United States of America v. Google LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., )

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Plaintiffs, )

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v. ) Case No. 20-cv-3010 (APM)

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GOOGLE LLC, )

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Defendant. )

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STATE OF COLORADO et al., )

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Plaintiffs, )

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v. ) Case No. 20-cv-3715 (APM)

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GOOGLE LLC, )

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Defendant. )

_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The age-old saying “the devil is in the details” may not have been devised with the drafting

of an antitrust remedies judgment in mind, but it sure does fit.

On September 2, 2025, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion (“Remedies Opinion”),

ECF No. 1435 [hereinafter Rem. Op.], following its determination that Defendant Google LLC

had maintained monopolies in the general search services and general search text advertising

markets through exclusive distribution agreements in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

See United States v. Google LLC, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2024). The Remedies Opinion

recounted the case’s procedural history; made new findings of fact, particularly with respect to

emerging generative AI (“GenAI”) products; discussed the legal principles animating the court’s

decision; and determined the scope of remedies sufficient to “pry open” the markets closed by

Google’s antitrust violations. The court agreed that Google’s proposed prohibitory injunctions

were a start. Rem. Op. at 107. But it also held that, to be effective, the remedies should include

some of Plaintiffs’ proposed behavioral remedies, including disclosure of information about

Google’s search index, compelled sharing of certain user data, and forced syndication of search

results and search text ads, as well as a Technical Committee to assist Plaintiffs with their

enforcement efforts. The court rejected more severe proposals, such as the divestiture of Chrome,

mandated choice screens, and a complete payment ban, among others. Id. at 3–6.

The court then directed the parties to meet and confer and present a joint proposed final

judgment consistent with the Remedies Opinion’s findings and conclusions. See id. at 222–23.

That is when the devil reared its head. As has been true during much of this five-year-long

litigation, the parties continued to see eye-to-eye on little, even with the benefit of the Remedies

Opinion. They submitted two competing final proposed final judgments reflecting their respective

interpretations of the Remedies Opinion with accompanying briefs explaining their positions.

See Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Pls.’ Final Proposed Final J., ECF No. 1442 [hereinafter Pls.’ Br.];

Pls.’ Br., Pls.’ Final Proposed Final J., ECF No. 1442-1 [hereinafter Pls.’ FPFJ]; Def. Google

LLC’s Br. in Supp. of Entry of its Proposed Final J., ECF No. 1441 [hereinafter Google’s Br.];

Google’s Br., App. to Google’s Br., ECF No. 1441-1 [hereinafter Google’s App’x]; Google’s Br.,

Def. Google LLC’s Proposed Final J., ECF No. 1441-2 [hereinafter Google’s FPFJ].

The parties convened before the court on October 8, 2025, for a hearing on those proposed

final judgments (“October 8th hearing”). See Tr. of Hr’g on Final J. Proceedings, ECF No. 1447

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[hereinafter Hr’g Tr.]. A week later, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Substitute Provisions offering

modified versions of certain provisions in their proposed prohibitory injunctions that purported to

reflect an updated understanding of the court’s Remedies Opinion. See Pls.’ Notice of Substitute

Provisions, ECF No. 1449 [hereinafter Pls.’ Suppl.]. Google responded a few days later.

See Def. Google LLC’s Resp. to Pls.’ Suppl., ECF No. 1451 [hereinafter Google’s Suppl.].

Having now heard hundreds of hours of testimony, reviewed thousands of pages of exhibits

and briefing, and considered all the relevant law and authorities across both the liability and

remedies phases, the court at long last enters the Final Judgment against Google. While the

Remedies Opinion broadly established the court’s remedy-specific conclusions of law, the court

now explains with more granularity the reasons for adopting, rejecting, or modifying the specific

provisions of the parties’ most recent proposed final judgments. See United States v. Microsoft

Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that the district court

must “provide an adequate explanation for the relief . . . ordered” and “explain[] how its remedies

decree would accomplish [the] objectives” of antitrust remedies established by the Supreme

Court); cf. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004)

(“No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably

supervise.” (citation omitted)).

Rather than regurgitate the whole of the Remedies Opinion or scrutinize every word of the

parties’ proposals, this opinion highlights the parties’ major disagreements and explains how the

court resolves them in the Final Judgment. For completeness, the court also includes an Appendix

identifying the finer differences between the parties’ proposals and the language the court

ultimately adopts.

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II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The court starts with three preliminary points. First, in their briefs and at the October 8th

hearing, the parties repeatedly offered as a basis for advancing their positions that, by deciding in

the Remedies Opinion to impose or modify a certain remedy, the court had “adopted” text from

the party’s proposed final judgment, or that their proposed provisions “track” the Remedies

Opinion while the other’s depart. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 21:13-17; id. at 41:18–42:10; Pls.’ Br. at

11–12, 28–29; Google’s Br. at 10, 13, 15. Such arguments rest on an incorrect assumption. As

emphasized at the hearing, to the extent the court “adopted” anything offered by a party, it was a

proposed remedy as a general concept, not the text offered to define it. Hr’g Tr. at 21:18–22:3.

“It is a federal court’s judgment, not its opinion, that remedies an injury.” Haaland v. Brackeen,

599 U.S. 255, 294 (2023). The court exercises its remedial authority in this case through the Final

Judgment; the Remedies Opinion and the one at hand merely explain the exercise of this authority.

See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 825 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. Trump v.

CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 930 n.3 (2025) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

Second, the court reiterates the scope of its remedial authority. “The remedy in a Section 2

enforcement action ‘must seek’ to ‘unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct,’ ‘deny to the

defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no practices likely to

result in monopolization in the future.’” Rem. Op. at 58 & n.3 (quoting Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at

103). Supreme Court precedent “uphold[s] equity’s authority to use drastic measures to achieve

freedom from the influence of the unlawful restraint of trade,” as long as such measures

“reasonably tend[] to dissipate the restraint and prevent evasions.” United States v. Bausch &

Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944). But the “[m]ere existence of an exclusionary act

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does not itself justify full feasible relief against the monopolist to create maximum competition.”

Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 106 (citation omitted); see also Rem. Op. at 62–63.

Though these broad principles framed the court’s task, the evidence (or lack of it) was the

key to deciding whether to adopt or reject a proposed remedy. After all, “[t]here can be no remedy

absent a factual basis to support it.” Rem. Op. at 119. The court considered and rejected proposed

remedies that could not be sufficiently justified by evidence. See, e.g., id. at 119–28 (rejecting a

payment ban because of anticipated harms to third parties); id. at 164–68 (declining to require

Ads Data–sharing because Plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence as to how it would increase

competition in the general search text ads market); see also id. at 128 n.14 (declining to consider

a partial payment ban because of a lack of evidence). The court continues to be guided by the

evidence in fashioning the specific terms of the Final Judgment.

Finally, “it is well settled that once the Government has successfully borne the considerable

burden of establishing a violation of [antitrust] law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved

in its favor.” United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 & n.18 (1961)

(first citing Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. at 726; then citing Loc. 167 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.

United States, 291 U.S. 293, 299 (1934)). Plaintiffs in this case have successfully borne this

burden. See Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 32. Where any doubts remained after considering the

evidence and the parties’ positions, the court has deferred to Plaintiffs as to the appropriate

remedial terms. See also Rem. Op. at 60 (citing 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 653f (5th ed. & Supp. 2025) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP] (“[A]ny

plausible doubts should be resolved against the monopolist.”)); id. at 66 n.4 (citing 3 AREEDA &

HOVENKAMP ¶ 650a(2)(B) (“[I]t is always appropriate to deprive the defendant of the continuing

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benefits of past misbehavior. In devising the ‘tailored’ remedies for this purpose, reasonable

doubts will ordinarily be resolved against the defendant.”)).

With this understanding, the court now turns to those terms. The court begins by

addressing several definitions that are fundamental to the reach and effect of the Final Judgment.

It then turns to the prohibitory injunctions and required data-sharing and syndication remedies.

The court concludes by explaining how the Final Judgment will be enforced, in particular the

Technical Committee’s operations and the court’s retention of jurisdiction. The provisions not

addressed in this opinion can be found in the Appendix.

III. DEFINITIONS

A. GenAI-Related Terms

GenAI plays a significant role in these remedies. As a refresher, between the liability and

remedies phases, GenAI burst on to the scene as a formidable nascent threat to general search

engines (GSEs). Rem. Op. at 2; see also id. at 99 (“[T]here is ample evidence that GenAI chatbots

grounded in general search perform an information-retrieval function that is similar to GSEs.”).

The remedies phase thus became “as much about promoting competition among GSEs as ensuring

that Google’s dominance in search does not carry over into the GenAI space.” Id. at 2; see also

id. at 106–07 (“GenAI products have emerged as a competitive threat to the traditional GSE, and

Google cannot be permitted to leverage its dominance in general search to the GenAI product

space.”).

The court determined that GenAI products and companies should be included in the

remedies insofar as GenAI products and GSEs share the capacity to “fulfill a broad array of

informational needs.” Id. at 99–101; see also id. at 45–46 ¶ 66. The court rejected Google’s

insistence that GenAI products should be excluded because they were outside the relevant markets

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or untethered to Plaintiffs’ theory of liability. See id. at 101. Expanding the scope of the remedies

to include GenAI, the court held, was both within the court’s authority and appropriate to ensure

that Google’s illegal conduct could not reverberate into that emerging market. Id. at 101–02 (citing

New York v. Microsoft Corp. (New York I), 244 F. Supp. 2d 76, 128–29, 193 (D.D.C. 2002)).

Despite this, the parties maintain drastically different understandings of how a GenAI

product should be defined for purposes of the Final Judgment. Plaintiffs would have “GenAI

Product” mean “any application, software, service, feature, tool, functionality, or product that

involves or makes use of Generative AI capabilities or models.” Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.J. Google offers

no similar umbrella definition. Rather, in an effort to narrow the universe of GenAI products swept

into the Final Judgment, it offers several different terms referring to discrete GenAI products or

categories of products that have among their “principal functions answering information-seeking

prompts across a wide variety of topics using a broad range of publicly available information.”

See Google’s FPFJ § IX.K, L, Y, Z.

The court adopts Plaintiffs’ definition of “GenAI Product” with Google’s specification that

a GenAI Product, for purposes of this decree, have “among its principal functions answering

information-seeking prompts across a wide variety of topics using a broad range of publicly

available information.” See Final J., ECF No. 1462 [hereinafter FJ], § IX.J.

Google’s discrete terms are too narrow. Taken together, they have the potential to exclude

Google GenAI products beyond Google Gemini and Google Assistant or any product that is not

strictly “a user-facing mobile software application . . . that makes use of generative AI capabilities

or models.” See Google’s FPFJ § IX.K, L; see also Pls.’ Br. at 28–29.

But Plaintiffs’ proposed definition is exceedingly broad. The parties’ shared definition of

“GenAI” (as opposed to “GenAI Product”) is “a type of artificial intelligence that creates new

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content including but not limited to text, images, code, classifications, and other media using

machine learning models.” See Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.I; Google’s FPFJ § IX.H; see also Rem. Op. at 17

¶ 2. Products that “involve[] or make[] use of [such] capabilities or models” encompass a near

infinite swath of industries and products having nothing to do with GSEs or the illegal conduct at

issue. See Google’s Br. at 2–5.

GenAI products and companies were expressly included in the Final Judgment because of

the growing integration of GenAI into search products. See Rem. Op. at 19 ¶ 6. But search and

GenAI are not completely interchangeable. See Remedies Hr’g Tr., ECF Nos. 1393–1420

[hereinafter Rem. Tr.], at 21:2-5 (Opening Arg.) (Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledging that search

and GenAI “are different but overlapping products” and that GenAI “is not a replacement for

[s]earch today”); Rem. Op. at 43 ¶ 63. At least for now, GSEs and GenAI products have use cases

not shared by the other. See Rem. Op. at 44 ¶ 65. Narrowing Plaintiffs’ definition to products that

have “among [their] principal functions answering information-seeking prompts across a wide

variety of topics using a broad range of publicly available information” better fits the purpose of

including GenAI products within the remedial scheme.

Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that the court “was clear that the final judgment shall

extend to any GenAI Product with the ‘capacity to fulfill a broad array of informational needs.’”

Pls.’ Br. at 28–29 (quoting Rem. Op. at 100). Yet in the same breath, they argue that “Google’s

attempt to restrict what GenAI Products are covered by the final judgment based on their form or

‘principal function’ . . . excludes relevant Google GenAI Products from the final judgment [and]

ignores any possibility that nascent GenAI competitors may disrupt Google’s market dominance

through future innovations.” Id. at 29. Although Plaintiffs stated later that it was “not [their]

intention” to sweep in GenAI technologies such as those powering non-information-retrieval

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functions in Google products like Photos, Gmail, or Drive, Hr’g Tr. at 114:5–115:9; see Google’s

Br. at 2–3, their proposal unequivocally does so.

For these reasons, the court has adopted the definition of “GenAI Product” described

above.1 See FJ § IX.J. The modification makes adopting Plaintiffs’ definition of “Third-Party

GenAI Product” appropriate. See FJ § IX.CC; Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.FF. The court also adopts

Plaintiffs’ definition of “Google GenAI Product.” See FJ § IX.N; Pls.’ § IX.N. Finally, the court

adopts Google’s definition of “Google Assistant Application,” as Plaintiffs’ addition of “and . . .

any Google GenAI Product” would have swallowed the rest of the definition into a nullity.

See FJ § IX.M; Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.M; Google’s FPFJ § IX.K.

B. “Qualified Competitor” and “Competitor”

Because the data-sharing and syndication remedies are designed to directly benefit

potential competitors in the relevant markets, it is necessary to define which emerging or extant

competitors are eligible to enjoy them—that is, to determine who is a “Qualified Competitor.”

To start, the court has adopted Plaintiffs’ version of “Competitor.” See FJ § IX.E. The

parties’ proposed definitions are not so far off, but Google’s includes several qualifications.

Compare Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.E, with Google’s FPFJ § IX.D. Plaintiffs’ version is simpler and reflects

the court’s directive to include GenAI; the court did not intend to broaden the definition of a

Competitor to then narrow it again in unnecessary ways. See Rem. Op. at 103–04 & n.8.

The parties agree that a Qualified Competitor should meet certain data security standards,

agree to regular data security and privacy audits, not pose a risk to the national security of the

United States, and make a sufficient showing of a plan to invest and compete in or with the GSE

1

The court sees no material distinction between the definition of “GenAI Product” it has adopted and Plaintiffs’

suggestion that their definition of “GenAI” should be left intact with their definitions of “Google GenAI Product” and

“Third-Party GenAI Product” limited only to those products that can “fulfill a broad array of informational needs.”

