Guevera

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SAMANTHA GUEVERA,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM

v. AND ORDER

25-CV-4061-SJB-JMW

THE VILLAGE OF FREEPORT, et al.,

Defendants.

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BULSARA, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Samantha Guevera (“Guevera”) seeks a preliminary injunction requiring

that Defendants release her vehicle that the Village of Freeport (“Freeport”) seized more

than four months ago. In the alternative, Guevera requests an immediate hearing

requiring Freeport to establish its right to continue to possess the vehicle. For the

reasons explained herein, the motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Guevera filed this case on July 23, 2025 against Freeport, the Chief of the Freeport

Police Department Michael Smith, a John Doe police officer, as well as JCB & Sons, Inc.

(d/b/a Non-Stop Towing & Recovery) and its owner Jerome Bonomo (collectively,

“Defendants”). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1). She filed an Amended Complaint on August 7,

2025. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 18). The Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief and

damages for the unlawful seizure of her vehicle. (Id. ¶ 1). The following allegations are

drawn from the Amended Complaint and motion papers.

Freeport has a “Scofflaw Policy” (the “Policy”) under which its police

department conducts warrantless seizures of motor vehicles with outstanding unpaid

parking tickets.1 (Id. ¶¶ 21–22). Guevera alleges that Freeport lacks a process for pre-

or post- seizure hearings to challenge the seizure of a vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24). Though,

at the same time, Guevera cites to the Village Code, which provides that “within 10

days of the impoundment, removal or seizure [Freeport] shall provide written notice . . .

of the right to a retention hearing.” (See Vill. Code § 155-107(A), attached to Pl.’s Mot. in

Supp. of Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s PI Mot.”) as Ex. B, Dkt. No. 41-3 at 2). Guevera also

submitted one of the notices she received informing her of her right to such a hearing.2

(See Notice dated Aug. 22, 2025, attached to Pl.’s PI Mot. as Ex. C, Dkt. No. 41-4 at 2).

Freeport effectuates the seizures through JCB & Sons, a local towing and storage

business. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 29).

On July 18, 2025, an unidentified officer with the Freeport Village Police

Department seized Guevera’s car, which was by her apartment complex, because of

1 Freeport’s Policy (or its substantially similar predecessor) has been the subject

of two federal lawsuits, as both parties note. In Toyota Lease Trust v. Village of Freeport,

the Court held that Freeport’s Scofflaw Policy, as applied, violated plaintiff’s Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the seizure was warrantless, with no

applicable exception, and because there was no pre-deprivation notice. No. 20-CV-

2207, 2023 WL 4443992, at *8–*10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2023), report and recommendation

adopted in part, 2023 WL 4449333 (Mar. 30, 2023). No declaratory or injunctive relief was

issued in the case, and a facial challenge was not resolved either. Higgs v. Village of

Freeport also found that the Policy, as applied, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights of the plaintiff there, but the Court declined to issue declaratory

relief. (See Report & Recommendation, Higgs v. Vill. of Freeport, No. 23-CV-3943

(E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025), Dkt. No. 48 at 13, 21; Order dated Sep. 22, 2025, Higgs, No. 23-

CV-3943 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2025) (adopting R. & R. in part)).

2 Guevera only includes a notice dated August 22, 2025 with her motion. But

Defendants, in their opposition, report that Guevera was first mailed a notice on July 28,

2025, which was delivered to her on July 30, 2025. (See Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s

Mot. for Prelim. Inj. filed Dec. 1, 2025 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 42 at 2; Notice and

Tracking, attached to Defs.’ Opp’n as Ex. C, Dkt. No. 42-4 at 2–4).

unpaid traffic tickets. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26). Guevera, citing issues receiving mail at her

apartment, says she had no knowledge of any outstanding tickets. (Id. ¶ 27). The

officer transferred possession of the vehicle to JCB & Sons for towing and storage. (Id.

¶ 28). Both Freeport and JCB & Sons have since demanded payment and liability

releases to recover the car. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 38, 41). Both have also threated to “acquire title”

and sell the vehicle if Guevera fails to pay. (Id. ¶ 42).

