Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SALEEM R. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against - 25-CV-5993 (PKC) (SDE)

STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Defendants.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff Saleem R. Williams, proceeding pro se, filed this action

against Defendants, challenging a “criminal action initiated by the State of New York under the

alleged docket number CR-000340-25-RI” based on a “motor vehicle stop and subsequent arrest”

on January 13, 2025. (Compl., Dkt. 1, at ECF1 4.) Plaintiff seeks to have the Court dismiss the

criminal action because the “alleged offenses occurred outside the territorial limits of the State of

New York.” (Id. at ECF 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have taken “private property

under duress without just compensation or consent,” which constitutes a breach of trust. (See id.

at ECF 2.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants “are therefore liable” for damages and penalties

arising from unlawful restraint, illegal arrest, excessive bail, placing of improper liens, and

deprivation of property. (See id. at ECF 2, 11–12.) As support, Plaintiff attaches a “contract in

admiralty jurisdiction,” which provides that he is a “Vessel in Commerce” that was “initially

created as a trust.” (Id. at ECF 8–9.) In that document, Plaintiff asserts “that the IRS, & the SSA,2

1 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing

system and not the document’s internal pagination.

2 The Court presumes that these are references to the Internal Revenue Service and the

Social Security Administration.

and the federal courts have willfully been making injurious ‘presumptions’ which prejudice [his]

Constitutional rights by trying to associate [him] with the ‘idems sonans[,’] which is the all caps

version of [his] Christian name which is in fact a trust previously associated with a ‘public office.’”

(Id. at ECF 8.) The document further provides that Plaintiff “revokes all permissions to the

Government and/or any political subdivisions/Organizations to use [the] copyrighted TRUST

name[d] SALEEM RONALD WILLIAMS JR. TRUST or trust in any fashion except by explicit

written request/order in direction otherwise.” (Id. at ECF 9.)

Plaintiff applied to waive the filing fees by filing an application to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”). (IFP Mot., Dkt. 2.) On October 30, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request

to proceed IFP with leave to file a Long Form IFP application or pay the filing fee. (Mem. &

Order, Dkt. 4.) On November 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Long Form IFP application. (Long Form

IFP, Dkt. 5.) For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, but

dismisses the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and frivolousness.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A court may dismiss a pro se action

sua sponte under certain circumstances. A court shall dismiss an IFP action under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) where it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” An action is “frivolous” when “the ‘factual contentions are clearly

baseless,’ such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy,” or where “the claim is

‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’” See Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); Scanlon v. Vermont, 423 F. App’x 78, 79 (2d

Cir. 2011) (summary order); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (“[A]

finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the

irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to

contradict them.”). Separately, a district court must dismiss a pro se complaint sua sponte where

it determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).

At the same time, it is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards

than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and the Court is required to read a plaintiff’s pro se complaint

liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9–10 (1980); McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the

Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2017). At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court

must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

DISCUSSION

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for two reasons. First, the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenge to his ongoing state criminal proceeding. In Younger v.

Harris, the Supreme Court emphasized that federal courts should “abstain from taking jurisdiction

over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.”

Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971)). This noninterference, called Younger abstention, is

mandatory where “(1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is

implicated in that proceeding; and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate

opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims.” Id.; Grieve v. Tamerin,

269 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2001). When Younger abstention applies, the federal court is stripped

of subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. See Diamond “D” Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 197;

Weiss v. New York, No. 22-CV-2326, 2024 WL 2837623, at *2 (2d Cir. June 5, 2024) (summary

order).

Younger abstention applies here. First, according to Plaintiff, a criminal case is pending

against him under Docket No. CR-000340-25-RI. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at ECF 4.) Second, New

York has an important state interest in enforcing its criminal laws, including traffic laws. See

Parson v. Barrett, No. 14-CV-1431 (DNH) (RFT), 2015 WL 5055279, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 21,

2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 5062363 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2015);

Johnson v. Yonkers City Ct., No. 22-CV-0049 (LTS), 2022 WL 1004180, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,

2022). And third, Plaintiff has not articulated any reason why his constitutional and jurisdictional

claims cannot be raised in the state court proceedings. In particular, Plaintiff has not alleged any

facts that would support an inference of “bad faith, harassment[,] or any other unusual

circumstance that would call for equitable relief” in connection with his state court case. Diamond

“D” Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 198 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54). Therefore, the Court must

abstain as Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the pending criminal action. See Matava v. CTPPS, LLC,

No. 22-CV-242 (CSH), 2022 WL 462396, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2022) (dismissing an IFP

complaint under Younger); Parson, 2015 WL 5055279, at *3 (same); Mercado v. Orange Cnty.

Legal Aid Soc’y, No. 19-CV-11904 (CM), 2020 WL 635579, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2020)

(same).

Second, the Court must dismiss the Complaint because its allegations pertaining to

Plaintiff’s “trust” are frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Generously construed, Plaintiff’s

Complaint presents a series of documents that purport to give him a right to be free from

government interference and impute penalties on the Government for its alleged violations of his

constitutional rights. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at ECF 8–15, 29–42.) But these documents are rife

with nonsensical, unconnected statements, such as: (1) “Since the birth of the Undersigned, the

Government has utilized the credit and future earning potential of the Undersigned, establishing

and operating a Private Offset Account through the use of the Vessel in Commerce, SALEEM

RONALD WILLIAMS JR. TRUST without the knowledge, consent, or permission of the

Undersigned acting to the detriment of the beneficiary Saleem-Ronald: Williams Jr.,” (id. at

ECF 9); (2) “the Undersigned has the right to appeal to a Twenty Five sovereign People Magna

Carta Grand Jury for the restoration of property, liberties, or rights of which The Undersigned has

been dispossessed by an Oppressing Government or its Representatives,” (id. at ECF 14 (internal

quotation marks omitted)); (3) “[t]he US Judges and US Attorneys are actually employees of the

IMF and have [been] expatriated out of the United States. . . . [and] are now unregistered foreign

agents,” (id. at ECF 27); and (4) “After finding the alleged ‘Defendant’ guilty, the court clerks sell

the judgments to the Federal Courts. Since the Defendant is a ‘decedent’, the court officials

consider themselves as a beneficiary,” (id. at ECF 25). Thus, even under a liberal reading,

Plaintiff’s allegations are wholly incredible, irrational, and appear to be the product of delusion.

See Bussie v. Bharara, No. 16-CV-1342 (MKB), 2016 WL 4468191, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,

2016) (dismissing a complaint as frivolous where a plaintiff made unrelated and disconnected

statements); Singleton v. New York, No. 24-CV-2208 (RA), 2024 WL 1962853, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.

May 2, 2024) (dismissing as frivolous a complaint that contained “incomprehensible” legal

jargon).

LEAVE TO AMEND DENIED

Generally, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without . . . granting leave to

amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim

might be stated.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Chavis v.

Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)). But a court has inherent power to dismiss without

leave to amend or replead “where the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on its

face,” see Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988), or where amendment would

otherwise be futile, Hill v. Curcione, 657 F. 3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011). Because the Court

concludes that granting leave to amend here would be futile, the Court declines to do so.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and as barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. The Court certifies

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good

faith and therefore denies IFP status for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case,

as well as mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: December 4, 2025

Brooklyn, New York