Hr’g Tr. at 115:5-20.

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and/or Search Text Ads markets.2 See Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.W; Google’s FPFJ § IX.T. These criteria

will ensure that the data-sharing and syndication remedies fulfill their intended purpose of

increasing competition in the relevant markets. See Rem. Op. at 129–36, 170–71.

The biggest disagreement among the parties concerns Google’s proposal that a Qualified

Competitor not only be initially certified as one but also annually recertified on those same criteria.

See Google’s FPFJ § IX.T. Google points out that, because Qualified Competitors will be given

an enormous quantity of valuable rights and data, “the incentives for mischief . . . will be

enormous.” Hr’g Tr. at 26:13-18. Google reasons that bad actors that are initially certified as

Qualified Competitors could easily abandon a previously demonstrated “plan to invest and

compete in or with” the relevant markets and potentially pose privacy and security risks or simply

become a white label of Google. Id. at 26:13–28:4. In the absence of a recertification requirement,

Google contends, the remedies could incentivize harmful or even anti-competitive behavior or

allow it to escape detection.

Plaintiffs object to the recertification requirement as “unnecessary red tape.” Id. at 22:5-

7. Although they agree that a Competitor that abandons its plans to compete should be decertified,

Plaintiffs argue that obvious, established contenders like Microsoft’s Bing should not be subject

to a yearly burden to continue to benefit from the remedy. Id. at 22:5-8. Putting up annual

roadblocks burdening all Qualified Competitors rather than calling out Qualified Competitors on

an individual basis “when there’s suspicion” is, to Plaintiffs, an example of a “red-tape hoop” that

Qualified Competitors must jump through that will delay getting “to a world where there’s

competition.” Id. at 25:4-11, 37:6-23.

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The court expressly revised the language “plan to invest and compete in” to “plan to invest and compete in or with”

the relevant markets. See Rem. Op. at 103–04 (emphasis added). Google’s FPFJ does not reflect this revision.

See Google’s FPFJ § IX.T (“plan to invest and compete with”). The court assumes this was error.

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The court agrees with Google that an annual recertification requirement is prudent. The

court shares Google’s concern about companies initially certified as Qualified Competitors who

might abandon their professed intent to compete and improperly take advantage of data releases

or other remedies. See id. at 23:2–24:12. Some companies that already compete or have

maintained their intent to compete in the relevant markets, such as Microsoft, DuckDuckGo, and

OpenAI, will face no “red tape” in getting recertified. For new market participants, requiring them

to make an annual showing of their continued intent to compete with Google should not prove to

be overly burdensome.

Plaintiffs advance an audit procedure as an alternative to a recertification requirement. Id.

at 25:4-11. But audits are conducted in hindsight, not with foresight. By the time a reason to

initiate an audit arises, the mischief has likely already occurred, potentially with enormous

consequences not only for Google but for its users whose data may be shared with a Qualified

Competitor gone rogue. And Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Qualified Competitors warranting

decertification will be readily noticeable from their market activities (or lack thereof) suffers from

the same infirmity. See id. at 24:16-25. By the time mischief’s effects are felt in the market, it

may be too late. To arrive at a “world where there’s competition,” the remedies must ensure that

their purpose is effected through the entirety of the judgment period. An annual recertification

requirement is a relatively simple prophylactic measure to keep bad actors from escaping

detection. The court trusts that the Technical Committee and Plaintiffs will establish a

recertification process that is neither difficult nor burdensome. See id. at 27:10-14.

Finally, Google would put the burden on the court to determine, sometimes in consultation

with the Technical Committee, whether a Competitor meets the required data security standards,

poses a national security risk to the United States, and has made a sufficient showing of a plan to

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compete in or with the relevant markets. See Google’s FPFJ § IX.T. Though Plaintiffs have

hedged on this point, see infra Section VIII, the Final Judgment is enforced by Plaintiffs.

See Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[U]ltimately the

power to enforce the terms of the decree rests with the government.” (quoting United States v.

Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft IV), 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 198 (D.D.C. 2002))); see also Pls.’ Br. at

21–24. And the Technical Committee exists to serve Plaintiffs in that effort. See Massachusetts,

373 F.3d at 1244; see also In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig., 147 F.4th 917, 954 (9th Cir.

2025) (establishing a Technical Committee to “provide[] a process to review and resolve inevitable

disputes between the parties—ideally without further need for judicial intervention”).

As Google often emphasized in its remedies-phase briefs, “courts should never aspire to

the role of central planners and must be sensitive to the possibility that the continuing supervision

of a highly detailed decree could wind up impairing rather than enhancing competition.” Def.’s

Proposed Conclusions of L., ECF No. 1347, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 102–03 (2021)). The court therefore adopts

Plaintiffs’ version, whereby those determinations are made by Plaintiffs, in consultation with the

Technical Committee. See FJ § IX.V; see also infra Section VIII.

C. “Device”

Google proposes that a “Device” covered by the Final Judgment exclude devices running

on the ChromeOS operating system.3 Google’s FPFJ § IX.F. It points out that “Plaintiffs never

challenged agreements with companies that manufacture Chromebooks, let alone established that

those agreements harm competition” and that the court rejected Plaintiffs’ proposed self-

preferencing ban. Google’s Br. at 7–8 (citing Rem. Op. at 216–17). Google also contends that

3

Google adopted the term “Covered Device” while Plaintiffs use “Device.” Compare Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.H, with Google’s

FPFJ § IX.F. The court opts to use “Device.” See FJ § IX.H.

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placing conditions on the distribution of Chrome could not be achieved with respect to devices

running on ChromeOS because “the Chrome browser is the UI [user interface] for . . . a ChromeOS

device or Chromebook.” Id. at 8 (quoting Rem. Tr. at 3892:17-20 (Samat) (alteration in original)).

In fact, Chrome and ChromeOS are so integrated that Google has not yet been able to separate

them. Id. (citing Rem. Tr. at 2611:6-23 (Nieh)).

The court finds this reasonable. Plaintiffs insist that allowing Google to exclude

ChromeOS-based devices would permit it to enter “nakedly exclusive” agreements with

manufacturers of ChromeOS devices. See Pls.’ Br. at 26–27; Hr’g Tr. at 117:24–118:8. The court

does not share Plaintiffs’ concern. Exclusive distribution of Chrome by a manufacturer of a

ChromeOS device is not the kind of anticompetitive agreement that has been at issue in this case.

Unlike distribution on Android or Apple devices or on a third-party browser, Chrome is a necessary

component of a ChromeOS device. And although Google Search is the default search engine on

Chrome, the court previously rejected a self-preferencing ban in part because Plaintiffs never

pursued a theory of liability based on this fact. Rem. Op. at 216–17. Without a factual basis to

support restricting exclusive distribution of Chrome on ChromeOS devices, the court cannot order

Google be enjoined from entering into such agreements. Cf. Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 152

(“[E]xclusive agreements are not condemned per se by the antitrust laws, even if they involve a

dominant firm.”). The court also finds it reasonable to exclude ChromeOS-based devices from the

remedies altogether, rather than, as Plaintiffs suggest, identifying individual provisions from which

they are carved out. Hr’g Tr. at 117:19–118:8.

“Device” will thus expressly exclude “any device on which the ChromeOS operating

system or a successor to the ChromeOS operating system is installed.” See FJ § IX.H. Plaintiffs’

definition is otherwise consistent with the court’s interpretation of the part of Google’s remedies

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that proposed optionality as to the default GSE on a given access point on a device-by-device basis.

See Pls.’ FPFJ § IX.H (“‘Device’ or ‘device’ means any single smartphone, tablet, laptop, or

desktop. For clarity, any two devices are different devices, even if they are the same make and

model (e.g., two Samsung Galaxy S25s are two devices; two Apple iPhone 16 Pros are two

devices).”); Rem. Op. at 105. This definition ensures that optionality will exist at the level of the

individual device. See Pls.’ Br. at 27.

D. “Google”

Finally, a few words on the definition of “Google.” The parties have addressed the court’s

previous concern about the breadth of Plaintiffs’ originally proposed definition, see Rem. Op. at

221–22, by cabining it to those people or entities “controlling or overseeing Google Search

(including syndicated products), Search Text Ads (including syndicated products), the Chrome

Browser Application, the Google Search Application, the Google Assistant Application, and any

related Google GenAI Product.” See Pls’ FPFJ § IX.L; Google’s FPFJ § IX.J.

The court adopts Plaintiffs’ final proposed definition, which includes Google’s “affiliates,

partnerships, and joint ventures” and is written with an eye towards preventing Google from simply

moving its anticompetitive conduct to a sister company. See Pls’ FPFJ § IX.L. To this, the court

also adds: “For clarity, the term ‘affiliates’ includes any Alphabet, Inc.–related entity that controls

or oversees the aforementioned products.” See FJ § IX.L. This definition will capture Alphabet

subsidiaries like DeepMind that are separate from Google but work with it to develop Google

products relevant for purposes of these remedies. See Hr’g Tr. at 123:5-23; see also Rem. Tr. at

625:1–626:3 (Hsiao); id. at 3341:8-21, 3348:7-22 (Collins). Google should not be able to avoid

the terms of the Final Judgment by how Alphabet chooses to organize itself.

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IV. PROHIBITORY INJUNCTIONS

The court previously acknowledged that Google’s proposed prohibitory injunctions were

a good starting place to remedy its illegal conduct. Rem. Op. at 104. But they did not alone go

far enough, either as a class of remedies or as injunctive relief itself.

As injunctive relief, Google’s proposals addressed the core of its anticompetitive

conduct—its exclusive distribution agreements. See Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 32–33. The

proposed provisions broadly would have offered Google’s distribution partners more flexibility to

contract with companies other than Google for search and search-related products. Rem. Op. at

105–06. The court agreed that Google should indeed be barred from entering into those exclusive

agreements, but also added that (1) like Browser Developers, original equipment manufacturers

(OEMs) and wireless carriers should be given the opportunity to set a different GSE at various

search access points across different devices on an annual basis; (2) Browser Developers should

expressly be permitted to promote any Third-Party General Search Service or Third-Party GenAI

Product; and (3) Google should not be permitted to contract with Apple to exclusively distribute

any Google GenAI product either in any Safari mode or on any Apple mobile or desktop device.

Id. at 110–11.

In their final proposed final judgments, the parties presented slightly different versions of

Google’s originally proposed provisions reflecting different understandings of the court’s

instructions and holdings. The major disagreements here are whether (1) Google GenAI Products

should be subject to lesser restrictions; (2) prohibited conditioning of one Google product on a

partner’s acceptance of another product is limited to actual agreements; (3) distribution contracts

must terminate after one year; and (4) provisions applicable to Browser Developers and Apple

should be different from those applicable to Android devices.

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A. Effect of Inclusion of GenAI

Google appears for the most part to have heeded the court’s ruling that GenAI be

incorporated into the remedies generally, see id. at 99–104, and that it be written into certain

provisions specifically, see, e.g., id. at 111. See generally Google’s FPFJ § III. But its proposed

text includes a semantic head fake to afford greater flexibility for distributing its GenAI products.

For example, Google broadly proposes being barred from conditioning the licensing of “Google

Play or any other Google software application” on the distributing, preloading, placing,

displaying, using, or licensing of the Google Search or Chrome applications. Id. § III.A–B

(emphasis added). This prohibition would prevent Google from, say, tying distribution of Google

Maps to a partner’s acceptance of Search or Chrome. But Google proposes dropping the “any

other Google software application” language when it comes to distributing its GenAI products.

Google would bar itself from conditioning the licensing of only “the Google Search Application,

the Chrome Browser Application, or Google Play” on the distributing, preloading, placing,

displaying, using, or licensing of its GenAI products, including Gemini and Google Assistant. Id.

§ III.C–D. In other words, under Google’s proposal, it could say to a partner, “We’ll license

Google Maps but only if you also distribute Gemini.” Google employs similar methods of relaxing

restrictions that would otherwise prevent it from entering exclusive agreements in other provisions

about GenAI. Compare, e.g., Google’s FPFJ § III.H–I, with id. § III.J; id. § III.L–M, with id.

§ III.N.

Google defends this subtle yet material distinction by arguing that GenAI was “not part of

Plaintiffs’ theory of liability or the Court’s liability determination” either with respect to Google’s

conduct or its products. See Google’s Br. at 11. Provisions that regulate the licensing of Google

GenAI products or revenue-share agreements (RSAs) pertaining to such products should be

16

narrower than parallel provisions for Search or Chrome, Google insists, because the former are

“forward-looking provisions” where the court’s “discretion is necessarily less broad,” and a

broader remedy creates the “danger of imposing restrictions that prevent the defendant from

forging new routes to serve consumers.” Id. at 10–12. Accordingly, Google believes it should be

able “to retain the right to condition, for example, the Google Maps and YouTube apps on the

exclusive distribution of Google GenAI and Google Assistant,” because none of these products

are “monopoly products.” Hr’g Tr. at 59:4–62:18; see also Pls.’ Br. at 5.

Adopting Google’s proposal would be self-defeating. See Rem. Op. at 62 (“Antitrust

actions would be ‘futile exercise[s]’ indeed ‘if the Government prove[d] a violation but fail[ed] to

secure a remedy adequate to redress it.” (alterations in original) (quoting E. I. du Pont, 366 U.S.

at 323)). To repeat once more, Google cannot be permitted to replay its illegal conduct with its

GenAI products. Google’s arguments have for the most part already been considered and rejected

by the court. See id. at 99–104.

It is simply not true that the injunctive relief must be so tightly shrink-wrapped around the

exact contours of liability. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States (NSPE), 435 U.S. 679,

698 (1978) (affirming injunctive relief that went “beyond a simple proscription against the precise

conduct previously pursued”); accord 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 653f (“[I]njunctive relief must

be tailored with sufficient breadth to ensure that a certain ‘class’ of acts, or acts of a certain type

or having a certain effect, not be repeated.”). As Google recognizes, see Google’s Br. at 11, the

court can also enjoin “‘practices connected with acts actually found to be illegal,’ including

practices ‘which are of the same type or class as unlawful acts,’” Rem. Op. at 60 (first citing United

States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89 (1950); then citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine

Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 132 (1969)). Employing “the same anticompetitive playbook for its

17

GenAI products that it used for Search,” id. at 99, would surely be within the same type or class

as Google’s unlawful exclusionary acts with respect to Search.

