Roland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL WAYNE ROLAND, No. 4:25-CV-01307

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

WAYNE COUNTY PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DECEMBER 8, 2025

Plaintiff Daniel Wayne Roland filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit

under Section 1983,1 claiming that officials at Wayne County Prison violated his

constitutional rights. The Court will dismiss Roland’s complaint and provide him

limited leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

Roland lodged his complaint in July 2025 while incarcerated at SCI

Phoenix, eventually paying the initial partial filing fee approximately one month

later.2 It appears that Roland is no longer incarcerated and currently resides in

Lemoyne, Pennsylvania.3

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).

2 See Doc. 1.

Roland alleges that, beginning in January 2024 and continuing through

March of that year, his constitutional rights were violated by various Wayne

County Prison officials. He first asserts that on two occasions in January, he was

issued misconducts for “minor” offenses and that his Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process rights were infringed during the prison disciplinary

proceedings for both misconducts.4 He further alleges that the conditions he

endured during his disciplinary segregation violated his Eighth Amendment right

to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.5 Finally, Roland claims that

unspecified prison officials failed to protect him from an inmate assault in March

2024, also in violation of the Eighth Amendment, before transferring him to

Luzerne County Prison.6

Roland sues the following eight defendants: Wayne County Prison, Wayne

County Prison Board, Warden Randall Williams, Deputy Warden John Masco,

Lieutenant Paul Soccodato, Sergeant Huffman, Acting Sergeant Jaycox, and

Correctional Officer Carney.7 He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as

well as a declaration that his constitutional rights were violated.8

4 Doc. 1 at 4-5.

5 Id. at 6-7.

6 Id. at 7-8.

7 Id. at 2-3.

8 Id. at 10-11.

He additionally asserts that he “filed a lawsuit in the state courts dealing

with the same facts involved in this action” in August 2024.9 He recounts that he

sued Wayne County Prison, Wayne County Prison Board, Warden Randall

Williams, Deputy Warden John Masco, Lieutenant Dixon, and Correctional

Officer Carney in the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County, Pennsylvania, at

docket number 419-CV-2024.10 He further states that the case was dismissed on

November 1, 2024, based on Defendants’ preliminary objections in the nature of a

demurrer.11

Following review of the complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),12

the Court finds that Roland fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Court will therefore dismiss the complaint but grant leave to amend.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.13 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”14 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

9 Id. at 12.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Although Roland is no longer incarcerated, when he filed his complaint, he was imprisoned at

SCI Phoenix. See Doc. 1 at 3. Thus, Section 1915A applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Review of the complaint is also appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as Roland is proceeding

in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

14 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).15

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”16 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.17 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.18

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.19 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”20 Second, the court should distinguish well-

15 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

16 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

17 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

18 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

19 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

20 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.21 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”22

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”23

Because Roland proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”24

III. DISCUSSION

As best as the Court can discern, Roland is asserting a procedural due

process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a conditions-of-confinement

claim under the Eighth Amendment, and a failure-to-protect claim under the

Eighth Amendment. It is nearly impossible to determine which claims target

which Defendants. However, the Court need not ascertain which Defendants are

connected to the various claims because each Section 1983 claim is insufficiently

pled. The Court will address Roland’s numerous pleading deficiencies in turn.

21 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

22 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

24 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

A. “Person” for Section 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.”25 Only “persons” are subject to suit under Section 1983, and

entities such as prisons, medical departments, or private medical companies

generally do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.26

Under this well-settled law, any Section 1983 claim against defendants

Wayne County Prison and Wayne County Prison Board must be dismissed, as

these county entities are not persons subject to Section 1983 liability. Moreover,

Roland does not allege an unconstitutional policy or custom by either entity such

that a Section 1983 suit could be maintained against it through its connection with

the municipal government.27 Thus, both Wayne County Prison and Wayne County

Prison Board will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

25 Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).

26 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989); Slagle v. County of

Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 264 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming on other grounds and observing that

district court properly “dismissed Clarion County Jail as a defendant in this case,” quoting

district court’s reasoning that “‘it is well established in the Third Circuit that a prison is not a

“person” subject to suit under federal civil rights laws’”); Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp.