Guevera challenges the seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment violations, (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66–88), and under the New York Constitution,

(id. ¶¶ 89–90). She also asserts, against all Defendants, a claim for a declaratory

judgment that their conduct is unconstitutional and for damages and attorney’s fees.

(Id. ¶¶ 91–96). Finally, she brings a separate claim for conversion against JCB & Sons

and Bonomo, pursuant to which she asks for punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 97–102).

On November 25, 2025, Guevera filed a motion for a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”) and preliminary injunction requiring the return of the vehicle. (Pl.’s PI Mot. at

1). In her motion, Guevera reports that she submitted multiple requests for a hearing,

first on September 2, 2025 and then on October 7, 2025. (Id. at 2–3). Freeport scheduled

a hearing for October 17, 2025,3 though by that point, Guevera had lost her job, since she

could not commute to work. (Id. at 3). As a further consequence of her lost income, she

and her two children are at risk of eviction and homelessness. (Id.). The hearing officer

3 Guevera received a notice of her right to a hearing on August 22, 2025, and

requested one on September 2, 2025, but did not receive one until October 17, 2025, a

timeline that Defendants do not contest. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 8). The Village Code that both

parties cite requires a hearing be commenced within 21 days from the time the notice of

seizure is sent, which it appears was not honored. Vill. Code § 155-107(B)(4).

found that Guevera had seven outstanding unpaid parking tickets on her 2011 Jeep

Grand Cherokee, all issued in less than a three-month span. (Decision by Hr’g Officer

dated Oct. 30, 2025, attached to Pl.’s PI Mot. as Ex. A, Dkt. No. 41-2 at 2). The officer

further concluded that those tickets were validly issued and that the seizure of her

vehicle was proper, specifically noting that Guevera “does not contest receipt or notice

of these parking violations.” (Id.) But the officer lowered the amount of fees Guevera

owed for the towing and storage to $ 746.64, since the vehicle was not parked in a

location that posed a safety hazard and had a current registration. (Id.). Defendants

note that the amount originally due as of the date of the hearing was $ 7,371.00. (Defs.’

Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. filed Dec. 1, 2025 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), Dkt. No.

42 at 2). Guevera alleges that the hearing officer was not a neutral arbiter, “but merely

an agent of” Freeport. (Pl.’s PI Mot. at 3). She also reports that she is unwilling to

execute the release of liability Freeport requires as a condition of the return of her

vehicle. (Id. at 4).

The Court denied the TRO request and ordered briefing on the preliminary

injunction. (Order dated Nov. 25, 2025). Defendants submitted an opposition on

December 1, 2025. (See Defs.’ Opp’n).

LEGAL STANDARD

“[A] preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of

right.’” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)); Daileader v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London

Syndicate 1861, 96 F.4th 351, 356 (2d Cir. 2024). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a

party must clearly show “(1) irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the

merits or both serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships decidedly

favoring the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the public

interest.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59,

79 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32,

37 (2d Cir. 2018)). A party must make a “clear showing,” to obtain “one of the most

drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies.” Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v.

Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted).

Preliminary injunctions may be “mandatory” or “prohibitory.” N. Am. Soccer

League, 883 F.3d at 36. “Prohibitory injunctions maintain the status quo pending

resolution of the case; mandatory injunctions alter it.” Id. at 36–37 (citing Tom Doherty

Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995)). The status quo in the

context of a preliminary injunction is “the last actual, peaceable uncontested status

which preceded the pending controversy.” Mastrio v. Sebelius, 768 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.

2014) (per curiam) (quoting LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994)). A party

moving for a mandatory injunction, or an injunction that “will provide the movant with

substantially all the relief sought,” which “cannot be undone even if the defendant

prevails at a trial on the merits” must satisfy a heightened legal standard. Yang v.

Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotations and citation omitted). The

movant must both “(1) make a strong showing of irreparable harm, and (2) demonstrate

a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” id. (quotations and citations

omitted), as opposed to merely establishing irreparable harm and either a likelihood of

success or both a serious question as to the merits and decidedly prevailing on the

balance of hardships.

DISCUSSION

“Irreparable harm is ‘the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a

preliminary injunction.’” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 233–34 (2d

Cir. 1999) (quoting Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.