At the October 8th hearing, Google contended that it should be permitted to condition its

GenAI products in the same way that, for example, Microsoft has been conditioning distribution

of its GenAI product, Copilot, on other applications “given the nascent nature of the market and

given the level and the degree of competition” and because “Google doesn’t have market power

in Gemini.” Hr’g Tr. at 61:5–64:5; see also Google’s Br. at 13. The court is unpersuaded.

Besides the representation made by counsel at the hearing, no evidence has been presented

that Microsoft in fact conditions distribution of Copilot on other applications, or that any other

company does so with their respective GenAI products. See Rem. Op. at 217 (finding that

Microsoft has integrated Copilot into Edge and Bing, but not that Microsoft bundles Copilot with

other applications). Even if they did, the point of these remedies is not to ensure that Google

maintains parity with competitors—it is to ensure that others can effectively compete in these

markets. Cf. Massachusetts, 373 F.3d at 1231 (Section 2 remedies must “restor[e] conditions in

which the competitive process is revived.”); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 650a(2)(D).

Moreover, Google’s argument that it should not be prevented from pursuing creative

licensing regimes with its GenAI products because of its relative lack of power in that market is

unconvincing. Remedies need not be strictly limited to “monopoly products” or even products for

which the monopolist has any leverage in the market. The New York I court recognized this when

it approved the inclusion of new technologies that “ha[d] the capacity to function in a manner

similar to that of” the middleware that was the focus of liability in the remedies decree.

224 F. Supp. 2d at 129. And the D.C. Circuit affirmed that decision. See Massachusetts, 373 F.3d

at 1204. Even Google’s own proposed provisions, by their own terms and by Google’s

18

characterization, include products not at issue in liability or for which findings of fact about market

power were never established. See Google’s FPFJ § III.A–B (referring to “Google Play or any

other Google software application” (emphasis added)); Google’s Br. at 11. Google acknowledges

that even those products would fall within the court’s authority to enjoin other conduct “of the

‘same type or class’ as the violations.” Google’s Br. at 11 (citation omitted).

To be certain, the D.C. Circuit has cautioned that when “adopting a forward-looking

provision,” the court’s “discretion is necessarily less broad because . . . it is in danger of imposing

restrictions that prevent the defendant from forging new routes to serve consumers.”

Massachusetts, 373 F.3d at 1224. But that discretion is not so constricted that it prohibits the court

from imposing remedies to prevent the same unlawful conduct from occurring again in a

meaningfully overlapping context. See id. at 1233 (“The district court certainly did not abuse its

discretion by adopting a remedy that denies Microsoft the ability to take the same or similar actions

to limit competition in the future rather than a remedy aimed narrowly at redressing the harm

suffered by specific competitors in the past.”).

In sum, the court declines to accept the relaxed injunctive relief Google proposes with

respect to GenAI products. Those provisions related to such products shall be parallel to the

provisions related to non-GenAI Google products in the way that Plaintiffs propose.4 See FJ

§ III.A–D, H–J, M.

4

Google also characterizes the court’s description of its recent Gemini Commercial Agreement with Samsung as

“recogniz[ing] this distinction” between GenAI and non-GenAI products with respect to access-point optionality.

See Google’s Br. at 12–13 (discussing Rem. Op. at 50–56). The court simply described these agreements to

demonstrate that the liability decision was already influencing the way Google was contracting with its partners,

see Rem. Op. at 107, not to define the scope of the Final Judgment when it comes to the distribution of GenAI products.

19

B. Scope of Prohibited Conditioning

The parties appeared to agree throughout the remedies phase about the constraints on

Google’s ability to condition the distribution of one piece of software on another. See Rem. Op.

at 106. Apparently, not so.

Google’s proposed injunctive relief prevents it from entering or maintaining agreements

that contain an express conditioning term. But Plaintiffs’ proposals ban conditioning altogether,

regardless of whether it has been memorialized in an agreement. Compare Google’s FPFJ § III.A–

J (“Google shall not enter or maintain any agreement . . . that conditions . . . .”), with Pls.’ FPFJ

§ III.A–J (“Google shall not condition . . . .”).

Plaintiffs urge acceptance of their version to prevent Google from not only entering into

agreements that contain an express conditioning term, but also declining to enter agreements that

would not. Pls.’ Br. at 3. They allege that “[i]n a meeting, Google confirmed that . . . Google

intends to reserve the right to conditionally refuse to license the Play Store based on whether the

device manufacturers opt to distribute Google Search–related products.” Id. Google emphatically

denies having made this representation, Hr’g Tr. at 54:1–56:10, but still defends its proposed

language on the basis that “Plaintiffs did not establish, and the Court did not find, that Google

engaged in any ‘conditioning’ that did not involve an agreement,” see Google’s Br. at 9–10, and

that Plaintiffs’ proposed language invites potential misinterpretation by partners, see Hr’g Tr. at

56:11-16.

The court has already explained that injunctive relief need not be surgically drawn around

the exact contours of liability. See supra Section IV.A. But more to the point, conditional refusals

to deal are as pernicious as conditional deals committed to writing. Cf. OJ Com., LLC v. KidKraft,

Inc., 34 F.4th 1232, 1247 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Conditional refusals to deal—i.e., one firm unilaterally

20

refusing to deal with another firm unless some condition is met—and exclusive dealing [are]

synonymous.” (cleaned up)); BRFHH Shreveport, LLC v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 49 F.4th 520

(5th Cir. 2022) (“[C]onditional refusals to deal are functionally equivalent to exclusive-dealing

arrangements.” (citing OJ Com., 34 F.4th at 1247)); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d

181, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (analyzing exclusionary business practices as if they were exclusive

agreements because such practices were “as effective as those in written contracts”). A prohibition

on Google’s anticompetitive conduct would be fundamentally flawed if, for example, Google were

prohibited from entering into an agreement that expressly conditions the licensing of the Play Store

on the distribution of Search but were permitted to decline a request to license Google Play because

the partner would not preinstall Search on its devices. See Pls.’ Br. at 3. After all, this court must

“end the illegal conduct and . . . make every effort to protect against conduct of the same type or

class.” New York I, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 189.

Plaintiffs’ language is not impermissibly vague, as Google suggests. Google’s Br. at 10.

It is straightforward: Google shall not condition. Google protests that “Plaintiffs have not

explained whether the act of ‘condition[ing]’ purportedly could reach even a trivial statement by

a single Google employee that does not result in an actual agreement,” Google’s Br. at 10, and that

it is at risk of being brought into a contempt proceeding over a potential misunderstanding during

negotiations, Hr’g Tr. at 56:9-16. These concerns are overstated. The court is confident that

“trivial” statements will not result in contempt proceedings and that if there is a non-trivial

allegation of breach, the Final Judgment’s enforcement procedures will provide an adequate path

to resolution. See generally FJ § VII.

Google swears that “there’s not going to be any conditioning of the type” and that it is

“100 percent certain that [the court] would find that to be a violation of the decree, and that [it]

21

will not take place.” Hr’g Tr. at 57:1-4. Then it should have no problem with a decree that

expressly prohibits “any conditioning of the type.” The court therefore adopts Plaintiffs’ language

that “Google shall not condition.” See generally FJ § III.

C. Annual Termination

At the liability phase, the court determined that “[t]he lack of flexibility for partners to exit

the distribution agreements reinforces their foreclosure effect.” Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 158.

This lack of flexibility came from both the agreements’ durations and the fact that they were not

easily terminable. Id. The court thus approved of provisions giving Browser Developers, OEMs,

and wireless carriers an annual opportunity to reset the search product at different access points

across different devices. Rem. Op. at 110–11.

Google believes that multi-year agreements with a right to opt out annually without

termination fees offer sufficient flexibility. In fact, it argues, a multi-year agreement with annual

opt-outs would increase the contracting options for partners, including opting out of their

agreements after one year, if they wish. Google’s Br. at 14; Hr’g Tr. at 74:19–75:5. Google insists

that partners want these choices and that providing them will foster greater competition. Hr’g Tr.

at 75:6-13.

Plaintiffs see it differently. They urge that an applicable agreement must “terminate[] no

more than one year after the date it is entered.” Pls.’ FPFJ § III.K. Stressing that Google’s prior

agreements were hard to terminate, Plaintiffs argue that Google’s proposal would still permit it to

find creative ways to make termination difficult or to discourage opting out, such as by annually

increasing RSA payments or imposing other burdens. Pls.’ Br. at 7 & n.2.

The court holds that a hard-and-fast termination requirement after one year would best

carry out the purpose of the injunctive relief.

22

Recall, the liability phase “record reflects no meaningful competitive rebidding of the

agreements. The more common story is Google’s partners renewing the agreements without

genuine consideration of an alternative.” Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 158. Requiring contracting

parties to reevaluate their positions and renegotiate their agreements each year would create regular

opportunities for competitive rebidding. Competitors in the industry would be on regular notice

as to when an agreement between a Browser Developer, OEM, or wireless carrier and Google is

coming to an end and be able to prepare accordingly to enter a competitive bid when that time

comes. See Hr’g Tr. at 73:19–74:8. A bright-line, one-year term also will simplify enforcement.

See Pls.’ Br. at 7; Hr’g Tr. at 73:11-18 (Plaintiffs’ counsel suggesting that adopting Google’s

language would in fact be less efficient than Google represents because it may require “mini

economic trial[s]” on potential multi-year contracts “to see whether or not the incentives

overwhelm what should be the right of termination”); see also id. at 67:24–69:6 (Plaintiffs’ counsel

approving of an omnibus agreement for the required separate agreements for different Operating

System versions and privacy modes across different devices as long as each agreement must be

renegotiated each year). But see Google’s Br. at 14 & n.2 (describing Plaintiffs’ proposal as

increasing administrative burden because the optionality Plaintiffs seek could be achieved in a

single agreement).

The court is skeptical of Google’s contention that its proposal would give partners more

flexibility. In theory, partners have always had a choice. But in practice, Google has held all the

cards. Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 158; Hr’g Tr. at 80:1-5. Knowing that contracts will come to

23

an end annually gives them a bit of the leverage they previously lacked and, importantly, will

create frequent opportunities for genuine competition.5

Courts have presumed under related antitrust provisions that exclusive contracts ending

within a year are reasonable. Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 157. Given the aggregation of factors

contributing to the exclusive agreements’ substantial foreclosure of the market, the hard-and-fast

yearly termination requirement will help to “pry open” that market. See FJ § III.K–M.

D. Browser Developers and Apple

The parties’ proposals with respect to Browser Developers and Apple differed from the

start, and they have only diverged further. Plaintiffs originally proposed that Google could “enter

or maintain any agreement requiring” either a Browser Developer or Apple to set Google Search

(and for Apple, also any Google GenAI Product) as the default search engine or product only if

that agreement applies to just one Operating System Version and one Privacy Mode at a time.

Pls.’ FPFJ § III.L–M. They also clarified that “this provision does not prohibit Google from

negotiating multiple such agreements with” a Browser Developer or Apple “as long as no

agreement is conditioned on another.” Id. Google, on the other hand, proposed that it could enter

such an agreement as long as the Browser Developer or Apple is permitted “on an annual basis to

set a different Default Search Engine in the United States for any Operating System Version and/or

Privacy Mode offered by the Browser Developer [or Apple] without foregoing any payments

attributable to an Operating System Version or Privacy Mode where Google Search remains set as

5

Google takes issue with a yearly termination requirement as “impermissibly regulat[ing] third parties.” Google’s Br.

at 13. But antitrust remedies directed at agreements that unlawfully foreclose markets will necessarily affect relevant

third parties to some degree. That is unavoidable. See, e.g., New York I, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 152–56 (approving

restrictions on Microsoft’s ability to enter certain agreements with third party OEMs); cf. E. I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at

326 (“[C]ourts are authorized, indeed required, to decree relief effective to redress the violations, whatever the adverse

effect of such a decree on private interests.”).

24

the Default Search Engine.”6 Google’s FPFJ § III.L; id. § III.M–N. Plaintiffs maintain that

Google’s provision would allow it to require Apple to set Google as the default search engine on

every instance of Safari on every Apple device at every access point as long as it did so one year

at a time. Pls.’ Br. at 8–9; Hr’g Tr. at 72:3-15. But Google is adamant that its provision would

allow a Browser Developer or Apple on an annual basis to “mix and match” across Operating

Systems or Privacy Modes without any impact on their revenue share. Hr’g Tr. at 77:14–78:10.

It insists that the only difference between its provisions and Plaintiffs’ is the issue of yearly

termination and administration. Id. at 78:11–79:8.

At the October 8th hearing, Plaintiffs justified their proposal in part by stating that they

understood the court “to permit some more exclusive dealing on browsers and Apple.” Id. at 70:4–

16. More specifically, they said, “We read Your Honor’s opinion to suggest that you would be

okay with more all-or-nothing type agreements, where Google would buy, for example, all iPhones

in the United States, the standard Safari mode default, where Apple can’t change a single device

to a different default. We find that troubling, but if they were going to do that, we want it to be

limited to the mode and the operating system.” Id. at 69:7-13. In response, the court clarified it

did not intend for there to be daylight between restrictions on Google’s ability to contract with

respect to Android devices and those with respect to Browser Developers and Apple. Id. at 70:25–

71:15. Plaintiffs told the court that this was “welcome news,” id. at 71:16, and that they would

“love to rewrite” those provisions, id. at 87:23–88:22.7

6

Because the court has already found that applicable restrictions should not be relaxed with respect to GenAI products

and that agreements permitted under the prohibitory injunctions must terminate after one year, see supra Sections

IV.A, C, the court discusses these provisions without addressing those differing elements of the parties’ proposals.

The court also does not discuss the one element of these provisions that is undisputed—that Browser Developers and

Apple are expressly permitted to promote any Third-Party General Search Service and Third-Party GenAI Product.

See Pls.’ FPFJ § III.L–M; Google’s FPFJ § III.L–N.

7

As far as the court can tell, Plaintiffs appear to have understood the court to “permit some more exclusive dealing”

with respect to Browser Developers and Apple because it read the court’s description of Google’s original revised

25

Following this exchange, Plaintiffs submitted new proposals for its provisions regarding

Browser Developers and Apple. See Pls.’ Suppl. These revised provisions tightened the

restrictions to mirror those imposed on Android partners. They would prevent Google from

conditioning consideration for (1) setting Google Search or any Google GenAI Product as the

Default Search Engine or default GenAI Product on any browser access point (including

alternative modes) or any proprietary Apple feature or functionality (such as Safari, Siri, Spotlight,

and any Privacy Mode) on a device on (2) setting the same product on any other browser access

point or proprietary Apple feature or functionality on that same device or any other device in the

United States. See Pls.’ Suppl. § III.L–M. In other words, Plaintiffs propose that the same access-

point-by-access-point and device-by-device optionality it proposes for Android devices apply also

to browsers and Apple devices.

The Final Judgment will include, over Google’s objection, Plaintiffs’ revised provisions

regarding Browser Developers and Apple. See FJ § III.L–M.

As a threshold matter, the court rejects Google’s contention that it cannot consider

Plaintiffs’ updated provisions because they were presented “after the evidentiary record is closed

and after briefing and argument on the parties’ [proposed final judgments].” See Google’s Suppl.

at 5. Plaintiffs have not relied on new evidence. And Google has had a fulsome opportunity to

respond at both the October 8th hearing and in writing. Furthermore, in crafting the Final

Judgment, the court is not beholden to the exact language the parties have proposed at any stage.

proposed final judgment and its acknowledgment that “[a]ll of this is a good start” as adopting that description for

purposes of the Final Judgment. See Rem. Op. at 105–07 (“Under its proposal . . . Google also would be permitted to

pay Browser Developers, including Apple, to set Search as the default GSE, so long as the Browser Developer (1) can

promote other GSEs and (2) is permitted to set a different GSE on different operating system versions or in a privacy

mode and make[] changes, if desired, on an annual basis. . . . And Apple could preload GSEs on a device-by-device

basis (i.e., Safari for Mac versus Safari for Windows), and install different GSEs for different search modes, like

private browsing.”). As previously explained, see supra Section II, any “approvals” of a proposed remedy did not

signal the court’s embrace of the proposal’s specific text.

26

The court makes this determination with the evidentiary record already before it, as well as the

benefit of the parties’ arguments and submissions.

Google’s merits objections to Plaintiffs’ updated proposals are largely a reprise of its

position that the prohibitory injunctions must be limited to the narrowest reading of the court’s

liability findings. For example, Google stresses multiple times that Plaintiffs only established that

the “purported ‘exclusivity’ arose from Apple having agreed for the term of the contract not to

‘pre-select a different default search engine in Safari’s private browsing mode’ or ‘offer a different

default search engine on different Apple devices (e.g., different defaults on mobile versus desktop

devices).’” Id. at 1 (quoting Pls.’ Post-Trial Br., ECF No. 896, at 36); see also id. at 2–3 (referring

to the court’s representation at the October 8th hearing that it had understood Plaintiffs’ reference

to device-level optionality as being relevant to the device type). Maybe so, but the court can

fashion a remedy that goes “beyond a simple proscription against the precise conduct previously

pursued.” NSPE, 435 U.S. at 698; see supra Section IV.A.

Google also argues that device-by-device and access-point-by-access-point optionality is

unnecessary to include in the provision applicable to Apple. Because Apple, too, is an OEM,

Google states, all the other provisions in the prohibitory injunction will also apply to Apple.

Google’s Suppl. at 3. This is only partly true.

The court held at the liability phase that “(1) agreements between Google and browser

developers, such as Apple and Mozilla, were exclusive insofar as they established Google as the

out-of-the box default search engine; (2) mobile application distribution agreements (“MADAs”)

between Google and Android [OEMs] were exclusive in practice; and (3) [RSAs] between Google

and Android device distributors—both OEMs and wireless carriers—formalized the practical

exclusivity of the MADAs.” Rem. Op. at 9–10 (citing Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 146–52).

27

In doing so, it evaluated separately the Apple Internet Services Agreement (ISA) and Browser

Developer agreements on one hand and the Android agreements on the other, because the way

Google Search was distributed across those agreements differed. For Apple and Browser

Developers, Search is integrated into specific search access points, such as Safari, Siri, and

Spotlight on Apple devices, and the search box, navigation or location bar, and search box

displayed on the Startpage on Mozilla’s Firefox browser. See Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 44 ¶ 59;

id. 96 ¶ 334. For Android devices, on the other hand, Search is primarily distributed through

individual applications, such as the Google Search Widget and Chrome, and bundled with others

like YouTube and Google Maps as part of the MADAs. Id. at 97–100 ¶¶ 348–361. Apple does

not contract for Google services through applications the way Android partners do. So, while

Apple is indeed an OEM, those provisions that prevent Google from conditioning payment or

licensing of applications on the distribution of one another do not apply to Apple. This objection

therefore falls flat.

Finally, Google maintains that “[t]he additional provision applicable to agreements setting

Google Search as the Default Search Engine in a Third-Party Browser has always differed in some

respects from the provisions directed to certain devices because a browser default is only one

search access point on a device. There is no logical basis for distinguishing between individual

devices or access points in the context of a browser default, which is why no one even suggested

such a concept until Plaintiffs raised it this month.” Google’s Suppl. at 4 (emphasis omitted).

Google overlooks the fact that Browser Developers can also be OEMs—notably, for instance,

Samsung. Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 35–37 ¶¶ 9, 16. Others may emerge in the future. Plaintiffs’

proposal ensures that a device manufacturer that also has a proprietary browser could contract for

browser placement with different competitors. The court acknowledges that at present firms that

28

are only Browser Developers (e.g., Mozilla) may not have the ability to select a default search

engine on a device-by-device basis. But because express recognition of such optionality would

deny Google “the ability to take the same or similar actions to limit competition in the future,”

Massachusetts, 373 F.3d at 1233, the court thinks deference to Plaintiffs is warranted here.

See E. I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 334; supra Section II.

E. Other Provisions

The court addresses two final provisions of the proposed prohibitory injunctive relief, each

proposed by Plaintiffs or Google alone. The court adopts neither.

First, Plaintiffs propose a provision that reads: “Google shall not enter or maintain any

exclusive contract relating to the distribution of Google Search, the Google Search Application,

the Chrome Browser Application, the Google Assistant Application, and any Google GenAI

Product in the United States.” Pls.’ FPFJ § III.N. This is far too broad and vague a term.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) requires that every order granting an injunction

“describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(d)(1)(C). Plaintiffs defend the provision essentially as being designed to catch what is “not

allowed.” Hr’g Tr. at 87:12–88:3; see also Pls.’ Br. at 12 (“Section III.N prevents any inadvertent

gap between the remedies opinion and the final judgment regarding the treatment of exclusive

contracts relating to the distribution of Google Search, Chrome, Google Assistant, and the Gemini

app.”). But that is exactly the kind of ban on unspecified conduct that Rule 65(d) is designed to

prevent. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (“[Rule 65(d)] requires that those enjoined

receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.”); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Brock,

778 F.2d 834, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting order that enjoined “substantially similar” conduct

without explaining what would be similar). The provision tracks what Plaintiffs describe as “the

29

Court’s directive that . . . the final judgment bar ‘any exclusive contract,’” Pls.’ Br. at 12 (quoting

Rem. Op. at 3), but again, the Final Judgment is what restrains Google, not an opinion. Rule 65(d)

requires specificity, not vague language that might fill undefined “gaps.” See United States v.

Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have held injunctions to be

too vague when they enjoin all violations of a statute in the abstract without any further

specification . . . .” (citing SEC v. Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2007))).

The court can understand Plaintiffs’ desire to include a provision that “helps prevent a

recurrence of the unlawful conduct by ensuring that Google cannot adopt novel forms of the

exclusive distribution the Court condemned.” Pls.’ Br. at 12 (citing Microsoft II, 253 F.3d at 103).

But the court cannot enjoin “all future violations of the antitrust laws.” Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at

133. The Final Judgment’s enforcement provisions, including the court’s retention of jurisdiction,

should provide an avenue for addressing any allegation of noncompliance or circumvention.8

Second, Google proposes a provision that reads: “Nothing in this Final Judgment shall

otherwise prohibit Google from providing Consideration to a manufacturer or wireless carrier with

respect to any Google product or service in exchange for such entity’s distribution, placement on

any access point, promotion, or licensing of that Google product or service.” Google’s FPFJ

§ III.O. Apparently, Google drafted this provision in response to Plaintiffs’ previously proposed

payment ban. Pls.’ Br. at 13. The court has rejected for now that proposed remedy. Rem. Op. at

119–28. Because this provision otherwise adds nothing of value to the Final Judgment, the court

declines to adopt it.

8

Plaintiffs’ counsel also stated that “[i]f those provisions [enjoining Google from locking up device or access-point

flexibility] were also changed to where everyone, including Apple and browsers, had device-by-device and access-

point-by-access-point flexibility, I don’t know if I could name a type of exclusive agreement right now that would be

captured by III.N.” Hr’g Tr. at 88:4-12. Because the court adopts Plaintiffs’ modified §§ III.L and III.M, see supra

Section IV.D, Plaintiffs’ concern should be placated.

30

V. DATA-SHARING

The chief conflict regarding the data-sharing remedy has to do with Google’s proposal that

the data be shared subject to a license governing use. See Google’s FPFJ § IV.C.4.

Required sharing of certain data is justified to “narrow the scale gap created by Google’s

exclusive distribution agreements and, in turn, the quality gap that followed.” Rem. Op. at 130.

Google has acquired a massive scale advantage in part because its exclusive distribution

agreements have enabled Google to see far more queries than any of its rivals. Google,

747 F. Supp. 3d at 49–50 ¶¶ 86–90. Those queries gave Google data that helped improve the

quality of Search, which in turn attracted more users and improved monetization, reinforcing the

flywheel of network effects that entrenched Google’s monopoly. Id. at 161–62. Because antitrust

remedies must “deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation,” Microsoft III, 253 F.3d

at 103 (citations omitted), and because scale is a significant fruit of Google’s exclusive distribution

agreements, see Rem. Op. at 89, the court held that sharing data—specifically, of Web Search

Index9 Data and User-side Data—“represents a reasonable method of eliminating the

consequences of [Google’s] illegal conduct,” Rem Op. at 130 (quoting NSPE, 435 U.S. at 698).

The data would give competitors the opportunity to boost quality while they continue to innovate

to set themselves apart competitively from Google. See id. at 145–46; see also id. at 130 (citing

In re Google Play Store, 147 F.4th at 947 (affirming an information-sharing remedy that would

“overcome [Google’s] illegally amplified network effects by giving rival stores a fair opportunity

to establish themselves” (cleaned up))).

9

The Final Judgment adopts Google’s “Web Search Index” rather than Plaintiffs’ “Search Index.” See FJ § IX.FF;

Appendix; Google’s App’x at 1. Google’s term and definition more closely aligns with the court’s prior directive that

this definition should exclude data from Google’s various other indexes not crawled from the web. See Rem. Op. at

141.

31

Google proposes that any data required to be shared under the Final Judgment be subject

to a license governing use. That license would “include a requirement that the Qualified

Competitor commit not to share or sell the datasets, and shall use the datasets for the exclusive

purpose of serving users located in the United States through a General Search Engine, Search

Text Ads, and/or a Third-Party GenAI Product.” Google’s FPFJ § IV.C.4. The Final Judgment

should forbid Qualified Competitors from selling the data they receive to unknown third parties,

Google argues, because the data-sharing remedy is meant to furnish Qualified Competitors tools

to compete in the relevant markets, not to give them an easy way to “turn a quick profit in a manner

that violates user privacy (including Google’s own terms of service).” Google’s Br. at 20.

In general, the court agrees that data should be shared subject to a license, but with

modifications that incorporate some of Plaintiffs’ objections.

A. Restriction on Sharing or Selling Data

Plaintiffs’ main concern raised at the October 8th hearing about the licensing proposal was

that restricting Qualified Competitors from selling or sharing data from the jump would

“artificially constrain them right now before we even know who they are, what their new product

might be, [or] how they might innovate on that.” Hr’g Tr. at 47:3–48:1.

As to the restriction on selling data, Plaintiffs argue that any Competitor whose intention

is only to sell data rather than earnestly use it to compete would be screened out from the start, as

such a firm would not be certified as a Qualified Competitor. Id. at 47:3-11. When pressed to

offer a scenario in which it would be appropriate for a Qualified Competitor to simply sell the data

to a third party, regardless of whether that third party has an interest in developing a GSE, counsel

for Plaintiffs could only relay that those specific scenarios are as of now unknown. They noted

only that it is possible, for example, that a Qualified Competitor would want to sell a product that

32

includes the data, and the Final Judgment should not preemptively preclude them from doing so

without letting that scenario unfold. See id. at 49:5-17.

As to the restriction on sharing data, Plaintiffs worry that such a license would prevent

Qualified Competitors from sharing data with a partner in a joint venture, for example “with an AI

company to improve search results or innovate new search-oriented products.” Pls.’ Br. at 15;

see also Hr’g Tr. at 48:18–49:19. Google does not flatly oppose the possibility of such a joint

venture, but it points out that it “would need to understand whether the joint venture partner is

actually doing something that is related to the purposes of this remedy.” Hr’g Tr. at 53:10-24.

With all this in mind, the court agrees that it is appropriate to subject Qualified Competitors

to a license that prohibits them from sharing or selling the data received under the Final Judgment.

But those Qualified Competitors will be able to petition the Technical Committee (or the court, if

necessary) for relief from that constraint.

The court has serious concerns about allowing Qualified Competitors unbridled use of this

valuable data. Even with appropriate privacy safeguards in place, User-side Data is still likely to

contain highly sensitive information about individual users. See Rem. Op. at 163. And allowing

a Qualified Competitor simply to sell the data to make a profit would be inconsistent with the

purpose of this remedy. But at the same time, the court also agrees that Qualified Competitors

should not be prevented from entering joint ventures or otherwise innovating with this data. After

all, data-sharing is meant to give competitors a hand in setting themselves apart from Google.

See id. at 145–46. Because the real-world effects of the data-sharing remedy have not yet been

borne out, there is value in leaving slightly ajar the door to the possibility that some form of sharing

or selling the data would be reasonable. See also Hr’g Tr. at 52:22–53:3 (Plaintiffs’ counsel stating

that they are more concerned about the hurdles put up for sharing and would be willing to write

33

out the sale provision); id. at 53:21-24 (Google’s counsel stating that a Qualified Competitor and

its potential partner getting approval and providing Google with notice and some transparency

would be “something that makes sense”).

B. “Exclusive Purpose”

Next, Plaintiffs take issue with Google’s proposed limitation that Qualified Competitors

use the data “for the exclusive purpose of serving users . . . through a General Search Engine,

Search Text Ads, and/or a Third-Party GenAI Product.” See Google’s FPFJ § IV.C.4. They read

this language as permitting Qualified Competitors to use the data “only for ‘serving’ users results,”

but not to improve algorithms or products. Pls.’ Br. at 15.

The court does not read the proposed text so narrowly. That provision does not require a

Qualified Competitor to only serve users “results.” It does not limit how the data is used, whether

directly to serve query results or to improve algorithms or products, as long as the end purpose of

such use is to develop a product in the relevant markets that is competitive in quality.

Google itself maintains that “these terms are intended to require Qualified Competitors to

use the disclosed data solely to compete in the appropriate markets rather than turn a quick profit.”

Google’s Br. at 20; see also Hr’g Tr. at 42:25–43:20 (Google’s counsel agreeing with the court

that the intention behind this phrase is not how Plaintiffs characterized it). If it becomes evident

during the judgment period that Google does in fact intend to use this language to essentially

neutralize the remedy, the court will reconsider it. But for now, the court finds this limitation

reasonable.

C. Burden on Qualified Competitors

Plaintiffs worry that “Qualified Competitors who currently sell data or search results (for

example to GenAI companies) would also be forced, at significant expense, to make the choice of

34

either maintaining a second copy of their data or systems untouched by the data at issue or shut

down that business.” Pls.’ Br. at 15.

The court is unsure of Plaintiff’s concern. Nothing in the Final Judgment would prevent a

Qualified Competitor from selling its own search results and its own search results data, even if

such products used Google’s proprietary data as an input in some way. And companies like the

GenAI companies Plaintiffs refer to that could benefit from the data in a way that is consistent

with the purpose of the remedy can themselves seek to be certified as Qualified Competitors.

Lastly, if there is some compelling reason a Qualified Competitor must sell the data that is

consistent with the purpose of this remedy, it may petition the Technical Committee (or the court)

to do so. See supra Section V.A.

D. Location of Users Served

Google would specify that the consumers served by use of the data be “located in the United

States.” Google’s FPFJ § IV.C.4. Plaintiffs argue that, under Google’s provision, a Qualified

Competitor that currently serves search results worldwide using one system would be forced to

exert considerable effort into building anew or maintaining separate infrastructure to use Google’s

data for the purpose of only serving users “located in the United States.” Pls.’ Br. at 15. At the

hearing, the court asked counsel for Google how this would be feasible as a practical matter. Hr’g

Tr. at 44:3-45:21. Counsel for Google responded that “that may be a [T]echnical [C]ommittee

issue that . . . depending on how these competitors operate . . . [the Technical Committee] can

resolve,” id. at 45:14-17, but that ultimately what that phrase attempts to prevent is data getting

into the hands of competitors who would use the data to develop products, whether search or

unrelated to search, outside of the United States or that do not include the United States because

“[t]hat’s outside the scope of what this case was about,” id. 45:2-8. Though the court understands

35

Google’s concern, given the practical difficulties the language may produce, the court believes

that excising the phrase would avoid confusion. The court is willing to revisit this issue if

necessary, with input from the Technical Committee.

* * *

The provision imposing a license for shared data will thus be as follows: “The data

specified in Sections IV.A and B will be shared pursuant to a license governing use. The terms of

the license shall include a requirement that the Qualified Competitor commit not to share or sell

the datasets unless authorized by the Technical Committee or the Court and shall use the datasets

for the exclusive purpose of serving users through a General Search Engine, Search Text Ads,

and/or a Third-Party GenAI Product.” FJ § IV.C.3. To be clear, the license requirement is not

meant to allow Google to impose further burdens on Qualified Competitors. Nor is it meant to be

an “artificial hurdle[]” to Qualified Competitors’ ability to innovate. See Hr’g Tr. at 52:20-21. As

drafted by the court, this provision will simply ensure that execution of this remedy remains

moored to its purpose. To facilitate execution of this remedy, the court has also included in the

Final Judgment a provision requiring that Plaintiffs and the Technical Committee, with input from

Google, create a template for such a license within six months of the effective date of the Final

Judgment. See FJ § IV.C.3.

VI. SEARCH SYNDICATION

Because it will take time for Qualified Competitors to develop high-quality competitive

GSEs even with the data-sharing remedy, the court found that requiring Google to syndicate its

search results would provide a much-needed “bridge” for Qualified Competitors to deliver quality

search results that will foster short-term competition with Google. Rem. Op. at 170–71 (quoting

Rem. Tr. at 3023:16–3024:14 (J. Adkins) (agreeing that “search syndication can provide a bridge

36

until a new search engine can become a fully independent search engine”)). But it also determined

that the information syndicated would be narrower than what Plaintiffs proposed and that

syndication would be subject to a license restricting use, as “the purpose of this remedy is to

provide a short-term measure for Qualified Competitors to compete as they improve their own

search capabilities, not an additional means to facilitate that development. Other remedies serve

that latter purpose.” Id. at 178.

Consistent with the Remedies Opinion, the parties’ proposals include some version of a

search syndication license. See Pls.’ FPFJ § V.A–B; Google’s FPFJ § V.A–B. They differ in

substantial ways, however. Mainly, the parties disagree on whether the terms of the search

syndication license should (1) be restricted to those “no less favorable” than those in existing

licenses or to “ordinary commercial” terms; (2) permit Google to restrict display of search results;

(3) permit sub-syndication; and (4) last for a term of five years regardless of whether such term

might extend beyond the six-year judgment period.

A. “No Less Favorable” versus “Ordinary Commercial” Terms

1. License Terms Generally

Originally, Plaintiffs had proposed an exceedingly broad search syndication remedy. They

proposed, among other things, that Google would be required to provide search syndication

services only at marginal cost and could not place any conditions or restrictions on how a Qualified

Competitor could use or display the syndicated content. Rem. Op. at 168–70. The court narrowed

many of these provisions largely because they strayed too far from terms found in licensing

agreements in the existing search syndication market. Id. at 173–74 (quoting Bausch & Lomb,

321 U.S. at 728 (“Congress has been liberal in enacting remedies to enforce the antimonopoly

37

statues. But in no instance has it indicated an intention to interfere with ordinary commercial

practices.”)).

In making this determination, the court used phrases like the following: that a “Qualified

Competitor who opts into the syndication remedies shall receive organic results and features on

terms no less favorable than a current licensee”; “when it comes to a remedy like syndication for

which there is an established market and which requires Google to deal with a Qualified

Competitor, it is best to hew closely to ordinary commercial terms”; and “[p]ricing shall be based

on ‘financial terms no worse than those offered to any other users of Google’s search syndication

products.’” Id. at 173–74 (emphases added) (citation omitted). The court’s overarching point was

that the terms of a syndication license should not be unmoored from commercial realities already

in place.

The parties have picked from this section of the Remedies Opinion the phrases that, they

believe, best fit their purposes. Phrases like “no less favorable than,” “no worse than,” and “least

restrictive” appear throughout Plaintiffs’ proposal. See Pls.’ FPFJ § V.A–B. Google’s, on the

other hand, consistently refers to “ordinary commercial” terms. See Google’s FPFJ § V.B.

The parties have sparred over what these terms mean and whether they track the court’s opinion.

See Pls.’ Br. at 18–20; Google’s Br. at 25–29.

For the most part, the court is wary of Google’s blanket reliance on “ordinary commercial”

terms. First, Google’s use of “ordinary commercial” terms is ambiguous. As Plaintiffs point out,

it is unclear what an “ordinary commercial” term with respect to any limitation currently is or how

it may change over time. Pls.’ Br. at 19. To be fair, the court used “ordinary commercial terms”

in the Remedies Opinion, so Google cannot be faulted for grasping onto that language. But it did

38

not intend for that phrase to convey an effective veto to Google over the search syndication terms

merely because a term or some combination of terms is not deemed “ordinary.”

But that is precisely how Google would have the court apply it. If a Qualified Competitor

proposes a term that is not “ordinary” or typical to Google’s existing syndication agreements,

Google wants to be able to reject it. Such an ability would inhibit the innovation this remedy

attempts to encourage. For example, potential Qualified Competitor DuckDuckGo operates a GSE

that seeks to set itself apart by focusing on user privacy. Br. of Amicus Curiae Duck Duck Go,

Inc. in Supp. of Pls.’ FPFJ, ECF No. 1446-1 [hereinafter DuckDuckGo Br.], at 4; Google,

747 F. Supp. 3d at 36 ¶ 12. In an amicus brief, DuckDuckGo worries that, under Google’s

proposed provisions, Google would be able to refuse to syndicate search results to privacy-focused

GSEs like DuckDuckGo’s by saying that a provision ensuring a certain degree of user-data

protections is not “ordinary” to Google’s existing syndication agreements. DuckDuckGo Br. at 5.

Qualified Competitors hoping to compete by offering unique services or features may therefore be

forced to either forego the syndication remedy or abandon developing what sets them apart. Id. at

5–6.

Save one exception, the court will adopt Plaintiffs’ language over Google’s use of

“ordinary commercial” terms. Because these provisions are many, the court will discuss two areas

where these differences were particularly contentious: pricing and display restrictions.

2. Pricing

The court held that Google would not be required to provide syndication services at “no

more than . . . marginal cost.” Rem. Op. at 174. Because the availability of marginal-cost

syndication from Google would disincentivize new syndication market entrants and potentially

harm current providers of search syndication services, the court wrote that “[p]ricing shall be based

39

on ‘financial terms no worse than those offered to any other user of Google’s search syndication

products.’” Id. at 173–74 (citation omitted).

And yet Google took a different tack. It now proposes that “Google will offer these

syndication services on a non-discriminatory basis to Qualified Competitors at market rates

consistent with ordinary commercial terms agreed to by other users of Google’s search syndication

products.” Google’s FPFJ § V.B.3.

Its main objection to the court’s language, which Plaintiffs have adopted, is that it would

create the same problems the court contemplated would arise from a “marginal cost” provision.

A most-favored-nation pricing term, Google protests, would result in syndication licenses with

pricing terms cherry-picked from, for instance, discounted organic search syndication pricing

offered to partners who also syndicate search text ads, sometimes at prices below marginal cost.

Google’s Br. at 26. Ordinarily, Google says, such discounted pricing is offered because the

discount is offset by the revenue Google expects from the ad syndication. Id. Google argues that

being required to offer the discounted rate to a Qualified Competitor where Google cannot expect

the same revenue to offset it would “‘interfere with’ and ‘reduce, if not eliminate, competition in

the market for syndicated search results’” for the same reasons the court determined marginal-cost

pricing would. Id. (quoting Rem. Op. at 175).

Google’s concern is overstated. The court thinks it is unlikely that a Qualified Competitor

will syndicate search results from Google but not search text ads. After all, it is through search

text ads (and other forms of advertising) that GSEs generate revenue. While it may be possible

that a Qualified Competitor will syndicate search results from Google but search text ads from

elsewhere or not at all, until such arrangements come to fruition, the court is disinclined to alter

40

the Final Judgment in a way that permits Google to dictate pricing with Qualified Competitors

based on existing commercial terms reached with Google’s profit motive in mind.

Similarly, that most-favored-nation pricing would “substantially impact[] Google’s

monetization expectation,” Google’s Br. at 26, is of no moment. Google’s “monetization

expectation” is a fruit of its illegal conduct. See Rem. Op. at 95–97. “Those who violate the

[Sherman] Act may not reap the benefits of their violations and avoid an undoing of their unlawful

project on the plea of hardship or inconvenience.” E. I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 326–27. The Final

Judgment’s pricing provisions may result in syndication agreements that depart from the way

Google has historically contracted or made its revenue. See Google’s Br. at 26–27. But that is an

acceptable consequence of remedying Google’s illegal conduct. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 103

(holding that Section 2 remedies must “deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation”

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

3. Restriction on Display of Search Results

Originally, it was Plaintiffs who sought to enable Qualified Competitors to “effectively

replicate how Google delivers its [search engine results pages (“SERPs”)].” Rem. Op. at 172

(“How else to explain Plaintiffs’ insistence that Google must provide information that is ‘the same

as if the Qualified Competitor’s query had been submitted through Google.com’?” (citation

omitted)). Now, Plaintiffs accuse Google of attempting such a result. Hr’g Tr. at 98:15–99:1.

And they are right. Google now proposes that it be “permitted to place its ordinary commercial

restrictions on the use and display of its syndicated results and content.” Google’s FPFJ § V.B.8.

At the October 8th hearing, Google’s counsel explained that its typical syndication-display

restrictions include requiring a “Powered by Google” branding insignia, preventing the licensee

from changing the order of the syndicated search results, or simply preventing the licensee from

41

“using the syndicated results in manners other than the way Google . . . presents them.” Hr’g Tr.

at 106:19–107:10. Google believes it should be able to continue to impose these restrictions under

the Final Judgment.

Plaintiffs aver that if Google can limit Qualified Competitors’ display of the syndicated

search results to, for example, the “10 blue links” in the way they are displayed on Google’s own

SERPs, a GenAI company like OpenAI would not be able to “repackag[e] it” as they or their

consumers would see fit. Id. at 98:15–99:1; see also Rem. Tr. at 389:17–390:2 (Turley) (OpenAI

is “not trying to recreate the type of experience that [a consumer] would find on Google.com where

you see ten blue links.”); Hr’g Tr. at 98:18-21 (“[Google’s] provision says they can put ordinary

commercial restrictions on the use and display of syndicated Search results. That is what we worry

about would create a world of Google clones.”). Because of these concerns, Plaintiffs propose that

Google may not impose such restrictions “beyond the least restrictive terms Google provides under

any current search syndication agreements.” Pls.’ FPFJ § V.B.6.

The court agrees with Plaintiffs. Google frames its proposal in part by arguing that

oftentimes a Qualified Competitor wants to be able to adopt Google’s branding “as part of the

reason why they’re syndicating from Google.” Hr’g Tr. at 109:9-18. That may be true for some

current licensees. But for a Qualified Competitor—who, to reiterate, can only be certified if it can

demonstrate a plan to invest and compete in or with the GSE and/or Search Text Ads markets—

becoming a Google clone or marketing itself as one seems an unlikely desire. The syndication

remedy is meant to give Qualified Competitors a boost in quality while they develop competitive

products, not to pose as Google in the meantime. And at least one potential Qualified Competitor

in the GenAI space has explicitly expressed a desire to depart from Google’s familiar ten blue

42

links format. At bottom, allowing Google to require licensees to display results to replicate

Google’s SERPs would be at odds with what this remedy is designed to achieve.10

* * *

In sum, both pricing and non-pricing restrictions or limitations in a search syndication

license pursuant to the Final Judgment shall be, for the most part, defined by Plaintiffs’ language,

on “least restrictive,” “no less favorable,” or “no worse” terms. The Final Judgment will retain

the use of “ordinary commercial” terms to protect against Qualified Competitors using the

syndication agreement in a manner than exceeds its intended purpose. See Rem. Op. at 184 (citing

Rem. Tr. at 2988:9–2989:3, 2990:22–2992:10 (J. Adkins) (discussing Google’s ordinary

restrictions on scraping, indexing, and crawling in its current syndication agreements)).