2d 543, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that PrimeCare is not a “person for purposes of Section

1983” and thus not subject to liability under that statute); see also Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d

991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that “New Jersey Prison Medical Department” was a state

agency and not a “person” under Section 1983).

27 See, e.g., Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).

B. Official Capacity Claims

Roland sues all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.28

Suing the individual Defendants in their official capacities is akin to suing the

municipality—Wayne County—itself.29 To assert a Section 1983 claim against

Wayne County by way of an official capacity claim against a county official,

Roland must identify a policy or custom fairly attributable to the municipality that

caused him constitutional injury.30 He must also plausibly plead facts showing that

each Defendant is a decisionmaker endowed with authority to promulgate or

establish an official custom or policy.31 Roland has done neither, so any official

capacity claims must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

To plausibly state a Section 1983 claim for infringement of procedural due

process rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual

interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide

28 See Doc. 1 at 1-2.

29 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).

30 Id. at 690-91.

31 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (explaining that a decision to

adopt a particular course of action made by the “government’s authorized decisionmakers”

represents an act of official government policy (emphasis added)); McTernan v. City of York,

564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiff failed to “allege conduct by a municipal

decisionmaker” in his attempt to assert municipal Section 1983 liability).

‘due process of law.’”32 If a plaintiff cannot identify a protected interest that is “at

stake,” the analysis is at an end.33

The gravamen of Roland’s due process claim is that he was charged with

two minor misconducts in January 2024, placed into segregated housing before

being found guilty of the offenses, and ultimately given ten days’ disciplinary

custody as a punishment for each offense.34 He further complains that he was

provided with a copy of the misconduct report for his first infraction a day late and

that he was not afforded witnesses during the second misconduct hearing.35

Roland cannot state a procedural due process claim because he has not identified a

protected interest that is at stake.

Roland’s claim does not implicate “life” or “property,” so by process of

elimination he must be relying on a liberty interest for his due process claim.

However, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that disciplinary

segregation alone—under conditions that mirror those “imposed upon inmates in

administrative segregation and protective custody”—generally does not reflect an

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life” such that it implicates a protected liberty interest under the

32 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki,

227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).

33 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hill, 455 F.3d at 234-35.

34 See Doc. 1 at 4-5.

35 See id.

Fourteenth Amendment.36 And the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has repeatedly held that disciplinary segregation for periods much longer

than that which Roland experienced does not rise to the level of an atypical and

significant hardship.37 Therefore, because Roland has not identified, and cannot

identify, a protected liberty interest that is at stake for his Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claims, the analysis is at an end. This is true regardless of

the process (or alleged lack thereof) utilized by Wayne County Prison officials

during the disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, Roland’s procedural due

process claims must be dismissed.

D. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . .

which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.”38

Nevertheless, the state cannot subject an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment

or “inhumane treatment,” such as deprivation of “identifiable human need[s]” like

“food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety[.]”39

36 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995).

37 See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months); Torres v. Fauver,

292 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (135 days); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-07 (3d Cir.

1997) (fifteen months); Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x 721, 725 (540 days).

38 Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).

39 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (citation omitted).

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a

prisoner-plaintiff must plausibly allege both objective and subjective elements.40

Objectively, the inmate must demonstrate that “the prison official deprived the

prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” often referred to as

a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.41 “The benchmark for alleging such

deprivation is not that the inmate was merely uncomfortable; he or she must show

they [were] ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm.’”42

Subjectively, the prisoner must show that “the prison official acted with

deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s “health or safety.”43 Deliberate

indifference means that the defendant “acted or failed to act despite having

knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would subject the

inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.”44 Deliberate indifference is a high

bar and requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant “recklessly disregard[ed] a

substantial risk of serious harm.”45

Roland’s conditions-of-confinement claim fails at both prongs. Objectively,

he has not alleged a sufficiently serious deprivation. Roland avers that, during his

40 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015)

41 Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

42 Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

43 Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 226 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

44 Id. at 227 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

45 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

ten-day stints in disciplinary segregation, he could not participate in regular

recreation or religious services, was served “2 cold cut sandwiches and sometimes

a juice for his meals 3 times a day,” could not move unrestrained throughout the

prison, did not have normal access to the law library, and had his phone and tablet

usage limited to one hour per week.46 These minor inconveniences, whether

considered alone or together, do not constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation of

life’s necessities.