1983)); JTH Tax, LLC v. Agnant, 62 F.4th 658, 672 (2d Cir. 2023). “In the absence of a

showing of irreparable harm, a motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.”

Rodriguez, 175 F.3d at 234. Irreparable harm is an “injury that is neither remote nor

speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of

monetary damages.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 660 (2d

Cir. 2015) (quoting Forest City Daly Hous., Inc. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153

(2d Cir. 1999)). And a “plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that . . .

[it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter, 555

U.S. at 20. This is a “substantial” burden. Daileader, 96 F.4th at 358.

Guevera argues that “the Supreme Court has presumed irreparable harm” for

constitutional claims. (Pl.’s PI Mot. at 7–8 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373

(1976)). As the Second Circuit recently clarified, the holding of Elrod is not so broad.

See Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rts. v. Lamont, 153 F.4th 213, 248 (2d Cir. 2025) (“To satisfy [the

irreparable harm] requirement, however, Plaintiffs argue only that a ‘violation of

constitutional rights per se constitutes irreparable injury.’ This general assertion is

incorrect.” (citation omitted)). “To be sure, [the Second Circuit has] presumed

irreparable harm for alleged deprivations of certain constitutional rights,” such as

Fourth Amendment violations. Id. (citing Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212

F.3d 738, 744 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting irreparable harm presumed when plaintiffs alleged

deprivations under Fourth and Eighth Amendments)); e.g., Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d

73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]e agree with the district court—given the fundamental right

involved, namely, the right to be free from unreasonable searches—that Covino has

sufficiently demonstrated for preliminary injunction purposes that he may suffer

irreparable harm arising from a possible deprivation of his constitutional rights.”). “But

the Supreme Court has never applied this presumption outside the First Amendment

context.” Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rts., 153 F.4th at 248; see also 11A Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2025) (“Courts have

largely rejected presumptions of irreparable harm except in the very narrow context of

first amendment challenges. . . . [W]hen there is an alleged deprivation of a

constitutional right to free speech or freedom of religion, many courts find that no

further showing of irreparable injury is necessary. This principle has not (for the most

part) and ought not be extended beyond the first amendment context.”); cf. Tripathy v.

Lockwood, No. 22-0949, 2022 WL 17751273, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2022) (“The district

court erred in relying on Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985) and

Majorica, S.A. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 762 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)—both

intellectual property cases—for the proposition that Tripathy’s delay in seeking

enforcement of his rights was by itself sufficient to deny his motion for preliminary

injunction. Rather, the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of

time, is unquestionably considered irreparable injury for the purposes of a preliminary

injunction.” (quotations omitted)).

And even where a party has asserted that a presumption is appropriate, the

Second Circuit has not applied it axiomatically. See Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rts., 153 F.4th at

248 (declining to decide whether the plaintiffs established irreparable harm in Second

Amendment context). In the end, it is a presumption, not an immutable finding of

irreparable harm. See id. And “any such presumption of irreparable harm is

inoperative if the plaintiff has delayed either in bringing suit or in moving for

preliminary injunctive relief.” Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., 60 F.3d 964, 968

(2d Cir. 1995); e.g., Williams v. County of San Diego, No. 17-CV-0815, 2020 WL 7318125, at

*5–*6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (applying presumption of irreparable harm to alleged

Fourth Amendment violation, but finding that plaintiffs’ delay “undermines the

immediacy of any harm” and, “[i]n fact, it affirmatively weighs against a finding that

imminent harm is likely”). Accordingly, the Court presumes that a Fourth Amendment

violation garners a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm and evaluates whether

Defendants have overcome it by demonstrating Guevera’s delay in seeking relief. The

Court separately analyzes whether her injury is “actual and imminent,” Schneiderman,

787 F.3d at 660, and remediable by monetary damages.

First, Guevera’s delay in moving for injunctive relief weighs against the

presumption that the harm is irreparable. “A district court should generally consider

delay in assessing irreparable harm,” Tom Doherty, 60 F.3d at 39, because a preliminary

injunction implies an “urgent need for speedy action to protect the plaintiff[‘s]

rights,” Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d at 276. Delay ”indicate[s] an absence of the

kind of irreparable harm required to support a preliminary injunction.” Id. Sufficient

delay may “preclude the granting of preliminary injunctive relief,” entirely. Tough

Traveler, 60 F.3d at 968 (quoting Majorica, S.A. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 762 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir.

