

I.

The parties married in December 2014. Two children were born of the

marriage in 2019 and 2022. They divorced in July 2023, by way of a Dual Final

Judgment of Divorce, which incorporated a Marital Settlement Agreement

("MSA") signed that same month. Pursuant to the MSA and a March 2023

consent order, joint legal custody of the children was awarded to the parties,

with defendant designated as the parent of primary residence and plaintiff as the

parent of alternate residence.

Following the divorce, a prolonged course of post-judgment litigation

ensued, featuring at least six Division of Child Protection and Permanency

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("DCPP" or "Division") investigations, questions of parental fitness, therapeutic

visitation, and allegations of harassment between the parties. These proceedings

intertwined with DCPP litigation under the FN docket.

We summarize the issues now on appeal by way of the following timeline.

In July 2023, a referral was made to the DCPP initiated by the parties' co-

parenting therapist, citing concerning behaviors of defendant. In August 2023,

the DCPP initiated the FN litigation and the children were removed from

defendant's custody and placed with plaintiff based on expert recommendations

provided in the FN litigation. As a result, defendant consented to a

psychological evaluation and was granted only supervised visitation with the

two children. In October 2023, plaintiff obtained an order continuing physical

custody of the children with him. In that same month, defendant and the children

started therapeutic visitation, and defendant was required to obtain updated

psychological evaluations as part of the FN proceeding.

On January 18, 2024, an FN order was entered dismissing the Title 9

portion of the complaint but continued the FN proceeding for care and

supervision under Title 30. On January 26, the parties entered into a Civil

Restraints Agreement, whereby defendant consented to have no contact with

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plaintiff's current or future employers about the status of their family and not to

harass plaintiff and his immediate family members.

In December 2023, the therapeutic visitation provider appointed in the FN

litigation terminated its services due to defendant's noncompliance with the

programs' rules. In March 2024 defendant completed a "Parents as Teachers"

program where her providers noted improved communication, but in April 2024,

the second therapeutic visitation provider terminated its services, also citing

inappropriate conduct by defendant during the visitations. In her discharge

report, the therapeutic visitation facilitator recommended that defendant

undergo mental health treatment, parental assessment, and a psychological

evaluation. Thereafter, the court required defendant to engage in therapeutic

visitation with a third provider but she refused. In response, the FN court

entered an order suspending her parenting time pending her entry into

therapeutic visitation.

On July 5, 2024, in a separate proceeding, plaintiff obtained a Temporary

Restraining Order against defendant under the Prevention of Domestic Violence

Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. On September 30, 2024, a Final Restraining

Order ("FRO")2 was entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant. After a

2

Defendant appealed the FRO, which is currently pending under A-1023-24.

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multiple day hearing, the FRO court determined defendant harassed plaintiff and

that an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from future harassment. In that

proceeding, plaintiff alleged defendant committed harassment by appearing at

his apartment where he resided with the children without a valid reason and

contrary to both the court order suspending her parenting time and the civil

restraints agreement entered into by the parties in January 2024.

On October 7, 2024, in the FN matter, the court ordered "[defendant's]

contact with both the minor children shall occur only within therapeutic

supervised visitation conducted by a licensed therapist approved by the

Division, pending further order of the [c]ourt." On November 1, 2024, the FN

court ordered that "[plaintiff] shall temporarily have sole legal custody of [the

two minor children], pending further order of the Court." On November 8, the

FM court granted plaintiff's unopposed motion to incorporate the FN custody

terms into an FM order, granted plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the

children and required defendant to pay child support to plaintiff.

Defendant contacted the motion court claiming she had filed a cross-

motion on or about November 8 prior to the court's decision which was not

considered. Thereafter, she filed a reconsideration motion on November 10. In

an order and written decision dated November 12, 2024, the court re-opened the

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proceeding, considered and then denied defendant's cross-motion and

reconsideration motion in a written decision.

The court's decision stated:

Here, exigent circumstances exist to modify the

existing custody arrangement [in the MSA] between the

parties, namely [d]efendant's demonstrated detrimental

impact on the children and the attenuated mental health

of the children. Moreover, [p]laintiff has been

effectively exercising full physical custody of the

children since August 17, 2023, when the children were

removed from [d]efendant by DCPP and placed in

[p]laintiff's care. Plaintiff has also already been

granted full physical custody by virtue of [c]ourt

[o]rder entered in the parties' FN matter since at least

October 13, 2023. Defendant has not even seen the

children since April 9, 2024, since she purportedly

refuses to comply with [c]ourt-[o]rdered supervised

therapeutical visitation.

Further, the court explained:

[I]n the supervised visitation summaries from late 2023

which the [c]ourt has had the opportunity to review, in

camera, the [d]efendant was clearly displaying

troubling, detrimental [behavior] to the children's

welfare. For example, it was reported that [d]efendant

was defiant, would overstep, not fo1low rules, would

confuse the children, and would say upsetting and

inappropriate things to the children during the visits.

Defendant was also observed to have lied and bargained

with the parties' son to say things in exchange for

getting new toys. It was also reported that [d]efendant

challenged the provider and [physically] pushed the

provider every time she walked past the provider.

Thus, it is hardly surprising that the supervisors

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terminated those supervised visits due to [d]efendant's

conduct. It bears repeating that [d]efendant then

refused to work with the third therapeutic visitation

provider, although it stands to reason that this too

would be terminated and unsuccessful, unless and until

[d]efendant addressed her mental health issues.

Concerning the effect of the FN orders, the court clarified it:

[I]s not making any independent findings regarding

custody and parenting time. Rather, in light of the

active FN matter, this [c]ourt is deferring to [the FN

court]. More specifically, by entering an [o]rder in this

post judgment matter that [p]laintiff shall have

temporary legal and physical custody pending further

[o]rder of the [c]ourt, this [c]ourt is simply codifying

what has already been [o]rdered by the FN [c]ourt. At

such time as that FN litigation is concluded, either party

can make application to modify custody and parenting

time.

Thereafter, on November 22, 2024, the FN court entered an order which,

in relevant part stated: "This litigation is terminated . . . the court has determined

that the children are safe in the physical and legal custody of their father and the

remaining issues, including physical and legal custody and visitation/parenting

time, must be resolved under [the FM matter]." The order continued by stating:

Any attempted modification of legal or physical

custody must be sought under the [FM matter].

Pending order of the court under the [FM matter], there

shall be no visitation/parenting time.

Visitation/parenting time must be sought by application

under [the FM matter]. All medical records sought by

[V.R.] shall be requested [in the FM matter].

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On that same date, defendant filed an Order to Show Cause ("OTSC") in

the FM matter requesting sole residential custody of the children. The OTSC

was decided by a different FM judge resulting in an order and decision under

date of December 3, 2024. The court's written decision accompanying the order

found that on November 1, 2024 an FN order was entered stating plaintiff "shall

temporarily have sole legal custody of [the two minor children], pending further

order of the [c]ourt." The court further noted:

[T]here have been six [] separate Child Protective

Services . . . investigations in the past two years

regarding both parties, however the allegations [against

plaintiff] of sexual and emotional abuse were deemed

"unfounded" or "not established" as were the

allegations against defendant for inadequate

supervision and the allegations against both parties for

neglect.

The court also stated "DCPP [found] it does not have any concerns for the

children [being] in the care of [p]laintiff, and DCPP has assessed [p]laintiff's

home and deemed it to be safe for the children." The court added, "DCPP

remains concerned for defendant's interactions with the children without the

supervision of a licensed therapist" and "[a]dditionally, [ d]efendant has not seen

the children since April 9, 2024, because she purportedly refuses to comply with

[c]ourt-[o]rdered supervised therapeutical visitation."

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8

The court concluded:

On November 30th, 2023, January 1st, 2024, and

January 18th, 2024, the [FN] [c]ourt had ordered the

[d]efendant to attend trauma focused CBT Therapy

through Mind your Mind and comply with their

recommendations. Additionally, on April 10th, 2024,

the [d]efendant was ordered to comply, on consent,

with recommendations of the psychological evaluation

to extent she has not done so. Defendant has failed to

comply with each of these previous [c]ourt [o]rders.

DCPP reportedly closed their most recent case because

of the [d]efendant's noncompliance, and because the

[p]laintiff retains sole residential custody of the

children absent visitation from the [d]efendant. It

appears that the [d]efendant is attempting to circumvent

her deficiencies by filing various motions and [OTSCs]

seeking parenting time when parenting time was to be

supervised under DCPP. The [d]efendant's pending

motion will be heard in its due course.

Thereafter, on December 6, 2024—the return date set for defendant's

converted OTSC—the court denied her application without prejudice for sole

custody of the children. The court reiterated its prior reasons in its denial of

defendant's OTSC, i.e. her non-compliance with the provisions in the FN orders

concerning therapeutic visitation, psychological evaluations, and that she had

not had contact with the children since April 2024. The court further found the

application was not supported by any "organized, relevant evidence" to support

a change to the prior custody orders. An order was entered denying defendant's

A-1023-24

9

motion without prejudice and continuing the November 12 order which granted

plaintiff sole custody through the incorporated FN dismissal order.

On appeal, defendant contends the FM court: (1) failed to conduct an

independent best interests analysis, improperly deferred to FN court orders and

disregarded evidence of the children's welfare; (2) erred by failing to consider

qualified expert testimony supporting her parental fitness, instead relying on

unqualified expert opinions and inadmissible records; and (3) committed

"procedural irregularities"—including a failure to consider her motion(s), its

denial of oral argument, its refusal to consider documentary evidence, and its

entry of medical findings without expert support—which she claims collectively

violated her due process rights. We are not persuaded by any of these

contentions.

II.

Family courts maintain "special jurisdiction and expertise in family

matters," and "appellate courts should accord deference to [the] family court['s]

factfinding." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "Discretionary

determinations, supported by the record, are examined to discern whether an

abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546,

564 (App. Div. 2017).

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Our standard of review is that we will not disturb a trial judge's factual

findings when they are "supported by adequate, substantial and credible

evidence." Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974). We only "disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial

judge [when] we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to

offend the interests of justice." Ibid. (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen,

78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). However, "all legal issues are

reviewed de novo." Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis, 430

N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

A.

We first address defendant's contention the FM courts failed to conduct

an independent best interests analysis and improperly deferred to the FN court

orders and disregarded evidence of the children's welfare. "A custody

arrangement adopted by the trial court, whether based on the parties ' agreement

or imposed by the court, is subject to modification based on a showing of

changed circumstances, with the court determining custody in accordance with

the [child's] best interests." Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 322 (2017). The

moving party must first show "a change of circumstances warranting

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modification" of the extant custody and parenting time order. Costa v. Costa,

440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. Super. 58,

63 (App. Div. 2014)).

The moving party in a custody-modification motion is not entitled to . . .

an evidentiary hearing without meeting "the threshold standard of changed

circumstances." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327 (2013); see also Lepis v. Lepis,

83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980) ("[a] prima facie showing of changed circumstances

must be made before a court will order discovery"). A prior custody order,

"whether reached by consent or adjudication, embodies a best interests

determination." Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993).

With that determination having been made in a prior custody order, a party

seeking to modify the order "must bear the threshold burden of showing changed

circumstances which would affect the welfare of the children." Ibid.

"Judges who handle FN and [FM] dockets may choose to handle the

matters separately or at the same time." B.C. v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot.

& Permanency, 450 N.J. Super. 197, 206 (App. Div. 2017). Thus, the same

judge aware of all of the evidence surrounding the welfare of the children should

ordinarily preside over both proceedings, whether the FM matter is heard at the

same time as the FN matter or not. Ibid. However, hearing both matters

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simultaneously is not necessarily preferable. Ibid.; see also New Jersey Dep't

of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 214 N.J. 8, 42

(2013) (stating "it is preferable for the court to ensure there are separate and

distinct proceedings" for a Title 30 FN action and an FM custody dispute,

however "procedure may not always prevail").

In I.S., the Division of Youth and Family Services filed a complaint

seeking custody of twin girls after their mother, who was overwhelmed and

unable to manage their special needs, requested assistance. Id. at 40. At the

conclusion of residential treatment, one of the twins was discharged to live with

her father who had not previously had custody. The FM court granted custody

under a best-interests-of-the-child analysis, finding this was the only appropriate

disposition to end Title 30 proceedings since the mother had not completed her

required treatment and presented no evidence that it was safe to return the child

to her care. Importantly, our Court in I.S., determined a trial court has discretion

to adjudicate child welfare matters with custody matters at the same time, as

long as the parents are not prejudiced. Id. at 39-42. In I.S., the Court affirmed

the trial court's consolidation of a Title 30 action with a custody action. Id. at

41.

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We conclude there is overwhelming evidence in the record supporting the

FM court's findings culminating in the November 12 order, which essentially

deferred to the custody determinations and order in the active FN litigation.

There is undisputed evidence in the record that defendant refused to abide with

the requirements in the FN orders. The first FM court's finding of exigent

circumstances granting plaintiff sole custody of the children and barring any

unsupervised contact by defendant until she completed services was not

erroneous. Specifically, defendant's refusal to comply with the FN order

requiring therapeutic visitation and compliance with the recommendations in the

psychological evaluation underscored the need for the court's order since the FN

matter was still active and its orders were controlling.

Turning to defendant's contention the court erred in its December 2024

orders, we note those orders were entered after the FN litigation was terminated.

The FN court's final termination order of November 22, 2024, required any

"modification" of custody must be sought in the FM matter. We therefore

conclude, at that point, the FN final order was the controlling custody order

subject to modification based only on a showing of changed circumstances.

We note, the FN court was involved with the parties and children for a

significant period of time and substantial evidence was provided through

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therapists and experts in that proceeding addressing the custody plan that served

the children's best interests. We further conclude, as did the trial court, that

defendant failed to complete conditions precedent in the FN order prior to

moving for a change of custody in the FM matter. Although not specifically

noted by the trial court, we conclude defendant's refusal to abide by the FN

orders, which was subsequently incorporated in the first FM court's November

12, 2024 order, was a necessary condition precedent to defendant showing a

changed circumstance. Due to this failure, we are satisfied defendant did not

meet her burden of establishing a prima facie change of circumstances to modify

the prior custody orders. We agree with the second FM court's findings that

defendant was making a clear attempt to circumvent the requirements set out in

the FN orders by filing applications in the FM action seeking sole custody and

unsupervised parenting time of the children.

We are further unpersuaded by defendant's arguments the trial court's

references to the expert reports in its findings to support its order continuing

sole custody of the children to plaintiff were erroneous. We note the November

FN termination order stated "if there is any application to the [FM] court for any

changes in custody/visitation, the Division must be notified and is authorized to

release its records to the court for a review." A review of the record

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demonstrates that the FM court reviewed substantial information from experts

and therapists contained in the Division records. Those records demonstrated

that defendant underwent psychological evaluations in September 2023,

yielding diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder and Paranoid Personality

Disorder, with recommendations for trauma-informed CBT, further evaluations,

and therapy, but failed to comply. Moreover, the expert opinions defendant

relied on to support her application were reviewed by the FN court prior to

entering its orders 3, including its final order granting plaintiff sole custody and

barring defendant from having contact with the children due to her failure to

complete the services ordered.

Additionally, both FM courts referenced the expert evaluations and

recommendations. In its November 12 amended order, the court noted that

defendant did not demonstrate compliance with recommended services and that

"was the likely reason why the FN court has required defendant's contact with

the children to remain as therapeutic supervised visitation pending further order

of the court."

Similarly, the second FM court found it reviewed defendant's voluminous

exhibits—emails, letters, and documentation from various providers—but could

3

We note, no orders in the FN matter were appealed.

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not ascertain compliance with DCPP's recommendations due to the disorganized

nature of the filings and lack of certification. The court further found that recent

service provider reports had recommended continuing supervised visitation due

to defendant's persistent behavioral concerns.

We now address defendant's contentions the court erred by failing to

consider "qualified expert testimony supporting her parental fitness [and]

instead relying on unqualified expert opinions and inadmissible records" and

conclude this argument is without merit. The court appropriately relied on

evidence in the FN record and the Division's files to assess and reject defendant's

motion for sole custody as there was substantial evidence in the motion record

this was not in the children's best interests. We discern no error in the FM courts'

review of those records or their findings relying on this information in making

their custody determinations.

In addition, we note the December orders denied defendant's motion

"without prejudice." Therefore, defendant had the right to refile her application

and seek an adjudication on the merits once she provided cogent, organized, and

understandable submissions for the court's consideration.

B.

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We now turn to defendant's contention the court erred by

permitting/employing a series of procedural irregularities, including the timing

and treatment of her cross-motion, the denial of oral argument, the refusal to

consider her voluminous documentary submissions, and its medical

determinations made without expert support, which collectively deprived her of

due process. Since we have addressed the expert issues in Section II-A, we

address defendant's remaining arguments hereafter.

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Machine Co., 153 N.J. 371, 389 (1998); see also Doe

v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995). "Due process is not a fixed concept . . . but a

flexible one that depends on the particular circumstances." Doe, 142 N.J. at 106.

"Fundamentally, due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner." Ibid.

The record clearly shows the trial court considered the merits of

defendant's cross-motion and motion for reconsideration and addressed the

substance of each of her arguments in its November 12, 2024 amended order

and statement of reasons. The court's decision specifically stated "this [c]ourt

is also choosing to address [d]efendant’s [m]otion for [r]econsideration, filed

November 10, 2024 that is largely duplicative and repetitive of what she alleges

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in her [] cross-motion." Because defendant was properly noticed and had a

meaningful opportunity to be heard, we discern no violation of her due process

rights.

Lastly, we address defendant's assertion that the court's failure to hold oral

argument before entering the December 2024 orders requires reversal. Rule 5:5-

4(a) states:

Motions in family actions shall be governed by R[ule]

1:6-2(b) except that, in exercising its discretion as to

the mode and scheduling of disposition of motions, the

court shall ordinarily grant requests for oral argument

on substantive and non-routine discovery motions and

ordinarily deny requests for oral argument on calendar

and routine discovery motions.

This Rule has been interpreted as "mandating argument when significant

substantive issues are raised and argument is requested." Mackowski v.

Mackowski, 317 N.J. Super. 8, 14 (App. Div. 1998). "The denial of such

argument deprives litigants of an opportunity to present their case fully to a

court." Ibid. "However, the [Rule] still permits a trial court to exercise its

discretion to deny such requests, even in cases involving 'substantive' issues."

Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 285 (App. Div. 2010). The intention

of this Rule

is to give the trial judge the option of dispensing with

oral argument . . . when no evidence beyond the motion

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papers themselves and whatever else is already in the

record is necessary to a decision. In short, it is the sole

purpose of this rule to dispense with what is regarded

as unnecessary or unproductive advocacy.

[Fusco v. Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. 321, 328-29 (App.

Div. 1982).]

While oral argument may be desirable in factually complex family matters, it is

not required absent a genuine dispute of material facts. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.

Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007); P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 214 (App.

Div. 1999).

We have previously determined defendant's motion and OTSC failed to

present genuine factual disputes of a changed circumstance from the custody

provisions set forth in the final November FN termination order. Therefore, we

conclude the trial court's decision not to hold oral argument was not an abuse of

discretion nor a violation of defendant's due process rights since defendant's

written applications failed to provide a prima facie change of circumstances on

their face.

To the extent we have not otherwise addressed any of the defendant's

remaining arguments, we determine they are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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