A final word on Google’s objections: Google contends that Plaintiffs’ proposed license

restrictions contradict the court’s previous assurance that “Qualified Competitors generally will

have to follow ordinary commercial terms and therefore will not need to be customized.” Google’s

Br. at 28–29 (quoting Rem. Op. at 180). Google takes this quote out of context. The court made

this assurance in response to Google’s concern that the syndication remedy would put the court in

the role of a “central planner.” Rem. Op. at 180 (citation omitted). Google should take the court

at its word that it has no intention of becoming a “central planner.” Indeed, adopting Plaintiffs’

terms will avoid this. Google appears to believe that, unless it alone gets to say what terms are

ordinary, each license will be a custom-made patchwork of terms causing Google insurmountable

challenges.11 But there is more certainty in the universe of terms that are the “least restrictive” or

10

As to use, Google explains Qualified Competitors should not be permitted to use syndicated data to feed into their

LLMs for training. Hr’g Tr. at 107:11–108:1. The court agrees the Final Judgment should not permit this. See id. at

108:19–109:2. But the court does not believe that is what Plaintiffs seek or that the Final Judgment in fact permits it.

11

In response to the court’s note in the Remedies Opinion that “[i]f there are technical feasibility issues with

syndicating only crawled web results, Google shall so advise the court,” Rem. Op. at 173 n.24, Google now lists a

43

that are “no less favorable.” In any event, Google cannot “avoid an undoing of [its] unlawful

project on the plea of hardship or inconvenience.” See E. I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 326–27.

Lastly, for both the search and search text ads syndication remedies, the court will also

require that Plaintiffs and the Technical Committee, with input from Google, create a template for

such syndication licenses within 60 days of the effective date of the Final Judgment. See FJ

§§ V.B, VI.B.

B. Sub-Syndication

The court agrees with Google that Qualified Competitors should not be able to sub-

syndicate the search results they syndicate from Google under the Final Judgment. See Google’s

FPFJ § V.B.11. Plaintiffs object, arguing that sub-syndication is a standard permission in the

existing syndication market and that, because it is not apparent yet whether a Qualified Competitor

would “need” to sub-syndicate, the Final Judgment should not foreclose them from doing so

upfront. Hr’g Tr. at 93:3-16.

But Google has it right: “Allowing Qualified Competitors to sub-syndicate Google’s

results . . . is entirely divorced from the Court’s reasoning that new general search engine entrants

should receive syndication from Google for the purpose of improving . . . their own SERPs.”

Google’s Br. at 22 (citing Rem. Tr. at 4805:4-6 (Closing Arg.) (Plaintiffs’ counsel stating that it’s

their “view that the syndication remedy should not be available to people who just want to

syndicate”)). Given that search syndication is meant to provide a Qualified Competitor a way to

serve high-quality results while it develops its own products, the court does not see why a Qualified

Competitor would “need” to sub-syndicate to accomplish that purpose. See Rem. Op. at 170–71.

host of “technical feasibility issues.” See Google’s Br. at 29. The court is not at this time convinced that these issues

are so burdensome the features subject to syndication must be limited to those that Google “provides under current

standard search syndication agreements.” See id. As explained above, Google overstates how “bespoke” the

syndication agreements with Qualified Competitors will be. See id.

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And that some syndication agreements today, including Google’s, permit some level of sub-

syndication does not warrant expanding the purpose of the syndication remedy. See Pls.’ Br. at

20; Hr’g Tr. at 93:19–94:8; see also id. at 105:6–106:6 (Google’s counsel stating that sub-

syndication is not a widespread practice and usually limited to the licensee’s affiliate, and that in

those agreements where Google does permit sub-syndication, it retains an absolute right to

reject it).

C. Duration

A syndication license pursuant to the Final Judgment will be for a term of five years,

regardless of when Google’s syndication service is made available to the Qualified Competitor,

for both search and search text ads syndication.

Despite the court’s holding to that effect, see Rem. Op. at 175–76, Google has added that

a syndication license will be for a term of five years, unless there are fewer than five years

remaining before the end of the judgment period. Googe’s FPFJ § V.A. In that case, Google

proposes, the license will be for a term lasting the remainder of the judgment period. Id. In

practice, what that means is that only a Qualified Competitor that comes onto the scene during the

first year of the Final Judgment will enjoy a full five-year syndication term.

The court does not dwell on this long. It held that the syndication license would be for five

years based on testimony from potential Qualified Competitors that five years would be enough

time in which to become independent of Google. Rem. Op. at 175–76 (citing Rem. Tr. at 426:16-

25 (Turley)); id. at 176 n.25 (citing to article detailing that Brave began delivering search results

exclusively from its own search index within about two years). And as DuckDuckGo points out,

allowing these syndication licenses to terminate at the end of the judgment period could permit

Google to simply run out the clock on license negotiations, especially as the judgment period draws

45

to a close. DuckDuckGo Br. at 6–7. The syndication remedy as Google would have it would not

fulfill its purpose for a Qualified Competitor that becomes certified in year five of the six-year

judgment period; the Qualified Competitor would simply not have enough time with the syndicated

data to develop a competitive GSE in the meantime. See Rem. Op. at 175–76; Hr’g Tr. at 110:10–

111:8. What’s more, were the court to adopt Google’s proposal, the incentive for Qualified

Competitors to come forward would diminish over the period remaining on the Final Judgment.

Such an outcome would benefit only Google, not competition.

VII. SEARCH TEXT ADS SYNDICATION

“Because Google has more users, it has more advertisers, and with more advertisers, it has

more dollars to improve its GSE and pay for distribution.” Rem. Op. at 183. And because

Qualified Competitors would be attempting to compete “[i]n the face of such formidable

headwinds,” the court held that Qualified Competitors should also be able to syndicate search text

ads from Google as a “short-term measure designed to ‘pry open’ the relevant markets.” Id.

For the same reasons search syndication licenses will be restricted on “no less favorable

terms” and other similar language used by Plaintiffs rather than Google’s “ordinary commercial”

terms, the same will be true, for the most part, for search text ads syndication. See generally FJ

§ VI. The restriction on scraping, indexing, and crawling will remain on ordinary commercial

terms. Id. § VI.B.6. The provision regarding the duration of such licenses will also be the same.12

Id. § VI.B.

12

The restriction on display will be slightly different. See FJ § VI.B.6. The court previously held that “Google may

place ordinary-course restrictions on the use or display of syndicated content.” Rem. Op. at 184. Unlike in search

syndication, Google presented evidence of the specific ways search text ads syndication without ordinary-course

restrictions on display or use could harm advertisers and ad quality. See id. (citing Rem. Tr. at 2972:4–2976:3, 2979:5–

2984:10 (J. Adkins)). That said, the court does not adopt Plaintiffs’ narrow enumeration of permissible justifications

for imposing such restrictions. See Pls.’ FPFJ § VI.B.6.

46

The search text ads syndication remedy differs in one important way from the search

syndication remedy. The court previously contemplated the possibility of new entrants into the ad

platform market. See Rem. Op. at 183 (“It is also possible that an independent ad platform could

emerge to compete with Google and Microsoft, which are the only current suppliers of general

search text ads in the United States.”). Becoming an independent ad platform in the search text

ads market takes a near-insurmountable effort in part due to Google’s monopoly. See Rem. Tr. at

1794:12–1797:3 (Epstein) (describing “cold start” problems). To be competitive, a potential new

entrant would need to be able to offer publishers syndication of high-quality ads. See id. at

1798:16–1799:16 (Epstein); see also Pls.’ Br. at 20. So, while sub-syndication of search results

would be inappropriate for Qualified Competitors looking to compete in search for the reasons

explained above, see supra Section VI.B, sub-syndication of search text ads would be a useful

bridge for a Qualified Competitor looking to compete with Google’s ad platform. Sub-syndication

will thus be permitted for search text ads only if “such Qualified Competitor has been certified as

a Competitor to a Google ads platform (e.g., Google Ads).” FJ § VI.B.9.

VIII. ENFORCEMENT

From the beginning, the provisions related to the Technical Committee have been

contentious. The court will not rehash the parties’ arguments or go over their final proposals with

a fine-tooth comb here. Rather, the court will explain at a high level its approach to the relevant

provisions.

The court has been clear that a Technical Committee is an appropriate instrument to assist

Plaintiffs in their enforcement efforts, as it “comports with federal courts’ long history of utilizing

appointed experts and provides a process to review and resolve inevitable disputes between the

parties—ideally without further need for judicial intervention.” Rem. Op. at 211 (quoting In re

47

Google Play Store, 147 F.4th at 954). A Technical Committee that is the “enforcement arm of the

government,” Microsoft IV, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 197, embodies the principle that with the

government’s broad authority to enforce the antitrust laws comes discretion with how violations

should be redressed, see F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 170–71

(2004) (“A Government plaintiff . . . must seek to obtain the relief necessary to protect the public

from further anticompetitive conduct and to redress anticompetitive harm. And a Government

plaintiff has legal authority broad enough to allow it to carry out this mission. . . . ‘[I]t is well

settled that once the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a

violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor.’” (quoting E. I. DuPont,

366 U.S. at 334)); see also Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 575 (1972).

Throughout the remedies phase, Plaintiffs have vigorously insisted that the court’s rulings

and the case law make clear that “ultimately the power to enforce the terms of the decree rests with

the government.” Pls.’ Br. at 21 (quoting Massachusetts, 373 F.3d at 1243). In their most recent

brief, they took issue with Google’s attempts at squeezing Plaintiffs out of various enforcement

activities and roping the court into resolving disputes instead. Id. at 20–21. They also accused

Google of attempting to “empower Google to delay or stymie enforcement at every turn simply by

objecting.” Id. at 21. Plaintiffs’ FPFJ reflects these objections. See generally Pls.’ FPFJ § VII.

Yet at the hearing, Plaintiffs appeared to surrender their position. From the jump, they

conceded that Google should have full opportunity to object to any detail of the Final Judgment’s

execution. See Hr’g Tr. at 18:24–19:10. And despite the clear textual differences in the parties’

FPFJs and briefs, Plaintiffs’ counsel effectively agreed that “there is substantively no difference

between the language that [Plaintiffs have] proposed, at least with respect to Google’s ability to

48

object and bring things to the Court’s attention, and what [Google has] proposed.” Id. at 20:11–

21:2.

Plaintiffs’ counsel tried to assure the court that it is “free to delegate any of those elements

[of enforcement] entirely to the [T]echnical [C]ommittee, entirely to [P]laintiffs.” Id. at 34:7-14.

But the court is frankly at a loss for how it can square this with their simultaneous position that

“there is no such decision that ends with [Plaintiffs] and the [T]echnical [C]ommittee” and that

“Google can object to everything and almost anything that would then require [the court’s]

resolution.” Id. at 19:20–20:5.

The court is wary of being called in as a referee to the minutiae of the Final Judgment’s

execution and enforcement. Nevertheless, because the parties agree that Google should have a

broad right to object, the court will grant it. See FJ § VII.A.7.k. This should put to rest Google’s

blanket objections to Plaintiffs’ alleged attempts at taking decision-making authority from the

court. Google’s Br. at 30–32. The parties offer the assurance that they will elevate for judicial

consideration only the most important conflicts. See Hr’g Tr. at 19:24–20:5; 26:7-12. The court

is skeptical. Still, it adopts Google’s express right to object with cautious optimism that the parties

will keep their word.

Although Google will have an express right to object, the court affords some deference to

Plaintiffs’ provisions in this section of the Final Judgment. See generally FJ § VII; see also

Appendix. Google appears to protest any function carried out by the Technical Committee that

goes beyond mere “technical competence,” characterizing the broad oversight and investigative

functions Plaintiffs propose as “an end-run around the Court’s rejection of the Plaintiffs’

anticircumvention and anti-retaliation proposals.” See Google’s Br. at 32–33. Yet, the Technical

Committee established in New York I and affirmed by Massachusetts had much of these same

49

broad functions. See Second Modified Final J., United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-cv-1232,

ECF No. 889 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2009). None of these responsibilities are a “substitute for the

enforcement authority of [Plaintiffs]” or the court. Rem. Op. at 212 (citing Massachusetts,

373 F.3d at 1244).

Finally, to keep the court updated on the progress of executing the Final Judgment,

Plaintiffs, with input from the Technical Committee, shall submit a status report within 90 days of

the effective date of the Final Judgment and then on future dates as set by the Court. FJ § VII.E.1.

IX. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

Last but not least, the court addresses its retention of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was

explicit in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. that, where the government is entitled to

relief in a Section 2 case, the “court’s power” to order additional relief to remedy an earlier antitrust

violation “is clear,” even after the judgment period has passed. 391 U.S. 244, 251 (1968);

accord 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 325a (“[A] court’s involvement is not necessarily ended

once its decree is issued.”); id. ¶ 325c2 (“Antitrust decrees may reserve the court’s jurisdiction to

order additional or modified relief.” (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.

295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954))). Both parties’ proposals would

preserve this court’s jurisdiction accordingly.

Plaintiffs’ proposal that it be permitted to file suit against Google for a period of four years

after the expiration of the Final Judgment for any violations of the Final Judgment committed

during the judgment period is not, as Google argues, the impermissible creation of a cause of

action. See Google’s Br. at 38–39. It is simply a part of the court’s retention of its jurisdiction to

enable Plaintiffs to enforce the Final Judgment.

50

That said, the court will not determine now, as Plaintiffs propose, what Plaintiffs must

show to alter the judgment and to what standard Google will be held in response. Compare FJ

§ XI.A, with Pls.’ FPFJ § XI.A. The court will address those specifics if and when the time comes.

X. CONCLUSION

It bears repeating that “Google is a monopolist, and it has acted as one to maintain its

monopoly.” Google, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 32. In crafting the Final Judgment, the task of this court

was to “unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct, . . . deny to the defendant the fruits of its

statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in

the future,” Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 103 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), even if

the remedies ordered would “entail harsh consequences,” FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d

1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting E. I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 327). The terms of the Final

Judgment have been designed to do just that consistent with established Section 2 legal principles.

The Final Judgment accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: December 5, 2025 Amit P. Mehta

United States District Judge

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APPENDIX

I. JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs’ Proposal Google’s Proposal Final Judgment

The Court has jurisdiction over the This Court has jurisdiction over the This Court has jurisdiction over the

subject matter of this action and over subject matter of this action and over subject matter of this action and over

Google. Google LLC. Google LLC.

II. APPLICABILITY

Plaintiffs’ Proposal Google’s Proposal Final Judgment

This Final Judgment applies to Google This Final Judgment applies to Google This Final Judgment applies to Google

and to each of its officers, directors, and to each of its officers, directors, and to each of its officers, directors,

agents, employees, subsidiaries, agents, employees, subsidiaries, agents, employees, subsidiaries,

successors and assigns; and to all other successors, and assigns. successors, and assigns; and to all

persons in active concert or other persons in active concert or

participation with Google who have participation with Google who have

received actual notice of this Final received actual notice of this Final

Judgment by personal service or Judgment by personal service or

otherwise. otherwise.

III. PROHIBITORY INJUNCTIONS

Plaintiffs’ Proposal Google’s Proposal Final Judgment

A. Google shall not condition the A. Google shall not enter or A. Google shall not condition the

licensing of Google Play or any other maintain any agreement with a licensing of Google Play or any other

Google application on the distribution, manufacturer that conditions the Google application on the distribution,

preload, placement, display, use, or licensing of Google Play or any other preload, placement, display, use, or

license of the Google Search Google software application on that license of the Google Search

Application on any device sold in the manufacturer also distributing, Application on any device sold in the

United States. preloading, placing, displaying, using, United States.

or licensing the Google Search

Application on Covered Devices sold

in the United States.

B. Google shall not condition the B. Google shall not enter or B. Google shall not condition the

licensing of Google Play or any other maintain any agreement with a licensing of Google Play or any other

Google application on the distribution, manufacturer that conditions the Google application on the distribution,

preload, placement, display, use, or licensing of Google Play or any other preload, placement, display, use or

license of the Chrome Browser Google software application on that license of the Chrome Browser

Application on any device sold in the manufacturer also distributing, Application on any device sold in the

United States. preloading, placing, displaying, using, United States.

or licensing the Chrome Browser

Application on Covered Devices sold

in the United States.

C. Google shall not condition the C. Google shall not enter or C. Google shall not condition the

licensing of Google Play or any other maintain any agreement with a licensing of Google Play or any other

Google application on the distribution, manufacturer that conditions the Google application on the distribution,

preload, placement, display, use, or licensing of the Google Search preload, placement, display, use, or

52

license of the Google Assistant Application, the Chrome Browser license of the Google Assistant

Application on any device sold in the Application, or Google Play, on the Application on any device sold in the

United States. manufacturer also distributing, United States.

preloading, placing, displaying, using,

or licensing the Google Assistant

Application on Covered Devices sold

in the United States.

D. Google shall not condition the D. Google shall not enter or D. Google shall not condition the

licensing of Google Play or any other maintain any agreement with a licensing of Google Play or any other

Google application on the distribution, manufacturer that conditions the Google application on the distribution,

preload, placement, display, use, or licensing of the Google Search preload, placement, display, use, or

license of any Google GenAI Product Application, the Chrome Browser license of any Google GenAI Product

on any device sold in the United Application, or Google Play, on the on any device sold in the United

States. manufacturer also distributing, States.

preloading, placing, displaying, using,

or licensing Google GenAI Assistant

Application on Covered Devices sold

in the United States.

E. Google shall not condition E. Google shall not enter or E. Google shall not condition

(i) Consideration or (ii) the license of maintain any agreement with a (i) Consideration or (ii) the license of

Google Play or any Google software manufacturer or wireless carrier that Google Play or any Google software

application on a device manufacturer conditions (i) Consideration or (ii) the application on a device manufacturer

or wireless carrier refraining from license of Google Play or any Google or wireless carrier refraining from

developing, distributing, preloading, software application, on that developing, distributing, preloading,

placing, displaying, using, selling, or manufacturer or wireless carrier placing, displaying, using, selling, or

licensing any Third-Party General refraining from developing, licensing any Third-Party General

Search Service on any device sold in distributing, preloading, placing, Search Service on any device sold in

the United States. displaying, using, selling, or licensing the United States.

any Third-Party General Search

Service on Covered Devices sold in

the United States.

F. Google shall not condition F. Google shall not enter or F. Google shall not condition

(i) Consideration or (ii) the license of maintain any agreement with a (i) Consideration or (ii) the license of

Google Play or any Google software manufacturer or wireless carrier that Google Play or any Google software

application on a device manufacturer conditions (i) Consideration or (ii) the application on a device manufacturer

or wireless carrier refraining from license of Google Play or any Google or wireless carrier refraining from

developing, distributing, preloading, software application, on that developing, distributing, preloading,

placing, displaying, using, selling, or manufacturer or wireless carrier placing, displaying, using, selling, or

licensing any Third-Party Browser on refraining from developing, licensing any Third-Party Browser on

any device sold in the United States. distributing, preloading, placing, any device sold in the United States.

displaying, using, selling, or licensing

any Third-Party Browser on Covered

Devices sold in the United States.

G. Google shall not condition G. Google shall not enter or G. Google shall not condition

(i) Consideration or (ii) the license of maintain any agreement with a (i) Consideration or (ii) the license of

Google Play or any Google software manufacturer or wireless carrier that Google Play or any Google software

application on a device manufacturer conditions (i) Consideration or (ii) the application on a device manufacturer

or wireless carrier refraining from license of Google Play or any Google or wireless carrier refraining from

developing, distributing, preloading, software application, on that developing, distributing, preloading,

placing, displaying, using, selling, or manufacturer or wireless carrier placing, displaying, using, selling, or

53

licensing any Third-Party GenAI refraining from developing, licensing any Third-Party GenAI

Product on any device sold in the distributing, preloading, placing, Product on any device sold in the

United States. displaying, using, selling, or licensing United States.

any Third-Party GenAI Assistive

Service on Covered Devices sold in

the United States.

H. Google shall not condition the H. Google shall not enter or H. Google shall not condition the

payment for preload of, placement of, maintain any agreement with a payment for preload, placement, or

or assignment of an access point for manufacturer or wireless carrier that assignment of an access point for the

the Google Search Application for one conditions the payment for preload, Google Search Application for one

device on any other preload, placement, or assignment of an access device on any other preload,

placement, or assignment of an access point for the Google Search placement, or assignment of an access

point for the Google Search Application on the preload, placement, point for the Google Search

Application, the Chrome Browser or assignment of any other access Application, the Chrome Browser

Application, the Google Assistant point to any of Google Search, the Application, the Google Assistant

Application, or any Google GenAI Google Search Application, the Application, or any Google GenAI

Product for that device or any other Chrome Browser Application, the Product for that device or any other

device sold in the United States. Google Assistant Application, and/or a device sold in the United States.

Google GenAI Assistant Application

on Covered Devices sold in the United

States. For the avoidance of doubt,

Google shall only contract with such

partners with respect to such access

points on a device by device basis.

I. Google shall not condition the I. Google shall not enter or I. Google shall not condition the

payment for preload of, placement of, maintain any agreement with a payment for preload, placement, or

or assignment of an access point for manufacturer or wireless carrier that assignment of an access point for the

the Chrome Browser Application for conditions the payment for preload, Chrome Browser Application for one

one device on any other preload of, placement, or assignment of an access device on any other preload,

placement of, or assignment of an point for the Chrome Browser placement, or assignment of an access

access point for the Google Search Application on the preload, placement, point for the Google Search

Application, the Chrome Browser or assignment of any other access Application, the Chrome Browser

Application, the Google Assistant point to any of the Google Search Application, the Google Assistant

Application, or any Google GenAI Application, the Chrome Browser Application, or any Google GenAI

Product for that device or any other Application, the Google Assistant Product for that device or any other

device sold in the United States. Application, and/or a Google GenAI device sold in the United States.

Assistant Application on Covered

Devices sold in the United States. For

the avoidance of doubt, Google shall

only contract with such partners with

respect to such access points on a

device by device basis.

J. Google shall not condition the J. Google shall not enter or J. Google shall not condition the

payment for preload of, placement of, maintain any agreement with a payment for preload, placement, or

or assignment of an access point for manufacturer or wireless carrier that assignment of an access point for the

the Google Assistant Application or conditions the payment for preload, Google Assistant Application or any

any Google GenAI Product for one placement, or assignment of an access Google GenAI Product for one device

device on any other preload, point for the Google Assistant on any other preload, placement, or

placement, or assignment of an access Application or a Google GenAI assignment of an access point for the

point for the Google Search Assistant Application on the preload, Google Search Application, the

Application, the Chrome Browser placement, or assignment of any other Chrome Browser Application, the

54

Application, the Google Assistant access point to any of the Google Google Assistant Application, or any

Application, or any Google GenAI Search Application and/or the Chrome Google GenAI Product for that device

Product for that device or any other Browser Application on Covered or any other device sold in the United

device sold in the United States. Devices sold in the United States. For States.

the avoidance of doubt, Google shall

only contract with such partners with

respect to such access points on a

device by device basis.

K. Google shall not enter or K. Google shall not enter or K. Google shall not enter or

maintain any agreement requiring or maintain any agreement with a maintain any agreement requiring or

conditioning Consideration on the manufacturer or wireless carrier conditioning Consideration on the

distribution of, preload of, placement requiring the preload, placement, or distribution, preload, placement,

of, display of, use of, license of, or assignment of an access point on display, use, license, or assignment of

assignment of an access point for the Covered Devices in the United States an access point for the Google Search

Google Search Application, the to any of the Google Search Application, the Chrome Browser

Chrome Browser Application, the Application, the Chrome Browser Application, the Google Assistant

Google Assistant Application, or any Application, the Google Assistant Application, or any Google GenAI

Google GenAI Product in the United Application, and/or a Google GenAI Product in the United States unless the

States unless the agreement terminates Assistant Application for a period of agreement terminates no more than

no more than one year after the date it more than one year, unless the one year after the date it is entered.

is entered. agreement allows the manufacturer or

wireless carrier to terminate the

agreement on an annual basis and does

not charge a fee for terminating.

L. Google shall not condition L. Google shall not enter or L. Google shall not condition

(1) Consideration for a Browser maintain any agreement requiring a (1) Consideration for a Browser

Developer setting Google Search or Browser Developer to set Google Developer setting Google Search or

any Google GenAI Product as the Search as the Browser Default Search any Google GenAI Product as the

Default Search Engine or default Engine in a Third-Party Browser in the Default Search Engine or default

GenAI Product on any browser access United States unless the agreement GenAI Product on any browser access

point (including alternative modes (i) permits the Browser Developer on point (including alternative modes

such as Privacy Mode) on any Device an annual basis to set a different such as Privacy Mode) on any Device

on (2) the Browser Developer setting Default Search Engine in the United on (2) the Browser Developer setting

Google Search or any Google GenAI States for any Operating System Google Search or any Google GenAI

Product as the Default Search Engine Version and/or Privacy Mode offered Product as the Default Search Engine

or default GenAI Product on any other by the Browser Developer without or default GenAI Product on any other

browser access point on that same foregoing any payments attributable to browser access point on that same

Device or any other Device in the an Operating System Version or Device or any other Device in the

United States. Any agreement Privacy Mode where Google Search United States. Any agreement

containing a default condition remains set as the Default Search containing a default condition

permitted by this provision must Engine; and (ii) expressly permits the permitted by this provision must

expire after one year and must Browser Developer to promote any expire after one year and must

expressly permit the Browser Third-Party General Search Service or expressly permit the Browser

Developer to promote any Third-Party Third-Party GenAI Product in the Developer to promote any Third-Party

General Search Service and Third- United States. General Search Service and Third-

Party GenAI Product.1 Party GenAI Product.

1

Originally: “Google shall not enter or maintain any agreement requiring a Browser Developer to set Google Search as the Browser

Default Search Engine in a Third-Party Browser in the United States unless the agreement (i) applies to no more than one Operating

System Version and no more than one Privacy Mode, (ii) terminates no more than one year after the date it is entered, and (iii) expressly

55

M. Google shall not condition M. Google shall not enter or M. Google shall not condition

(1) Consideration for Apple setting maintain any agreement requiring (1) Consideration for Apple setting

Google Search or any Google GenAI Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) to set Google Google Search or any Google GenAI

Product as the Default Search Engine Search as the Default Search Engine in Product as the Default Search Engine

or default GenAI Product with respect the United States with respect to any or default GenAI Product with respect

to any proprietary Apple feature or proprietary Apple feature or to any proprietary Apple feature or

functionality, including Safari, Siri, functionality, including Siri and functionality, including Safari, Siri,

Spotlight, and any Privacy Mode Spotlight, unless the agreement Spotlight, and any Privacy Mode

within those products, on one Device complies with Section III.L above. within those products, on one Device

on (2) Apple setting Google Search or on (2) Apple setting Google Search or

any Google GenAI Product as the N. Google shall not enter or any Google GenAI Product as the

Default Search Engine or default maintain any agreement requiring Default Search Engine or default

GenAI Product with respect to any Apple to distribute any Google GenAI GenAI Product with respect to any

proprietary Apple feature or Assistant Application in any Apple proprietary Apple feature or

functionality on that same Device or web browser or on any Apple mobile functionality on that same Device or

any other Device in the United States. or desktop device in the United States any other Device in the United States.

Any agreement containing a default unless the agreement expressly Any agreement containing a default

condition permitted by this provision permits Apple to promote any Third- condition permitted by this provision

must expire after one year and must Party General Search Service or Third- must expire after one year and must

expressly permit Apple to promote any Party GenAI Product in the United expressly permit Apple to promote any

Third-Party General Search Service States. Third-Party General Search Service

and Third-Party GenAI Product.2 and Third-Party GenAI Product.

N. Google shall not enter or [No similar provision.] [No similar provision.]

maintain any exclusive contract

relating to the distribution of Google

Search, the Google Search

Application, the Chrome Browser

Application, the Google Assistant

Application, and any Google GenAI

Product in the United States.

[No similar provision.] O. Nothing in this Final [No similar provision.]

Judgment shall otherwise prohibit

Google from providing Consideration

to a manufacturer or wireless carrier

with respect to any Google product or

service in exchange for such entity’s

distribution, placement on any access

point, promotion, or licensing of that

Google product or service.

O. Nothing in this Final P. Nothing in this Final N. Nothing in this Final

Judgment shall prohibit Google from Judgment shall prohibit Google from Judgment shall prohibit Google from

permits the Browser Developer to promote any Third-Party General Search Service and Third-Party GenAI Product. For clarity, this

provision does not prohibit Google from negotiating multiple such agreements with a Browser Developer as long as no agreement is

conditioned on another.”

2

Originally: “Google shall not enter or maintain any agreement requiring Apple to set Google Search or any Google GenAI Product as

the Default Search Engine or default GenAI Product in the United States with respect to any proprietary Apple feature or functionality,

including Safari, Siri, and Spotlight, unless the agreement (i) applies to no more than one Operating System Version and no more than

one Privacy Mode, (ii) terminates no more than one year after the date it is entered, and (iii) expressly permits Apple to promote any

Third-Party General Search Service and Third-Party GenAI Product. For clarity, this provision does not prohibit Google from

negotiating multiple such agreements with Apple as long as no agreement is conditioned on another.”

56

distributing the Google Search distributing the Google Search distributing the Google Search

Application, the Google Assistant Application, the Google Assistant Application, the Google Assistant

Application, and any Google GenAI Application, and a Google GenAI Application, and any Google GenAI

Product through a single Application Assistant Application through a single Product through a single Application

Programming Kit (APK) as long as the Application Programming Kit (APK) Programming Kit (APK) as long as the

licensee has the option to disable end- as long as the licensee has the option to licensee has the option to disable end-

user access to any of those applications disable end-user access to any of those user access to any of those applications

and services that the licensee declines applications and services that the and services that the licensee declines

to license. licensee declines to license. to license.

IV. REQUIRED DISCLOSURES OF DATA

Plaintiffs’ Proposal Google’s Proposal Final Judgment

A. Google’s Search Index: A. Google’s Web Search Index: A. Google’s Web Search Index:

Within thirty (30) days of a Qualified For the term of this Final Judgment, Within thirty (30) days of a Qualified

Competitor’s certification pursuant to Google will make available, at Competitor’s certification pursuant to

Section IX.W, Google shall make Marginal Cost, to Qualified Section IX.V, unless granted additional

available to such Qualified Competitors the following data related time, Google shall make available, at

Competitor, at marginal cost, to to Google’s Web Search Index on a marginal cost, to Qualified

Qualified Competitors the following non-discriminatory basis while Competitors the following data related

data related to Google’s Search Index: safeguarding personal privacy and to Google’s Web Search Index:

1. for each document in the security: 1. for each document in the

Google Search Index, a unique 1. for each document in the Google Web Search Index, a unique

identifier (DocID) and another Google Web Search Index a unique identifier (DocID) and another

notation sufficient to denote all the identifier (DocID) and another notation sufficient to denote all the

documents Google considers notation sufficient to denote all the documents Google considers

duplicates of each other; documents Google considers duplicates of each other;

2. a DocID to URL map; and duplicates of each other; 2. a DocID to URL map; and

3. for each DocID, the (A) time 2. a DocID to URL map; and 3. for each DocID, the (A) time

that the URL was first seen, (B) time 3. for each DocID the following that the URL was first seen, (B) time

that the URL was last crawled, (C) set of associated data: (A) time that that the URL was last crawled, (C)

spam score, and (D) device-type the URL was first seen, (B) time that spam score, and (D) device-type

flag. the URL was last crawled, (C) spam flag.

This information shall be provided for score, and (D) device-type flag. The information shall be provided for

all websites in the full Search Index 4. This information must be all websites in the full Web Search

Google uses for searches on provided for all websites in the Web Index Google uses for searches on

Google.com, the Google Search Search Index Google uses for Google.com, the Google Search

Application, or any other current or searches on Google.com, the Google Application, or any future Google

future Google general search products. Search App, or future Google general search products. Nothing in

Nothing in Section IV is intended to general search products. Section IV is intended to transfer

transfer intellectual property rights of 5. Google must make this intellectual property rights of third

third parties to index users. information available to Qualified parties to index users.

Competitors on a one-time basis at or

around the time they are so certified

as a Qualified Competitor.

6. Nothing in this Section IV is

intended to transfer intellectual

property rights of third parties to

index users.

57

B. User-Side Data: For the term B. User-Side Data: For the term B. User-Side Data: For the term

of this Final Judgment, Google shall of this Final Judgment, Google will of this Final Judgment, Google shall

make available, at marginal cost, to make available, at Marginal Cost, to make available, at marginal cost, to

Qualified Competitors the following Qualified Competitors the following Qualified Competitors the following

User-side Data on a non- User-side Data on a non- User-side Data on a non-

discriminatory basis while discriminatory basis while discriminatory basis while

safeguarding personal privacy and safeguarding personal privacy and safeguarding personal privacy and

security: security: security:

1. User-side Data used to build, 1. User-side Data used to build, 1. User-side Data used to build,

create, or operate the GLUE create, or operate the GLUE create, or operate the GLUE

statistical model(s); and statistical model(s); and statistical model(s); and

2. User-side Data used to train, 2. User-side Data used to train, 2. User-side Data used to train,

build, or operate the RankEmbed build, or operate the RankEmbed build, or operate the RankEmbed

model(s). model(s). model(s).

Google shall make this data available 3. For the avoidance of doubt, Google shall make this data available

to Qualified Competitors at least “User-side Data” for purposes of to Qualified Competitors at least

twice, with the exact number and Section IV includes only the twice, with the exact number and

frequency of such disclosures to be underlying data, not the model itself frequency of such disclosures to be

determined by the Court after or any ranking signal or score, spam determined by the Court after

consultation with Plaintiffs and the score, information retrieval score, consultation with Plaintiffs and the

Technical Committee (TC). Any cap information satisfaction score, query Technical Committee (TC). Any cap

on the number of such disclosures interpretation information, query on the number of such disclosures

shall be informed, in part, by the utility suggestion information, query-based shall be informed, in part, by the utility

of the datasets disclosed after salient term, or document salient of the datasets disclosed after

appropriate privacy-enhancing term. appropriate privacy-enhancing

techniques have been applied. For 4. The number of times a techniques have been applied. For

clarity, this Section IV.B shall not Qualified Competitor may receive a clarity, this Section IV.B shall not

require disclosure of intellectual dataset will be capped by the Court require disclosure of intellectual

property or trade secrets, such as after consultation with the Technical property or trade secrets, such as

algorithms, ranking signals, or post- Committee. The cap on the number algorithms, ranking signals, or post-

trained LLMs. of such disclosures will be informed, trained LLMs.

in part, by the utility of the datasets

disclosed after appropriate privacy-

enhancing techniques have been

applied.

C. User-Side Data Sharing C. User-Side Data Sharing C. User-Side Data Sharing

Administration: Administration: These remedies are Administration:

intended to make this data available in

a way that provides suitable security

and privacy safeguards for the data the

Google must share.

1. Plaintiffs, in consultation with 1. Before this data specified in 1. Plaintiffs, in consultation with

the TC, shall promptly determine the Paragraph IV.B is shared with the TC, shall promptly determine the

appropriate User-side Data privacy Qualified Competitors, Google shall appropriate User-side Data privacy

and security safeguards to be applied apply adequate anonymization and and security safeguards to be applied

before Google shares the data privacy-enhancing techniques to before Google shares the data

specified in Section IV.B with ensure the data is anonymized and specified in Section IV.B with

Qualified Competitors. Google shall secured, while attempting to Qualified Competitors. Google shall

have up to six (6) months from the optimize its usefulness. have up to six (6) months from the

date that the Plaintiffs, in date that the Plaintiffs, in

58

consultation with the TC, determine 3. Google will have up to six (6) consultation with the TC, determine

such privacy and security safeguards months from the date that security such privacy and security safeguards

to implement the technology and and privacy safeguards are finally to implement the technology and

provide any notice necessary to determined to implement the provide any notice necessary to

comply with this Section IV, and technology and provide any notice comply with this Section IV, and

Google shall be deemed to have necessary to comply with this Google shall be deemed to have

implemented the technology once Section IV.C.2. implemented the technology once

Plaintiffs, in consultation with the Plaintiffs, in consultation with the

TC, determine that the technology, TC, determine that the technology,

including privacy and security including privacy and security

safeguards, is fully functional. safeguards, is fully functional.

2. Google shall provide 2. Google must provide 2. Google shall provide

sufficient information about each sufficient information about each sufficient information about each

dataset such that Qualified dataset such that Qualified dataset such that Qualified

Competitors can reasonably Competitors can reasonably Competitors can reasonably

understand what it contains, understand what it contains, understand what it contains,

including but not limited to a including but not limited to a including but not limited to a

description of what the dataset description of what the dataset description of what the dataset

contains, any sampling methodology contains, any sampling methodology contains, any sampling methodology

used to create the dataset, and any used to create the dataset, and any used to create the dataset, and any

anonymization or privacy-enhancing anonymization or privacy-enhancing anonymization or privacy-enhancing

technique that was applied. technique that was applied. technique that was applied.

Plaintiffs, in consultation with the Plaintiffs, in consultation with the Plaintiffs, in consultation with the

TC, may impose restrictions on what Technical Committee, may TC, may impose restrictions on what

information Google shares under this recommend restrictions on what information Google shares under

Section IV.C.2 for the purposes of information Google shares under this this Section IV.C.2 for the purposes

(i) promoting data privacy and Paragraph IV.C.2 for the purposes of of (i) promoting data privacy and

security and (ii) ensuring privacy and (i) promoting data privacy and security and (ii) ensuring privacy

security safeguards are effectively security and (ii) ensuring privacy and security safeguards are

applied. and security safeguards are effectively applied.

effectively applied.

[No similar provision.] 4. The data specified in 3. The data specified in Sections

Paragraph IV.A and B will be shared IV.A and B will be shared pursuant

pursuant to a license governing use. to a license governing use. The

The terms of the license shall include terms of the license shall include a

a requirement that the Qualified requirement that the Qualified

Competitor commit not to share or Competitor commit not to share or

sell the datasets, and shall use the sell the datasets unless authorized by

datasets for the exclusive purpose of the Technical Committee or the

serving users located in the United Court and shall use the datasets for

States through a General Search the exclusive purpose of serving

Engine, Search Text Ads, and/or a users through a General Search

Third-Party GenAI Product. Engine, Search Text Ads, and/or a

Third-Party GenAI Product. Within

six (6) months of the Effective Date

of this Final Judgment, Plaintiffs and

the Technical Committee, with input

from Google, shall create and submit

to the Court a template for such

license.

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V. REQUIRED SYNDICATION OF SEARCH RESULTS

Plaintiffs’ Proposal Google’s Proposal Final Judgment

A. Search Syndication License: A. Search Syndication: Google A. Search Syndication License:

Google shall take steps sufficient to must take steps sufficient to make Google shall take steps sufficient to

make available to any Qualified available to any Qualified Competitor make available to any Qualified

Competitor, on financial terms no a syndication agreement whose term Competitor, on financial terms no

worse than those offered to any other will be five (5) years from the date worse than those offered to any other

user of Google’s search syndication Google’s search syndication service, user of Google’s search syndication

products, a syndication license whose as set forth in this Final Judgment, is products, a syndication license whose

term will be five (5) years from the made available to the Qualified term will be five (5) years from the

date the license is signed, and which Competitor, unless there are fewer than date the license is signed, and which

shall require Google, via real-time five (5) years remaining before shall require Google, via real-time

API(s), to make the following expiration of the term of the Final API(s), to make the following

information and data available in Judgment, in which case the term will information and data available in

response to each query issued or be the remainder of the term of the response to each query issued or

submitted by a Qualified Competitor: Final Judgment. Google must make submitted by a Qualified Competitor:

1. both desktop and mobile available under the syndication 1. both desktop and mobile

versions of the ranked organic web agreement the following information versions of the ranked organic web

search results obtained from and data in response to each query search results obtained from

crawling the web; submitted by a Qualified Competitor: crawling the web;

2. the user-facing query- 1. Both desktop and mobile 2. the user-facing query-

rewriting features that Google versions of the ranked organic web rewriting features that Google

provides under any of its current search results obtained from provides under any of its current

search syndication agreements as of crawling the web (i.e., the ten blue search syndication agreements as of

the date of entry of this Final links) that Google provides under the date of entry of this Final

Judgment, including user-facing current standard search syndication Judgment, including user-facing

Search Features that enable query agreements; Search Features that enable query

correction, modification, or 2. the user-facing query- correction, modification, or

expansion; and rewriting features that Google expansion; and

3. the Local, Maps, Video, provides under current standard 3. the Local, Maps, Video,

Images, and Knowledge Panel search syndication agreements, Images, and Knowledge Panel

Search Feature content that Google including user-facing features that Search Feature content that Google

provides under any of its current enable query correction, provides under any of its current

search syndication agreements as of modification, or expansion; and search syndication agreements as of

the date of the entry of this Final 3. the Local, Maps, Video, the date of entry of this Final

Judgment. Images, and Knowledge Panel Judgment.

search feature content that Google

provides under current standard

search syndication agreements. For

the avoidance of doubt, Google is

not required to syndicate content in a

manner inconsistent with its third-

party content license agreements.

B. Search Syndication License B. Search Syndication B. Search Syndication License

Terms: The search syndication license Agreement Terms: The search Terms: The search syndication license

specified in Section V.A shall have the syndication agreement must have the in Section V.A shall have the following

following additional features: following additional features: additional features:

60

1. Google shall make syndicated 1. Google will make syndicated 1. Google shall make syndicated

content available via an API. content available via an API. content available via an API.

2. Google shall provide 2. Google will provide Qualified 2. Google shall provide

responses with latency and reliability Competitors with latency and Qualified Competitors with latency

functionally equivalent to what any reliability functionally equivalent to and reliability functionally

other user of Google’s search what Google ordinarily provides to equivalent to what any other user of

syndication products would receive other users of Google’s search Google’s search syndication

as of the date of entry of this Final syndication products with respect to products would receive as of the date

Judgment. queries originating in the United of entry of this Final Judgment. For

States. For the avoidance of doubt, the avoidance of doubt, Google’s

Google’s obligations do not extend

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