1985)).

“[T]he length of delay is measured from the time the plaintiff originally learned

of the alleged violation or is put on notice thereof[.]” Two Hands IP LLC v. Two Hands

Am., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 3d 290, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Tough Traveler, 60 F.3d at 968).

Here, the delay, measured from the date of the deprivation, the seizure of Guevera’s car

on July 18, 2025, is more than four months. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25). Guevera also waited

more than five weeks after receipt of the first notice of her right to a retention hearing to

request one from Freeport, (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2), despite having already filed this lawsuit.

This “failure to act sooner undercuts the sense of urgency that ordinarily accompanies a

motion for preliminary relief and suggests that there is, in fact, no irreparable injury.”

Tough Traveler, 60 F.3d at 968. And there is no explanation from Guevera in the record

here that could explain or excuse this delay. See Monowise Ltd. Corp. v. Ozy Media, Inc.,

17-CV-8028, 2018 WL 2089342, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018) (collecting cases denying

preliminary injunctions in circumstances of unexplained delays of two or three

months).

Even were the Court to assume Guevera has a newfound urgency because of

changed circumstances—namely, the job she lost that spiraled into other consequences

of financial instability—the delay remains. Guevera’s brief and accompanying affidavit

are unfortunately lacking in necessary detail as to why or when she lost her job. As best

the Court can surmise, Guevera may have lost her job sometime between September 2,

2025 and October 7, 2025. (Pl.’s PI Mot. at 3). At minimum, Guevera waited seven

weeks to move for a preliminary injunction after she lost her job. At most, she waited

almost three months. Nor has she provided any details about any potential eviction.

These details are necessary to determine a host of issues, including whether, despite the

seizure of her car some months ago, the consequences of the seizure only became more

serious recently, and whether the consequences are traceable to the seizure of her car or

some other factor. But none have been provided.

In any event, the unexplained nearly two-month (and possibly four-month)

delay remains sufficient to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm. “There is no

bright-line rule for how much delay is too much, but courts in this Circuit ‘typically

decline to grant preliminary injunctions in the face of unexplained delays of more than

two months.’” Monowise Ltd. Corp., 2018 WL 2089342, at *2 (quoting Gidatex, S.r.L. v.

Campaniello Imps., Ltd., 13 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)) (collecting cases); Weight

Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Luigino’s, Inc., 423 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We have found

delays of as little as ten weeks sufficient to defeat the presumption of irreparable harm

that is essential to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”); e.g., Silber v. Barbara’s

Bakery, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 2d 432, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“In the four months after Plaintiffs

initiated the instant action, Plaintiffs were neither unaware of, nor were they actively

pursuing, their purported right to enjoin Defendant . . . . Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not

qualify for the limited exception to the general rule that delay destroys a presumption

of irreparable harm.”).

The absence of facts that could explain the apparent delay also demonstrate that

any injury is not imminent. Rodriguez, 175 F.3d at 234–35 (explaining that imminence is

a “principle element” for obtaining preliminary relief: “the harm must be so imminent

as to be irreparable if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm”); Jayaraj v.

Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]rreparable harm is measured in terms of the

harm arising during the interim between the request for an injunction and final

disposition of the case on the merits[.]”). Guevera provides the Court no information

about the imminence of any future injury and provides instead only conclusory general

assertions. (See Pl.’s PI Mot. at 3 (“Her loss of employment has also caused significant

financial instability, as she is now at risk of eviction[.]”); Aff. of Samantha Guevera in

Supp. of Prelim. Inj. dated Nov. 24, 2025, attached to Pl.’s PI Mot. as Attach. 8, Dkt. No.

41-8 ¶ 11 (“As a result of the financial strain of not having a car, my living situation has

become strenuous and I may not be able to stay in my apartment much longer.”)).

Setting aside whether these consequences are causally linked to the constitutional

violations, without any further detail as to when or even if she may face eviction, she

cannot show that continued deprivation of her car imposes “actual and imminent”

injury. Schneiderman, 787 F.3d at 660; e.g., Oliva v. Brookwood Coram I, LLC, No. 14-CV-

2513, 2016 WL 3637010, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2016) (“[B]ecause plaintiff is not now

facing any realistic prospect of homelessness sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm

necessary to support an order of preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff cannot show

irreparable harm at this time.”) (adopting report and recommendation); Byng v. Kelly,

No. 22-CV-1406, 2023 WL 2206547, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023) (“The mere threat of

proceedings that might possibly lead to plaintiff’s eviction at some unknown time in the

future does not suffice to show irreparable harm.”), report and recommendation adopted,

2023 WL 2573271 (Mar. 20, 2023).

Finally, Guevera’s constitutional injury is remediable by damages, and thus

injunctive relief is not appropriate.4 JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75, 79

(2d Cir. 1990) (“Irreparable injury is one that cannot be redressed through a monetary

award. Where money damages are adequate compensation a preliminary injunction

should not issue.”). “Monetary compensation need only be adequate for preliminary

relief to be unwarranted, not perfect.” St. Joseph’s Hosp. Health Ctr. v. Am. Anesthesiology

of Syracuse, P.C., 131 F.4th 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2025) (quotations omitted). Defendants

argue that Guevera’s injury—the seizure of her vehicle, plus any fees required to

recover it—are compensable by a damages award, (Defs.’ Opp’n at 6), and the Court

agrees. “In cases alleging constitutional injury, a strong showing of a constitutional

deprivation that results in noncompensable damages ordinarily warrants a finding of

irreparable harm.” Kane v. De Blasio, 19 F.4th 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam)

(quotation omitted). “It is well settled . . . that adverse employment consequences, like

4 As the Court has already explained, to the extent Guevera claims that the injury

in this case is the loss of her job or financial instability, those are too unsupported,

speculative, or causally attenuated to constitute injury tied to the seizure of her vehicle

or attendant deprivation of due process. In any event, those injuries are compensable.

Kane v. De Blasio, 19 F.4th 152, 171 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (explaining that lost

income is an economic harm that is compensable with money damages).

the loss of income accompanying a suspension without pay, are not the type of harm

that usually warrants injunctive relief because economic harm resulting from

employment actions is typically compensable with money damages.” Id. at 171

(quotations omitted); e.g., Silber, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (“In light of Plaintiffs’ repeated

references to the ‘premium price’ garnered by Defendants . . . , as well as Plaintiffs’

explicit prayer for compensatory damages, the Court concludes Plaintiffs may be

adequately compensated through an award of money damages.”); Schulder v. Hooker,

No. 08-CV-3052, 2008 WL 4862461, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2008) (“[T]here is . . .

absolutely no showing that she could not be made whole by monetary damages for any

loss of business suffered.”). And Guevera’s appeal to a dissipating asset case involving

real property in inapposite. There is no suggestion that even if her vehicle is sold—

which Defendants note is unlikely, though they do not commit to refraining from sale—

she could be appropriately compensated through monetary relief, since there is no

suggestion that her vehicle is “a unique piece of property in which [she] has an

unquantifiable interest.” Lost Lake Holdings LLC v. Town of Forestburgh, No. 22-CV-

10656, 2023 WL 8947154, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2023); e.g., Perry v. Perry, No. 12-CV-

5727, 2012 WL 12875462, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2012) (“Plaintiff has not demonstrated

any irreparable harm. Rather, these claims relate to money, financial instruments, or

replaceable personal property.”).

CONCLUSION

Because the Court concludes Guevera has not shown the necessary irreparable

harm to secure a preliminary injunction, the Court need not resolve whether the

heightened standard of a prohibitive injunction applies here, nor the likelihood of

success on the merits or the balance of hardships. See St. Joseph’s Hosp. Health Ctr., 131

F.4th at 108 (“Because NAPA has failed to show that it will suffer irreparable harm, we

do not consider its arguments as to the other preliminary injunction factors.”).

Therefore, the motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. The request for an

immediate hearing is also denied, since that is just another means of requesting

preliminary relief, which is unwarranted, for the reasons explained.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara

SANKET J. BULSARA

United States District Judge

Date: December 4, 2025

Central Islip, New York