As to the subjective prong, Roland likewise fails to plausibly plead

deliberate indifference by any Defendant. Nowhere in his complaint does he allege

that he raised the at-issue conditions of confinement to a specific Defendant and

that Defendant was recklessly indifferent toward a substantial risk of harm to

Roland’s health or safety. Although Roland indicates that he informed Williams,

Masco, and Soccodato about the due process issues with the disciplinary

proceedings and “the housing of mentally unstable inmates in general

population,”47 he does not allege that he informed any named Defendant about the

purportedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement that he experienced while

housed in disciplinary segregation.

Even if he had, the conditions about which Roland complains do not rise to

the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, so a Defendant’s failure to address

46 See Doc. 1 at 6-7.

47 Id. at 9.

the purported condition (or conditions) would not subject Roland to a substantial

risk of harm or deprive him of one of life’s necessities. Therefore, Roland’s

conditions-of-confinement claim is fatally flawed and must be dismissed under

Section 1915A(b)(1) and Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.

E. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect

“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”48 Prison officials,

therefore, have “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners.”49 However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of

another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for

the victim’s safety.”50

To plead an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a prison

official, the inmate must plausibly allege that “(1) he was incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was

deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to [the prisoner’s] health and safety,

and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused [the prisoner] harm.”51 In this

context, deliberate indifference is a subjective standard; that is, “the prison official-

48 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Mack

v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

49 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).

50 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

51 Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367.

defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate

safety.”52 Actual knowledge or awareness of a substantial risk to an inmate’s

safety can be proven “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial

evidence.”53

In his final claim, Roland alleges that on March 1, 2024, he was attacked

from behind without warning by inmate Michael Casabianca, who had a well-

known history of mental health and behavior issues.54 He claims that he was

struck “about 6 times” in the head and face area, causing injuries to his jaw and

teeth.55 According to Roland, both he and Michael Casabianca’s incarcerated

father, Anthony Casabianca, had previously “begged and pleaded with staff to

remove Michael from the general population unit.”56

Roland’s failure-to-protect claim is deficient because he does not plausibly

allege that any named Defendant was subjectively aware of the risk to Roland

posed by Michael Casabianca, acted with deliberate indifference to that risk, and

thereby caused Roland’s harm. Although Roland repeatedly asserts that

unspecified “staff” were aware of Michael Casabianca’s mental health and

behavior issues, he does not allege that any named Defendant was subjectively

52 Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)).

53 Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

54 Doc. 1 at 7.

55 Id. at 7

56 Id.

aware of a risk of Roland being attacked by Michael Casabianca and acted with

deliberate indifference toward that risk, causing Roland’s injuries. Thus, as it

stands, Roland’s complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect

claim against any named Defendant.

F. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”57 The Court will grant Roland limited

leave to amend in the event that he can plead additional facts that would plausibly

state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a named Defendant.

Roland’s procedural due process and conditions-of-confinement claims, on

the other hand, will be dismissed with prejudice. As thoroughly explained above,

Roland’s allegations do not and cannot plausibly state either a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim or an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim, so granting leave to amend those claims would be futile.

If Roland chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without

reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth his

claim or claims in short, concise, and plain statements and in sequentially

57 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.

numbered paragraphs, and must address the deficiencies identified herein. Roland

may not include claims that have been dismissed with prejudice in his amended

pleading. Furthermore, he must name appropriate defendants and specify the

offending action(s) taken by a particular defendant. This step is critical for Roland,

as his complaint often fails to establish how each Defendant was involved in the

alleged constitutional misconduct.

If Roland does not timely file an amended complaint, any dismissal without

prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with prejudice and the Court will

close this case. If Roland files an amended complaint that fails to comply with the

specific directions provided above, the Court will summarily strike any such

inappropriate pleading from the record.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Roland’s complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Limited leave to amend will be provided.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge